

The Reconquest Kings of Portugal

Political and Cultural Reorientation on the Medieval Frontier

Stephen Lay



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on the Medieval Frontier**

Stephen Lay

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For my parents and for Yue Siew

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Abbreviations

ADA	‘Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis’, ed. M. Blöcker-Walter.
APV	‘Annales Portugalenses veteres’, ed. P. David.
CAI	<i>Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris</i> , ed. A. Maya Sánchez.
CCCM	<i>Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis</i> .
CMP-A	<i>Chancelarias Medievais Portuguesas. Documentos de Chancelaria de D. Afonso Henriques</i> , ed. A. E. Reuter.
DMP	<i>Documentos Medievais Portugueses, Documentos Régios</i> , ed. R. P. de Azevedo.
DDS	<i>Documentos de D. Sancho I (1174–1211)</i> eds R. P. de Azevedo, A. de Jesus da Costa, and M. R. Pereira.
ES	<i>España Sagrada</i> , ed. E. Flórez.
HC	<i>Historia Compostellana</i> , ed. E. Falque Rey.
JL	<i>Regesta Pontificum Romanorum</i> , eds P. Jaffé, S. Löwenfeld, W. Wattenbach, F. Kaltenbrunner and P. Ewald.
MGH	<i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum</i> , eds G. H. Pertz et al.
MGH SS	<i>MGH Scriptores in Folio et Quarto</i> .
PL	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina</i> , ed. J.-P. Migne.
PMH	<i>Portugaliae Monumenta Historica</i> , ed. A. Herculano.
PP	<i>Papsturkunden in Portugal</i> , ed. C. Erdmann.

Introduction

On 8 August 1064, after a gruelling six-month siege, the Muslim defenders of Coimbra surrendered to forces led by King Fernando I of León-Castile. This strategic riverbank city was to become the Portuguese capital for much of the medieval period, and its capture marked a critical juncture in the long struggle between Christendom and Islam for possession of the Iberian Peninsula – the *Reconquista* – which in Portugal came to an end with the fall of the last Muslim enclaves on the Algarve coast in 1250. The reconquest in Portugal has frequently been subsumed into more general accounts of the reconquest in Spain. Yet during the period between the mid-eleventh and mid-thirteenth century Portugal developed from a small, embattled county under the authority of the neighbouring monarch of León-Castile into an independent kingdom with stable borders that have remained largely unchanged until the present day. The successful prosecution of the reconquest appears to have been intricately interconnected with a process of national formation and the achievement of political independence from Spain. The Portuguese historian Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão thus reflected an opinion commonly held among his compatriots when he insisted: ‘Portugal was, above all, a product of the *reconquista*.’¹

The origins of the reconquest lie in the early decades of the eighth century – when an invading Arab and Berber army brought Islam forcibly into the Iberian Peninsula. The Christian Visigothic defenders were scattered at the decisive battle of Gaudalete River in 711, and the last Visigothic king, Roderick, was assumed killed in the melee. Organised opposition rapidly collapsed, and the remnants of Visigothic society either submitted to Muslim domination or fled into the distant north. These fugitives were eventually rallied by Pelayo, the first king of Asturias, who then confronted the all-conquering Muslim forces on a small hill known as Covadonga. Despite Muslim numerical superiority and the blandishments of Bishop Oppa, who spoke for those Christians willing to accept the domination of the invaders, Pelayo remained resolute.

[The bishop began] 'My son, I think you are not unaware that all Spain was formerly governed as one realm under the rule of the Goths and outshone all other lands in wisdom and learning. Also, as I said before, the whole of the Goths when gathered together were not strong enough to withstand the onrush of the Ishmailites [i.e. the Muslims]. How will you therefore be able to defend yourself...?'

To this Pelayo replied: 'Have you not read in Holy Scripture that the Church of God can become as small as a grain of mustard and can then, by God's grace, be made to grow again even larger?'

The bishop answered: 'Indeed it is so written.'

Pelayo said: 'Then Christ is our hope [that] Spain may be saved and the army of the Gothic people restored.'²

This stirring account from the anonymous *Crónica de Alfonso III* was accepted by later historians as a classic statement of the defeated Visigothic people's desire to reclaim their usurped inheritance. The subsequent southern expansion of the kingdom of Asturias could then be represented as a reconquest of lost territory that followed directly from Pelayo's original act of defiance. This connection neatly legitimised military aggression with both a divine mandate and an appeal to natural justice. For generations of Iberian historians the reconquest became the cornerstone of their perception of the past. Ramón Menéndez Pidal followed a long and illustrious historical tradition when he assured his readers: 'The proposal to recover all the soil of the Fatherland, which never ceased to appeal to the mass of people... had been the united enterprise of all Spain.'³

Yet the concept of the reconquest, for all its political and patriotic utility, was more complicated than jingoistic interpretations might suggest. Despite exhaustive efforts by generations of Spanish historians, no physical evidence of the encounter at Covadonga, either archaeological, numismatic or documentary, has been brought to light. There are no eighth-century accounts of the battle, and almost two hundred years of silence lie between the event and the earliest extant descriptions of it. Nor were these tenth-century authors merely disinterested antiquarians. Behind the composition of this epic tale of defiant resistance was a clear agenda: to link their own monarch, Alfonso III of Asturias (866–910), to the long-defunct Visigothic kings. The aim was nothing less than (to borrow Peter Linehan's forceful metaphor) the hijacking of a royal body and the theft of its identification papers!⁴ Even before the Arab invasions, the Asturias region does not seem to have been considered a part of the Visigothic kingdom; those few who took refuge there had no greater claim to the Visigothic heritage than did the many of their co-religionists who remained on their ancestral lands under Muslim authority. Nor is the uncertain pedigree of the Asturian kings the only factor undermining the traditional construction of the reconquest. For there is something inherently implausible, even contrary to human nature, in the

idea of an implacable sectarian animosity being maintained for centuries. Over time relations appear to have evolved beyond the simple, unremitting hostility attributed to Pelayo. Warfare, when it was waged, had concrete and limited aims. A culture of *convivencia*, or coexistence, gradually prevailed, in which economic, political and cultural links were maintained within an atmosphere of pragmatic tolerance and enlightened self-interest. During the tenth century faith-based antagonism was dwindling and many of the more strident expressions of sectarian fervour appear to have been the politically motivated interpolations of later generations. Certainly in Portugal this seems to have been the case. Large Muslim and Jewish communities lived in relative harmony under Christian rule. Effective relationships were maintained between cultures at all social levels. Only towards the end of the eleventh century is there evidence of resurgent sectarian animosity.⁵

This re-emergence in Iberia of an ideology of confrontation appears to have originated outside the peninsula. Portuguese leaders nevertheless chose to place themselves at the forefront of the resulting clash of cultures, and their efforts paid a handsome dividend in terms of territorial and political gain. Among the most significant of these gains was a papal bull, *Manifestis probatum*, issued on 23 May 1179 by Pope Alexander III (1159–1181). In this bull Pope Alexander formally recognised Afonso Henriques (1128–1185), the ruler and self-proclaimed king of Portugal, as monarch of a sovereign realm. ‘You have been an intrepid destroyer of the enemies of the name of Christ and a diligent supporter of the Christian faith,’ the pontiff approved, ‘leaving to posterity a praiseworthy name and an example to imitate.’⁶ The delivery of *Manifestis probatum* marked a climax in the long campaign by the ruling house of Portugal to establish an authority independent of the neighbouring Spanish monarchs. Pope Alexander made clear in his endorsement that a major factor in his support for Afonso’s royal pretensions was the Portuguese leader’s success as a warrior defending the frontier between Christendom and the Islamic world. What is less apparent, however, is the means by which the Portuguese ruling house was able to translate military success against Muslim forces to the south of Portugal into political independence from the Christian Spanish kingdoms to the east.

A clue to where part of the answer might lie is in the nature of *Manifestis probatum* itself. That Pope Alexander was in a position to determine the status of a Portuguese ruler is a striking demonstration of the pervasive influence European institutions had come to exert in the Iberian Peninsula. In his groundbreaking work *The Making of Europe* Robert Bartlett traced the formation during the medieval period of an aggressively expansive Latin Christian culture. This culture was created when a reform-minded Church, eager to impose ecclesiastic conformity on Christian society, found a convergence of interest with an adventurous, land-hungry and militarily proficient secular society.⁷ From the tenth century onwards, pressure from this expansionist Latin Christendom began to be felt throughout the Iberian

Peninsula. Encroaching foreign influence had many manifestations: the direct immigration of individuals and institutions; the development of commercial and social networks; and, perhaps most pervasively, the transfer of ideas and social mores. As a result of this increased communication there gradually emerged among European and Iberian Christians a sense of commonality, of an identity based on shared faith and through it a shared culture. But even as community identities widened to include peoples widely separated geographically, those of alternative faiths were correspondingly excluded. Crucially for the future direction of Portugal, Afonso Henriques personified the cultural dichotomy of his society: for he was the son of an Iberian princess, Infanta Teresa, and an immigrant Latin Christian nobleman, Count Henry of Burgundy. By virtue of this mixed ancestry Afonso – and subsequently the royal dynasty he founded – were well placed to take fullest advantage of the gradual reorientation of Portuguese society from a characteristically pluralistic Iberian culture into the south-western frontier of an uncompromisingly orthodox Latin Christendom.

This book is certainly not the first attempt to assess the impact of the reconquest on the development of Portugal. The debt owed to the body of work already directed towards these critical centuries will be immediately apparent from the footnotes presented. Nevertheless, over a period of time, significant gaps have opened between several different spheres of scholarly interest. Portuguese historians have built up an impressive tradition of research on the early history of their country, yet it is a historiography that is not always easily accessible to the non-Portuguese reader. Moreover, an underlying agenda for much of this scholarly effort has been to trace (and thus to justify) the achievement of political independence from Spain. Traditional Portuguese historiography of the reconquest period has, as Derek Lomax observed, ‘preferred to stress the individuality of Portugal as against the rest of the peninsula, and so [has] laid more emphasis on relations with the Leonese and Castilians than with the Muslims.’⁸ This focus on the local has similarly tended to marginalise the role of Latin Christian cultural influence during this decisive period in Portuguese history. On the other hand, scholars working outside the Iberian Peninsula have tended to concentrate their attention on Portugal’s larger neighbour, Spain. Although this approach is readily explained by factors such as the relative size of the two countries, the similarities in their historical development, and the often arbitrary geographical border between them, there is a danger that the very real distinctiveness of Portuguese development can be obscured.

The purpose of this book, therefore, is twofold. The initial aim is to provide for the Anglophone reader an entry point into a remarkable period in the history of a remarkable country. Yet Portugal did not develop in isolation. A secondary aim of this book is to highlight the pervasive and multifaceted nature of Latin Christian influence in the region during this formative historical phase. Admittedly, this focus on the strengthening links between

Portugal and Europe cannot help but marginalise a number of important internal historical processes – although references in the footnotes should allow those with special interests in these areas to pursue them further. The compensations, however, are many. As Robert Bartlett has observed, ‘the expansionary power of [Latin Christian] civilization sprang from its centres, even if it may be seen most starkly at its edges.’⁹ While this book is primarily intended as an introduction to the fascinating early history of one small kingdom, it approaches this history by examining the profound and ultimately decisive effects of the very forces that forged Latin Christian Europe as a whole.

1

Portuguese Society in the Eleventh Century: Conquest, Reconquest or *Convivencia*?

Eleventh-century Portuguese society was the product of a unique combination of geography and history. Rugged mountain ranges rising to heights of almost 2,000 meters hedge the region to the east, making direct travel into central Spain difficult and hazardous. This isolation encouraged self-sufficiency and a mistrust of outside interference, characteristics that were embedded more deeply by the passage of time. Prehistoric tribes, Celts, Phoenicians, Romans and Visigoths all left their mark upon the landscape and on the consciousness of its inhabitants. An accumulation of legends, ancient place names and overgrown ruins linked the eleventh-century Portuguese with the distant past. Yet the realities of day-to-day existence during this period were shaped above all by the cataclysmic events of the Arab invasions in 711.¹

The first dire tidings of the Visigothic defeat at the Guadalete River reached the peoples in the westernmost reaches of the peninsula quickly, and perhaps in the most dramatic of forms. There is a persistent local legend that the body of the slain King Roderick, last of the Visigothic monarchs, was borne in secret to the Portuguese city of Viseu for burial in the church of S. Miguel do Fetal.² The armies of the first Muslim invasion force, led by Tāriq b. Ziyād under the authority of Mūsā b. Nusayr, the governor of Africa, initially concentrated their efforts in the Visigothic heartland and did not press their advantage into the west of the peninsula. This respite lasted only three years. In 714, a second Muslim army, commanded by Mūsā b. Nusayr's son 'Abd al-'Azīz, marched westwards in search of further conquests. The unfortunate citizens of Beja, Mértola and Ossónoba (Faro) resisted and their walls were taken by storm, although this may well have been a convenient fiction on the part of the invaders, since under Muslim law a failed defiance allowed the victors to claim the goods and lands of the vanquished. Perhaps these events cowed the peoples of the north into submission, or perhaps the invaders had simply secured sufficient land for their needs in

the fertile south. In any event, treaties were made with northern magnates leaving Christians in possession of their estates, governed under their own law codes and liable only for a special tax levied on all non-Muslims living under Islamic rule.³

Relatively few of the invaders established themselves in the less hospitable regions north of the Mondego River. These hardy settlers were in the main Berber tribesmen, and along with their religion and culture, they carried with them their inherited feuds and ethnic prejudices. In 741 these tensions flared into open conflict when the Berber peoples revolted against the rule of their Arab co-religionists. Al-Andalus, as Muslim Spain came to be known to its inhabitants, was cast into turmoil and the northwestern territory – the al-Gharb – denuded of defenders as the Berber tribesmen marched southwards to eventual defeat at the hands of an Arab-Syrian army. The repression of the Berber peoples in the wake of this defeat, coupled with a major famine in 750, caused many of the survivors to abandon Iberia altogether.⁴ They were to be sorely missed by those they left unguarded, for in the mountains of Asturias the descendants of Pelayo had consolidated their strength and were beginning to expand southwards. The *Chronicon Albeldense* records a series of attacks by Pelayo's son-in-law, Alfonso I (739–757), which devastated the Douro region. The towns of Porto, Braga, Chaves and Viseu were sacked and their populations forcibly resettled in Asturian-controlled lands to the north.⁵ Florid contemporary descriptions of Alfonso's raids encouraged later commentators to portray the Douro valley during this period as a desolate no-man's land, completely devoid of inhabitants. Although this seems to exaggerate the level of destruction caused, civic centres were apparently laid in ruins; the population declined sharply as a southwards retreat took place; and political authority devolved into the hands of regional aristocracies.⁶

In the decades that followed, Muslim and Christian leaders would both attempt to fill this power vacuum. The Umayyad amir 'Abd al Rahmān II (822–852) ordered the construction of an impressive citadel (which survives to the present day) in the southern city of Mértola. Just how far northwards these troops could have imposed Umayyad authority is uncertain; in any event, the death of 'Abd al Rahmān's in 852 ended the attempt.⁷ Initiative inexorably passed to the resurgent Christian forces. The discovery in the 830s of a tomb at Compostela believed to be that of St James the Apostle provided the Christian kingdoms with an enviable heavenly patron; the elevation of Alfonso III three decades later ended a long period of uncertain leadership and offered the firm rule necessary to direct this energy into a new wave of expansionism. In 868, the region between the Minho and the Douro rivers was secured and constituted as the county of 'Portucale' under Vímara Peres (869–873). Among the legacies of the first count of Portucale was the founding of the city that bore his name: Vimarānis – modern day Guimarães. The ancient religious centre of Braga was also occupied and resettled, as was the border town of Chaves to the north, along with Viseu and Lamego

to the south. In 878, a full decade after the re-establishment of Porto, the strategically vital city of Coimbra on the Mondego River was finally secured by Christian forces. This city quickly grew to become the centre of another county under the authority of Hermenegildo Guterres (878–911), and the Mondego River was thus established as the semi-permeable frontier with the Islamic world. During this period authority was further concentrated into the hands of the local aristocratic families, particularly the descendants of Vímara Peres and Hermenegildo Guterres, who guarded their growing prestige jealously.⁸

The final years of the tenth century saw the pendulum of relative strength begin to swing again, this time against the Christians. The Galician seaboard was menaced by the return of an old enemy, when a series of Viking raids struck at the coastal communities. In 966 the bishop of Iria was killed in battle defending the shrine of St James, and for the next half-century the dragon-ships of the North would remain a constant danger. Spanish resistance was undermined by internal divisions among the defenders; revolts by leading magnates, including the counts of both Portucale and Coimbra, squandered military capacity at what was to prove a particularly dangerous time, for to the south a new threat was rising. In order to unify the disparate communities of al-Andalus Muhammad b. Abī 'Āmir (981–1002) adopted a policy of directing the belligerence of his subjects outward, against the disorganised Christian kingdoms, and his success earned him the cognomen 'al-Mansūr' (the victorious). In a series of extended campaigns, during which the disunity of the defenders often told against them, Christian forces were pushed back over the Douro River and the city of Coimbra was retaken by Muslim forces in 987. Al-Mansūr emphasised his military superiority a decade later by leading an army across the river and blazing a trail of destruction through Galicia to Compostela, where the sanctuary was destroyed and the church bells carried back to Cordoba in triumph.⁹ As the tenth century drew to a close over the ashes of Compostela the Christian Spanish may well have wondered whether their patron saint had abandoned them. With the dawning of a new century, however, the pendulum began to swing back in their direction once more.

The eleventh-century Christian resurgence

Military strategy in northern Portugal was to a large extent dictated by the realities of physical geography. Mountains dominate the topography and create a significant barrier to any travel towards the east. The most densely settled areas were (and are) in the coastal zone and along the river valleys that transect the region. These river valleys could constitute formidable barriers to north–south travel and possession of strong points commanding the banks were necessary to establish a defensible frontier. At the end of the tenth century the campaigns of al-Mansūr had forced the Christians back to a tenuous hold on the northern bank of the Douro River; there they consolidated

their strength and awaited an opportunity to return in force to the Mondego valley. This patience was finally rewarded in the middle years of the eleventh century, and the resulting campaign established permanent Christian control over the territorial heartland of the future nation of Portugal.

To the great relief of the battered Spanish forces, their fearsome enemy al-Mansūr breathed his last in 1002. The attempt by 'Abd al-Malik al-Muzaffar, al-Mansūr's able and energetic son, to continue military operations against the Christians ended with his own death in 1008. An unclear line of succession led to a civil war that lasted for over two decades and, when no single leader proved strong enough to restore unity, the caliphate fractured into a number of independent *taifa* states (from the Arabic *taifa* meaning 'banner'). In al-Gharb the largest of these newly emerged states was centred on Badajoz. Initially the smaller territories of Mértola, Silves, Gibráleon, Huelva and Niebla remained autonomous, but in the decades after 1040 these were gradually annexed by Seville, bringing the two most powerful states into direct rivalry.¹⁰ In the Christian North, meanwhile, a strong leader had emerged in the person of King Fernando I of León-Castile (1037–1065). Through a combination of good fortune and military prowess King Fernando was able to unite the fractious Christian communities under his authority. Taking advantage of Muslim disunity Christian forces launched a series of bold military operations against the border strongholds of al-Andalus.

In the far west of the peninsula the groundwork for this crucial campaign had already been laid. Gonçalo Trastamires, the head of a powerful local aristocratic family, took advantage of a chance opportunity to capture the town of Montemor-o-Velho in 1034. Four years later he consolidated this success by securing nearby Avenoso.¹¹ As discord among the Muslims deepened, King Fernando committed royal forces in a concerted effort to extend his influence further into the south. This advance began in 1057 with the capture of Seia and then Lamego, the last Muslim-held city in the Douro valley. The following summer Christian forces began their advance to the Mondego with the reduction of Viseu in July 1058. This victory was particularly satisfying for King Fernando because his grandfather, Alfonso V of León (999–1028), had been killed by a chance arrow while attacking the same city three decades earlier. Having exacted his belated revenge, Fernando returned to oversee operations in the eastern marches of his kingdom, leaving the task of securing the countryside around Viseu to local forces. However, by 1064, the king was back in the west undertaking a six-month siege that ended with the negotiated surrender of Coimbra early in July. The capture of the city was a decisive strategic success, particularly with the benefit of hindsight. Though Muslim raiding parties might occasionally cross the Mondego River, possession of the northern bank had passed to the Christians and the process of resettling the captured territory could begin afresh.¹²

Fernando moved quickly to consolidate his newly captured territory. Authority in Coimbra was granted to Sisnando Davides, a man whose

remarkable career had more than prepared him for this delicate task. Sisnando was born in the Coimbra region, possibly at Montemor-o-Velho, and as a child he suffered the misfortune of being captured by a Muslim raiding party from Seville. Despite this inauspicious beginning, and his choice to remain faithful to the Christian religion, Sisnando was able to reach high office in Seville – an example indeed of the culture of religious tolerance that prevailed in the Muslim *taifa* states. A disagreement of unknown cause with the rulers of the city eventually urged Sisnando northwards in search of new opportunities. He was warmly welcomed by Fernando of León-Castile, who immediately recognised Sisnando's special qualifications. For even though Sisnando had continued to profess the faith of his birth, he was one of the many Christians who through close association with Islamic society had adopted the culture and language of the Arabs. Members of this peculiarly Iberian cultural subgroup were known in Christian society as 'Mozarabs', from the Arabic term *musta'rab* or *musta'rib* (one who claims to be an Arab).¹³ There was already a sizeable Mozarabic community in Coimbra, and Fernando no doubt hoped to encourage their loyalty by appointing Sisnando to rule over them. At the same time, because Sisnando was something of an outsider among the local aristocracy, his appointment was less likely to strengthen the hands of jealous noble families in resisting royal authority. Finally, Sisnando's knowledge and familiarity with Muslim society made him an ideal royal representative to develop relations with the *taifa* rulers that went beyond simple belligerence. Sisnando would soon be called upon to demonstrate all his political and diplomatic skills.¹⁴

One short year after the capture of Coimbra the long period of Christian military success came to a sudden end with the unexpected death of King Fernando on 24 June 1065. Spanish unity dissolved almost immediately as, in accordance with both Iberian tradition and the king's last wishes, the realm and its assets were divided among his heirs. The king's two daughters, Urraca and Elvira, received the cities of Zamora and Toro, respectively. The eldest of his sons, Sancho II (1065–1072), inherited the Castilian component of his father's territories along with a lucrative financial tribute paid to the royal treasury by the Muslim city of Zaragoza. The second son, Alfonso VI (1065–1109), received what was potentially the richest of the inheritances: the royal lands of León along with the annual gold tribute from Toledo. An awkward amalgam consisting of the territories of Galicia and Portucale, combined with the newly captured lands between the Douro and Mondego rivers, and the financial tribute paid by Muslim Badajoz, became the kingdom assigned to the youngest of Fernando's sons, Garcia II (1065–1073).¹⁵ King Garcia was probably in his early twenties at the time of his accession and the policies he adopted reflect a certain youthful impetuosity. His reign, though a tumultuous and ultimately unsuccessful one, nevertheless did have important long-term ramifications for the future development of Portugal.¹⁶

Only a handful of charters survive from King Garcia's royal chancery, but the story they tell is a revealing one. The young king inherited an unstable realm dominated by an entrenched local nobility. During his father's reign great efforts had been made to curb the influence of these noble houses through the appointment in the region of royal agents such as Sisnando Davides.¹⁷ Garcia, however, adopted a more direct approach. On 24 March 1066 the king summoned together the dignitaries of his realm to witness the formal humiliation of one of their number: the Portuguese nobleman Garcia Monnioniz, governor of Anegia (modern Arouca). The unfortunate nobleman and his wife were forced to sign an oddly sinister document in which they testified that it was not through fear of punishment or death, but rather with great joy, that they signed over their ancestral lands to the king. Both husband and wife were then exiled to Castile. While King Garcia's justification for this precipitous act of royal autocracy went unrecorded, the reaction of the local aristocracy to such an attack on their ancient rights and privileges can be easily imagined. Such misgivings were no doubt intensified when Garcia used the confiscated territory to enrich his own followers. On 4 January 1068 the title of governor and a portion of the land seized from Garcia Monnioniz were granted to Munio Venegas; and on 16 May 1070, a similar substantial grant was made to another royal favourite, Afonso Ramires, in return for unspecified services.¹⁸ Meanwhile, King Garcia complemented this direct assault on aristocratic autonomy with a more subtle policy of royal intervention in the affairs of the realm through the installation of sympathetic church officials.

Ecclesiastical authority in the newly established kingdom of Galicia-Portugal was complicated by the ambitions of several leading churchmen. Bishop Vistuario of Lugo saw in the arrival of the new king an opportunity for the preferment of his church and became a frequent attendee at Garcia's court. Did he aspire to the archbishop's mitre as metropolitan of the kingdom? If so, his ambitions would have brought him into direct competition with the equally ambitious Bishop Cresconio of Iria, whose responsibilities encompassed the increasingly popular (and thus wealthy) pilgrimage site at Compostela. However, King Garcia appeared to have an agenda of his own. Ostensibly responding to a pious request from the two rival bishops, the king supported the re-establishment of the ancient and illustrious see of Braga. A local man, Bishop Pedro (1071–1091), was given authority over the church that, prior to the Arab invasion, had been the metropolitan of the ecclesiastical province of Galicia.¹⁹ Nor was this the end of the young king's enthusiasm for church reconstruction: he also drew up plans to install new bishops in Lamego and Tûy. While Garcia's ecclesiastical initiatives may well have contained an element of personal piety, there were also concrete benefits to be gained. Newly installed bishops were in effect royal agents, expected to intervene in local affairs at the king's behest. At the same time, the lands required to support the new benefices was sequestered in large

part from the local families themselves – thus, not only did the aristocratic houses find themselves with unwanted ecclesiastics forced upon them, but they were also obliged to pay for their upkeep. Passions rose across the kingdom, ultimately with tragic consequences, for in 1069, Bishop Cresconio of Iria's successor, Bishop Gudestes (1068–1069), was murdered by his own uncle.²⁰ If the unfortunate bishop was the first victim of the growing opposition to Garcia's style of leadership, as seems highly probable, he was certainly not to be the last.

Even as Bishop Pedro was taking up his new responsibilities at Braga, aristocratic disenchantment reached a point of crisis. One of the leading local magnates, Count Nuno Mendes of Portucale, rose in revolt against royal authority. Fully aware of the danger posed by this rebellion, King Garcia moved with alacrity and caught Count Nuno unprepared at Penderosa, north of Braga, in February 1071. Royal troops scattered the rebel forces and Nuno Mendes, the last male descendant of Vímara Peres, founder of Portucale, was killed in the rout.²¹ Yet King Garcia was granted little leisure to savour his military triumph. The rise of domestic turmoil within the kingdom had attracted opportunistic attention from beyond its borders; and while the sequence of event is uncertain, it seems most likely that King Alfonso of León, whose territory bordered that of Garcia, struck the first blow.²² In the absence of strong local support, Garcia was forced to retreat before his brother's invading forces. Meanwhile, King Sancho of Castile, carefully watching events from a distance, decided he could not allow Alfonso unchallenged occupation of Galicia-Portugal, and so launched an attack of his own. The elder brothers met at the battle of Golpejera in June 1072, from which Sancho emerged victorious. The defeated Alfonso of León was first imprisoned in Burgos and subsequently exiled to Muslim Toledo. Sancho followed up his success at Golpejera with an invasion of Galicia-Portugal that ended with Garcia being captured near Santarém and then banished to Seville.

Fortune, however, had another twist in store, and Garcia's exile in Muslim lands proved to be a short one. Only a few of months after his arrival messengers reached Seville bearing the sensational news that King Sancho had been assassinated outside the walls of Zamora while attempting to force obedience on his sister, Urraca. Sensing an opportunity to restore his position, Garcia enlisted the aid of the ruler of Seville, al-Mu'tamid, and then hurried northwards to press his ancestral claims. But the young king was already too late. His elder brother Alfonso had reached the kingdom first and moved quickly to secure their joint inheritance. He had no interest in sharing power. Aided, it would seem, by their formidable sister Urraca, Alfonso lured the trusting Garcia to a prearranged meeting place on the pretext of seeking a negotiated settlement, then promptly ordered him arrested. The hapless younger brother was subsequently confined to the castle of Luna. Though relatively well treated during his long imprisonment, the former king was

forced to wear chains until his death almost two decades later. According to legend, on his deathbed Garcia refused his elder brother's offer to have the manacles removed, and so was buried still wearing them. His tumultuous life and unhappy fate would subsequently make King Garcia a favourite subject for poets and balladeers. Meanwhile, however, the short-lived kingdom of Galicia-Portugal was absorbed into a reunited León-Castile.²³

Although King Garcia has never been numbered among the Portuguese monarchs, his reign did have important long-term repercussions for the region. Garcia's most obvious legacy was in the ecclesiastical initiatives that had provoked such strong local unrest. The reconstruction of Braga created another node in the pattern of ecclesiastical tension in western Iberia, and over time the ambitious churchmen of the ancient metropolitan were to play a key role in the development of Portugal. Garcia's rule also highlighted the difficulty any central authority faced in countering the influence of the local aristocracy. Entrenched interests might be shaken, as with the death of Count Nuno Mendes; yet new power arrangements were constantly being formed. Thus Sisnando Davides, who held authority in Coimbra throughout Garcia's reign, had married Nuno Mendes' daughter Loba Aurovelido and integrated into local aristocratic circles. Sisnando's success, moreover, highlighted another aspect of eleventh-century Portuguese society: its pragmatism towards cultural difference. The count of Coimbra's Mozarabic heritage appears to have presented no barriers to his advancement up the aristocratic ranks. Similarly too, sectarian issues played little part in Garcia's dealings with external powers. The young king maintained effective relations with the Muslim *taifas* to the degree that, despite the rising turmoil in the kingdom, he never faced attack from the south. In fact, as his position deteriorated, Garcia may well have sought aid from the *taifa* rulers. His eventual capture near Santarém, deep in Muslim territory, certainly suggests some form of collusion had taken place; and following Sancho's death, Garcia seems to have won the support of al-Mu'tamid in his failed bid to regain the throne. In the final analysis, Garcia's pragmatic policies towards the Muslims, in common with his attempts to harness the power of the Church and the local nobility, proved insufficient to bring political stability to his realm. Nevertheless, these strategies were not inherently flawed. From his gilded royal prison, Garcia may well have taken some cold comfort in the knowledge that his elder brother Alfonso pursued many of the same policies in the region with far greater success.

The triumph of political pragmatism under Alfonso VI (1072–1085)

By the beginning of 1073 Portugal had come under the control of Alfonso VI, king of the reunited realm of León-Castile. This formidable monarch would continue to exercise undisputed suzerainty over the region until

his death in 1109. During Alfonso's reign the pragmatic approach to cross-cultural relations adopted by earlier monarchs came to full fruition. The Leonese king displayed an unusual ability to consider alternative cultural perspectives – both Christian and non-Christian – and this characteristic would underpin his most important long-term legacies in Portugal. During the long southern expansion significant numbers of Jewish and Muslim people had been overtaken by the tides of war and incorporated into Spanish society. The western regions of the peninsula, in common with many other areas under Alfonso's control, developed a cultural pluralism in which large Jewish and Muslim communities coexisted relatively peacefully under Christian authority. In Portugal, however, the delicate task of ruling this multicultural society was complicated by the presence of an unusually large concentration of Mozarabic Christians.

The Jewish presence in Iberia stretched back into antiquity. Under the rule of the Visigothic kings Jewish communities suffered significant persecution, and so had considerable justification for welcoming the eighth-century Arab invasions. The Muslim rulers of al-Andalus granted the Jewish minority the protected status of *dhimmī* or 'people of the book' (in common with the Christian minority) and allowed them a measure of self-government under their own religious laws. Individuals pursued artistic and literary excellence, or filled high administrative office in Muslim cities.²⁴ Later, as the Spanish kings forced the frontier southwards, many Jewish communities fell under their control and were able to retain significant rights. Senior clergymen outside the peninsula viewed this situation with some disapproval, and in 1081, Pope Gregory VII (1073–1085) admonished Alfonso against allowing Jews any authority over Christians. The repetition of such papal injunctions suggests that secular powers were slow to obey.²⁵ Similar conditions seem to have prevailed in Portugal, with Jews appearing as merchants and property owners in major cities. In Coimbra, for example, a prosperous Jewish quarter had developed and one of its residents was in a position to sell to Afonso Henriques the land on which the royal monastery of Santa Cruz was subsequently built.²⁶

The situation for Muslims under Christian authority in many ways paralleled that of the Jews.²⁷ The Muslim minority was known to their Christian rulers as 'Mudejars', from the Arabic *al-mudajjan* (those allowed to remain) and there was a certain rough irony in this designation. It referred not only to those Muslims who elected to remain on their land after it had come under Christian control, but also to those unfortunates captured and enslaved during military operations.²⁸ The latter were in all likelihood the more numerous. With Muslim legal scholars arguing that the duty of the faithful was to withdraw rather than submit, the majority of those wealthy enough to relocate to Muslim-held areas generally did so. Those who stayed appear to have been predominantly agricultural workers and the urban poor.²⁹ Nevertheless, when gathered in sufficient numbers, these people

could usually obtain rights of self-jurisdiction along with freedom of worship. Rodrigo Diaz, 'the Cid', provides a famous example of the powers of collective bargaining. When the Cid captured Valencia in June 1094 he sought to reassure the anxious citizens with the following observation:

God has bounteously given me Valencia and I rule it. If I conduct myself justly here and put affairs in order, God will leave me in possession of the city; but if I do wrong here by injustice or out of pride, I know that He will take it from me. From today, let each one go to his estate...and resume ownership of it as the law of the Moors requires....³⁰

Rodrigo made no reference to a religious or historical mandate of any kind. Instead he based his claims on his own ability and the expectation that God would grant justice on strictly non-doctrinal lines. In Portugal too, documents record the presence of significant minorities within frontier towns, and efforts were made to formalise relations between different cultural groups. Thus, a charter granted by Afonso VI to the border town of Santarém in 1095 includes measures to regulate interaction between Christians, Muslims and Jews. Such measures remained an important feature of Portuguese town charters and royal initiatives to protect minority groups continued throughout the eleventh and the twelfth century.³¹

While the positions of Jews and Muslims under Christian rule were in many ways similar, a third significant minority group, the Mozarabic Christians, could not be so easily categorised or contained. Many Mozarabs were the descendents of those Visigoths who had remained on their land after the Arab invasions and accepted Muslim authority; others, such as Sisnando Davides, were northerners who had for various reasons been brought up within Islamic society. In all cases, however, even as these people had adopted the manners and language of their Muslim overlords, they clung tenaciously to the religion of their forefathers.³² These religious forms, sometimes rather misleadingly termed the 'Mozarabic rite', were in reality a slightly archaic variant of the same Visigothic rites adhered to by the Christian Spanish. In fact the characteristic that most differentiated the religious practices of the Mozarabs from those of their northern co-religionists was the depth of the Mozarabic attachment to traditional religious forms, since these rituals had sustained their culture while under Muslim domination and continued to constitute their only defence against ethnic disintegration. Nor was their piety in any way unorthodox. In 1068 Pope Alexander had been asked to confirm the suitability of Mozarabic religious practice and, after examining their texts, had done so.³³

Ironically, however, the very orthodoxy of the Mozarabic faith in many ways highlighted their equivocal position, even within Christian society. The name 'Mozarab' is in itself indicative of the ambivalent attitudes many northern Spanish held towards members of this cultural subgroup. Although

the word was probably derived from the Arabic *musta'rab* or *musta'rib*, (one who claims to be Arab), this was not a term the Muslims used themselves. Instead, it was employed by Spanish Christians to define a branch of their co-religionists in cultural terms.³⁴ It was a label denoting difference rather than commonality, for in the socially fluid Iberian kingdoms a shared Christian faith was not enough in itself to ensure sympathy between culturally diverse peoples. The Spanish seem to have had little expectation that Mozarabs living in Muslim lands might constitute a potential fifth column. Instead the opposite seems to be the case; and in 1064 the Mozarabs of recently captured Coimbra were accused of secretly preferring Islamic rule to that of King Fernando. Even into the mid-twelfth century the Spanish made scant effort during military operations to discriminate between Muslims and Mozarabs among their enemies. Individuals from either faith who were unfortunate enough to be seized by northern raiding parties apparently received much the same rough treatment.³⁵ For more than any other group in Iberian society, the Mozarabs demonstrate both the pervasiveness and the practical limits of pragmatic coexistence. In Christian society they were categorised not by their religious beliefs but by their cultural accoutrements; the Muslims saw past their appearance to focus on their faith. Thus, defined as they were by their difference, the Mozarabs could live in both worlds, or in neither; their political orientation was essentially a matter of circumstance or indeed personal choice. Nevertheless, they were not excluded from either society and could be accepted as loyal subjects on both sides of the frontier.

Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, it was among the Mozarabs that the most definite statements of what might be called an ideology of reconquest were to be found. Despite their unique position between the Christian and Muslim worlds, the Mozarabic peoples had lost most in the Arab invasions. As a cultural group they maintained an awareness of the past and their literature betrays a strong sense of historical grievance.³⁶ Yet perhaps the most striking statement of the Mozarabic attitude towards the righting of ancient wrongs was in fact penned by a Muslim, 'Abd Allāh of Granada, and attributed to none other than Sisnando Davides. In a description of an embassy sent by Alfonso of León-Castile, 'Abd Allāh recalled Sisnando adding to his king's message a warning of his own.

Al-Andalus originally belonged to the Christians. Then they were defeated by the Arabs and driven to the most inhospitable region, Galicia. Now that they are strong and capable, the Christians desire to recover what they have lost....³⁷

Nevertheless Sisnando, like all Mozarabs, was deeply inured to Arabic culture; indeed his attempt to justify the expansionism of his co-religionists in historical terms is indicative of the close connections that still bound

him to the Muslim world in which he had grown up, for his implication is that the Spanish were impelled not by sectarian animosity, but by the demands of natural justice. The aim of his reconquest was not necessarily to expel the Muslims from Spain, rather it was to impose Christian rule over them. Thus, Sisnando's position could be seen to be simply an inversion of the cultural *convivencia* he had experienced during his time in Muslim service.

Culturally Arabic and yet faithful to their traditional forms of Christianity, the Mozarabs constituted a unique social subgroup. By the eleventh century a great number of Mozarabs had migrated to the north or been enveloped as the frontier moved southwards. There were numerous Mozarabic communities across Christian Spain, particularly in urban areas; but for a variety of reasons, there was an unusual concentration of these communities in Portugal. The westernmost regions of the peninsula had great cultural resonance for the traditionally minded Mozarabs. Braga, a religious centre which could trace its history back to ancient times, was associated with such ecclesiastical luminaries as Paulus Orosius in the fourth century and St Martin of Braga 200 years later. Until 1085 Braga was also the only ancient metropolitan city under Christian control. In Portugal too, Mozarabs could find political and ecclesiastical leaders who shared their cultural leanings. Both Count Sisnando Davides and Bishop Paternus of Coimbra (1092–1098) were Mozarabs, while Bishop Pedro of Braga had strong sympathy for the ancient forms of worship the Arabised Christian community favoured.³⁸ By the middle of the eleventh century, the Coimbra region had become something of a Mozarabic stronghold and this was reflected as a strong local sense of the past, a respect for tradition, but most of all a deep conservatism in matters of religious practice. At the same time, the Mozarabic community also had much to contribute to Christian society as a whole, including a close familiarity with the Muslim world and an ability to operate effectively across cultural barriers. During the early reign of Alfonso of León-Castile, such qualities were highly valued and could be the key to considerable individual advancement.

The ambitions of the Leonese monarch extended far beyond the sovereignty of his own multicultural kingdom. In an exchange of letters with al-Mu'tamid of Seville, Alfonso is purported to have styled himself 'the emperor of the two religions'. This title was intended to infer influence, even authority over the fractious Muslim states to the south. While the veracity of these letters has been difficult to establish with certainty, the attitudes of inclusiveness implicit in them also underpinned the Leonese monarch's wider relationships with Muslim al-Andalus.³⁹ For Alfonso, in common with other Spanish Christian leaders of his time, had come to recognise that coexistence with the Muslim *taifa* states could yield far richer results than anything that might be gained through a policy of unrelenting belligerence. In the chaotic world that emerged following the

break-up of the caliphate and the emergence of the mutually suspicious *taifa* states a complicated network of cross-cultural diplomatic relations had developed, linking rival states in cooperation or rivalry. Issues of religious orientation were frequently ignored as rulers on both sides of the highly permeable frontier struck bargains and made alliances on the basis of practical gain.

Throughout the eleventh century and indeed well into the twelfth-century diplomacy – albeit diplomacy backed by force – was the premier tool of Iberian statecraft. Treaties between Christian and Muslim rulers were common, with perhaps the most famous of these agreements being the mutual defence pact negotiated by al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza and Fernando of León-Castile in 1062. King Ramiro I of Aragon (1035–1063) paid dearly for underestimating the strength of Fernando's resolve when, less than a year after this agreement was concluded, he launched a disastrous attack on the Zaragoza stronghold of Graus. The Leonese king fulfilled his obligations under the terms of the treaty and sent five hundred knights to support his Muslim ally. The strengthened garrison routed the attacking Aragonese army and King Ramiro himself was slain.⁴⁰ Nor was this military alliance unusual: the texts of other agreements have survived to provide striking illustrations of *convivencia* in action. A pact signed in April 1069 by Sancho IV of Navarra (1054–1076) and al-Muqtadir, for example, bound Sancho to support his ally against all enemies, be they Christians or Muslims; and this close relationship was renewed in May 1073. Other less vaunted individuals struck similar deals, with the best known of these being Rodrigo Díaz, 'the Cid'. During an eventful career (including a presence at Ramiro's fatal denouement at Graus in 1062) Rodrigo served several *taifa* rulers as a mercenary commander. The victories he won on their behalf, over both Christian and Muslim opponents, merely served to increase his stature among his own co-religionists.⁴¹

The creation of military treaties between members of different faiths presupposed a degree of mutual respect, and such agreements could sometimes be sealed with the closest of bonds. Thus, Alfonso cemented an alliance with al-Mu'tamid of Seville by entering into official concubinage with the Muslim ruler's daughter-in-law, Princess Zaida. Far from being considered in any way unsuitable, this relationship became grist for romantic literature and a son from the union, Sancho, was later considered the primary contender for the throne of León-Castile.⁴² A reputation for fair dealing among the Muslims was an asset highly prized by Christian rulers. Consequently, despite the Cid's proven military prowess, he was exiled because he contravened Alfonso's agreements with al-Muqtadir by launching unauthorised attacks against Zaragoza territory.⁴³ Some years later, 'Abd Allāh of Granada recalled Alfonso's eagerness to ensure a businesslike atmosphere prevailed. 'God forbid,' the Leonese monarch supposedly exclaimed, 'that people should say that a man as great as I among the

Christians came to you, equally great among your kind, and then betrayed you.⁴⁴ In the volatile climate of Spanish politics rival leaders struck deals where they could, and such arrangements were firmly based in political expediency. This is nowhere more evident than in the evolution of the gold tributes, known as *parias*, exacted by the Christian kings from the *taifa* rulers.

The wealth of Iberia was concentrated in the south, in the sophisticated urban culture of al-Andalus; the mountainous north, on the other hand, produced skilled and restless warriors. This disparity presented clear opportunities for an enterprising Christian ruler. King Fernando first demanded the payment of *paria* tribute from Seville, Zaragoza and Toledo in 1062. These tributes were then paid fairly regularly for over twenty years, enhanced from 1074 by the imposition of similar obligations on Granada, and represented a huge financial resource for the Christian kings. The Zaragozaan *paria* alone has been calculated at somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 gold dinars per annum. 'Abd Allāh of Granada ruefully recalled that to secure the friendship of Alfonso VI in 1074 he was forced to pay a lump sum of 30,000 dinars in advance and promise the Leonese king a further 10,000 annually.⁴⁵ It was nothing less than protection money and as such bought security from attack. With hindsight later authors would read into Alfonso's actions a long-term strategy of economic warfare – yet there is a thin line between extortion and taxation. While these huge payments certainly allowed the Spanish monarchs who controlled them to field large, professional armies, they also dictated the uses to which such forces could be put. The Christian kings guarded their revenues jealously, mounting campaigns not to capture territory, but to menace defaulters into payment. Moreover great care was taken to ensure that these sources of income remained financially viable, a policy that often included strengthening chosen *taifas* against both Christian and Muslim incursion.⁴⁶

What then was Alfonso's idea of reconquest? Rather than being impelled by the burning desire to reclaim ancient ancestral lands in the name of Christendom, Alfonso's intention was simply to control the wealth these lands produced. His campaign to achieve this control was careful, slow and wherever possible non-violent. In his remarkable autobiography 'Abd Allāh of Grenada recalled the Leonese king quite candidly expounding on his overall strategy and the objectives he hoped to secure.

The best plan, indeed the only plan, is to threaten one with the other and take their money all the time until their cities are impoverished and weakened. When they are weakened they will surrender to me and become mine of their own accord.⁴⁷

This was a policy of pragmatic *convivencia* in which the aim was not to kill or even to banish the enemy, but instead to subject them to royal authority.

While this pragmatism had much in common with the reconquest as envisaged by Sisnando Davides, it was closer in spirit to the Cid's recognition of Muslim rights at Valencia. Alfonso seldom looked to the Visigothic past for justification, rather he simply eschewed overt sectarian or cultural animosities to embrace practical reality. This was a policy of tolerant *Realpolitik* and it reached a triumphant climax in 1085.

The city of Toledo, on the northern bank of the Tagus River, was an ancient, populous and wealthy urban centre. Alfonso knew the city well, having been sent there as an exile during the 1070s. The Muslim ruler of the city, al-Ma'mūn, had been instrumental in the young king's triumphant return to power and had in all likelihood extracted an oath of future solidarity from Alfonso in return for this support. When al-Ma'mūn was subsequently poisoned at Cordoba in 1075, his son, al-Qādir, inherited authority in Toledo, but demonstrated little capacity for effective rule. During al-Qādir's troubled reign Alfonso was forced to intervene to maintain his old ally's dynasty in power, and to do so more effectively the Leonese monarch gradually took control of the fortresses surrounding the city – always with al-Qādir compliance. When al-Qādir was finally driven from Toledo by a popular uprising, Alfonso moved against the city itself. Resistance was virtually nonexistent: after a short siege the citizens capitulated and received generous terms.⁴⁸ Any who wished to leave were allowed to take their moveable goods; those choosing to stay would retain possession of their property, their customary laws and freedom of religion. Separate agreements were reached with the Muslim, Jewish and Mozarabic communities under which the Great Mosque was to remain under Muslim control, the Jews kept their synagogue and the Mozarabs were guaranteed continued authority over churches they had previously held in the city.

The capture of Toledo was the most significant territorial gain made by Alfonso during a long, eventful reign and was a direct result of royal policies of pragmatic engagement with the Muslim world. In a move calculated to reassure the inhabitants of the multicultural city Alfonso chose Sisnando Davides, the Mozarabic governor of Coimbra, to rule in Toledo.⁴⁹ This appointment elevated the count of Coimbra into the highest level of royal politics – a remarkable rise for the former child-prisoner, and a position he owed primarily to his ability to operate effectively across cultural boundaries. Certainly he brought these qualities to his new office in Toledo. Both Christian and Muslim authors described Sisnando as a highly efficient governor whose moderation and even-handed approach to all members of the city's diverse population brought calm in the aftermath of the Spanish takeover, and indeed won many converts to Christianity from the Muslim and Jewish communities. Yet even as Sisnando worked to establish an effective government based on the accommodation of cultural difference, the principles of pluralism he sought to champion were decisively challenged from an unexpected quarter. For almost as soon as a relative tranquillity

had fallen over the city, Christian authorities seized the Great Mosque and, in direct defiance of the surrender terms, consecrated it as a cathedral.

The breach of faith appears to have been the result of a conspiracy between Bernard of Sedirac, the newly appointed bishop of Toledo (1086–1124/1125), and Alfonso's second wife, Queen Constance of Burgundy. Acting in concert, the bishop and queen overrode Sisnando's objections and, without waiting to consult the absent King Alfonso, ordered the seizure and consecration of the mosque. When news of this act of bad faith broke in the royal court the enraged king swept back to Toledo intent, it was later believed, on burning both bishop and queen alive in punishment for their actions. Alfonso's precipitous response to the besmirching of his good name in the Islamic world was only prevented by the intercession of an embassy from the Muslim community of Toledo. On bended knees the wronged Muslims convinced the king to take no action, for they prudently foresaw that any backlash of popular anger would inevitably fall on them.⁵⁰ For a time an uneasy peace was restored within the city, but the Jewish, Muslim and Mozarabic communities would have had strong cause to wonder whether the cultural tolerance that they had been promised was already beginning to evaporate.

During the early decades of his reign Alfonso of León-Castile had pursued a pragmatic strategy in his dealings with his own subjects and also in his relations with rival Iberian rulers. One striking result of this approach was the creation of a culture of pluralism within his realm, much to the benefit of those who were capable of operating effectively across social and political frontiers. It was a multicultural world and a time when individuals such as Sisnando Davides could rise rapidly. Yet events in the wake of the capture of Toledo highlighted another side to Alfonso's policy of social inclusion. The Spanish monarch was deeply attracted to the developing culture of Latin Christendom, and under his patronage the pace of cultural exchange quickened. An ironic consequence of Alfonso's social eclecticism was the translocation into Spain of an alternative ethos that was fundamentally intolerant of cultural diversity. Bishop Bernard and Queen Constance can be seen as exemplars of the Latin Christian world and their actions in Toledo reflected the attitudes of cultural exclusivity developing beyond the Pyrenees. The consecration of the Great Mosque was the first substantial Spanish victory for these attitudes of exclusivity over the more moderate policies of Iberian *Realpolitik*. It was a victory, moreover, which was not an isolated incident, but rather a critical point in an ongoing process of Latin cultural permeation of Iberia. Few regions of the peninsula were to be more deeply affected than the western coastal zone. Sisnando Davides was only one of many Portuguese who were to find this growing Latin Christian cultural influence both unwelcome and deeply unsettling.

Alfonso VI, the Latin Church and the estrangement of the Portuguese clergy

Bernard of Sedirac, the newly appointed bishop of Toledo, personified one strand of the Latin Christian cultural expansion: the transfer of orthodox Roman ecclesiastical ideas and personnel across the Pyrenees into Iberia. Perhaps the most striking indication of the advance of this cultural influence is the form of surviving official documents. Early Spanish records were written in the Visigothic script, a characteristically Iberian style of calligraphy. During the eleventh century, in a clear illustration of the pace of cultural change, this style was abandoned in favour of the Carolingian techniques commonly used in Europe.⁵¹ Acceptance of the new form of calligraphy was quite fitful in Portugal, where a 'transitional Visigothic' came into use during the second half of the eleventh century, with the more venerable styles still very much in evidence well into the twelfth century.⁵² A consideration of the story told by these documents suggests some of the reasons why such stylistic novelties were unwelcome in many Portuguese scriptoria – and why several of the most sensational scenes of resistance to Latin ecclesiastical innovation were played out in the west of the peninsula.

The eleventh century was a period of rapidly increasing communications between the Spanish kingdoms and the Latin Christian Church. The Aragonese kings Ramiro I and his son Sancho I Ramirez (1063–1094) forged early relations with the rising power of the reform papacy. These links grew in significance until in 1068 Sancho Ramirez formally conferred his kingdom on St Peter and agreed to pay an annual tribute as a token of his loyalty.⁵³ Rather than compete with Aragonese efforts to win papal approval, the kings of León-Castile directed their attentions towards the other great ecclesiastical institution of Europe: the Benedictine monastery at Cluny. Sporadic gifts of booty won during Fernando's successful frontier campaigns were gradually formalised into an annual grant, an act of generosity that was made possible by the imposition of *paria* tributes on the *taifa* states. The formal tribute to Cluny fell into abeyance on Fernando's death in 1065, although Alfonso maintained links with the monastery through a series of valuable donations including San Isidro de Dueñas, San Salvador de Palaz del Rey, Santiago de Astudillo and San Juan de Hérmedes de Cerrato.⁵⁴ Alfonso appears to have been prompted primarily by personal religious feelings and a genuine respect for the monastery's reputation for orthodox piety. Nevertheless the Leonese monarch could not have been unaware of the political possibilities inherent in his support for the Cluniac monks. This dimension of the relationship took on a greater importance in 1073, when the election of Pope Gregory VII opened a new and turbulent phase of papal–Spanish relations.

The new pontiff initiated contact with a series of sweeping and completely unrealistic claims for authority in the peninsula. Two of Pope Gregory's

earliest letters, both dated 30 April 1073, dealt with proposed French military operations in Spain, and made abundantly clear that Gregory's understanding of the situation beyond the Pyrenees was extremely partial and in all probability informed primarily by Aragonese interests. In these letters Gregory assumed complete sovereignty over the peninsula. The pontiff nominated a French nobleman of uncertain reputation, Count Ebles of Roucy, as a papal operative who would lead a military expedition into Spain and hold any land he managed to secure there as a vassal of the Holy See. Pope Gregory warned any other knights contemplating similar operations that if they wished for St Peter's blessing they must similarly pledge their obedience to the papal throne.⁵⁵ The pope made no reference whatsoever to the Spanish leaders and his clumsy intervention drew an immediate, hostile reaction. In an impressive example of cross-cultural solidarity Sancho IV Garcés of Navarra responded to the threat of unwanted northern interlopers by concluding a defensive alliance with al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza in May 1073. Alfonso of León-Castile appears to have acted less directly, and when Count Ebles' expedition ultimately came to nothing, spoiling actions by the monks of Cluny in protection of Leonese interests may well have been the cause.⁵⁶

Undeterred by the abject failure of this first attempt to establish authority over the Iberian Peninsula through the use of papal agents, Gregory reiterated his claims directly to the Spanish leaders. In a missive dated 28 June 1077 the pope warned the Iberian kings that St Peter's long-neglected ancient rights must be restored through the payment of tribute and the acknowledgement of papal authority.⁵⁷ Alfonso of León-Castile responded by recommencing payment of tribute not to Pope Gregory, but to the monks at Cluny, and he raised the amount to the astronomical figure of 2,000 gold dinars per annum.⁵⁸ In return for this generosity, the largest single benefaction the monks ever received, Cluny became a stalwart supporter of Leonese interests in Spain, France and, perhaps most importantly, in the papal court. Alfonso further signalled his resistance to Pope Gregory's claims for Iberian hegemony by officially adopting the title of emperor from 1077 onwards. The pope refused to acknowledge this new title in subsequent communications, but beset as he was by threats closer to home, he found himself unable to challenge Alfonso's self-declared imperial status.⁵⁹

Pope Gregory could display an obstinate resolve when defending those rights he believed pertained to the Holy See; at the same time, however, he was also capable of accepting patent political reality. In the face of the formidable alliance of Alfonso's secular power and Cluny's spiritual reputation the pope quietly shifted his ground. Rather than continuing to press for secular acknowledgement of papal authority, Gregory initiated a campaign to impose ecclesiastical conformity and obedience on the Spanish Church. In the pursuit of these new goals, old opponents could become effective allies. Alfonso and the monks of Cluny were willing to

support such a campaign and so papal efforts met with far greater success. A primary aim of Pope Gregory's programme was the imposition of Roman liturgical orthodoxy upon the Spanish Church. While previous popes had been willing to countenance the 'Mozarabic liturgy' and indeed only a decade earlier Alexander II had publicly declared it to be doctrinally sound, Gregory peremptorily overturned previous rulings and insisted that any non-Roman liturgies must be completely expunged. The scene was set for a decisive confrontation between Iberian custom and Latin innovation.

The pope launched his campaign against traditional Spanish religious forms in March 1074 by praising the king of Aragon for his success in imposing the Roman liturgy throughout his realm. Further letters petitioned the kings of Navarra and León-Castile to do likewise.⁶⁰ Alfonso appeared personally willing to comply and to this end arranged a judicial duel to decide the issue. In a detail that warns against ethnic generalising, the Castilian knight defending the local liturgy triumphed over the Mozarabic champion of Roman novelty. Undeterred, Alfonso ordered an ordeal by fire, and when the Mozarabic books survived immolation, the monarch kicked them back into the flames while shouting in true autocratic style: 'The horns of the law must bend to the will of kings!'⁶¹ The intensity of the campaign increased in 1080 when the papal legate, Cardinal Richard of St Victor in Marseilles, convened an ecclesiastical council at Burgos. King Alfonso was in attendance and was prevailed upon to formally agree to enforce the rite throughout his territories.⁶² Yet the pronouncements of ecclesiastical councils did not guarantee the obedience of wider society. The imposition of the Roman rite provoked considerable grassroots resistance, and in a letter to Abbot Hugh of Cluny, Alfonso bemoaned the desolation the change had cast over his people.⁶³ Consequently, even after the king had formally prescribed the use of the Roman rite throughout his realm, other forms of liturgy were maintained in some regions with tacit or even overt official approval.⁶⁴

Portugal, with its large Mozarabic population and ancient tradition of ecclesiastical pre-eminence, became a front line in the battle between proponents of the Spanish and the Roman liturgies. The leading figure in the local church was Bishop Pedro of Braga – a city with a glowing history of intellectual and ecclesiastical achievement – and he was categorically opposed to the new liturgical forms. During his incumbency documents produced in Braga betray limited Carolingian influence and throughout the diocese traditional forms of worship and ecclesiastical organisation were retained. Consequently his successor, Bishop Gerald (1096–1108), was obliged to write to Rome enquiring as to whether the ordinations Pedro had conducted, 'following the Toledan manner', should be allowed to stand. In subsequent years, after the Roman forms of worship had been more fully accepted, a new generation of clergymen in Braga wrote critically of their predecessor's conservatism.⁶⁵ Nor was Bishop Pedro the only Portuguese clergyman uncomfortable with change. The see of Coimbra may have lacked

the glittering historical pedigree of Braga, but the city had a large Mozarabic population, including the royal governor, Sisnando Davides, and the local ecclesiastical authority, Bishop Paternus; and here too the imposition of the Roman rite seems to have provoked significant unrest. The final reference to Bishop Paternus – his leaving to undertake an indefinite pilgrimage to the Holy Land – suggests a disappointed or discredited man.⁶⁶ Bishop Paternus' expected replacement, Martim, had been prior of the cathedral chapter and was a protégé of Sisnando. However, Martim only ever appeared in documents as 'bishop-elect,' and the delay in confirming his appointment as bishop of Coimbra may well have been the result of the struggle between proponents of the Roman and Mozarabic liturgical rites. Certainly it was not until after the death of Sisnando in 1091 that Alfonso felt able to impress his own choice on the church of Coimbra: Cresconio, a French Benedictine and the former abbot of St Bartholomew of Tûy.⁶⁷

Yet the Latin Christian reform programme did not end with the imposition of an unpopular foreign liturgy; a second phase of ecclesiastical reform was to produce even greater local discord. As Robert Bartlett has observed:

The theory of Latin Christendom was that of a cellular body and the cells were the dioceses. Every part of Christendom was meant to be a named and known see, and no part was meant to be in more than one...⁶⁸

In addition to forcing the Roman liturgy upon the peninsular churches, Pope Gregory insisted that the ecclesiastical structure of the Spanish Church be reorganised to conform to Roman ideals. Every church would be assigned its rank in the formal, magisterial hierarchy that encompassed the whole of Latin Christendom. Each institution, indeed each individual, would have a place in the conceptual edifice that was the Holy Church – and at the apex of this structure of obedience was the throne of St Peter. For his part, Alfonso of León-Castile was not unwilling to support the rearrangement of the Spanish Church. Such a rationalisation of ecclesiastical administration had much to recommend it to a monarch eager to encourage political centralisation in his own sprawling realm. However, local clergymen in Portugal had cause to feel less sanguine at the prospect of Roman administrative innovation.

In any reordering of authority there must be winners and losers. The clergy of Braga were resolved to ensure that they were not among the latter. Bishop Pedro of Braga had long entertained high ambitions for the prestige of his church. When Alfonso came to power in 1072 the incoming monarch had confirmed the bishop of Braga as the leading regional churchman. This royal recognition encouraged Bishop Pedro to seek even greater preferment. Of the five ancient Spanish metropolitans (which were Braga, Tarragona, Toledo, Mérida and Seville) only Braga was under Christian control when Alfonso returned to the throne. Bishop Pedro clearly believed

that this allowed him to speak as the highest ecclesiastical authority in the peninsula. Early documents issued at Braga contain phrases such as *cathedre Bracarensis metropolitane* and *baselica metropolitana*, and while such pretensions received no outside recognition, they signalled the direction of Bishop Pedro's future ambition.⁶⁹ Unfortunately for the aspirations of the clergy in Braga, even though Alfonso did indeed hope to create an archbishop within his realm, the pontiff urged him to delay – seemingly because of doubts in Rome about the suitability of Bishop Pedro himself for such a promotion.⁷⁰ As a result, the king consistently refused to support Bishop Pedro's attempts to advance the prestige of his church. The growing sense of frustration this produced in Braga was ultimately to find expression in the precipitous actions of several of the most eminent Portuguese churchmen.

During the 1080s a series of political and social upheavals shook the foundations of the Church both north and south of the Pyrenees, and the aftershocks of this turmoil would impact even in distant Portugal. In March 1080 a rising tension between papal and imperial authority reached a crisis when Pope Gregory intervened in German politics by formally deposing and excommunicating Emperor Henry IV for a second time. This proved to be a major miscalculation, not only because Gregory's chosen imperial candidate, Duke Rudolf of Swabia, died soon afterwards, but also because the pope had dangerously overplayed his hand. Three years earlier Pope Gregory had used the same methods to force contrition on Henry at Canossa; now though, a more experienced emperor enjoyed the backing of majority opinion. The defiant Emperor Henry summoned an ecclesiastical council in Brixen the following year and secured the deposition of Pope Gregory. Archbishop Guibert of Ravenna was elevated as Pope Clement III (1080–1100), and Emperor Henry moved to install the anti-pope on the throne of St Peter. Pope Gregory found to his chagrin that the number of his supporters dwindled almost as quickly as did his financial resources. By 1084 the pope's position had become untenable and he was forced to flee Rome. During this crisis, Bishop João II of Porto, who had been one of Gregory's closest advisors, suddenly defected to Clement's camp, taking with him a dozen other cardinals. Bishop João's actions, whether motivated by opportunism or conviction, thrust the Portuguese Church to the centre of both imperial and papal attention. Gregory responded by dispatching a papal legate, Abbot Jarento of Saint-Bénigne, with letters of instruction for Count Sisnando Davides – and it is significant that rather than entrusting the task to Bishop Pedro of Braga the pope chose to deal directly with the local representative of secular royal power. Bishop Pedro's conspicuous failure to enforce orthodoxy and order upon those clergymen closest to him had thus done nothing to further his hopes for a wider recognition of Braga's ancient prestige.⁷¹

That a crisis in distant Germany could have this impact in Portugal is testimony to the growing importance of an international dimension in

ecclesiastical politics; but events within the peninsula were soon to deliver an even sharper blow to Bishop Pedro's aspirations. On 25 May 1085 Alfonso received the formal surrender of Toledo, and amid the general Christian rejoicing, there were those in Braga who may have found less cause to celebrate. Braga's valuable distinction of being the sole ancient metropolitan in Christian hands ended with the elevation of the former monk of Cluny, Bernard of Sedirac, as the first bishop of the recaptured city. Bishop Bernard soon made it clear that, as far as he was concerned, the ancient Visigothic capital of Toledo should also be considered the pre-eminent church for all of Christian Spain. By 1088 the bishop's position in Toledo was secure enough for him to seek a hearing in the papal court. Before presenting his petition he took the precaution of visiting his old monastery to obtain advice and a blessing from Abbot Hugh. On his appearance before the curia Bishop Bernard received a sympathetic hearing from Pope Urban II (1088–1099), who was himself also a former monk of Cluny. The metropolitan status of Toledo was recognised, and Bernard was furthermore granted the authority of Primate for the entire peninsula. Pope Urban promulgated his decisions in a series of bulls issued to Archbishop Bernard, Alfonso of León-Castile, the prelates of Spain, and the abbot of Cluny.⁷²

Bernard's complete success during his visit to Rome was bitter news to Bishop Pedro, who would have had considerable justification for believing himself the victim of a Cluniac conspiracy. Nevertheless the redoubtable bishop of Braga was unwilling to relinquish without a struggle the rights and dignities he firmly believed to be his own. An opportunity appeared to arise in 1090 when the papal legate, Cardinal Rainer (the future Pope Paschal II), summoned together a council at León to discuss outstanding ecclesiastical business. Bishop Pedro seized his chance to demand the restitution of Braga's ancient stature and independence from the church of Toledo. Once again his efforts were to no avail. Cardinal Rainer, who was himself a former monk of Cluny, refused point-blank to reconsider these earlier papal decisions.⁷³ A sense of unjustified persecution coupled with wounded pride proved too much for Bishop Pedro and he came to the same conclusion Bishop João of Porto had reached almost two decades earlier. In 1091 Bishop Pedro took his case to the imperial pope, Clement III, in the hope of receiving a more favourable judgement. Clement immediately acceded to his requests and freed Bishop Pedro from Archbishop Bernard's control. It was to prove a hollow victory. Pedro was declared deposed, and the Spanish clergy immediately united in opposition to the turbulent bishop, allowing Alfonso to force him into monastic retirement. Bernard of Toledo was then able to appoint a new bishop, Gerald of Moissac, who was yet another former monk of Cluny. The triumphant appearance of Archbishop Bernard in Braga on 28 August 1092 to oversee the consecration of the new cathedral was a signal that, for the time being at least, the struggle for the restitution of the city's ancient ecclesiastical rights was over.⁷⁴

Bernard of Toledo's victory in 1092 over the proponents of local custom was as decisive for the Latin reformers as had been the seizure of the Great Mosque seven years earlier. The regional clergy learned to their cost that they could not effectively resist the combined authority of a reformist papacy, a formidable monarch, and an ever-increasing number of Cluniac monks appointed to high ecclesiastical office across the peninsula. The deposition of Bishop Pedro and his replacement by Bishop Gerald marked the effective end of local resistance to Roman demands for liturgical conformity. Nevertheless, the bitter humiliation of their church's submission to the authority of Bernard of Toledo was something the local clergymen could never bring themselves to accept. Fortunately for their future hopes, times were changing once again. The same forces of Latin Christian cultural expansionism that had carried Bernard of Toledo and Gerald of Braga to high office in the Spanish Church had also impelled others from across the Pyrenees to pursue their ambitions in the Iberian peninsula. With the arrival of these energetic new immigrants would come new opportunities for local ecclesiastical resistance.

A history of violence: the Latin Christian military aristocracy in León-Castile

When Bernard of Toledo seized the Great Mosque in 1085 for use as a Christian cathedral he had been encouraged and supported by Alfonso's wife, the formidable Queen Constance of Burgundy. The queen represented a second strand to the Latin Christian cultural expansion into the Iberian Peninsula, for alongside the Latin ecclesiastics who travelled southwards in order to direct the reorganisation of the Spanish Church came an equally significant immigration of adventurous Latin nobles. Many of these individuals appear to have been attracted by the prospect of booty that might be easily transported back across the mountains; others though hoped for more permanent advantage in Spain. The role of early Latin military expeditions into Iberia has been closely scrutinised by historians seeking to trace the rise of the European sectarian militancy that coalesced as the First Crusade in 1095. In the west of the peninsula, however, the activities of these adventurous immigrants would have very different ramifications. For as the eleventh century drew to a close the dynastic ambitions of some of the greatest noble houses of Latin Christendom, ambitions excited and guided by Queen Constance herself, brought one immigrant Burgundian to a decisive position of power in Portugal.

Of the many early Frankish visitors to Spain the most famous was Charlemagne, who in 778 led a large army through the Pyrenees, perhaps with the aim of taking Cordoba and incorporating Spain into the western empire. Carolingian hopes quickly foundered amid the turbulent realities of peninsular politics and the most enduring legacy of the expedition was

the literary epic *Chanson de Roland*, a celebration of heroic failure that did much to keep the Spanish frontier at the forefront of aristocratic imagination in Europe. Through the long centuries that followed, individuals or small bands of warriors undertook the long journey into Spain, inspired by the romance of foreign lands, by the increasing popularity of Santiago de Compostela as a focus for international pilgrimage and by pragmatic hopes of securing booty. Their activities left little record beyond infrequent references in chronicles to an exotic visitor alleviating the routine of monastic life.⁷⁵ During the eleventh century these expeditions grew in frequency and size. One such operation, an attack on Muslim-held Barbastro in 1064, was unusually well documented and has attracted considerable subsequent attention.

The army that attacked Barbastro was a conglomerate of French and Spanish contingents and may have marched under some form of papal aegis; as a result, the expedition has on occasion been described as a 'proto-crusade'.⁷⁶ On closer consideration, however, the evidence for papal involvement in the operation has proven to be rather ephemeral.⁷⁷ The trigger for the expedition, far from being an act of Islamic aggression, was the death of King Ramiro of Aragon in the ill-fated attack on Graus in 1063 – an attack that failed due to the intervention of five hundred Leonese troops sent by King Fernando to reinforce al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza. The targeting of Barbastro, moreover, was in all likelihood orchestrated by Fernando and his allies at Cluny simply to divert the crusaders away from the more politically sensitive city of Graus.⁷⁸ The apparent ease with which the objective of the campaign was switched away from the more strategically important city seems to betray an indifference among the foreign troops to any overall Spanish strategy. In addition, their inherently mercenary attitude was very clearly, and indeed tragically, displayed immediately after the city fell. Following a bloodthirsty massacre of the unfortunate citizens of Barbastro the majority of the northern troops, now laden down with their booty, turned immediately for home. Their departure left the city fatally undermanned and several months later it fell to a vengeful Muslim army with still further loss of life.⁷⁹

The brief Christian occupation of Barbastro brought no tangible benefit to the Spanish kingdoms; indeed the sanguinary episode filled many Iberians with dismayed disgust. The northern soldiers had displayed a murderous hostility towards non-Christians that shocked a local people more acquainted with the type of measured aggression exhibited at the negotiated surrender of Coimbra in the same year to Leonese and Portuguese forces. Muslim authors expressed understandable outrage; significantly though, the Christian Spanish were also appalled by the brutality of their comrades-in-arms. This unease was reflected in a treaty concluded in 1069 between Sancho of Navarra and al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza agreeing not to entertain further alliances with French or other foreign forces.⁸⁰ The cross-cultural

animosity of the visiting troops also extended beyond Muslims to members of the Jewish minority they encountered. Thus, Alexander II felt obliged to write to the bishops of Spain soon after the expedition praising their efforts in protecting the local Jewish population from the violence of those journeying 'to fight against the Saracens.'⁸¹ These early Latin Christian visitors in fact displayed all the worst aspects of their own aggressively xenophobic culture; and due in large part to this narrowness of vision, they were unable to make any enduring strategic contribution in Spain. At the same time, however, the expedition to Barbastro may well have had a more lasting impact in a strictly non-military sphere.

Among the participants in the Barbastro campaign was Duke William III of Aquitaine who, during his stay in Iberia, seems to have struck up a friendship with King Fernando. Cordial relations between them were maintained in the years that followed, perhaps with the assistance of the ubiquitous monks of Cluny, as both men were generous patrons of the order. Eventually the developing relations between Aquitaine and León-Castile were formalised with that most important of medieval links, a dynastic marriage. The betrothal of Duke William's daughter Inés to the king's second son Alfonso took place in around 1069. The vicissitudes of Alfonso's early career delayed the final ceremony, but after his success in combining the thrones of León and Castile the value of such foreign links to a reigning monarch became more clear. Both the sweeping claims of Pope Gregory and the ill-fated military expedition of Count Ebles de Roucy had ultimately been countered by Alfonso's adroit diplomatic tactics. Yet the size of Count Ebles failed expedition – which Abbot Suger likened to armies usually fielded by kings – made clear to intelligent observers that there remained abundant enthusiasm for adventures in Spain among the European military aristocracy.⁸² Alfonso, therefore, took the prudent step of cementing relations with his own northern allies by concluding his marriage with Inés of Aquitaine in or soon after 1073. Representatives from the monastery of Cluny may well have assisted in these arrangements when they met with Alfonso at Burgos to formally accept his gift of the monastery of San Isidoro.⁸³

However, the political expediency of the marriage did not guarantee its success. After several years had passed without any sign of an heir, Alfonso was driven to repudiate the unfortunate Inés some time after 1077. Despite this first unsuccessful match, the Leonese monarch's choice for a second wife drew him even more firmly into a web of alliances involving both Cluny and the French noble houses. In 1078 Duke Hugh I of Burgundy visited Spain to test his martial prowess against the Muslims of al-Andalus, and between forays along the frontier he became aware of Alfonso's domestic situation.⁸⁴ The duke of Burgundy was closely associated with the monks of Cluny; they agreed to act as intermediaries on his behalf, and before the end of the year, his recently widowed sister Constance was betrothed to Alfonso of León-Castile. Pope Gregory raised an objection on canonical

grounds due to the close relationship between Alfonso's first and second wives, but eventually allowed himself to be persuaded to accept the match in return for royal promises concerning the abolition of Visigothic liturgy in the kingdom.⁸⁵ By 1080 Constance of Burgundy had become queen and so five years later was in a position to intervene imperiously in affairs of state by encouraging Bishop Bernard of Toledo to consecrate the Great Mosque as his cathedral – thus demonstrating herself to be a formidable proponent of Latin cultural exclusivity in Spain. Yet in the immediate aftermath of her actions in Toledo, the next wave of foreign influence into the peninsula would come not from beyond the Pyrenees, but from across the Straits of Gibraltar.

The Christian capture of Toledo was a watershed moment in the reign of Alfonso VI and indeed in Iberian history more widely. The loss of this strategic territory brought the future viability of al-Andalus into question and prompted several of the *taifa* leaders to seek aid from their co-religionists in North Africa. This was a perilous course, as the *taifa* rulers were fully aware. The African Almoravids professed a more fundamentalist expression of the Islamic faith than did the peoples of al-Andalus, and the price for their assistance was likely to be high. Yet as al-Mu'tamid of Seville bleakly observed: 'Better to pasture camels than be a swineherd'.⁸⁶ A plea for assistance was sent. The Almoravid ruler, Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn, heeded the call and his subsequent arrival in al-Andalus at the head of an army of North African troops quickly swung the balance of power against the Christians. Alfonso's forces were scattered by the combined Almoravid-Andalusi army at Zallaqa in 1086, and the king himself barely escaped the rout with his life.⁸⁷ News of the defeat inflicted on the previously all-conquering Leonese army reverberated across Spain and was heard even beyond the Pyrenees.⁸⁸ Both the monks of Cluny and the short-lived Pope Victor III (1086–1087) roused themselves to impassioned appeals for aid from the knighthood of Christendom, and they found many who were prepared to listen. In the spring of 1087 Duke Eudes I of Burgundy and William the Carpenter of Méhun mustered a substantial army for a campaign in Spain.⁸⁹ But by the time the army was actually in the field, the situation on the Spanish frontier had already begun to change.

Although the defeat at Zallaqa seemed initially to foreshadow disaster for the Spanish kingdoms, the immediate threat soon receded. The Almoravids were unable to capitalise on their victory as doubts concerning the commitment of their local allies, coupled with disturbing reports of instability in North Africa, obliged Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn to return to Morocco. The removal of this unifying force allowed the old rivalries and animosities to arise among the *taifa* leaders and all too soon their fragile alliance had broken down. Alfonso moved eagerly to exploit this fragmentation and restore the patterns of alliance that had served him so well in the past. Within two years the *taifa* leaders of Zaragoza, Valencia and Granada had agreed to renew

the payment of the *paria* tribute; and in this climate of business-as-usual, the northern allies so desperately summoned in the shadow of Zallaqa had become a potential embarrassment. In order not to upset Alfonso's diplomatic offensive the newcomers were persuaded to attack the strategically unimportant Zaragoza stronghold of Tudela and after some desultory siege-work the army dispersed northwards in April 1087, having achieved nothing worthwhile from their Spanish sojourn.⁹⁰ As the soldiers turned dispiritedly for home, some of their aristocratic leaders rode further south in order to pursue other, non-military interests in the region.

Underlying royal policy throughout Alfonso's long reign was the question of the succession. His first marriage, to Queen Inés, had been childless. Queen Constance bore the king a single daughter, Infanta Urraca, while Alfonso's extramarital affair with a Castilian noblewoman, Jimena Muñoz, had produced two further daughters, the Infantas Elvira and Teresa. The lack of a male heir to the throne, legitimate or otherwise, was a clear opportunity that ambitious nobles could not ignore. Following the failure of the siege at Tudela, Duke Eudes of Burgundy travelled to León where he confirmed a donation by Queen Constance (who was his aunt), in favour of the Burgundian abbey of Tournus. While there, and no doubt with his aunt's support, Duke Eudes entered into marriage negotiations on behalf of his brother-in-law, Count Raymond of Amous, for the hand of Infanta Urraca. These arrangements were carried through successfully and, in what was nothing short of a coup for the foreign interests in the Spanish court, the count of Amous was betrothed to the king's sole legitimate daughter. By virtue of this marriage, the immigrant Burgundian count was established as the most likely successor to the Spanish throne; in the interim, Raymond accepted as dowry the lands of Galicia and Portugal combined into a new county.⁹¹ Consequently, as a result of foreign influences in the dynastic politics of a distant royal court, the Portuguese suddenly found themselves given into the authority of an unfamiliar Burgundian nobleman. Yet this dramatic development was to be only the first of the political surprises visited on the region by the untrammelled ambitions of immigrant nobles.

The rule of the first Burgundian: Count Raymond of Galicia-Portugal

Marriage to Infanta Urraca brought Count Raymond to power in a region traditionally mistrustful of central authority and which had already been deeply unsettled by the imposition of unwanted Latin ecclesiastical arrangements on the local church. Count Raymond could hope for little popular enthusiasm from his new subjects. However, despite this initially inauspicious outlook, during the first years of his rule in Galicia-Portugal Raymond enjoyed considerable good fortune. He was able to consolidate and even extend his authority over his conglomerate territory. But this honeymoon

period was not to last. Less than five years after coming to power in Galicia-Portugal, Count Raymond faced a dramatic challenge to his position from within the Burgundian court circle itself – in the person of his cousin, Count Henry of Burgundy. The machinations and power struggles that followed would have decisive implication for the future of Portugal.

The elevation of the immigrant Count Raymond of Amous to a position as the most likely successor to the thrones of León and Castile caused a sensation in the kingdom and soon provoked opposition. The first stirrings of resistance emerged in the region Raymond had claimed as his dowry. Bishop Diego Peláez of Compostela began preaching rebellion among the local peoples and several Galician magnates were prepared to listen. The extent of the rebellion is difficult to gauge, but there are indications of other civil disturbances in Castile, possibly orchestrated by Count Garcia Alvarez; and it may be no coincidence that the Mozarabic bishop of Coimbra was ushered on his way to the Holy Land shortly after royal control was restored. The probable aim of these insurrections was to free Alfonso's brother Garcia, the former king of the lands Raymond now claimed, for only thus could the rebels hope to legitimise their defiance. Although these rebellious nobles made unlikely claims that King William of England had offered them his encouragement on the basis of old promises supposedly made to Garcia, in the absence of more concrete local support, the insurrection soon faltered and royal authority was restored. Less than two years later King Garcia of Portugal-Galicia died in his royal prison cell at Luna, removing the possibility of a legitimate pretender to the throne and making future rebellion against Alfonso's disposition of the kingdom far less likely.⁹²

Count Raymond's run of good fortune continued in the years that followed. In 1091 Count Sisnando Davides, the staunch defender of local tradition, died at Coimbra and was laid to rest in the city's cathedral (where his tomb can still be viewed). The Mozarabic count was briefly succeeded by his son-in-law, Martim Moniz; clearly though Alfonso considered Martim to be out of step with the new regime, and within two years the young man had decided that his future lay elsewhere. Martim left Coimbra to seek his fortune on the other side of the peninsula, eventually joining the retinue of the Cid in Valencia. The turnover of ecclesiastical offices during these years was even more striking. Following the abortive rebellion of Bishop Diego of Compostela, Alfonso forcibly replaced him with Pedro, the abbot of Cardena. This exercise of secular authority in ecclesiastical preferment provoked a long crisis with the papacy, which only ended with the elevation of a compromise candidate, Bishop Dalmace, who as a former monk of Cluny could be expected to find favour with Pope Urban. Meanwhile, a similar period of turbulence had unsettled the Portuguese Church. In 1091 Bishop Pedro of Braga made his ill-advised appeal to the imperial pope Clement III and was forced into monastic seclusion; his eventual replacement, Bishop Gerald, was a monk of Cluny. In Coimbra, Bishop Paternus had departed for

the Holy Land in 1188. After an uncertain period in which his Mozarabic successor Martim was unable to secure his claims, Alfonso stepped in and imposed his own choice, another former Cluniac monk, Bishop Cresconio. Thus, in only few short years, the entrenched interests of decades had been swept away leaving Raymond in firm control of the southern marches of his new county.

More distant events also seemed to conspire in Count Raymond's favour. Relations between the Almoravids and the rulers al-Andalus, which were never close, soured soon after their joint victory at Zallaqa. Following an abortive attack on Aledo in 1088, in which the fractiousness of the local Muslims had frustrated the efforts of their North African allies, Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn decided to assume direct control over al-Andalus. The end came quickly for the party kings of the *taifa* states. 'Abd Allāh was forced from Granada in September 1090; al-Mu'tamid surrendered Seville the following year and withdrew to Morocco. When a nervous Al-Mutawwakil of Badajoz sought the reassurance of a defensive alliance with the ruler of León-Castile, he found that Alfonso's price was high. Despite the resulting uproar from his own subjects al-Mutawakkil agreed in 1093 to cede Lisbon, Sintra and Santarém into Christian hands. These three strategic strongpoints gave the Christians control over the Tagus estuary and thus all the lands north to the banks of the Mondego. This additional territory, when added to the estates Raymond already controlled, made him the second most influential figure in the kingdom after Alfonso himself.⁹³

With the benefit of hindsight, the year 1093 appears to have marked the zenith of Burgundian influence in the royal court of León-Castile. Alfonso had surrounded himself with a number of individuals who were closely linked to Cluny and to the noble houses of Southern France: his wife, Queen Constance, was Burgundian, as was his heir-apparent, Count Raymond, and his most senior ecclesiastic, Archbishop Bernard. Ironically, however, even at the point of their greatest influence, this faction – for so it can justly be called – met the first of a long series of setbacks. The Almoravids were undeterred by al-Mutawakkil's alliance with Alfonso of León-Castile and in 1094 their leader, Sir b. Abī Bakr, launched a surprise attack on Badajoz. The city was taken by storm and the unfortunate al-Mutawwakil was murdered, along with his sons.⁹⁴ Count Raymond's attempt to counter the Almoravid advance ended in disaster when the Portuguese relief force was ambushed soon after leaving Santarém and driven back with heavy losses. Diego Gelmírez, future archbishop of Compostela and confidant of kings, then a young cleric in the count's household, barely escaped to tell the tale.⁹⁵

Portuguese historians have traditionally portrayed Raymond's military discomfiture as the beginning of his fall from royal favour. Under this interpretation, when Alfonso learned of the debacle he lost faith in his son-in-law's ability to defend the western marches against the Almoravid threat, and so began looking for a more suitable field commander. The

last mention of Raymond holding authority in Portugal came in the final months of 1095, and the man chosen to replace him was his own cousin, Count Henry of Burgundy.⁹⁶ To induce Henry to take on the task, Alfonso offered him the hand of his illegitimate daughter, Teresa, in marriage. Raymond's unwieldy county was divided into its Galician and Portuguese components, with the more dangerous southern portion granted to Henry on terms that as compensation were particularly generous – including hereditary title over his lands. Unlike Raymond, Henry proved equal to the challenge presented by the Almoravids and was able to secure the frontier against further incursion.⁹⁷

This explanation of events has proved eminently satisfying to Portuguese pride. Count Raymond was to become the progenitor of the Spanish royal house, while Henry founded the line of Portuguese kings! Yet two events immediately prior to the Almoravid attack on Badajoz suggest a different royal agenda behind the division of Count Raymond's territory. In 1093, probably between July and October, the Burgundians lost their most influential court ally with the death of Queen Constance.⁹⁸ Later in the same year Alfonso's concubine Zaida, daughter-in-law of his one-time ally al-Mu'tamid of Seville, gave birth to a son, Sancho Alfónsez.⁹⁹ This child completely changed the complexion of court politics. Suddenly Alfonso was presented with the long-cherished possibility that a son of his own might succeed him on the throne; and the greatest obstacle to this goal became the predominance of the Burgundians in court. Not only was Count Raymond the strongest individual rival claimant to the throne, but as a group the Latin court faction was both culturally and politically far more likely to support a Burgundian nobleman than the illegitimate son of a Muslim princess. The social exclusivity of the court Burgundians had suddenly become a threat to Alfonso's new goal; and a change in royal priorities soon became apparent to all. In 1094, the year after Sancho's birth, the king's third marriage was arranged and, in a choice that marked a significant policy shift away from Burgundy, his new wife was an Italian, named Berta.¹⁰⁰ To further weaken the influence of the Burgundian faction, a logical gambit from the politically adroit king would be to divide his opponents by setting them against each other. Fortunately for Alfonso, he had the perfect candidate close at hand.

Count Henry of Burgundy seems to have spent much of the 1090s operating as a military commander on King Alfonso's behalf, and it would have been difficult to imagine a more effective foil to Count Raymond.¹⁰¹ Of the two men Count Henry had the more exalted lineage. He was a descendant of the dukes of Burgundy and could trace his line back to the French royal family, through his grandfather Duke Robert I Capet (1032–1076), brother of King Henry I (1031–1060). Count Henry's elder brothers were Duke Hugh I (1076–1079), who renounced his title in order to become abbot of Cluny, and Duke Eudes (1079–1103); their sister was none other than Queen Constance.

Duke Eudes of Burgundy had married Sybilla, the daughter of Count William I of Burgundy (the duchy and county of Burgundy being geographically and politically distinct entities), and it was from this link that Henry drew his kinship to Count Raymond. Thus, though the two Burgundian immigrants were technically cousins, the relationship was in fact quite tenuous. Few men could have been better placed than Count Henry to split the loyalties of the Burgundian court faction; and seen in this light, Alfonso's decision to divide Count Raymond's territory becomes an act not of disappointment or anger, but rather of high politics. Yet it was also a decision that was to have dramatic, and wholly unintended, implications for the future of Portugal.

The development of relations between the Iberian frontier kingdoms and Latin Christendom during the eleventh century was a gradual, often painful process. Direct military and political intervention was frequently hampered by both European ignorance of the situation in Spain and the sharp resistance to such intervention from the local people themselves. Over time, the Iberian kings were able to mediate the demands of the Latin Christian Church and the expansionist ambitions of the southern French nobility to their own advantage, although this policy was to cause a high level of unrest among many of their subjects. Few areas of Iberia were as deeply unsettled by the early phases of the Latin Christian cultural permeation of the peninsula as was Portugal. External forces imposed new liturgical practices on an often unwilling population and transferred the most senior ecclesiastical offices into the hands of immigrant French clergymen. At the same time, the tensions created by the Burgundian influence in the royal court brought first one, and then another foreign immigrant to overall authority in the region. Nevertheless, despite these many social dislocations, the end result of this rising foreign influence was that for the first time Portugal was constituted as a discrete political entity, under the authority of Count Henry of Burgundy and Infanta Teresa.

2

Ambition in a World of Turmoil: Count Henry (1096–1112) and Infanta Teresa (1112–1128)

The marriage of Count Henry of Burgundy and Infanta Teresa was a politically motivated union of two distinct facets of eleventh-century Spanish society. Count Henry was the embodiment of Latin aristocratic culture; Infanta Teresa was the illegitimate daughter of an ancient Iberian royal house. Yet far from being an effort to reconcile two diverse strands of Spanish political life, the marriage seems in fact to have been an attempt by Alfonso of León-Castile to divide the Burgundian court faction against itself. The inherent tensions this created for the couple's authority in Portugal were evident almost from the outset, and grew even more acute as the complex tides of Latin cultural influence that had carried them to power gradually began to turn. In order to survive and prosper in a changing world, Count Henry and later Infanta Teresa were increasingly obliged to rely on local resources. Flexibility and a seemingly boundless energy served Count Henry well. He succeeded in adjusting to the new political currents and, in a relatively short period, was able to consolidate his local authority to a remarkable degree. But the fast-developing world beyond the Pyrenees could not be safely ignored. When the unexpected death of her husband brought Infanta Teresa to power in 1112, she was to find to her cost that the maintenance of effective relations with the institutions of Latin Christendom could on occasion prove decisive.

Count Henry and the consolidation of local authority

Negotiations for Count Henry's marriage to Infanta Teresa were completed by the end of 1096 and in April of the following year notaries wrote confidently of the count's rule extending 'from the Minho River to the Tagus'.¹ What, though, was the nature of this authority? The terms under which Henry received the newly created county of Portugal have taken on considerable importance for Spanish and Portuguese historians in light of the

subsequent separation of the two countries. Charters issued by Henry and Teresa from as early as 1097 describe the land as 'our inheritance' and imply that they held absolute rights over it – a situation later construed as legitimising Portuguese independence from Spain. The argument that the initial grant of Portugal was held under some form of inalienable tenure would seem to be strengthened by the recollections of the twelfth-century author of the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*:

Because of his love and honour [for Teresa], the king gave her in marriage to Count Henry and gave her a magnificent dowry by granting her the land of Portugal to hold by hereditary right.²

However this seemingly forthright statement is not as straightforward as it seems. The author's aim was to idealise Alfonso VII, the Leonese king who first recognised Portuguese independence, and a wise royal biographer would certainly see the benefit in presenting the recognition of Portugal as a result of the king's obedience to his grandfather's will rather than a humiliating loss of territory.³ For while it is certainly possible that Alfonso VI granted Portugal to Count Henry as an inalienable right, it seems more likely that there were conditions attached, possibly reflecting the feudalism Count Henry had been familiar with in his homeland. The phrasing of several documents seems to hint at this form of tenure, and Count Henry does appear to have subsequently fulfilled the classic feudal duties of military service and attendance at court – certainly this is how the relationship was interpreted in Spain a century later.⁴ Ultimately, whether or not Count Henry's relationship with the king of León-Castile was draped in the trappings of feudalism, the reality of the Burgundian count's situation was a direct dependency on the continued support of his royal father-in-law.⁵

On his arrival in Portugal Count Henry faced a number of potential challenges to his authority. The Mozarabic community nursed their grievances after losing in rapid succession their Bishop Paternus, the bishop-elect Martim, their ruler Sisnando Davides, then his son-in-law and heir Martim Moniz. The Mozarabs, in common with most of the rest of the local population, may not have seen much difference between the newly appointed Count Henry and his predecessor, Count Raymond. Nor is there any evidence that Count Henry's authority was bolstered by even a small corps of Burgundian retainers of his own. Indeed very few Frankish immigrants of any sort can be traced in the contemporary Portuguese documents and none of these immigrants held office.⁶ Count Henry could not even anticipate unqualified support from the other source of Latin Christian influence in the region: French or French-trained clergymen. In the final years of the eleventh century the local churches had much to occupy their attention, for the dioceses of the region – Braga, Coimbra, Porto, Viseu, Lamego and Tûy – were in fierce contention with each other in protection of long-accrued rights and privileges, and as primate of Spain, Archbishop Bernard

of Toledo held technical suzerainty over them all.⁷ Yet the Portuguese clergymen were simply biding their time, waiting for any opportunity to challenge the authority of Toledo. On his arrival in this turbulent county, Henry must have felt far away from all that was familiar, and very much alone. Moreover, his many obligations outside the county could only have heightened his feelings of distance from those he was expected to rule.

During the first years of his overlordship in Portugal Count Henry spent the majority of his time far from his new estates, in the company of the itinerant royal court, ensuring that his relations with King Alfonso remained close. Thus, it was a rare gathering of court nobles that did not include Count Henry in attendance and he frequently appeared as a signatory to court documents. The count's role in Leonese affairs also went beyond simply witnessing official business and taking part in court routine. In addition to attendance on the king, Count Henry was also called upon to command royal armies in military actions far from Portugal. In November 1101, Henry led a large force to defeat south of Toledo, near the hamlet of Malagón, although he emerged unscathed himself. The following year the count once again took command of the armies south of Toledo. On this occasion the Christians were on the defensive and seemed to have enjoyed greater success.⁸ Rather than an independent local magnate, Henry thus appears during this period to have been acting more as an agent of the crown. Meanwhile, the day-to-day administration of the county rested in the safe hands of Soeiro Mendes of Maia, the governor of Coimbra and perhaps also the guardian of the young Infanta Teresa until her coming of age. In a recognition of Soeiro's importance as the local caretaker of his interests one of Count Henry's first official documents was a rich grant to the governor of Coimbra.⁹

Even as Count Henry was thus attempting to balance his Portuguese responsibilities with his interests in the Leonese court, developments in the ecclesiastical sphere were creating further opportunities for local unrest. The final decades of the eleventh century had been a difficult time for the clergy of Braga. Bishop Pedro's poorly conceived submission to the imperial pope Clement III in 1091 had led to Pedro's own deposition after which the *cathedra* had remained empty for several years. In the absence of strong leadership Braga's ecclesiastical rivals were able to advance their causes unhindered. Neighbouring bishops laid claims to a number of territories long held by the ancient metropolitan church; looming behind these squabbles was the tendentious issue of the extent of the archbishop of Toledo's primatial rights over the region, which had yet to be satisfactorily defined.¹⁰ The appointment of the saintly Gerald of Moissac as bishop in 1097 marked a significant turning point in the fortunes of the church in Braga.¹¹ Bishop Gerald was a former monk of Cluny and protégée of Archbishop Bernard of Toledo, although his relations with his old mentor soon cooled due to Bernard's resistance to the restoration of Braga's metropolitan status. Moreover, Bishop Gerald faced a difficult situation almost immediately on

his arrival in the disheartened region. In 1098 Bishop Cresconio of Coimbra died and was succeeded by Maurice, an independent-minded Cluniac monk also recruited by Bernard of Toledo from France. A dispute of unknown cause soon arose as the new incumbent sought to test Gerald's authority.¹² In the face of these provocations the bishop of Braga deemed it prudent to make the long journey to Rome in order to put his case personally to the papal court. This was a controversial action, in clear defiance of Bernard of Toledo's position of overall authority in the peninsula. Nevertheless, the direct approach soon bore fruit. In 1100 a new papal legate, Cardinal Richard of Marseilles, arrived in Spain where, despite Archbishop Bernard's own legatine status, he convened an ecclesiastical council at Palencia. This council proved to be a coup for Gerald of Braga: the ancient metropolitan rights of his church were formally acknowledged and Cardinal Richard recognised Gerald's own archiepiscopal status.¹³

The newly recognised archbishop of Braga had little time to savour this measure of success, for another threat was rising to the north. In 1095 Bishop Dalmace of Iria had used the opportunity presented by the Council of Clermont to secure a double triumph. The episcopal seat of Iria was transferred to Santiago de Compostela and freed from the oversight of either Braga or Toledo – it was a success that would have dramatic long-term implications throughout the peninsula.¹⁴ The death of Bishop Dalmace the following year led to a disputed succession and only after papal intervention did Diego Gelmírez, a native of Galicia and long-time administrator of the see, emerge victorious.¹⁵ This was a fortunate development for later historians as Diego Gelmírez encouraged and supported the production of an invaluable chronicle of his church: the *Historia Compostellana*.¹⁶ Starkly revealed in the pages of this history are Bishop Diego's boundless ambitions for Compostela, and also his willingness to use forceful, even unscrupulous methods to gain these ends. The new bishop's political style was well demonstrated in his early relations with Archbishop Gerald.

One point of contention between the two administrations was Compostela's claims over the churches of St Vitor and St Fructuoso in the suburbs of Braga. Fearing, perhaps, that Gerald's strengthening position would see Compostela divested of these assets, Diego Gelmírez resorted to plundering them. Under cover of an assessment of his holdings, the bishop seized the relics of several saints and bore them in triumph back to his own cathedral.¹⁷ While the Galicians could describe this 'pious theft' (*pium latrocinium*) in terms of divine will, the local Portuguese were filled with an outrage still echoed by modern writers.¹⁸ In the face of such provocation Archbishop Gerald once again set out for Rome, possibly in the company of Count Henry, and received a sympathetic hearing in the papal court. In April 1103 Pope Paschal (1099–1118) confirmed the actions of the council of Palencia and formally recognised Gerald as archbishop. The dependent bishoprics were named as Astorga, Lugo, Túj, Mondoñedo, Orense and

Porto. The contested status of Coimbra, which despite its proximity to Braga had been claimed by both Toledo and Compostela, was also addressed. In 1103 Coimbra and its controversially dependent sees of Viseu and Lamego were all placed under Gerald's authority.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Bishop Diego of Compostela refused to be discouraged. Two years later he returned to Rome by way of Cluny, hoping to secure the elevation of his own see to metropolitan status. Pope Paschal was unwilling to grant such a sweeping request, although he soothed the ambitious prelate by granting him the right to wear the regalia of an archbishop on certain feast days.²⁰ As a result of these decisions, the traditional predominance Braga had enjoyed in the region appeared to have been re-established.

Count Henry's role in these ecclesiastical machinations had been one of careful, ostensible neutrality. Publicly he accepted the authority of Bernard of Toledo in matters of local church organisation and did not demur when the archbishop placed his own candidates in vacant Portuguese sees. In a similar spirit, the pragmatic count of Portugal made pious grants to churches on all sides of these disputes.²¹ This is not to say that he was disinterested in the outcome. The Burgundian count would certainly have been aware that Archbishop Gerald's success in defending the prestige of the region's premier church could only reflect well on his own leadership. There was, however, another aspect to the archbishop's activities that Henry may have viewed with considerably less equanimity. Gerald of Braga saw it as his duty to take the lead in forwarding the reform that the papacy's social agenda called for. He was committed to the imposition of religious conformity throughout the region and, more controversially, he demanded absolute ecclesiastical independence from lay authority. Archbishop Gerald's biographer, Archdeacon Bernard (himself an immigrant Frenchman, and the future bishop of Coimbra), recalled with evident pride the firm stand Gerald took in the face of pressure from such leading local magnates as Count Soeiro Mendes de Maia, the influential governor of Coimbra.²² Yet such confrontations between local aristocrats and newly arrived foreign ecclesiastics placed Count Henry in a delicate situation. He owed his position to Latin Christian influences in the royal court and was to a certain degree obliged to encourage such efforts at Church reform. However, his support was a careful balancing act in which ecclesiastical expectations had to be satisfied – without alienating those powerful local interests he simply could not afford to number among his enemies.

Count Henry realised early that to sustain his authority in Portugal in the longer term he needed to create an effective base of local support. He was also astute enough to recognise that the key to local authority was to translate the resources of the county into effective troops and that the surest way to secure the respect of his subjects was to lead such troops in successful campaigns. The traditional means to attract noble supporters was through the carefully targeted disbursement of goods and lands. Count Henry

certainly pursued this course and in one charter addressed Soeiro Mendes, the beneficiary of considerable largess, as 'our loyal vassal'. At the same time Henry also made efforts to strengthen his relationship with another source of potential support. The first extant document Henry issued as count of Portugal was a *foral*, or town charter, granted to Guimarães. This charter encouraged the development of the town and at the same time created a certain commonality of interest between the count and the citizens. The charter also delineated the military obligations of the townsfolk of Guimarães both in attack and defence. Only a matter of months later a similar charter was granted to the town of Constantim de Panoias and many others were to follow.²³ Yet securing the support of local forces was one thing; leading them effectively in the field proved more difficult. Although few reliable accounts of border actions survive from these years, it seems likely that in 1103 an army patrolling the frontier was surprised by Almoravid forces at Vatalandi and driven back with in disarray. Numbered among the casualties were two of Count Henry's important local aristocratic supporters, Soeiro Fromerges and Mendo Cresconius.²⁴

The first years of Count Henry's rule in Portugal were, when taken in their entirety, a time of mixed success. Henry made strenuous efforts to impose his authority on the fractious county by forging links with leading sections of the Portuguese aristocracy, supporting the ambitions of the regional clergy and encouraging the development of local urban communities. Yet despite these efforts he remained something of an outsider. His authority in the region remained firmly reliant on the continued support of the distant royal court. Moreover, as a Burgundian, the count was inevitably associated with those disruptive and sometimes unpopular manifestations of Latin culture that were transforming the lives of local people. As a new century dawned Henry was to find that his associations with the institutions of Latin Christendom became increasingly difficult to harmonise with local authority. For even as he sought to consolidate his position in Portugal the nature of European contacts with the Iberian peninsula entered a period of profound and ultimately fundamental change.

Cross currents: Latin Christian influence in Iberia during the twelfth century

Count Henry had come to Portugal on the first waves of Latin Christian cultural expansion into Iberia, but even as he was taking up his new authority in the region the very nature of European intervention into the peninsula was shifting. The first and most obvious factor behind this change was the declaration of the First Crusade in 1095. Ironically, even though the crusading movement would become a definitive manifestation of Latin Christian military and cultural expansionism, the crusade also focused this enthusiasm eastward towards distant Jerusalem. The romance and adventure of

the Spanish frontier was almost immediately eclipsed by the lure of the East. Meanwhile a more subtle shift in relations between Iberia and Latin Christendom was taking place which, though overshadowed by events in the Holy Land, was nonetheless of profound significance in Portugal. Even as European attention was being drawn away from Spain the monks of Cluny, the ubiquitous agents of Latin interests in the peninsula, had for a variety of reasons begun to lose their influence over royal policy in León-Castile. These two developments had the potential to dramatically undermine Henry's position in Portugal; in fact, however, they highlighted one of the most striking features of his character. Count Henry was the consummate opportunist. No matter what situation presented itself, the count was usually able to derive maximum personal advantage from rapidly changing circumstances.

In November 1095 the town of Clermont in southern France was the stage for a general ecclesiastical council, and at the close of proceedings, Pope Urban II came before the assembly with a radical proposition. Secular knights were called upon to undertake an armed pilgrimage to assist Eastern Christians and to wrest the city of Jerusalem from Muslim control. Those willing to do so would be granted highly valued spiritual rewards. The great novelty of the appeal made by Pope Urban at Clermont, indeed the reason for his success, was the inspired combination of the ancient tradition of pilgrimage with the newer concept of holy war. While an arduous pilgrimage was a well-understood means of achieving spiritual grace, the concept of holy war rested on a more tendentious theoretical basis. Central to the thinking of the reform papacy was the ideal of a single Christian community united under the spiritual authority of the pope. In this world view the true calling of the knighthood was to defend the whole of Christendom against internal or external threats. The duty to defend threatened fellow Christians provided the rationale for holy war – yet it was a concept that cut across the more local loyalties of secular society and was by no means widely understood, let alone accepted, by all the early crusaders. The Holy City was the iconic image that drew them across the known world, and the remarkable success of the expedition in the East reinforced the centrality of Jerusalem in the popular conception of the crusade. As enthusiasm for the crusade surged, and Latin Christian attention turned inexorably eastwards, leading clergymen began to grow concerned about the effect of the crusade on the defence of other frontier regions of Christendom. Papal authorities attempted to redirect at least a measure of crusading enthusiasm away from the Holy Land and towards alternative military theatres, including Iberia. Perhaps the clearest indication of the difficulties they faced in this task is the reaction of the Iberian peoples themselves to this new form of religious militancy.

The first tidings of the crusade to reach Iberia were borne by the Spanish delegates actually present at the council. Bishop Dalmace of Compostela

was certainly in attendance as he was successful in obtaining his exemption from the authority of Braga. Presumably representatives from Braga also attended the council in an effort to counter Dalmace's arguments. Bernard of Toledo was present and took an active role at the council, arbitrating a dispute between two abbots from Languedoc. Other likely attendees include the bishops of Tarragona, Lugo, Pamplona and Vich, and representatives from the Castilian monastery of Sahagún.²⁵ Moreover, the call to crusade appears to have been heeded by a number of Iberian nobles. Pedro Gutiérrez of León and Fernando Díaz of Asturias are known to have returned from the East in 1100 bearing a valuable relic to the monastery of Sahagún. Other participants identified from charter evidence include Fortún Sanchez, Anzar Garcés of Medinuela, the brothers Fortún and Sancho Iniquez, and Anzar Jiménez of Aois. Two knights of Burgundian ancestry living in Spain, Bernard II of Besalú and Hugh II of Empurias, also seem to have joined the expedition.²⁶ A more famous aspiring recruit was Bernard of Toledo himself who, immediately on his return from the Council of Clermont, declared his intention of joining the crusading armies. After gaining grudging approval from Alfonso he set off, only to be forestalled by a Mozarabic rebellion against his lieutenants in the city. He was forced to return and reassert his authority before departing once again. When he did at last reach Rome he was to be disappointed, for Pope Urban personally ordered his over-enthusiastic subordinate back to Spain.²⁷

The peremptory treatment of the errant Archbishop Bernard typifies the attitude the papacy adopted to Spanish participation in Holy Land campaigns. In the years after the declaration of the crusade, Urban continued to emphasise the merit of defending Christians – the holy war facet of crusading – in the face of popular enthusiasm for the idea of an armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Thus, between 1096 and 1099, Urban made a strenuous effort to bolster the defence of Tarragona by dissuading local soldiers from setting out for the East.

Since the knights of other lands have unanimously resolved to go to the aid of the church of Asia and to liberate their brethren from the tyranny of the Saracens so also – I admonish you to this – so you assist the church adjoining you in continuous efforts against the assaults of the Saracens! Whoever falls on this campaign for love of God and his neighbour, let him not doubt that he will find the forgiveness of all his sins and eternal life through God's gracious mercy. And if one of you has resolved upon the journey to Asia, let him rather fulfil his pious purpose here. For it is of no service to liberate Christians from Saracens in one place and to deliver them in another to Saracen tyranny and oppression.²⁸

Nor was this an isolated injunction. In a letter to Bishop Pedro of Huesca in May 1098, Urban was willing to compare recent Aragonese gains with the

actions of the crusaders in Palestine, linking both fronts with the struggle against Muslim aggression.²⁹ Yet even secular leaders in Iberia were caught up in the general eagerness to visit the Holy Land. King Pedro of Aragon took the cross in 1100 with the intention of journeying eastwards, but was persuaded by Urban's successor, Paschal II, to direct his energies against the Muslim-held city of Zaragoza.³⁰ Count Henry of Burgundy also left the peninsula, ostensibly to travel to Jerusalem, although he actually went no further than Rome.³¹ Ultimately Pope Paschal formally forbade any Spanish troops from leaving for Jerusalem when their own kingdom was in danger of Muslim attack. The frequent reiteration of this point by subsequent popes and by Iberian prelates suggests that belief in the merits of defending Christendom as an end in itself was not as widely held as senior clergymen might wish.³²

In addition to discouraging departures from Iberia, the papacy also offered spiritual inducements to those prepared to stay. In 1110 and 1111 Pope Paschal instructed clergymen in Coimbra to offer spiritual benefits to soldiers aiding in the defence of the city.³³ An assault launched by Italian and Catalan forces in 1114–1146 to dislodge Muslim forces from the Balearic Islands also enjoyed such papal encouragement. Participants proudly wore their crosses and were assured they would benefit spiritually from their actions. At the council of Toulouse in January 1116 the assembled nobility were called upon to take the *via de Hispania* to the Holy Land; and Pope Gelasius II offered plenary indulgence to all those who agreed to do so.³⁴ Encouraged by this overt, if tenuous link back to the ideals of pilgrimage, a number of knights from southern France answered the call, including several recently returned Jerusalem veterans. An assault was launched against Zaragoza and, unlike the unfortunate inhabitants of Jerusalem in 1099, when the Muslim defenders surrendered in December 1118 they were allowed to leave the city unmolested. Surrounding towns capitulated soon afterwards.³⁵ Nevertheless, despite this success, papal efforts to organise further expeditions proved fruitless. In 1123 Pope Calixtus II formally established the spiritual equivalence of the Spanish and Palestinian theatres, a correlation that was confirmed by the Lateran Council of the same year.³⁶ Yet no major campaigns followed.

The lukewarm reaction to papal assurances that defending the frontier in Iberia was of comparable spiritual merit to the armed pilgrimage to Palestine, assurances that in many ways resembled an exercise in damage limitation, indicates that Jerusalem retained its magnetic allure for crusaders. However, for the peoples living on the western seaboard of the Iberian Peninsula, a growing European enthusiasm for the journey to the Holy City was to have unexpected implications. Prior to the council of Clermont the impact of visiting Latin Christian soldiery was felt most intensely in the north-eastern areas of the peninsula, the lands most readily accessible to contingents from beyond the Pyrenees. These patterns of contact changed markedly after

1095. Although in the first decades after Clermont the main crusading armies marched eastwards across Europe, a great many crusaders from the Atlantic coastal towns chose instead to take the sea-route to Jerusalem. The eastwards voyage took them along the Portuguese coast, through the Straits of Gibraltar, and then across the Mediterranean to the Levantine seaboard. Northern flotillas are known to have operated along the Palestinian coast during the First Crusade and rendered valuable service to the hard-pressed land forces.³⁷ While such fleets would presumably have stopped in Portugal during their voyage, it is not until some years after the First Crusade that even partial evidence survives of their activities. In 1107 King Sigurd of Norway led a large, heavily armed flotilla to Jerusalem and his adventures were subsequently recorded by a bard of the royal household. After accepting the hospitality of Henry I of England, the Norwegian fleet crossed to the Portuguese coast in 1108. As they sailed southwards the maritime crusaders attacked Sintra, Lisbon and Alcácer do Sal, plundering freely and slaying those Muslims they captured who would not renounce their faith. After similar depredations in the Balearic Islands the fleet reached Palestine, where they served for a time with King Baldwin I of Jerusalem. Meanwhile Count Henry, ever ready to take advantage of unexpected opportunities, had made the most of the Norwegians' cataclysmic visit to Sintra by reoccupying the depopulated city himself.³⁸

Such opportunism in the face of a rapidly changing world was an outstanding feature of Count Henry's character. This political acumen was to stand the count in good stead, for in the final years of the eleventh century the position of the Latin court faction – on which he owed his rise to power – began to deteriorate. Even as the declaration of the First Crusade opened a new and violent chapter in relations between Latin Christendom and the Islamic world, and dramatically redrew the patterns of European contact with Iberia, another of the major pillars of Latin influence in the peninsula had begun to tremble. During the eleventh century the monastery of Cluny had become the most influential European institution in Spain, due primarily to the close relationship the monks had forged with King Alfonso of León-Castile. The fantastic wealth Alfonso gained by coercing *paria* tributes from the *taifa* kingdoms enabled him to maintain an exclusive arrangement with Cluny; in return the monks had provided unrivalled spiritual comfort and occasionally decisive political intervention. However, as Alfonso's long reign gradually entered a difficult final phase, the monks of Cluny were to find the ageing monarch less and less amenable to their suggestions. One important reason for this cooling of relations was the failure of the economic basis on which the alliance had been built.

The Almoravid intervention in the peninsula and the destruction of the Spanish army at Zallaqa in 1086 brought a temporary end to Muslim payment of the *paria* tribute. In the midst of this shattering crisis the directing of large consignments of gold northwards to Cluny, once a sound and easily

supported investment, became increasingly burdensome to the Leonese monarch. In the years immediately after Zallaqa Alfonso was briefly able to reimpose the *paria* tribute on the *taifa* leaders, and in response to strident complaints from the suddenly impecunious monks he made a lump-sum back-payment to the monastery of some 10,000 gold dinars. Yet it had become clear to perceptive observers that the river of *taifa* gold was at last drying up. The rapid Almoravid takeover of al-Andalus in the 1090s progressively reduced the amount of *paria* tribute Alfonso received until by the beginning of the twelfth century the payments stopped altogether.

Alfonso's financial embarrassment allowed King Pedro of Aragon to ingratiate himself at Cluny by offering generous cash grants in 1097 and 1101. These one-time payments, probably shares of the spoils from the capture of Huesca and Barbastro, were far removed from the annual tribute arrangements entered into by Alfonso of León-Castile. Nevertheless, this generosity secured for Pedro a place in the monastery's daily prayers and in the thoughts of the abbot of Cluny.³⁹ More importantly, the exclusive access Alfonso had for so long enjoyed at Cluny was at an end. Soon afterwards, Count Henry also made several donations to the order. The first of these, São Pedro de Rates, was given to the Cluniac dependency of Sainte-Marie de la Charité-sur-Loire in March 1100. Another property, Santa Justa de Coimbra, was granted to La Charité early the following year.⁴⁰ Yet even though the monks of Cluny were successful in obtaining alternative patrons in Iberia to at least partially offset the loss of the annual Leonese tribute, they paid a price for this opportunism. When Alfonso had been able to monopolise the monks' goodwill they had lobbied for him alone and their voices could be decisive; by spreading their attentions, by attempting to serve many masters, their overall influence in the peninsula could only become compromised.

Nor was the uncomfortable issue of the gold tribute the only cause for a marked cooling of relations between Alfonso of León-Castile and the monks of Cluny. Another developing point of tension was, if anything, even more acute, for it concerned the very future of the throne itself. Royal policy for much of Alfonso's long reign had been dominated by the question of the succession. The monks of Cluny had become accustomed to playing a central role in the dynastic politics of the realm, first by assisting in the arrangement of Alfonso's marriages to a series of Burgundian noblewomen, then by encouraging the marriage between Count Raymond and Infanta Urraca that established the immigrant Burgundian as Alfonso's most likely heir. But no sooner had the monks arranged dynastic matters in Spain to their complete satisfaction than the birth of Alfonso's natural son Sancho in 1093 cast a shadow of doubt over these long-formulated strategies. The prospect of Infante Sancho, this son of a Christian father and a Muslim mother, claiming the throne of León-Castile was in accordance with neither the plans nor the cultural prejudices of the monks of Cluny. Nevertheless, as Sancho safely negotiated the perils of infancy and began to show promise as

a future leader, Alfonso's desire to have his own son succeed him strengthened. The simmering tensions in the court came to a climax in January 1103 when, at an ecclesiastical council convened at Carrión de los Condes by Bernard of Toledo, the young Sancho was formally presented to the court, and so officially established within the line of succession to the throne.⁴¹ The threat to the joint interests of the Burgundians and the monks of Cluny had become very real, and so they moved surreptitiously to mobilise their own forces.

Under the pretext of a meeting to negotiate Count Henry's donations to the monastery of La Charité it seems likely that another, more dangerous series of discussions took place. With the monks of Cluny acting as mediators, Count Raymond and Count Henry agreed to bury their differences and laid plans for a coordinated strategy to rise above their court rivals when Alfonso's long reign came to an end. The terms of their association were carefully laid out in a remarkable document that has become known as the 'Succession Pact'.⁴² Count Henry formally agreed that in the event of Alfonso's death he would support his cousin's rights to the Leonese crown. In return he would receive a third share of the treasury and possession of either Toledo or, should the city be unavailable, Galicia. The pact was witnessed by Dalmace Geret of Cluny, the monk who had in happier times collected the monastery's annual tribute from King Alfonso. Not surprisingly, this agreement has attracted a great deal of speculation over its context and implications, with interpretation being complicated by uncertainty over the date the document was drawn up. Yet such a plot would be difficult to imagine prior to the ageing king's acceptance of his son Sancho – in many ways the antithesis of the Latin Christian ideal of a secular ruler – as heir to the throne of León-Castile. For not only did the Succession Pact record a desperate and indeed a treasonous conspiracy, the agreement also clearly showed just how far from royal favour and influence the once all-powerful monks of Cluny had fallen.

In the turbulent wake of his meeting with Count Raymond and Dalmace Geret Count Henry disappeared from Iberia for several months, although his whereabouts are hinted at by a Portuguese document issued in May 1103, which acknowledged the assistance Soeiro Mendes had rendered to Infanta Teresa while her husband was undertaking the journey to Jerusalem. In reality, however, rather than take the long and dangerous road to the Holy Land, the count appears to have gone no further than Rome. While Count Henry's motives for visiting Rome are obscure, given the uncertain prospects of the Burgundian faction in León-Castile, it seems likely he sought to re-establish his own lines of communication with the world north of the Pyrenees in anticipation of the coming confrontation in Iberia.⁴³ This would certainly have been in character. During the first decade of his rule in Portugal, Count Henry revealed a highly developed ability to manipulate his Latin cultural heritage to the highest advantage; so too he was also able

to find opportunity for gain even when the tides of European influence were shifting. To Henry the crusade could be a source of unexpected military opportunity, or it could be a means to camouflage his own motives in journeying northwards. So too the division of the royal court into factions and the deteriorating position of the Cluniac monks provided Henry with the means to extract valuable promises from his cousin and to have them ratified by an unimpeachable spiritual authority. Such canny opportunism would serve Count Henry well. For from 1107 a series of unexpected disasters cast the Iberian kingdoms into a seemingly endless cycle of deepening turmoil.

The greatest prize of all: Henry's royal ambitions

Count Henry's visit to Rome proved to be a relatively short one and by July 1103 he had returned to Portugal.⁴⁴ There were certainly reasons enough for him to conclude his business outside the peninsula with such alacrity. In the years after the council of Carrión de los Condes the political situation in Iberia grew ever more tense as the stark choice of the succession became clearer. On one hand there was the Burgundian Count Raymond, in many ways an exemplar of Latin Christian cultural influence in the region. Opposed to him was Sancho, a child of the Iberian culture of *convivencia* and heir to the traditions of both Muslim and Christian worlds. The cultural direction of the kingdom seemed very much at stake. But in the end not even the relative stability of this confrontation of diametric opposites was to last. In the final years of Alfonso's reign a series of sudden deaths and disasters radically changed the political situation in the royal court. Uncertainty and civil disorder spread across the kingdom. Yet Count Henry soon proved himself highly capable of meeting new and unexpected challenges. Rising anarchy in the Christian kingdoms gave Count Henry wide scope for the exercise of his particular talents, until it seemed he need only reach out his hand to seize a royal crown of his own.

On 1 March 1106 the supporters of the Burgundian court faction had cause for great celebration when Infanta Urraca gave birth to a son. Count Raymond named the child Alfonso in honour of his father-in-law the king, rather than after his own father, Count William. This politic christening emphasised the child's importance. While Alfonso of Galicia lived, he guaranteed the succession of Count Raymond's own authority into the next generation and so greatly strengthened his family's claims for the throne of León-Castile. In the royal court, however, the appearance of a legitimate male heir in Galicia deepened the rift between the competing factions and cast into despondency those who still held out hope that King Alfonso's reign might not end in a battle for the vacant throne. Yet the celebrations in the north-east were soon to be curtailed. Less than eighteen months after the birth of his son Count Raymond fell seriously ill. The

efforts of the court physicians and the earnest prayers of his monastic allies proved equally unavailing and the count succumbed on 20 September 1107. The death of Count Raymond was a bitter blow to the hopes of the court Burgundians, and a council was quickly convened at León in an attempt to salvage as much from the situation as possible. The delegates were an impressive collection of foreign and local dignitaries, including Archbishop Guy of Vienne, the future Pope Calixtus II (1119–1124), who was Raymond's younger brother, and he intended to ensure that the rights of his family were respected. At this council Urraca was confirmed as ruler in Galicia, while her son Alfonso Raímundez was given into the care of Bishop Diego Gelmírez of Compostela.⁴⁵ These efforts though were clearly defensive in purpose, a circling of the Burgundian wagons; for with Raymond's death the untroubled accession of King Alfonso's own son Sancho to the throne appeared to have been all but guaranteed.

In the years after the formal presentation of the young Sancho at the royal court in 1103 Alfonso had worked hard to strengthen his son's position. In May 1106 Alfonso married his long-time concubine Zaida, who converted to Christianity and took the name Elizabeth. This was a precursor to Alfonso's official declaration the following year of Sancho as his successor and from March 1107 Sancho appeared in official documents as heir-apparent to the kingdom.⁴⁶ Once again, however, the uncertainties of life on the Iberian frontier were to intervene, rending asunder the careful plans of kings and counsellors. In the spring of 1108 a large Almoravid army advanced towards Toledo; in order to further cement his position as heir to the throne the young prince was appointed as titular commander of the defending army. On May 29 the two forces met at Uclés where, after initial success, the Christian army was overwhelmed by superior numbers. The prince and his bodyguard managed to flee the rout and sought shelter in the village of Belinchón, north-east of Toledo – but this safety was to prove illusory. Once inside the walls they were suddenly set upon and murdered by the Muslim inhabitants of the town. In a tragic irony the young prince, the best hope for those seeking to counter the seemingly inexorable rise of the Burgundian faction and the Latin cultural exclusivity they represented, was killed by those *mudejar* Muslims who had most to lose from the decline in the pragmatic culture of *convivencia*.⁴⁷ The remnants of the scattered Christian army bore back to King Alfonso the terrible news that in the space of a day the kingdom had lost not only the designated heir to the throne but also a large number of his most trusted nobles. In Guimarães, meanwhile, reports of the disaster at Uclés no doubt provoked a more equivocal reaction. For the deaths of first Count Raymond and then Prince Sancho within the space of a year had left very few viable heirs between Count Henry and the throne of León-Castile.

When the disheartened royal court met again at Sahugún in September Count Henry was in expectant attendance. Fortunately for the depleted

Spanish forces, the Almoravids had not followed up their victory at Uclés and so the most pressing issue before the assembled nobles became the urgent need to re-establish the line of succession: the count of Portugal was suddenly very close to the Spanish throne. No direct male heirs, legitimate or otherwise, had survived and though the ageing King Alfonso had married once again, to Beatrice of Burgundy, the marriage produced no children.⁴⁸ King Alfonso's options appeared to have narrowed to the choice between a legitimate daughter with an infant son and a illegitimate daughter with an experienced husband. Count Henry's hopes were to be dashed, however, for the king of León-Castile had clearly set his mind against a Burgundian succession and was able to conceive of another, unexpected alternative. He decided to marry his recently widowed daughter Infanta Urraca to his long-standing rival, Alfonso I 'el Batallador' of Aragon (1104–1134). The majority of his own nobles seem to have opposed this scheme and suggested instead one of their own number, Count Gomez González, as a more popular alternative. The clergy were also unsettled by their king's choice, with Bernard of Toledo voicing deep reservations on the grounds of consanguinity.⁴⁹ Refusing to be gainsaid, the old king opened negotiations with Aragon. By 1109 these arrangements were well in hand and in May of that year Alfonso formally declared Urraca to be his heir. This was one of his final acts, and Alfonso died in Toledo in July 1109. Despite their many misgivings, both nobility and clergy followed their monarch's last commands. Infanta Urraca was proclaimed queen and arrangements for her marriage to King Alfonso of Aragon were completed.⁵⁰ With their rights ignored and their hopes dwindling, Count Henry and Infanta Teresa swept out of the royal court, never to return.

On their arrival back in Portugal the couple faced another crisis and a decisive test of the strategies of leadership Count Henry had pursued through the first decade of his rule. Having broken with the royal court, the Portuguese rulers could no longer look to the moral or physical support of the Leonese crown to buttress their own authority. News of the events that had culminated at Sahagún sparked agitation across the county and the first fires of rebellion were already being kindled. The citizens of Sintra rose in revolt almost as soon as reports of King Alfonso's death reached them. Such civil unrest seems to have quickly spread further north, particularly in those predominantly Mozarabic regions where the inhabitants had been most deeply aggrieved by the many changes wrought upon their society in the name of religious and cultural conformity. Perhaps too they found a natural leader in the person of Martim Moniz, the son-in-law of Count Sisnando Davides, who during the long years of Count Henry's rule had served in Valencia and Aragon, but who may well have scented opportunities in his homeland following the death of the Leonese king.⁵¹ In any event, Count Henry reacted quickly and effectively to these dangers, and within the space of a year order had been restored throughout the county.

A hint of the extent of the insurrection, and the count's response to the more troublesome of his subjects, is indicated in a town charter granted in 1111 to Coimbra – home to a large and restive Mozarabic community. Under the terms of the new *foral* the citizens agreed to accept the exile of several of their more spirited fellows, to refrain from concluding alliances or agreements with other nobles, and never again to take up arms in defiance of Count Henry's authority.⁵²

The restoration of a level of internal stability within Portugal was doubly crucial for the count because developments on the wider Iberian stage also demanded his attention, with opportunities and potential perils emerging on all sides. Much of the news he received from the royal court would no doubt have given him cause for optimism. The precipitous marriage between Queen Urraca and King Alfonso of Aragon was already beginning to show signs of instability. Neither the nobility nor the clergy of the kingdom had supported the union, and it quickly became apparent that the royal couple were personally incompatible. Children might have cemented the arrangement, but as the relationship between husband and wife cooled this possibility seemed increasingly remote. For despite a well-deserved military reputation Alfonso was capable of a boorishness that, even by the standards of the age, was extreme. By April 1111 the couple had parted amid considerable acrimony. Tense negotiations to conclude the terms of their separation were broken off almost before they had begun, and when Aragonese forces occupied Toledo it became clear that arms would decide the many unresolved issues between them.⁵³ Meanwhile, Queen Urraca's situation was further complicated by the peripheral claims raised in Galicia by the supporters of her son, Alfonso Raimúndez. These nobles were adamant that the neither her marriage to the king of Aragon nor the terms of their separation would be allowed to impinge on the child's hereditary rights.

After a period of equivocation it was to this group of Galician nobles that Count Henry first offered his support. Count Raymond's son was the vessel for what remained of the Burgundian faction's hopes in the royal court, and Henry may also have felt obligated by the terms of the Succession Pact to aid his cousin's son. Thus, in 1110, the count of Portugal conspired with Count Pedro Froilaz, the leading local supporter of Alfonso Raimúndez, in capturing a group of Queen Urraca's Galician partisans. These unfortunates were then used to force the surrender of a border castle on the Minho River. However, in the following year, when Urraca's marriage with King Alfonso of Aragon finally broke down, Count Henry scented greater gains might be won by realigning himself with Aragonese interests. The Portuguese count demanded a high price in ceded estates for his cooperation, but then quickly proved himself to be more than worth his fee. The combined Portuguese and Aragonese army routed Queen Urraca's forces at the battle of Candespina on 26 October 1111. Among the casualties was Count Gomez González, the nobleman earlier suggested as the local alternative to the Aragonese king for

Urraca's hand, who was reportedly slain by Count Henry himself.⁵⁴ Yet in the wake of victory Henry began to have second thoughts about the advisability of too close a relationship with the belligerent king of Aragon. When agents from Queen Urraca's camp offered him similar spoils for his support he joined forces with his erstwhile enemy; together they moved against the suddenly outmanoeuvred King Alfonso, who wisely retreated to reconsider his next move.

The alliance of convenience between Count Henry and Queen Urraca did not long survive the withdrawal of an imminent threat. The queen was no doubt daunted by the high price of Portuguese assistance, but she also had good reason to be wary of too heavy a reliance on the Count Henry. The ruler of Portugal had two daughters, Urraca and Sancha; but in 1109 or possibly 1110 Teresa gave birth to a son, who was christened Afonso in honour of his royal grandfather.⁵⁵ The birth of Afonso greatly strengthened the Portuguese dynasty, and the child's name was an indication of his parents' wider ambitions. According to an anonymous author at the monastery of Sahagún, when Teresa learned of her husband's activities she berated him for not demanding from Urraca an equal share of the kingdom for his assistance against the king of Aragon. News of this, and reports that her half-sister had adopted the trappings of royalty, induced Queen Urraca to begin secret negotiations with her estranged husband, King Alfonso. A brief alliance followed, but was soon destroyed by the mutual distrust of the former husband and wife. By the end of the year Count Henry seems to have returned into the orbit of the king of Aragon and they appeared together in Sahagún; this though proved to be a brief liaison and in the following year he had returned to the queen's camp as part of a grand alliance of local forces she had laboriously pieced together. This unsteady conglomerate of local forces proved sufficient to counter the Aragonese army, and at Astorga the invaders were put to flight. The allies then pursued King Alfonso back to Carrión and briefly besieged him there, before retreating westward again.⁵⁶

In the midst of this intricate political manoeuvring the ever-present threat of Muslim al-Andalus was all but forgotten, and for the Portuguese rulers this was to prove a dangerous lapse. In 1111 the formidable Almoravid leader Sīr b. Abī Bakr launched a major offensive against the distracted Portuguese defenders in the Tagus valley. The frontier bulwark of Santarém was captured, prompting the collapse of the Christian defence line on the northern bank of the river. The Portuguese were forced into retreat, abandoning many of their settlements in the fertile lands previously protected by the stronghold at Santarém. A new defence line was hastily established, and the town of Soure was strengthened with the issuance of a new urban charter in June. This *foral* stipulated the benefits the hardy citizens would enjoy in return for guarding the approaches to Coimbra, since as a result of this Almoravid advance many people dwelling in what had been relatively secure territory now found themselves facing the threat of further

attack.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, dramatic though this loss of territory had been, the Muslim occupation of the Tagus valley made very little impact on contemporary Christian sources. The defence had been left primarily in the hands of the local nobility and urban militias. The greater magnates, whose activities tended to attract the attention of monastic chroniclers, devoted their attention to what seemed to them to be the greater threats, and indeed the greater spoils, as the confrontation between the queen of León-Castile and the king of Aragon intensified.

In this environment of shifting loyalties Count Henry had made adroit use of the desperate needs of neighbouring monarchs to dramatically improve his own position. Even though in 1109 the ageing King Alfonso had blocked Henry's attempt to secure the throne through inheritance, the Burgundian count refused to be thwarted. Two years of shrewd political and military manoeuvring had brought Henry control over territory that virtually constituted a kingdom in its own right. By the beginning of 1112, in addition to his original lands in Portugal, Count Henry had gained control over Astorga, Zamora, Salamanca, possibly Ávila and much of the modern region of Extramadura.⁵⁸ In the welter of broken alliances and cut-throat intrigue sovereignty over these lands had become unclear – an enterprising magnate could hope to lay lasting claim over whatever he could hold. Count Henry had reached a point at which he negotiated with royalty as an equal and his authority over his own lands appeared as a *de facto* independence: he had become a king in all but name. Yet even as Henry the Burgundian was approaching a position of political autonomy within the peninsula, ill-fortune intervened and brought all his ambitions to nothing. His was a dangerous life and in 1112 Henry was seriously injured, possibly in the fighting around Astorga. The count was carried back to Zamora, but his wounds proved too severe for treatment. He died in the city on the 22 May and was subsequently buried at Braga.⁵⁹

In a remarkable career Henry the Burgundian came to power on the early waves of Latin influence in the peninsula and rose to become one of the leading figures in Iberian politics. Henry was typical of the expansionist European society that had bred him: conventionally pious, militarily gifted, ambitious and – at need – ruthless. Portuguese historians have characterised Count Henry as *o bom cavaleiro francês* (the good French knight) who did much for the development of the country without actually becoming a part of it.⁶⁰ Certainly the Burgundian count did not limit himself to Portugal; his ambitions extended far beyond a single county. Yet Henry's success in Iberia came not simply as a result of Latin influence in the region, but rather through his own ability to derive maximum benefits from the frisson created by that influence in the society around him. When Latin cultural links could assist him, he made use of them; overall, however, his greatest opportunities came as a direct result of his own unusual skill in adapting to the local environment and assimilating into the local culture.

The reign of the uncrowned queen (1112–1128)

On 1 August 1112 Infanta Teresa offered a donation to the monastery of Pombeiro 'for the soul of my husband Count Henry and for the remission of my own sins'.⁶¹ This is the sole reference made in official documents to the loss of her husband; from then onwards his signature simply no longer appears on charters. Ostensibly this would seem to reflect the arrangements Count Henry had accepted on his arrival in Portugal. The legal basis for the Burgundian's rule had always been derived from Infanta Teresa's relationship with the Leonese royal house; documents he issued had emphasised this, and Teresa's status was in no way impaired by his death. Yet the smooth transition of power into Teresa's hands as presented in the documentary record seems to conceal a more complex reality.

...the diplomatic evidence shows that [reigning queens] saw themselves as true heirs and rulers in their own right, but the narrative evidence from chronicles, letters and other expository prose shows that the idea of a female wielding power in her own right was literally inconceivable to many twelfth-century commentators.⁶²

In fact, as a result of Henry's death, Infanta Teresa's relationship to political power had changed profoundly. Public authority was viewed by medieval society in familial terms. As a daughter Teresa could be a vector of royal authority; as a wife she bestowed that authority to her husband. As a widow it was accepted that she might continue to exercise authority on behalf of her (male) children. Initially this politic fiction papered over the issue of Teresa's authority in the public sphere – although as time passed widening cracks began to show through.

However, in the summer of 1112, the most pressing immediate challenge to Teresa's position did not come from any particular unease among her own subjects at the prospect of female rule. Instead the greatest initial threat to Teresa's authority was the hostility of her own half-sister, Queen Urraca. In many ways their situations were very similar. Both women ruled alone after the deaths of their immigrant husbands, ostensibly in defence of their young children, but also in their own right. Yet these common circumstances seemed to create little sympathy between them. Immediately on learning of Count Henry's death, royal troops reoccupied Astorga and Zamora, making it clear that as far as the queen was concerned, earlier agreements had been cancelled. Teresa's response was a level-headed one. In recognition of her own straightened circumstances she quietly dropped her royal pretensions and her documents continue to bear the diplomatically neutral honorific of 'infanta'.⁶³ For Teresa was aware that in the new political climate Count Henry's policy of confrontation and negotiation could no longer serve her interests. Instead she embraced the role of *agent provocateur*.

Count Henry's death may have weakened his wife's position in relation to her half-sister; but Queen Urraca had also lost a valuable ally in her struggle against her estranged husband, the king of Aragon. Recognising this, the queen took advantage of a temporary lull in the fighting to raise the possibility of a formal truce. Alfonso's own followers, most notably the long-suffering soldiers of the urban militias, urged their ruler to attempt a peaceful settlement, and the king of Aragon grudgingly allowed himself to be persuaded. Infanta Teresa had other plans. The ruler of Portugal contrived to have a message smuggled to King Alfonso warning him of a plot by his former wife to poison him. The king of Aragon was more than ready to believe the suggestion and, despite Urraca protesting her innocence and offering to prove her good intentions through recourse to a judicial duel, Alfonso preferred to put a safe distance between himself and the queen. When a second attempt to reach an agreement between the two monarchs also failed, the king of Aragon returned eastwards, loudly condemning Leonese perfidy.⁶⁴ Perhaps Infanta Teresa genuinely believed in the assassination plot; clearly though peace in the Spanish kingdoms was for her an unwelcome prospect, while continued estrangement between the warring spouses brought many benefits. Teresa's own hopes for regional independence relied on Queen Urraca being unable to concentrate her full attention on Portugal; thus, an angry Aragonese king suited the infanta's interests very well. Eventually Queen Urraca seems to have reconciled herself to the realities of the situation, and in the wake of this breakdown of relations with her husband she entered into negotiations with her half-sister. Perhaps one result of this is the much-debated document included in the *Liber Fidei Sanctae Bracarensis Ecclesiae*, purporting to be a treaty under which Queen Urraca recognised Teresa's claims to the lands her husband had held at the time of his death. The authenticity of this document has frequently been called into question and the treaty is undated. Nevertheless, the agreement does seem to reflect the relative strength of Infanta Teresa and Queen Urraca by the end of 1113.⁶⁵

Nor was the belligerent king of Aragon the only potential foe Queen Urraca faced. Many among the Galician nobility resented her authority and had found common cause in the defence of the rights of her infant son, Alfonso Ráimundez. Count Henry had initially allied himself to their cause, until more lucrative opportunities emerged elsewhere. In the wake of the Leonese invasion of Portugal, Teresa gradually renewed and strengthened her association with these Galician conspirators. Prominent in the ranks of the disaffected were the two foremost magnates of the region, Count Pedro Froilaz of Trava and Bishop Diego Gelmírez of Compostela. These two men had a particular interest in Prince Alfonso's welfare: Bishop Diego had assumed responsibility as the boy's guardian and Pedro Froilaz was his tutor.⁶⁶ Perhaps Infanta Teresa also felt a certain sense of obligation to assist the young prince under the tenets of the Succession Pact. On the other hand,

however, rather than feeling bound by a decade-old agreement which she did not herself sign, it seems more likely that Teresa recognised the benefits such an alliance of northern secular and ecclesiastical powers might bring in counterbalancing Queen Urraca's political advantages and military might. Yet the infanta's growing involvement with the Galician magnates would ultimately come to shape the remainder of her rule in Portugal.

By 1116 the conspiracy of Galician magnates was prepared to act. Prince Alfonso was encouraged to dictate an open letter claiming the throne of Galicia and demanding that his mother respect his rights of inheritance. Copies were to be made and sent to interested parties both at home and abroad, including Alfonso's uncle, the influential Bishop Guy of Vienne. To add substance to these claims the prince then embarked on a tour of Galicia, during which he was feted wherever he went, ultimately returning to Compostela and establishing his base of operations there. Queen Urraca reacted quickly to this challenge to her authority, riding in pursuit of her errant son at the head of the royal army. Using a combination of blandishment and threat she managed to separate the conspirators, and the rebellion quickly collapsed. Faced with unprecedented urban unrest within the city of Compostela, Bishop Diego deemed it prudent to submit to royal forces. Count Pedro Froilaz remained defiant, however, and in the company of Alfonso Raímundez retreated westwards to consolidate a defence. It was at this point that Teresa took a hand. Portuguese troops joined forces with the Galician rebels to launch a surprise assault on Urraca's army; caught by surprise, the queen was forced to retreat to the castle of Sobroso. There she endured a brief siege before the rebels withdrew, allowing the shaken royal troops to return to Compostela. This unexpected Portuguese involvement in the region complicated Urraca's campaign plans, and with her own troops restive and eager to return home, the queen opted for negotiation. Prince Alfonso agreed to return to Toledo, and the conspirators escaped any form of royal censure. Teresa, meanwhile, had gained considerable prestige through her successful intervention in royal affairs, along with the gratitude of her Galician allies, the young prince and his many powerful supporters.⁶⁷

Infanta Teresa had little leisure for self-congratulation. The Leonese threat was in fact a lesser of the many perils facing the people of Portugal. The unifying presence of the Almoravids in al-Andalus had provided the basis for a Muslim military resurgence. Portuguese shipping and seaboard communities found themselves largely at the mercy of the Muslim fleets that ranged up the coastline as far as Galicia. An awed Portuguese chronicler later recalled these attackers being numerous as the grains of sand on the beaches they harried and three decades later the signs of their wide-ranging depredations were still evident to visitors passing along the Portuguese coast.⁶⁸ Nor were Muslim corsairs the only seaborne menace. In 1112 ships carrying Englishmen bound for Palestine arrived off the Galician coast. The sailors took the political turmoil they found in the region as licence for mayhem

and savagely plundered the settlements along the coast until they were caught in the act of looting a church by the avenging forces of Bishop Diego Gelmírez of Compostela. The English pilgrimage might well have ended there, but the bishop took pity on the mariners and merely extracted an oath of good behaviour before releasing them to continue their voyage. In an effort to limit the effects of such maritime attacks, and to police the valuable pilgrim trade to Compostela, Bishop Diego funded the construction of specialised warships designed by a Genoese shipwright.⁶⁹ Unfortunately for the Portuguese further to the south, the prohibitive cost of such an initiative was far beyond their means, and maritime raiders remained a constant danger for coastal communities.

The situation for Portuguese living inland was only marginally less unsettled. After the defensive line at the Tagus River was broken in 1111 the Portuguese moved quickly to protect Coimbra by strengthening their fortifications at Soure, Miranda da Beira and the castle of St Eulalia.⁷⁰ Despite these efforts the outlook for Coimbra grew increasingly ominous. In 1116 Miranda fell to Almoravid forces. Soon afterwards St Eulalia was taken by storm, and the few defenders who survived were transported to Africa in chains. When news of these disasters reached Soure the despairing inhabitants burned the town themselves and retreated northwards. Safety though was to prove elusive, for the pursuing Almoravid army pressed their attack across the Mondego River to the very walls of Coimbra.⁷¹ Teresa, meanwhile, had hurried southwards to lead the defence of the city and after a torrid struggle in which a great many citizens were killed or captured, Almoravid forces withdrew. The respite proved to be a short one. The following summer a second Muslim army, this time under the command of the Almoravid ruler 'Alī b. Yūsuf, invaded Portugal and launched another attack on Coimbra. The battle raged around the walls and, as the defence began to fail, within the very suburbs of the city itself. The papal legate, Cardinal Boso, passed on reports of these events to Pope Paschal and estimated that Portuguese casualties, both killed and captured, might number in the thousands. Nevertheless, though the defence buckled, it did not break, and after a twenty-day siege the Almoravid forces finally abandoned the effort.⁷²

This successful resistance to an all-out assault seemed to further enhance Teresa's confidence in her own abilities, and this growing self-assurance was reflected in her re-adoption in official documents of the controversial title *regina*. Unfortunately contemporary chroniclers did not specify the circumstances behind this elevation in status, and even openly hostile authors simply described Teresa as the queen of Portugal without giving any explanation.⁷³ In 1116 Pope Paschal assumed Teresa was a queen, presumably because Portuguese bishops had spoken of her as such. Only the official documents produced by Teresa's own notaries present a differentiated – and yet still by no means clear – picture. In May 1117 the title 'infanta' was replaced with 'queen'. For some eighteen months the titles

were used interchangeably, after which only the royal honorific appears. The silence of chroniclers and the fitful adoption of the royal title in official charters argue against any elaborate coronation or religious ceremony taking place; certainly the phrase *deo gratia* (by the grace of God) was not used by her notaries.⁷⁴ In fact the Portuguese ruler's use of royal titles highlights the nebulous nature of the institution itself. Ultimately, Teresa appears simply to have assumed a royal title on the basis of her father's pre-eminence, and her subjects found little reason not to acquiesce. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight, this ambiguous assumption of royal status marked the zenith of Teresa's independent authority.

Ecclesiastical politics during the reign of Infanta Teresa

The close relations Infanta Teresa forged with the Galician nobility were paralleled by the policies she developed in dealing with the local church. Count Henry had discreetly supported Archbishop Gerald of Braga and his successor Archbishop Maurice (1109–1118), the former bishop of Coimbra, in their efforts to defend and extend the privileges of their ancient church. Indeed one of Count Henry's final documents was a guarantee of Braga's privileges, issued on 12 April 1112.⁷⁵ This support was due in no small measure to the common French heritage the count shared with the two archbishops; following Henry's death, however, this cultural solidarity was lost. Increasingly Infanta Teresa turned for support and encouragement to a native Iberian clergyman, Bishop Diego Gelmírez of Compostela. In troubled times Bishop Diego certainly had much to offer. The church of Compostela possessed immense wealth garnered from visiting pilgrims; the bishop himself commanded considerable military forces, and he had built up an extensive network of alliances among the Galician aristocracy. While the clergy of Braga might petition powerful friends in Cluny and in Rome, they could only watch in dismay as their greatest local benefactor increasingly lavished her attention on their Galician rival.

In the years immediately after Count Henry's death Archbishop Maurice of Braga came under intense pressure as his ecclesiastical opponents in Compostela and Toledo mounted a prolonged campaign to challenge the pre-eminence won by his predecessor, Archbishop Gerald. In 1113 Bishop Diego orchestrated a political coup by securing the elevation of one of his staunch supporters, Hugo, as bishop of Porto. Once secure in the cathedral, Bishop Hugo became a consistent opponent of Archbishop Maurice's attempts to consolidate his own authority in the region. Bishop Diego followed this success with a series of calculated insults aimed at Archbishop Maurice, the most provocative being the consecration of clergymen who were technically under the authority of Braga. This campaign of intimidation peaked at a council convened at Palencia in October 1113. Bishop Diego formed an alliance of convenience with Archbishop Bernard of Toledo and together

they turned the gathering into a sustained attack on their mutual rival. The see of Mondoñedo was removed from Braga's control and Archbishop Maurice himself, along with his supporter Bishop Pedro of Lugo, were both deposed and removed from office. The grounds for this extreme action was a charge of disobedience to Archbishop Bernard in his role as papal legate. Queen Urraca's own chaplain, also named Pedro, became the new bishop of Lugo. When on 17 April 1114 Pope Paschal was persuaded to confirm these actions, Archbishop Bernard instructed Bishop Diego to circulate copies of the papal bull to Maurice's suffragan bishops, and also to Infanta Teresa.⁷⁶

Maurice of Braga refused to be a compliant victim of this assault and moved quickly to restore his position. Resorting to the increasingly familiar journey to Rome, he was able to plead his case personally. By the end of the year Pope Paschal had promulgated a bull formally confirming Braga's territorial borders in which Maurice was once again addressed as archbishop. In July 1115 the pope confirmed the metropolitan status of Braga and advised Maurice that he might reopen the controversial issue of Mondoñedo with the next papal legate. The following month the troublesome see of Porto was taken under direct papal control, ostensibly to assist in the reconstruction of the city. Finally, in November, the pope forwarded two letters to the peninsula that constituted a sweeping defence of Archbishop Maurice's regional authority. The first was to Bishop Gonçalo of Coimbra, insisting that he submit to the metropolitan authority of the archbishop of Braga. The second papal missive went still further: Bernard of Toledo's authority over Braga was cancelled on the grounds of mismanagement.⁷⁷ Up until this point, Archbishop Maurice would have been justified in feeling considerable satisfaction at the results of his personal petition. However, fortune was to prove fickle. During his stay in Rome he had become involved in a higher level of ecclesiastical politics and, even though the issues involved had little to do with peninsular affairs, as events unfolded the clergy of Braga found themselves thrust into the centre of a political maelstrom.

Archbishop Maurice had impressed the papal curia with his abilities and so when a new crisis arose he was entrusted with an important and sensitive responsibility. In 1116 the long struggle between the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire concerning, among other things, the issue of investiture, reached a crisis when Emperor Henry V finally lost patience and invaded Italy. Archbishop Maurice, being a well-regarded neutral, was sent to negotiate with the emperor even as the remainder of the papal court retired south to Benevento. In an apparent effort to accommodate the emperor and so create a measure of goodwill, Archbishop Maurice agreed to assist in his imperial coronation on 23 March 1117; unwittingly perhaps, he overstepped his mandate and drew down upon his own head the wrath of the papal court. The emperor was excommunicated and the unfortunate Archbishop Maurice deposed from office. Whatever his original intentions, the archbishop of Braga had been ambushed by circumstance and had no option

but to join the imperial cause. This was to prove a fateful decision. When Pope Paschal died on 24 January 1118 his successor, Pope Gelasius II (1118–1119), refused even to open negotiations with imperial forces. In frustration the emperor reoccupied Rome, forced the annulment of Gelasius' election, and offered Archbishop Maurice the papal tiara. The former archbishop of Braga accepted on 8 March 1118, taking the name Gregory VIII. Predictably, Gelasius responded by excommunicating both emperor and antipope on 7 April 1118 and he continued to maintain an unrelenting hostility until his death early the following year. Maurice, meanwhile, found fortune beginning to turn against him. Few senior ecclesiastics rallied to his cause and, even more disastrously, the unremitting efforts of Abbot Ponce of Cluny and Gelasius' more diplomatic successor Pope Calixtus II (1119–1124) eventually persuaded Emperor Henry to abandon him. As his support evaporated Maurice retired to Sutri in 1119, where two years later he was captured by papal troops. After a humiliating procession through the streets of Rome the deposed antipope was confined in a series of Italian monasteries until his death in 1137.⁷⁸

The tragedy of Archbishop Maurice was to prove a disaster for the church of Braga. Following his embroilment in imperial politics Archbishop Maurice sent a letter of explanation to the clergy he left behind in Portugal.⁷⁹ His protestations of higher callings would surely have brought them scant comfort, for already they had begun to pay the price for his actions. In 1117 the papal legate, Cardinal Boso of Anastasia, convened an ecclesiastical council at Palencia to adjudicate on several pending disputes.⁸⁰ Not surprisingly, in light of recent events, this council found against Braga, and particularly galling was the legatine decision to place Coimbra under the control of Mérida. Because the ancient metropolitan city remained under Muslim control its rights automatically devolved onto Bernard of Toledo. Worse was to follow. In 1118 Pope Gelasius responded to Maurice's election as antipope with a letter to the Spanish bishops advising them that the archbishop had been excommunicated and deposed from office. The election of a replacement was duly authorised.⁸¹ This allowed Archbishop Bernard of Toledo to arrange matters in Portugal to his own liking. A council was convened at Segovia on 2 June 1118, at which Archbishop Bernard announced the elevation of Paio Mendes da Maia (1118–1137). Archbishop Paio was the scion of a powerful local aristocratic house and a partisan of both Queen Urraca and the archbishop of Toledo himself. Infanta Teresa clearly disapproved of Archbishop Paio and the relationship between them quickly deteriorated. For as long as he remained in office the church of Braga could hardly hope for any restoration of her favour.⁸²

Meanwhile, Bishop Diego Gelmírez of Compostela had been watching these events closely and saw in them an opportunity to pursue his own dearest ambitions. The discomfiture of the Portuguese clergymen opened the possibility that the bishop of Compostela might secure for his own church

the status of metropolitan. Bishop Diego rushed messages of loyalty to the beleaguered papal curia and with them promises of financial support from the overflowing coffers at the shrine of Santiago. The *quid pro quo* would be the translation of metropolitan status from Braga to Compostela, and there is every possibility that the angry Pope Gelasius might have yielded. In the event, however, Bishop Diego's plans were thwarted by the perils of the road. Although his messengers were disguised as pilgrims, they were set upon and robbed while travelling through Aragon. The donation from Compostela never reached the papal curia and the death of Pope Gelasius in 1119 brought the negotiations to a sudden halt. Yet Bishop Diego still had another important card to play. The elevation of Pope Calixtus to the throne of St Peter provided the bishop of Compostela with a unique opportunity, for the new pontiff was none other than Guy of Vienne, the younger brother of Count Raymond of Galicia, and so also uncle to Alfonso Raímundez. By couching his request as a means to protect the young prince's rights, Bishop Diego was able to appeal to the pope's well-known avuncular interest.⁸³ The bishop of Compostela added to his petition letters of support from Abbot Ponce of Cluny and Duke Hugh of Burgundy (the pope's elder brother). In addition, the bishop forwarded to Rome rich tributes of treasure and coin – and this time they arrived safely. On 27 February 1120 Pope Calixtus finally yielded to his entreaties and temporarily translated the metropolitan status of Mérida to Santiago de Compostela; included in this arrangement were the dioceses of Salamanca and Coimbra as suffragans.⁸⁴ The pontiff also granted to the new archbishop legatine authority over the provinces of Galicia and Lusitania. The translation of Mérida's rights to Compostela was to have dramatic long-term implications. Historically, the southern regions of Portugal had been under the authority of Mérida; they would now devolve upon Compostela, and the scene was set for more acrimonious wrangling in the future.

What was Infanta Teresa's reaction to this decisive rearrangement of the ecclesiastical organisation of the region? There is no indication she was unduly dismayed by the damage done to Braga's authority and in fact, with Archbishop Paio clearly identifying his own interests with those of Bernard of Toledo and Queen Urraca, Teresa may well have welcomed, or even encouraged Bishop Diego's ambitions. Certainly Bishop Hugo of Porto, who was one of the bishop of Compostela's most effective agents, managed to maintain a cordial relationship with Teresa throughout this period. Indeed from the infanta's perspective, a Portuguese-Galician church under the control of Archbishop Diego was much to be preferred to any acceptance of the authority of Archbishop Paio and his ally Bernard of Toledo. Perhaps as Teresa's influence in the north-east grew she began to dream of welding Galicia and Portugal together as a single political and ecclesiastical unit. A hint that Teresa's thoughts were leading her in this direction can be found in the desire she expressed to be buried in the great cathedral church of

Santiago. Certainly she showed no interest in being laid to rest next to her husband in Braga or in establishing a royal tomb elsewhere in Portugal, as her son Afonso was subsequently to do.⁸⁵

In the course of a single turbulent decade the Portuguese Church had changed markedly. From a situation in 1108 where both the archbishop of Braga and the bishop of Coimbra had been Frenchmen and former monks of Cluny, by 1118 these same offices were filled by locally born clergymen. This transition was the most obvious aspect of a deeper change. Amid the general political uncertainty of the times the focus of both ecclesiastical and secular interests had become increasingly local. In earlier years the papacy had been a strong ally to the immigrant clergymen; but hampered by distance and a rapidly changing situation in Iberia, the Holy See had failed to impose concord on fractious local churches. In the absence of strong secular support the church of Braga had been unable to counter the wealth and local influence of their adversaries in Compostela and Toledo – a dire situation that was only compounded by the disastrous embassy of Archbishop Maurice. Yet even though the Portuguese clergy were unable to make significant headway against the forces arrayed against them, they did manage to survive them. They maintained a desire for restitution of their ancient rights, and awaited only an effective leader to renew their thwarted campaign.

The deteriorating fortunes of Infanta Teresa

From 1117 onwards Infanta Teresa adopted the title *regina*, but in many ways this grasping at royal status merely underlined the fundamental weakness of her position. She could only hope to maintain a local autonomy for as long as Queen Urraca remained distracted by other concerns. Unfortunately for the Portuguese ruler, Urraca was able during these years to find diplomatic solutions to many of her most pressing problems, and so was gradually able to focus her attention on the turbulent north-eastern regions of the kingdom. At the same time, Infanta Teresa was to find herself facing her own domestic complications. Her son, Afonso Henriques, was fast approaching maturity and he began demanding that his rights be recognised. Around the young Afonso there soon gathered a number of powerful local nobles eager to oppose his mother's authority. Into this already tense situation came another element of uncertainty as the world beyond the Pyrenees, which for almost a decade both Teresa and Urraca had largely ignored in favour of more immediate local concerns, began to exert a new and potentially decisive influence.

Queen Urraca's authority in León-Castile was complicated almost from the outset by pressing dynastic problems. Her son Alfonso Raimúndez had become a focus for aristocratic discontent in Galicia and a major political asset to his appointed guardian, Bishop Diego of Compostela. In 1116,

following the turmoil of the Galician rebellion, Urraca shrewdly granted the young Alfonso independent rule of the Toledo region. Not only did this mollify both her son and his foreign supporters, but it removed him from close association with his Galician partisans. The control Bishop Diego had exercised over the boy since 1108 was loosened and the young prince brought under the tutelage of the unswervingly loyal Bernard of Toledo.⁸⁶ The queen showed a similar adroitness in dealing with another major threat: her ex-husband, Alfonso of Aragon. The belligerent Aragonese king had remained intermittently hostile since the failure of their hastily arranged marriage in 1111. Relations between the two monarchs improved in 1117, when Urraca was able to take advantage of Alfonso's preoccupation with a planned attack on Muslim-held Huesca to secure a truce on her eastern border.⁸⁷ These two diplomatic initiatives did much to restore the security of León-Castile and allowed the queen greater freedom to deal with her rebellious subjects in the north-western marches of the kingdom.

In the years since their abortive rebellion on behalf of Alfonso Raímundeiz the conspiracy of Galician and Portuguese nobles had continued to murmur against Queen Urraca's authority. When Diego Gelmírez attained his long-coveted archiepiscopal rank in 1120 his potential for political agitation was also greatly enhanced. Queen Urraca determined on a show of strength. The queen led a royal army northwards into Galicia without meeting significant resistance and forced contrition on the fractious nobles, including the turbulent archbishop of Compostela. Infanta Teresa's continued defiance prompted the queen to invade Portugal and besiege the infanta at Lanhoso, some ten kilometres from Braga. Queen Urraca's forces ranged unimpeded as far south as the Douro River and on 17 June she marked her triumph with a grant to her loyal supporter, Archbishop Paio of Braga.⁸⁸ The extent of her victory emboldened Queen Urraca to press her advantage even further by moving directly against Archbishop Diego. Infanta Teresa, though still besieged in Lanhoso, somehow gained an inkling of her half-sister's intentions and managed to slip a message through the Leonese siege lines to warn her former ally of the impending danger. Yet the archbishop unwisely chose to ignore her well-meant warning, preferring to retain his dignity rather than seek safety in flight. He was subsequently arrested and his castles confiscated by royal troops.⁸⁹

Queen Urraca no doubt intended this *coup de main* to break the Galician conspiracy once and for all, but the arrest of Archbishop Diego proved to be a major miscalculation. Although the archbishop's imprisonment was a brief one, lasting only a matter of days, it caused a widespread sensation and brought Pope Calixtus directly into the fray. The speed and strength of the pope's response seemed to catch the Iberian leaders by surprise; and yet it should not have done. Strident defence of an incarcerated prelate was the reaction expected from an effective pontiff. In this case too, Pope Calixtus' personal interest in the welfare of his nephew Alfonso Raímundeiz

added further urgency to his intervention. Thus, on 7 October 1120, the pope addressed letters to the major players in the unfolding drama. Queen Urraca was given chill commands. Prince Alfonso received warm greetings. Urgent instructions were sent to the papal legate Cardinal Boso, to Archbishop Bernard and to the bishops of Spain. The pope advised all these correspondents of his intention to excommunicate Urraca and place León-Castile under interdict if full restitution to Archbishop Diego was not forthcoming within forty days.⁹⁰ The queen's enemies moved quickly to take advantage of papal anger. Archbishop Diego and Cardinal Boso organised a council at Sahagún on August 25 and while none of Urraca's supporters answered the summons, representatives from Galicia and Portugal did. The result was a foregone conclusion and the papal interdict was formally put in place.⁹¹ Given the unsettled state of the kingdom, this level of ecclesiastical sanction could easily mean the end of Urraca's rule.

The queen's only recourse to salvage her position was a direct appeal to the pope himself. The aging Archbishop Bernard of Toledo was charged with putting Urraca's case to the papal curia and in all likelihood he journeyed to Rome to petition the pope in person. This delicate mission, perhaps the most important of Bernard's long and distinguished career, turned out to be a complete success. Although the details of the archbishop petition have not been preserved, Calixtus' reply identified the interests of young Alfonso and the need to defend the frontier against Muslim incursion as the major reasons for the papal about-turn; thus, it seems likely that these were also major elements in Bernard's appeal. The decisions reached by the queen's enemies at the Council of Sahagún were overturned by papal order and the kingdom-wide interdict was lifted. In addition, the curia granted Bernard sweeping authority throughout the peninsula: his primacy over Spain was confirmed; his legatine authority reimposed over every region except Braga and Mérida and Toledo's metropolitan rights were also extended to encompass León and Oviedo.⁹² Queen Urraca's rule had thus been first threatened and then secured by the unexpected intervention of the distant papacy.

Ironically, even though Queen Urraca's brush with papal disfavour had been Infanta Teresa's salvation, the Portuguese ruler did not appear to immediately grasp the potential danger Latin influence could also pose to her own authority. Teresa's relations with Archbishop Paio had not improved in the wake of Urraca's invasion of Portugal and in 1122, when he dared returning to his cathedral, she precipitated a dramatic crisis in relations with the papacy by ordering his arrest. This intemperate action, which mirrored her half-sister's mistake the previous year, brought a similarly uncompromising response from Rome. The infanta received a terse injunction from Pope Calixtus threatening severe ecclesiastical sanctions, and a second letter was sent to Archbishop Diego ordering him to intercede with the infanta. The tone of this letter made clear that the pontiff was prepared to brook no hesitation from either of them.

It has come to us that Queen Teresa of Portugal has seized our brother Paio, archbishop of Braga, and holds him imprisoned. In letters sent to her we have commanded that, by the next Feast of the Holy Apostles Jacob and Thomas, she free him, his followers, and goods; otherwise we impose the sentence of excommunication upon her and her advisors, and we interdict all divine offices in her land, whether the baptism of children or the last rites of the dying, until she frees our brother and gives satisfaction to the church of Rome for these injuries. Therefore we order you...to have our sentence announced throughout your parishes and firmly observed.⁹³

The threat of personal excommunication and kingdom-wide interdict had the same salutary effect on Teresa as it had on her half-sister and she hurriedly released Archbishop Paio from his imprisonment. This second papal intervention into the region seemed to bring home to the infanta the importance of decisions taken in the papal court – and underlined the ineffectiveness of her own links across the Pyrenees. Yet with the archbishop of Braga implacably hostile towards her and Archbishop Bernard of Toledo staunchly loyal to his own queen, Teresa's only viable option for an intermediary with influence in Rome was her old ally Archbishop Diego of Compostela. Here too though, Teresa was to be disappointed.

Following his brief incarceration Archbishop Diego adopted a less confrontational stance towards Queen Urraca, and this measured policy soon yielded results. His confiscated lands were soon restored to him and in the months that followed he found several opportunities to score off his old sparring partner, Bernard of Toledo. Archbishop Diego persuaded the new papal legate Cardinal Deusdedit to convene a council at Compostela, rather than at Valladolid, as Bernard had requested. Then, in the early summer of 1124, Alfonso Raimúndez travelled to Compostela, rather than to Toledo, for his knighting ceremony at Archbishop Diego's hands. Finally, only a few months after this singular sign of favour, Archbishop Diego accomplished his most cherished goal when he persuaded Pope Calixtus to make permanent the temporary transference of the metropolitan status of Mérida to Compostela.⁹⁴ Thus, the archbishop found during these years that détente with Queen Urraca could be far more profitable than seeking to prop up Teresa's deteriorating political fortunes. Moreover, unbeknown to Archbishop Diego, clouds were beginning to gather on the horizon. In December 1124 Pope Calixtus breathed his last and his successor, Honorius II (1124–1130), harboured a deep suspicion for Diego of Compostela. The archbishop's legatine rights were cancelled and the frigid tone of subsequent papal communiqués made their renewal unlikely.⁹⁵ The death of the stalwart Archbishop Bernard of Toledo on the 25 April 1125 brought a long chapter of Spanish ecclesiastical history to a close; yet the archbishop of Compostela gained little advantage from the passing of his greatest rival.

In November 1125 Honorius confirmed Bernard's successor, Raymond of Osma (1125–1153), as archbishop of Toledo with primacy and legatine rights for the whole of Spain. Archbishop Diego also received letters from both Queen Urraca and Alfonso Raimúndez warning him against attempting to undermine the new primate's position.⁹⁶ If the archbishop had been unwilling to support Teresa prior to 1125, his subsequent beleaguered position rendered him incapable of greatly influencing events in Portugal thereafter.

As the possibility of obtaining access to the papal court through the agency of Archbishop Diego waned Teresa sought to establish alternative avenues of contact, but her efforts met with limited success. Early in 1125 the chance to forge an alternative link with Rome emerged when Pope Honorius took the long-disputed see of Coimbra directly under papal control. Any potential advantage was lost, however, because Bishop Gonçalo of Coimbra remained loyal to the archbishop of Toledo and thus also to Queen Urraca. As a result the pope's action merely exacerbated what one commentator has described as 'the lamentable decomposition of the Portuguese Church'.⁹⁷ Certainly there is no evidence that Teresa attempted to coerce Bishop Gonçalo with grants of territory – as her son was later to do – nor was the bishop a frequent signatory in court documents. With privileged access to the papacy through the secular clergy closed to her, Teresa made a belated attempt to win the sympathy of the other great ecclesiastical figure of Latin Christendom, the abbot of Cluny, by donating property at Vimieiro to the Benedictine order. This was Teresa's only direct grant to Cluny, and it seems to have brought little benefit beyond the prayers of the grateful monks.⁹⁸ Welcome as these might have been, they were not in themselves enough to bolster Infanta Teresa's deteriorating local authority.

The failure or inability of local ecclesiastical magnates to offer effective support forced Infanta Teresa closer to her sole remaining ally, the Galician nobleman Pedro Froilaz. Thus, Count Pedro's son, Fernando Pérez, became a familiar figure in the Portuguese court, and in January 1121 he was described in a charter as 'Lord of Coimbra and Portugal'. Count Fernando came to hold authority in the crucial frontier towns of Montemor-o-Velho and Soure, and the castle of St Eulalia. From 1122 the count was a regular signatory to Teresa's charters and frequently lent his assistance in official duties, such as acting as an intermediary in negotiations with the Leonese.⁹⁹ With his support Teresa was also able to extend her influence into the Minho region. In 1122 she could grant generous privileges in Orense; three years later opportunistic nobles seized Túy on her behalf.¹⁰⁰ Count Fernando's relationship with the infanta soon developed beyond political convenience and took on a romantic dimension. While surviving accounts do not resolve the question of whether Fernando and Teresa were ever formally married, the couple did have a daughter who was old enough in 1132 to be included in a charter of donation to the Trava family monastery at Jubia.¹⁰¹ Soon other members of the Trava family also began to accrue authority in Portugal,

with Fernando's brother Bermundo marrying Teresa's daughter Urraca in 1122 and appearing in charters from 1126 as the lord of Viseu.¹⁰²

The growing prominence of the Galician nobles in Portugal soon provoked local resistance, and the impropriety of Teresa's relationship with Fernando unsettled many observers, particularly among clergymen. On one occasion Theotonio, a local religious leader and later one of the founders of the great Augustinian monastery of Santa Cruz, noticed the couple sitting together in his congregation. Aware of their romantic relationship he immediately launched into a blistering sermon on loosening public morals; the two blushing lovers were forced to flee the church in shame. Nor was this the only occasion the preacher crossed verbal swords with Teresa. As he was preparing to celebrate the Mass one Sunday morning Theotonio received a message from the impatient Teresa – who had once again risked joining his congregation – ordering him to complete the ceremony as quickly as possible. The indignant cleric refused, suggesting that Teresa could either patiently wait or immediately leave. This uncompromising reply forced contrition on Teresa, who sought Theotonio's forgiveness. This he gave, but only after sternly commanding her to mend her errant ways.¹⁰³

While the unconventionality of the couple's relationship may have tried the patience of a saint, such criticisms also had clear political overtones. Infanta Teresa's charters demonstrate that she claimed her mandate to rule from her father, Alfonso VI of León-Castile – but underlying this legalese was the reality that deeply ingrained medieval sensibilities could only countenance female rule within the structure of family relationships. Acceptance of Teresa's authority rested on her ostensible role as mother and protector of her children's interests. Yet in her liaisons with the Galician magnates Teresa was entering dangerous territory. Under Spanish tradition the rights of the widow were respected under law, but with one particular constraint.

Preference as tutor and guardian went first to widowed mother or father, a legal tradition since Visigothic times, but a parent could be displaced by a relative or, among the aristocracy, an outsider who would better serve the child's property interests...[and] communities were concerned that [a widow] supply discipline, moral guidance and other less tangible evidence of her suitability for rearing the young.¹⁰⁴

These attitudes were codified into the laws of towns and cities throughout the peninsula. By flouting the public morality they represented, Teresa was both undermining her own political position and legitimising the animosity local noble families felt towards their Galician rivals. If Teresa was deemed to be incapable of providing adequate guardianship over her children, her right to exercise authority in the public sphere was also compromised, and others could in good conscience take it upon themselves to intervene. Thus, disgruntled members of the Portuguese aristocracy began to rally around

Afonso Henriques, the son of Teresa and Henry of Burgundy, and the formation of this faction was the beginning of the end of Teresa's authority in Portugal.

The last crisis: the rise of Afonso Henriques

On 25 May 1125 the young Afonso celebrated his official arming ceremony, a ritual heavy with significance in medieval Spanish society, for it represented the passage to full adulthood and rights of inheritance. In an act of calculated defiance Afonso chose to hold the ceremony in the cathedral of Zamora, a city that had become something of a haven to those opposed to Infanta Teresa's authority.¹⁰⁵ The bishop of the city, Bernard of Perigord, was a staunch supporter of Bernard of Toledo and it was to Zamora that Archbishop Paio of Braga had initially fled from Teresa's wrath prior to his arrest in 1122. Certainly there is no indication that Teresa herself was present at the ceremony and, not surprisingly, in the wake of this gesture of hostile independence, the relationship between mother and son deteriorated still further. Nor was this the only sign that generational change was working against Teresa. Less than a year later, on 8 March 1126, Queen Urraca died in León, and Teresa had cause to rue the passing of her long-term adversary. The uncontested accession to the throne of Alfonso Raímunde as King Alfonso VII (1126–1157) removed many of the dynastic tensions within the kingdom and the few recalcitrant nobles were quickly forced into obedience.¹⁰⁶ Initially King Alfonso sought détente with the rulers of Portugal and signed an early accord with Infanta Teresa and Count Fernando at Ricobayo.¹⁰⁷ Clearly though, as far as the young king was concerned, this agreement was a temporary convenience. Within a year he had stabilised his rule sufficiently to move against the still-defiant Portuguese.

In the spring of 1128 the king of León-Castile invaded across the Minho River. Resistance proved impossible and his troops caused widespread destruction before Teresa submitted to his authority. Alfonso used the arrival of the Knights Templar in the peninsula to underline his victory, appearing as lead signatory in a grant made to the new military order on 19 March 1128.¹⁰⁸ Afonso Henriques fared little better than his mother, enduring a siege at Guimarães before similarly capitulating. A reissue of the city's charter immediately afterwards underlines the position of subordination Afonso was forced to accept.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, this humiliation seems to have goaded Afonso into casting off the last of his obedience to his mother: the *foral* was witnessed on his own authority, without reference to Teresa – a step that has been interpreted as the first solid indication of a formal split between the two.¹¹⁰ In a document issued the following month Afonso's defiance was abundantly clear. He made a generous donation to his mother's implacable opponent, Archbishop Paio of Braga, in anticipation of the day 'when I have acquired the land of Portugal'.¹¹¹ From this point onwards there seemed

little hope of negotiation and hostilities quickly deepened into civil war. The struggle between mother and son proved to be mercifully brief – indeed little reference to the progress of the war survives beyond the fact that it ended on 24 July 1128 in a battle at São Mamede, several kilometres from Guimarães, at which Afonso's supporters triumphed. Teresa and Fernando both survived their defeat and may have attempted to maintain a presence in the northern marches of Portugal for a time, before being forced into exile.¹¹² With Afonso Henriques' assumption of power a new era of Portuguese history was about to dawn.

Infanta Teresa claimed power and royal title based on the status of her father. By adopting royal dignity Teresa sought to reinforce her own position and counter the authority of her half-sister Urraca. The legal basis of these claims was never firmly established; yet their legitimacy was not openly challenged – neither by her subjects nor even by Queen Urraca. Nevertheless, royal titles without the backing of sufficient military and political power proved hollow indeed. Teresa could rely only on disunity within the kingdom of León-Castile and was patently incapable of resisting the full weight of royal displeasure. Any attempt to lift the conflict above the regional sphere was thwarted by Urraca's domination of trans-Pyrenees links; and when other sources of support faded Teresa was forced into greater reliance on the family and connections of Count Pedro Froilaz. Yet by favouring members of the Galician aristocracy Teresa alienated local Portuguese noble houses, even as she exacerbated the inherent tension between her role as mother of the future ruler and her more controversial claims to rule as queen in her own right. Civil war and defeat at the battle of São Mamede was the price she paid.

3

The Nascent Kingdom: Consolidation and Expansion under Afonso Henriques (1128–1148)

The battle of São Mamede marked the beginning of a new phase in Portuguese history. Unlike Count Henry and Infanta Teresa, who had pursued their ambitions outside the county, Afonso Henriques concentrated his considerable energies into first consolidating an authority within Portugal and then on formalising his relationship to the Leonese throne. By 1140 Afonso was in a position to declare himself king; and three years later this self-proclaimed status was acknowledged by his titular overlord, Alfonso VII of León-Castile. Posterity came to view Afonso's successful assumption of royal status as marking the foundation of Portugal as an independent nation. Alexandre Herculano admirably captured the attitude of many of his countrymen towards their first king:

National affection came to accord to Afonso Henriques the aura of sainthood...for when we pass through the grey, eroded archway of the Church of Santa Cruz [the site of Afonso's tomb] we go to salute the mortal remains of the man without whom there would not exist today the Portuguese nation and, perhaps, not even the name of Portugal.¹

Traditionally this achievement has been represented as above all a military one, in which the young king won royal status through his peerless abilities as a soldier. If Afonso has been surrounded by an 'aura of sainthood', then his iconic symbol is his broadsword! Yet the Portuguese ruler did not simply carve a path to the throne. His success was based on well-considered strategies that took into account both local Iberian realities and the possibilities inherent in a resurgence of Latin cultural influence in the peninsula.

As Afonso and his noble supporters gathered together in the wake of their victory over Infanta Teresa and her Galician allies they may well have been prey to a number of qualms. Although the young ruler claimed in April 1129 that his authority extended throughout Portugal, free from any outside

influence (*ab omni pressura alienus*), the reality was quite different.² Afonso was young, relatively inexperienced, and his own resources were limited. Moreover, because the young ruler had seized power by force of arms, he possessed no official title of his own, inheriting neither his father's status as a count nor the royalty his mother had assumed for herself. This dilemma is apparent in the titles Afonso developed for use in his official documents. 'The illustrious infante lord Afonso', a charter written in December 1128 proclaimed, 'son of Count Henry and Queen Teresa, nephew of the great Emperor Alfonso, of happy memory'.³ Variants of this formula would be used for the next decade, and this emphasis on pedigree merely underlined Afonso's lack of a formal title beyond the nebulous 'infante' – at this time connoting simply a position as heir apparent. Such uncertainties made the young ruler heavily reliant on the secular and ecclesiastical magnates who had assisted him into power. Thus, the relationship Afonso forged with his own aristocratic supporters in the years that followed would be the first crucial test he faced.

Afonso Henriques and the magnates of the county

Just who were the local nobles who had provided the decisive counterweight to Infanta Teresa's Galician allies? One of Afonso's most important supporters, and indeed one of Teresa's more implacable opponents, was Archbishop Paio of Braga. From at least 1122 a number of other important nobles appear to have gravitated away from Teresa's court, among them Soeiro Mendes de Sousa, Paio Soares da Maia, Fernando Mendes 'O Bravo' of the house of Bragança and the influential brothers Ermígio, Egas and Mendo Moniz of Ribadouro. In the years that followed they were joined by others, particularly after Afonso's arming ceremony in 1125, including Nuno Pais de Azevedo and Paio Vasques de Bravães.⁴ Men such as these rode with Afonso to the victory at São Mamede and in the years afterwards continued to wield considerable influence in his court. Their families had grown used to the autonomy and local predominance that distance from León-Castile had brought; secure in their landed wealth and inherited privileges they presented a significant obstacle to any centralisation of authority. The problems faced by the new ruler of Portugal were highlighted in 1131 when Bermundo Peréz, his brother-in-law and the former lord of Viseu, rose in revolt. This insurrection attracted considerable local support and was not easily suppressed.⁵ Reliant as he was on the continued backing of his powerful local supporters, Afonso could hardly afford to confront them directly. Instead he initiated an innovative policy aimed at easing his dependency on these aristocratic co-conspirators.⁶

The first indication that Afonso wished to change the nature of his relationship with the old noble families was an act that was both deeply symbolic and at the same time eminently practical. In or before 1132 Afonso moved the seat of government from Guimarães, his birthplace and the

long-time centre of the county, southwards to the strategic city of Coimbra on the Mondego River. This initiative demonstrated the young ruler's desire to break with the policies of the past; equally though, Afonso sought to distance himself geographically from his noble allies, who by and large held their lands and castles in the more settled regions north of the Douro River. The southern marches of the county, between the Douro and the Mondego rivers, had been under Christian control for a shorter period of time and remained far more exposed to the threat of attack from Muslim armies or raiding parties. This was frontier territory, populated by small groups of independent-minded settlers and those who made up for their lack of social status with ambition and resolve. But perhaps most importantly for Afonso's purposes, this was also a region in which the dense webs of aristocratic privilege that so hampered any exercise of central authority in the north had not yet formed. By moving his court to Coimbra, Afonso was openly pledging his future to these new territories and to the resolute people who dwelt there.⁷

The relocation of the seat of government to Coimbra created new opportunities for adventurous southern knights and unfamiliar names begin to appear as signatories in Afonso's charters. Men such as Martim Anaia or the Mozarab Randulfo Soleimás now began to enjoy Afonso's company and favour. Over time important dynasties were to grow up in these borderland regions, such as the family of Gonçalo Dias, the royal governor of Coimbra. Gonçalo's sons Fernando, Salvador and Gonçalo continued the family tradition of service, while his nephew, Pedro Salvadores, was seneschal in Afonso's court from 1179 to 1185.⁸ Room was found for these new men by the gradual displacement of the scions of older aristocratic families. Those powerful clans which had for so long dominated Portuguese politics gradually found their hold on high office less certain. Following the deaths of Soeiro Mendes and Archbishop Paio Mendes, for example, the next generation of the family were unable to secure Afonso's trust. Pedro Pais de Maia was obliged to leave Portugal and subsequently appeared at the royal court of León-Castile. Similar choices awaited the Braganças: Fernando Mendes' son Mem Fernandes also found that his future prospects seemed brighter in the court of Alfonso of León-Castile. Even the stalwart Egaz Moniz was unable to bequeath influence to his three sons, none of whom appeared in court documents after his death.⁹

One reason these new nobles were able to supplant the old was that increasingly it was the hardy borderland troops who made up the ranks of Afonso's army, and it was they who waged his wars of consolidation and expansion. The dangers of life on the frontier ensured the soldiers' military skills remained honed, while their relatively humble status made them eager for the profits and potential advancement military success could bring. With less to lose, they were all the more eager to seek gain. Beneficiaries of Afonso's largess during these early years included João Viegas, whose loyalty in countering the insurrection of 1131 was rewarded

with estates confiscated from the rebellious nobles themselves.¹⁰ Men such as these formed the backbone of Afonso's army and the degree to which he came to rely upon them was strikingly revealed during the successful Portuguese surprise attack on Santarém in 1147. When Afonso initially proposed the operation to the northern nobles they balked at the potential risks of the enterprise and flatly refused to take part. The Portuguese leader was eventually obliged to conduct the campaign with his own forces and with those of his only reliable follower, Fernando Pedro of Coimbra.¹¹ Fernando and his predominantly Mozarabic force went on to play a key role in the Portuguese triumph.

Over time the 'frontier knights' from the southern marches of Afonso's territory became a major asset in Afonso's bid to balance the power of the entrenched noble families. Military force, however, was not in itself enough to establish a lasting local authority: just as important was the establishment of effective relations with the local clergy. A loyal Portuguese Church could offer their ruler numerous benefits, among the most important being their ability to counter the local influence of the aristocracy. Even before Afonso came to power in 1128 he signalled his intention to pursue a strikingly different ecclesiastical policy to that of his mother Infanta Teresa. The young ruler had established constructive relations with senior Portuguese churchmen during his rise to power and he continued to cultivate these local prelates as he consolidated his authority. Afonso's policies thus laid the foundations for a marked improvement in the prestige and local authority of Braga and at the same time encouraged the re-establishment of significant cultural contacts between Portugal and Latin Christendom.

Infanta Teresa had alienated the local churches by allying herself with Archbishop Diego of Compostela; her son, however, adopted the opposite strategy. Afonso worked hard to court and keep the goodwill of Archbishop Paio of Braga with generous grants, while one of his first decisions as ruler in Portugal demonstrated his desire to limit the influence of the powerful Archbishop Diego.¹² In the final months of Infanta Teresa's reign Bishop Gonçalo Pais of Coimbra had breathed his last. On the eve of the battle of São Mamede Teresa nominated Archdeacon Tello of Coimbra for the position, but the victorious Afonso immediately overturned this ruling in favour of Archdeacon Bernard of Braga. While Tello's biographer carefully explained the decision as being the result of youthful vacillation – with Afonso bending like 'a fragile reed' to false counsel – there was also an important political dimension to this choice.¹³ Tello had been willing to submit to the archbishop of Compostela; but Bernard, reading the political tides more correctly, offered to present his obedience to Archbishop Paio of Braga. When the identity of Bishop Gonçalo's successor was announced Archbishop Diego objected vigorously, obliging Bishop-elect Bernard to journey to Rome to plead his case personally. Archbishop Paio later joined him there to add his support to the petition. Before a final decision could be

reached, however, the death of Pope Honorius II (1124–1130) plunged the papal court into the turmoil of schism, and Bishop Bernard's *de facto* installation was allowed to stand.¹⁴

The failure to secure the election of a friendly bishop in Coimbra was a setback for the church of Compostela; but worse was to follow only a year later. In 1131, after a career that spanned over three tumultuous decades, the pugnacious Archbishop Diego Gelmírez died and was laid to rest in the church he had done so much to glorify. His passing marked the end of an era in the affairs of the region and relieved a large measure of the external pressure on the Portuguese Church. Four years later Pope Innocent II (1130–1143) formally granted his protection to the canons of Coimbra, a move probably intended to support Bishop Bernard against any further machination from the already weakened church of Compostela.¹⁵ In 1136 there came yet another blow to the deteriorating influence of the archbishop of Compostela in Portugal, with the death of their most stalwart local ally, Bishop Hugo of Porto. Afonso Henriques had no apparent difficulty in securing the election of his own preferred candidate, João Peculiar, a man who would play a decisive role in the development of the Portuguese Church and, ultimately, in Afonso's long campaign for regional independence.

Bishop João Peculiar of Porto had gained his cognomen because he was thought to be the peculiarly the Lord's own. His origins are uncertain: one biographer claimed he was a French immigrant, another recalled he was born locally and that his parents held land in Portugal.¹⁶ In fact what this confusion seems to suggest is that João Peculiar was equally at home in both Iberian and Latin worlds. If he was Portuguese, he demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of the world beyond the Pyrenees; if he was an immigrant from that world, he had assimilated so completely into his adopted country that he could be mistaken for a local. João Peculiar was to prove highly effective in the dangerous world of Iberian ecclesiastical politics, but would also remain an important supporter of Latin cultural influence in the region. When Archbishop Paio of Braga died in 1138, it was Bishop João who succeeded him at the head of the regional church, and he quickly proved himself to be an indefatigable champion of Braga's ecclesiastical rights. Only a year after his elevation Archbishop João appeared at the Second Lateran Council. There he secured formal recognition of his church's metropolitan status and was also able to persuade Pope Innocent II to return Coimbra to the authority of Braga. But in acceding to this request, the pope added the less welcome caveat that Archbishop João must himself acknowledge the primacy of the archbishop of Toledo.¹⁷ Such a submission to his rival was deeply unpalatable to Archbishop João. By adopting a strategy of prevarication he was able for a time to avoid either direct refusal or compliance. Yet the simmering issue of Braga's submission to the primacy of Toledo was to become increasingly bitter and divisive, and it would have critical long-term implications for the development of Portugal.

Even as Archbishop João Peculiar strove to re-establish the ancient prominence of Braga, an ecclesiastical development the archbishop had helped to initiate some years earlier in Coimbra was beginning to attract Afonso's attention. The Portuguese ruler was an enthusiastic supporter of new religious institutions – no doubt personal piety was a significant motivation, but such institutions also offered invaluable local prestige and re-established cultural links with Latin Christendom. The foremost of these institutions, the Augustinian monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra, was founded in 1132. Tello, who had been the unsuccessful aspirant to the bishopric of Coimbra in 1128, took the lead in the establishment of the monastery, with the assistance of another local religious leader, Theotonio, and also João Peculiar.¹⁸ Tello had travelled widely in Europe and had undertaken the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. He had been impressed by a number of religious institutions he had seen during his journeys and was eager to recreate them in his homeland. His early efforts to attract Infanta Teresa's interest in the project had been unsuccessful; but a chance encounter with Afonso Henriques on the road to Coimbra gave him another opportunity. According to popular legend, when Afonso admired a beautiful saddle Tello had obtained in Montpellier the enterprising clergyman offered to give it to him in return for a promise to support the foundation of the monastery. The young ruler was amused by the suggestion and agreed: a grant of land was made on 9 December 1130 to redeem his pledge.¹⁹ From the outset Santa Cruz was organised according to the Augustinian rule. Once Tello had launched the project Theotonio, a man who was also widely travelled and had visited the Holy Land, became the main organisation force. Under the influence of these founders the structure of the new monastery reflected existing institutions in Palestine and Europe, with the final arrangements drawing in particular on the example of St Ruf in Avignon.²⁰ The canons of Santa Cruz quickly developed a reputation for both piety and learning; and as their status grew they soon attracted further support from Afonso.

The rapid success of the monastery of Santa Cruz brought down upon the canons the jealousy and then the animosity of powerful local rivals. Almost immediately the canons found themselves embroiled in jurisdictional and demarcation disputes with Bishop Bernard of Coimbra. A campaign of obstruction mounted by the bishop and clergy of the city finally goaded João Peculiar into a direct petition to Pope Innocent. His circumvention of the normal ecclesiastical hierarchy proved successful and on 26 May 1135 Santa Cruz was placed under papal protection. The Augustinian monastery was the first religious institution in Portugal to be so recognised by the distant curia. Four years later another Augustinian house supported by Afonso, at Grijo, was also taken under the papal aegis. João Peculiar's success in the curia thus had important repercussions for Afonso Henriques. The privileged position of the two monasteries provided the grounds for a dialogue with Rome and offered Afonso the opportunity to demonstrate his

piety directly to an appreciative pope. Thus, in letters dated 20 May 1135 and 27 April 1139, Pope Innocent addressed Afonso in the warmest terms, acknowledging his interest in the situation in Coimbra and urging him to continue to honour and protect the monastery.²¹ Such high-level ecclesiastical links were to prove invaluable to Afonso's longer-term ambitions, as would be the prestige that came from being acknowledged as the principal patron of internationally recognised religious houses.

In the years after his victory at São Mamede Alfonso Henriques consolidated his local authority by employing imaginative strategies designed both to counter the influence of the northern nobility and to enhance his own relations with the Church. Afonso found common cause with the clergy of Braga in restoring the prestige of their ancient cathedral and curtailment of the influence of the archbishop of Compostela in Portugal. At the same time, he embraced those new religious developments that might enhance his local prestige. Particularly valuable was the growing reputation of the monastery of Santa Cruz – a reputation known even in Rome – which provided a reflected glory to Afonso that was unattainable by even the most powerful of the aristocratic houses. For all that Afonso was lauded by later generations as a soldier, without a secure base of operations any long-term military success would have been impossible. His martial reputation was thus predicated on his less spectacular achievements within Portugal. As his position improved, however, Afonso was able to turn with increasing confidence towards the opportunities for military expansion that were developing outside the county.

Afonso of Portugal and the battle for regional independence

An anonymous Portuguese royal historian, writing in the monastery of Santa Cruz towards the end of Afonso's long reign, described the most salient aspects of his royal patron thus:

He was a man skilled in arms, erudite of speech, most prudent in his deeds, with an upright character, graceful of body and handsome of face, fully within the Catholic faith and in matters of religion submissive, benevolent and most devoted. He defended the whole of Portugal with his sword.²²

Other authors also wrote glowingly of their king's strength and invincibility, until a generation later the Portuguese ruler's military reputation had been cemented in the popular mind. Thus, Rodrigo of Toledo recalled a leader who was tenacious and ever ready for battle; his contemporary, Lucas of Túy elaborated on Afonso's campaign of expansion into Muslim lands and his readiness to defend his conquests against all threats.²³ During the first decade of his rule, however, Afonso's military fortunes were in fact

quite mixed: he enjoyed some major triumphs, but at the same time suffered his share of military setbacks.

Authors writing under royal patronage during the king's mature years might hearken back to describe a resolute and indeed a pious warrior, but the contemporaries of his youth were less complementary. An author in Compostela distrusted that Afonso, made bold by a 'wicked insolence', was seeking to extend his territory at the expense of his overlord, King Alfonso of León-Castile.²⁴ Such mistrust proved to be well-founded when in 1130 Afonso attempted to reassert Portuguese influence in Tûy. This first incursion was unsuccessful: the appearance of King Alfonso in Galicia and resistance among Afonso's own northern nobles forced the Portuguese leader to withdraw. A subsequent expedition two years later similarly ended in defeat, this time at the hands of Afonso's old adversary Fernando Pérez and the Galician noble Rodrigo Vela. A third attempt to expand Portuguese sovereignty into Galicia met with greater initial success. The Portuguese advanced into the Limia region and built a castle at Celmes to ensure continued control. After provisioning and garrisoning the new castle Afonso returned to Portugal. However disaster struck in 1134, when King Alfonso unexpectedly returned, stormed the castle, and killed or captured the entire garrison.²⁵ News of this failure cast the Portuguese court into deep despondency, and for some months Afonso made no further attempts at northern expansion. During this unhappy period the Portuguese king sought instead to consolidate his position, providing safe haven for rebellious Leonese nobles such as Gonzalo Pelaéz, and turning his energies to strengthening his own border defences to the east and south.²⁶

Events in Spain soon drew Afonso's attention back to his north-eastern border. The death of Alfonso of Aragon in 1134 appeared to provide the Portuguese ruler with another opportunity to extend his authority into Galicia. The king of Aragon had no direct heirs and in the confusion over the succession a group of Navarrese nobles asserted their independence by creating a monarch of their own, Garcia IV (1134–1150). The new king of Navarra promptly allied himself with the ruler of Portugal in opposition to Alfonso VII of León-Castile, and in 1137 Afonso marched his forces back into Galicia. Initially the incursion met with success: Tûy was taken by force; a number of other castles were secured by stealth or surrendered. A local force under the command of Fernando Pérez and Rodrigo Vela was scattered at Cerneja and the unfortunate Rodrigo captured by Portuguese troops. Afonso's elation quickly soured, however, when fortune suddenly turned against him. Urgent messages reached the Portuguese in Galicia that a Muslim invasion force had crossed the Mondego River and were threatening the Portuguese heartland. The invaders had already overwhelmed the newly built castle of Leiria and were threatening the town of Tomar. Almost simultaneously further messengers reached Afonso with the unwelcome news that the king of León-Castile had moved decisively to reimpose

obedience on King Garcia of Navarra and was now leading his army into Galicia, intent on punishing the fractious nobles there. Faced with threats from all sides the Portuguese leader was compelled to sue for peace. An agreement was reached between Afonso and the king of León-Castile at Tûy on 4 July 1137. The detail of this truce have been preserved and the terms the Portuguese ruler was forced to accept clearly demonstrate the peril of his position. Afonso restored the briefly usurped territory in Galicia to his cousin and pledged in future to support him militarily against both Christian and Muslim enemies. For his part, Alfonso of León-Castile conceded only that Afonso Henriques might continue to rule in Portugal.²⁷

The Treaty of Tûy firmly closed the door to any further Portuguese expansion into Galicia. Afonso had no choice but to turn his restless energies southwards, towards a Muslim frontier, which had until then had been accorded only secondary priority. This redeployment was not the result of any rise in sectarian hostility or indeed any great fervour for the reconquest; nevertheless, it proved highly successful. In 1139 Afonso led a sizeable Portuguese force southwards and it is possible that – in obedience to the treaty signed two years earlier – he timed this attack to coincide with an offensive launched along the frontier by Alfonso of León-Castile. The Portuguese incursion was eventually met by a Muslim army at Ourique, and the battle that resulted was to have an impact far in excess of its military significance.²⁸ Contemporary chroniclers record only a few sparse details. The Portuguese army encountered a large Almoravid force under a commander identified as ‘King Esma’, reinforced by local troops from Seville, Badajoz, Elvas, Évora and Beja. A prolonged battle took place on the feast day of St James (25 July) in which the Portuguese put their enemies to flight.²⁹

Beyond these bare facts very little about the battle, even the location of Ourique itself, can be confirmed. Nevertheless, these brief descriptions were embroidered by later authors and formed the basis for an epic story. Thus, it came to be believed that the Muslim armies were led by no less than five Muslim kings and the shields they abandoned in their flight from the field were gathered together to become Afonso’s own coat of arms. They remain to this day the central image on the Portuguese national flag. As Luis Vaz de Camões, the greatest of Portuguese patriotic myth makers, declaimed:

Here, upon his own white shield,
triumphantly he drew,
Five blue bucklers, clearly rendered
Five kings defeated, thus remembered.³⁰

For according to the epic tradition, this was more than simply a military encounter. On the eve of battle, as the tale was told, Afonso received a vision – the so-called Miracle of Ourique – promising victory and granting him a divine mandate to establish an independent kingdom. When events had

confirmed this prophecy Afonso Henriques summoned a court of nobles, clergy and commons at the town of Lamego. There he declared himself king for the first time amid scenes of general acclaim. Yet dramatic though this portrayal of events undoubtedly is, in reality the circumstances behind Afonso's adoption of the trappings of kingship are far less clear.

Both the 'Miracle of Ourique' and the 'Cortes of Lamego', became articles of faith for generations of Portuguese, only to be revealed by modern historians to be pious invention based on fabricated documents.³¹ In reality medieval authors were oddly non-committal concerning Afonso's royal status. Contemporary Portuguese descriptions of Afonso's rise to power make no direct link between the victory at Ourique and the adoption of royal authority; although nor do they exclude the possibility. The earliest accounts of Afonso's reign, the *Annales Portugalenses Veteres*, always and without explanation refer to Afonso as king. Unfortunately the later and more detailed *Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium Regis* provides little additional information. Afonso is called *infante* until 1131 and then, again without explanation, he is given the title *rex*. Providentially a canon in Santa Cruz embellished his biography of Theotonio with background information concerning the political situation in the region. Afonso Henriques' elevation from *dux* to *rex* is noted, and explained as a result of the Portuguese leader's courage and military success. Authors writing outside Portugal provide little further clarification. The *Historia Compostellana* always refers to Afonso as *infante* but at the same time paradoxically refers to Portugal as a kingdom (*regnum*). The unabashedly Leonese focus of the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* only complicates the situation with its cryptic claim that Afonso's royal status was granted in honour of the mother he had deposed.³² None of these narrative accounts provide a reliable date for the assumption of the royal title. Official documents, on the other hand, by their very nature, tend to be more specific. Surviving dedicatory inscriptions from as early as 1138 appear to imply Afonso's royal status.³³ Certainly on 7 July 1139 Afonso issued his last charter using the title *infante*. In the next extant document, dated 10 April 1140, the Portuguese ruler described himself thus: 'The illustrious King Afonso, nephew of the most glorious Emperor of Spain, son of Count Henry and Queen Teresa, by the providence of God ruler of the entire province of Portugal'.³⁴

On balance of probability it would seem that Afonso's assumption of royalty was indeed linked in some way to his victory at Ourique. However, other considerations might also have influenced Afonso's actions. In the three years that had passed since the signing of the Treaty of Túy the ruler of Portugal had chafed at the submission forced upon him by the Leonese king. Afonso's own self-elevation may well have been the first step in a campaign to overturn the terms of the treaty. For almost before the ink on the charters proclaiming Afonso's royalty had dried the Portuguese ruler mounted another expedition into Galicia, in direct defiance of the accords

agreed to in 1137. Alfonso of León-Castile was more than prepared to meet the Portuguese challenge and counter-attacked in force. The two armies confronted each other at Valdevez; interestingly, however, the Portuguese and Leonese accounts of the resulting encounter diverge quite sharply. According to the Portuguese author, during the initial skirmishing a number of important Leonese knights were unhorsed, leading King Alfonso to fear that a general action might prove disastrous. Through the intervention of Archbishop João Peculiar a truce was declared and a celebratory feast was arranged. Amid the resulting wine and song the two leaders were able to establish a mutually acceptable peace. The Leonese chronicler, on the other hand, produced a slightly less romantic report in which a group of impulsive knights had initiated battle without orders and the turmoil led wiser heads to reflect on the pointless loss of life a full-scale battle would bring. Once again the attendant clergymen are cast as the mediators, and they were able to pressure the Portuguese king by reminding him of more pressing perils to the south, for news had reached the army that the Muslims had taken advantage of Christian disunity to destroy the newly rebuilt castle at Leiria and were attacking the nearby town of Trancoso. Only thus, in the face of pressing danger elsewhere, could the two monarchs be brought together over the negotiating table.³⁵

The truce arranged at Valdevez was not simply the cessation of immediate hostilities. The arrangements also appear to have included provision for a subsequent meeting to discuss future relations between Portugal and León-Castile. The two rulers duly met again at Zamora in September 1143 where, in the presence of the papal legate Cardinal Guido de Vico, an accord appears to have been reached. Chronicles are silent about this meeting, but the nature of the final agreement is implied in a charter the two men issued jointly at the close of proceedings. Alfonso VII of León-Castile heads the witness list, and he styled himself as emperor, a title he had claimed in 1135. Beneath the signature of 'Emperor Alfonso' appears that of 'King Afonso of Portugal'. The following month a second charter was drafted in which the same titles were used again. These documents thus reveal the actual nature of the shadowy agreement reached at Zamora – an agreement in which both rulers gained significant benefits and lost nothing at all. For while Alfonso VII conceded the royal status of his Portuguese cousin, he received in return from Afonso an acknowledgement of his own imperial authority.³⁶ The accord reached at Zamora thus represents a mutually beneficial arrangement between the two monarchs that did not substantially change the real power relationship between them.

How important then was the treaty of Zamora and the acknowledgement of Afonso's royal status by the self-styled Emperor Alfonso of León-Castile? Certainly later Portuguese authors believed these accords to be decisive: 'From the point of view of foreign relations', Pedro Soares Martínez has insisted, 'it was the beginning of Portuguese history.'³⁷ While this may be

overstating the case, these events were certainly an important culmination of Afonso Henriques' far-sighted policies of political consolidation. The Portuguese ruler had established an effective local powerbase and attained a reputation for military prowess; just as importantly, he had gained the prestige that only recognition by institutions outside the peninsula could bring. Yet what is most striking about Afonso's long campaign to secure a Leonese acknowledgement of his royal status was the limited impact his achievement made on contemporary records. Both his own subjects and those of his rivals were oddly reticent about his remarkable achievement. This silence, however, seems in itself to pose an important question: exactly what did royal authority actually imply in twelfth-century Iberian society?

North of the Pyrenees concepts of medieval kingship evolved within the framework of a wider Latin Christian culture. During the tenth and eleventh centuries this society solidified into a stratified hierarchy, and the role of royalty came to be more carefully defined. Legal and ceremonial demarcations of various kinds reinforced social stratification; and at the pinnacle of this edifice was the king, sanctified by a sacramental act of coronation and sharply distinguished from his subjects.

That the regnal year was dated, down to the thirteenth century, not from the moment of accession but from that of coronation, that is, from the moment of anointing, was not merely a diplomatic finesse, but had much deeper meaning: he was not king until the oil had transformed his being. In this act of unction divine grace was seen to have been tangibly conferred upon the king. Unction – with chrism and on the head – could leave no doubt that God's will (= grace) had become operative, so much so that the king was considered to be the sole recipient of such favours in the kingdom.³⁸

In the peninsula such ceremonies only slowly found popular acceptance. Throughout the twelfth century there can be traced a distinct tension between the secular concept of the monarch as primarily a military leader and the clerical ideal of a more sacred kingship. As a result, efforts by senior Spanish clergymen to ornament the monarchy with the elaborate rituals common in Latin Europe were typically met with official indifference or even suspicion.

It is when royal authority was conferred upon an individual that attitudes towards the institution of the monarchy were most prominently displayed. Alfonso VII of León-Castile, who dominated the Iberian political landscape for much of the first half of the twelfth century, provides a striking case in point. Over the course of an eventful career Alfonso was the recipient of no less than three separate coronations. The first of these ceremonies took place in 1111, when he was around six years of age. In a carefully orchestrated piece of political theatre Bishop Diego Gelmírez performed a

ceremony that included the familiar Latin Christian elements of ecclesiastical consecration and anointing with fragrant oil. Yet for all their solemnity, the actual purpose of these rituals is unclear, as in 1111 Queen Urraca was still firmly on the throne. The intention seems to have been to reassure the boy's supporters outside Spain and perhaps also to underline Bishop Diego's own position as Alfonso's guardian.³⁹ When Queen Urraca died some fifteen years later, and Alfonso came to power in his own right, no mention was made of the earlier ceremony. Although Archbishop Diego, with sacred oil in hand, attempted to intercept the new king at León, Alfonso declined to participate in a repeat performance. Instead he deemed it prudent to stage another formalisation of his authority and the tone of this ceremony was completely different. There was little ecclesiastical ritual: the king was simply acclaimed publicly by a gathering of the common people, nobles and clergy in León. The climax of proceedings came not in a consecration through anointment with sacred oil, but rather with the militaristic unfurling of the royal standard.⁴⁰ This absence of elaborate religious ritual was repeated when the Leonese monarch claimed the title of emperor in 1135. Alfonso summoned together another council at León consisting of clerical and lay magnates, along with a large crowd of non-noble onlookers. The timing also seems significant, for the gathering coincided with the temporary absence of the papal legate for Spain, Cardinal Guido de Vico, who in 1135 had briefly returned to Rome. Alfonso came before this council to claim his grandfather's imperial status on the grounds of his dominion over kings and foreign potentates (both Christian and Muslim). Again, ceremony was limited and the climactic point came with the acclamation of the crowd rather than through any ritual sanctification.⁴¹

In other Spanish kingdoms too, similarly pragmatic attitudes towards secular rule appear to have prevailed. In Aragon, for example, the death of King Alfonso in 1134, precipitated a series of succession crises. In the absence of direct heirs the warlike king of Aragon initially sought to place his realm under the protection of the international military orders.⁴² This impossible provision was quickly overturned and, in the face of a number of threats to the kingdom, the local nobility moved quickly to re-establish royal authority. The sole remaining son of the royal line, Alfonso's younger brother Ramiro, had chosen the religious life. Overriding all canonical objections the Aragonese aristocracy pried the royal heir out of his monastery and installed him on the throne as Ramiro II (1134–1137). King Ramiro was then married, this too in defiance of ecclesiastical prohibition, to Agnes, the daughter of Duke William IX of Aquitaine. When Agnes gave birth to an heir, Petronila, able to carry on the royal line, Ramiro thankfully abdicated his worldly responsibilities and returned to his cloister.⁴³ In Navarra, meanwhile, the death of Alfonso of Aragon was seized on by the local nobles as an opportunity to restore regional independence. They rallied behind Garcia of Morzón, grandson of Garcia V of Navarra (although his own father,

Ramiro Sánchez, was an illegitimate son). In the face of opposition from Alfonso of León-Castile and the threat of Aragonese intervention, the nobility of Navarra rushed their candidate onto the throne as Garcia VI Ramírez (1134–1150). In all these cases the guiding principle was expediency; the central action was not ritual anointing or even the placement of the crown, but the publicly voiced consent of the king's own subjects. Interestingly, in order to secure their unconventional positions, King Ramiro and King Garcia came to a mutually beneficial agreement in which the Aragonese king was declared the 'father' and the king of Navarra the 'son'.⁴⁴ This political fiction allowed both men to retain their royal titles while at the same time re-establishing the essential power relationship between them. It was an arrangement that bore many similarities to that reached only a few years later between the Leonese and Portuguese rulers at Zamora.

In twelfth-century Iberia monarchical authority appears to have been a relatively mutable concept. While laws of inheritance dictated the transference of royal power from one generation to another, these links could be quite tenuous: female members of the royal family might hold and convey secular authority; illegitimacy or canonical objection did not necessarily debar a potential claimant. A reigning monarch stood at the apex of society as the font of judicial authority and, in principle, the overall commander of the kingdom's military forces. This supreme secular authority was considered to be a sacred trust, ordained by God, and yet ecclesiastical rituals emphasising this divine mandate did not in themselves bestow authority. In fact rulers across Iberia appeared wary of any efforts by churchmen to ritualise (and so encroach upon) royal power. Afonso Henriques was no exception. A description of the ceremony marking his passage into knighthood, and full adult rights, is illuminating in this respect. The account was written some decades after the event and emphasises that the ritual was conducted 'in the manner of kings' and that Afonso took his weapons – representing his secular authority – from the altar with his own hands.⁴⁵ Clerics might bless this passage of authority; but the power itself was based in tradition, moulded by practical realities and ultimately reliant on the ability of the individual ruler. Thus, though the monarch did constitute the political apex of society, the pyramid was a low one and the stones were less than firmly set.

It is against this background that the achievements of Afonso Henriques must be judged. The Iberian monarchy was a developing institution, and it was this very flexibility that placed royal status within Afonso's grasp. His mother, Infanta Teresa, had adopted royal titles in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to outface her half-sister, Queen Urraca. Afonso's intentions in assuming royalty were quite different. In 1140 the primary value of the royal title for the Portuguese leader was to emphasise his suzerainty over the powerful noble families within his own territory. He did not seek to challenge the status of Alfonso of León-Castile – rather his self-elevation to royalty actually reinforced the Leonese monarch's own imperial pretensions. The title

Afonso gained under the accords at Zamora was primarily a recognition of his status as a leading power in the region, and thus a highly valued symbol of prestige. Yet the wider ramifications of the title were in fact quite limited. His royal status was not hereditary; it was not a declaration of independence from León-Castile, and it was not recognised outside the peninsula. To extend the implications of the title 'king of Portugal' beyond these restrictions, Afonso needed to broaden the Iberian concept of monarchy itself. This he could only hope to achieve through an effective re-engagement with the wider world of Latin Christendom.

Afonso Henriques and the re-engagement with Latin Christendom

The very presence of a Burgundian dynasty in Portugal was the result of a convergence between the expansionist aims of the European nobility and the peninsular policies of the Cluniac monks. Latin cultural influence faltered during the early decades of the twelfth century as the local ambitions of Count Henry and Infanta Teresa focused attention on regional concerns. This situation changed after 1128. Although Afonso Henriques had pursued strategies that were primarily intended to consolidate his authority within Portugal, a corollary had been the re-establishment of formal links with the wider Latin world. Thus, the Portuguese ruler had bolstered his own position by encouraging the clergy of Braga in their efforts to restore the international standing of their ancient church, even as he won valuable prestige by fostering the foundation of a new wave of ecclesiastical institutions within his territories. During the 1140s Afonso extended these outward-looking policies in the hope of giving greater substance to his brave claims for royal status. One facet of this cultural re-engagement was the restoration of links with the great aristocratic houses beyond the Pyrenees; another was a rapid escalation of contact with the diffuse and rapidly developing institutions of the Latin Church.

Among the most important links between noble families were those created by the institution of dynastic marriage. By 1143 Afonso Henriques was already over thirty years of age and had delayed matrimony for far longer than was usual. Almost immediately after the Leonese acknowledgement of his royal status, Afonso began actively seeking a suitable spouse – and he concentrated his attentions outside the peninsula. Negotiations were set in motion for a marriage with Mafalda, the daughter of Count Amadeus III of Maurienne and Savoy (1095–1148); and Afonso's family contacts in Burgundy may have proved very useful: Count Amadeus was the son of Gisela of Burgundy and his wife, Mafalda of Albon, was also a Burgundian. Moreover Count Amadeus himself was a highly regarded European figure who would later take command of the Italian contingent for the Second Crusade.⁴⁶ In terms of forging useful dynastic links, this was an advantageous

match for the Portuguese ruler. Arrangements for the marriage were quickly brought to a successful conclusion and by 1146 the wedding had taken place. Portuguese chroniclers praised Mafalda's probity and kindness, but they were also careful to emphasise her foreign nativity.⁴⁷ For not only did the successful negotiation of this marriage reintegrate the Portuguese royal house into the network of Latin Christian noble families, the selection of a foreign wife was in itself also a powerful symbol.

Afonso VI of León-Castile, Afonso's grandfather and the theoretical source of his authority, had married six times. His wives had been Burgundian, Italian and Muslim Andalusí. The taking of an exotic bride had thus come to be seen as a characteristic of royalty, a means by which a king might emphasise his own pre-eminence locally. Afonso of Portugal seemed aware of these overtones and sought wherever possible to re-emphasise the international character of his marriage. In 1147 the first of the couple's many children, a son, was born.⁴⁸ This son was christened Henry, a choice of name that was in a number of ways revealing. Afonso himself had been named in honour of his maternal grandfather, Alfonso VI, partially as a statement of political intent, but also in an attempt to assist his family's assimilation into local society. A generation later, however, the Portuguese ruler named his own firstborn son after the child's paternal grandfather, Count Henry, in an act which could not help but emphasise the family's exotic heritage. It was an indication, in fact, of how much times had changed. The status of the foreign outsider, which was a serious liability to a Burgundian immigrant count, had in less than four decades been transformed into a type of prestige that was simply unavailable to other noble families within the kingdom. Of such distinctions might monarchies be made.

A renewal of dynastic links with the world beyond the Pyrenees was complemented by the arrival in Portugal of a new, transnational organisation. At the beginning of the twelfth century the influence of Cluny in Iberia had waned amid the turbulence of local politics; at the same time, moreover, the predominant position of the order in the spiritual life of Europe was challenged by the rise of a rival religious movement, the Cistercian monastic order. The origins of the Cistercian order lay in the final years of the eleventh century, when a small group of Benedictine monks left the monastery at Cluny and established themselves at Cîteaux, not far from Dijon, where they hoped to pursue a purer and more rigorous form of monasticism. These monks soon attracted widespread interest and the support of the dukes of Burgundy. In 1113 Bernard, an enthusiastic new recruit, joined the monastery at Cîteaux; two years later he led a party of his brethren to form a new Cistercian community at Clairvaux. In the years that followed Bernard of Clairvaux became the spiritual leader and primary motivating force behind a remarkable expansion of the order. One important characteristic of the Cistercian reform was a preference for accepting undeveloped land far from established settlements, places of solitude where the monks might more

easily find the tranquillity they craved. The organisational structure of the monasteries evolved to facilitate the improvement of such land and the Cistercian monks gained a reputation for being able to bring even the most marginal territory into productive use. This high level of efficiency coupled with their renowned spiritual piety attracted further donations, particularly at the frontier regions of Latin Christendom. Within two decades there were over thirty Cistercian daughter houses; twenty years later there were almost three hundred.⁴⁹

The earliest progress of the Cistercians in Portugal is difficult to establish with certainty due to a disastrous fire in the Order's central archive at Viseu in 1841. Judging by the few reliable documents that survive, it seems likely that from as early as 1138 monasteries such as Santiago de Sever, S. Cristóvão de Lafões and S. João de Tarouca were being influenced by the Cistercian monastic reform, although it is not until 1144 that a charter makes this relationship explicit.⁵⁰ Monasteries affiliated with the Cistercian order also provided candidates for high ecclesiastical office, just as Benedictine houses had done a generation earlier. Thus, in 1146, the vacant see of Porto was offered to Pedro, who was a former monk of the Cistercian house of Pitões das Júnias in the Minho valley and then abbot of Osseira, in Galicia.⁵¹ The Cistercian Order clearly saw the Portuguese frontier as a land of opportunity and Bernard of Clairvaux maintained communications with local leaders there. The canons at Santa Cruz claimed that when Bernard heard reports of the sanctity of their founder, Theotonio, the abbot sent a miraculous healing staff that proved highly efficacious at easing the aging prior's arthritic pains.⁵² Abbot Bernard was also in contact with Afonso Henriques, and while suggestions that their correspondence began prior to the Second Crusade are difficult to substantiate, this communication is well documented in the early 1150s.⁵³ For the Cistercians had much to offer the ruler of an expanding frontier kingdom. In addition to their reputation for piety and the influence of Bernard of Clairvaux himself in the courts of Latin Christendom, the monks were also highly skilled at the mundane but crucial tasks of agricultural production. Afonso was eager to entice the monks to establish a presence in his realm, and as the century progressed the Cistercians would receive extensive grants of land from the Portuguese king.

The Cistercian monastic order was not the only religious novelty that emerged in Latin Christendom during the early years of the twelfth century. The Poor Knights of Christ and the Temple of Solomon, more popularly known as the Knights Templar, also enjoyed a period of exponential growth at this time. In 1118 Hugh de Payns founded a brotherhood of knights who undertook to police the pilgrim routes in the Holy Land and protect travelers to Jerusalem. The organisation developed slowly in relative obscurity until the knights attracted the support of Bernard of Clairvaux. They were subsequently recognised as a religious order at the Council of Troyes in 1128; a flow of new recruits and valuable donations quickly followed. One of the

earliest recorded grants to the Knights Templar was made in Portugal on 19 March 1128, when Infanta Teresa signed the castle at Soure over to their keeping. Possibly the infanta and Count Fernando also had plans for a still greater donation to the order in the Fonte Arcada region, but if so these were forestalled by the deteriorating political situation.⁵⁴ When Afonso assumed power in the county he confirmed the terms of his mother's grant, enthusiastically declaring the knights of the order to be his brothers, but despite these warm words he made no move to augment the Templars' holdings.⁵⁵ For over a decade the order received no further grants in Portugal, which may reflect the initial disinclination of the Knights Templar to assume any responsibility for frontier defence. The knights clearly believed that their primary duty was to direct all available resources to the Holy Land and only gradually were the Iberian leaders able to induce the knights to take a more proactive local role.⁵⁶ In Portugal it was not until 1144, sixteen years after they were established, that the local Templars emerged from the shadows, riding to defeat at the hands of Muslim forces led by Abū Zakarīya of Santarém.⁵⁷ Three years later, however, the Knights Templar had their revenge, when they took part in Afonso's capture of Santarém and were rewarded with important assets in the town.⁵⁸ For along with a growing military proficiency the knights offered Afonso something even more valuable: the unique prestige that came from supporting this highly respected international order of warrior monks. The Portuguese Templars, for their part, were able to lay the foundations for an extraordinary expansion during the second half of the twelfth century.

Afonso's re-engagement with the noble houses of Burgundy and his encouragement of the ebullient new religious movements brought the Portuguese ruler numerous concrete benefits, from an advantageous marriage and the provision of an heir, to the introduction of advanced agricultural techniques and the creation of units of professional, highly motivated monastic warriors. Most of all though, these strengthening links with Latin Christendom provided the type of international profile without which Afonso's claims for royal status could only ever be local in their scope and significance. Yet the most important relationship the Portuguese ruler forged during these years was with papacy. By supporting the clergy of Braga he established a strong working relationship with the most important local churchman, Archbishop João Peculiar; and through the success of the monastery of Santa Cruz Afonso had for the first time opened up direct communication with the papal court. The Portuguese leader was to use this greater prominence in Rome to take a dramatic step. Towards the end of 1143, only months after his fateful meeting with Alfonso VII at Zamora, the Portuguese ruler moved his relationship with the papacy onto a new level by abruptly declaring himself a vassal of the Holy See.

Such a declaration of loyalty and submission by an Iberian ruler was by no means unprecedented. In 1089 King Sancho Ramirez of Aragon, who

had declared himself a 'knight of St Peter' two decades early, agreed to pay the pontiff an annual silver tribute. In the following year Count Berenguer Ramon II of Barcelona declared himself a vassal of the papacy and agreed to make a similar financial contribution.⁵⁹ On 13 December 1143, in a letter directed to Pope Innocent II (1130–1143), Afonso of Portugal took the same decisive step:

As a knight of St Peter and of the Roman pontiffs I hold myself, my lands, and all dignities and honours pertaining to them [to be] for the defence and solace of the apostolic see; and I will accept the authority of no other ecclesiastical or secular lord...

In addition to this stirring pledge of loyalty Afonso promised the pope an annual tribute of four ounces of gold. To underline the earnestness of his offer the document was witnessed by the archbishop of Braga, the bishops of Coimbra and Porto, and by the papal legate to Spain, Cardinal Guido. In this document, known as *Claves regni*, Afonso conspicuously described himself as 'the king of Portugal'.⁶⁰

There were numerous potential benefits in this adroit political move. A technical fealty to the distant papacy was considerably less onerous than the more readily enforceable allegiance he owed to the emperor of León-Castile. Afonso may also have hoped that Pope Innocent would simply acknowledge his royal status, much as Alfonso of León-Castile had already done, and thus add still further to his local reputation. If so, he was to be disappointed. The papal court took hierarchies of social standing very seriously, and royalty was not a status popes were prepared to bandy. As it happened, Afonso's letter never reached its intended recipient, for by the time the Portuguese emissaries actually reached the curia Pope Innocent had died. His successor, Celestine II (1143–1144), made no move to reply to the Portuguese initiative and it fell to Pope Lucius II (1144–1145) to draft a finely worded response. But the long delay in answering Afonso's offer was not merely the result of changing papal administrations. Successive pontiffs prevaricated as to the most appropriate position to adopt towards the Portuguese offer largely because, welcome though such a pledge of loyalty from a distant land might be, too fulsome a response could only be detrimental to papal relations with the ruler of León-Castile. Wisely, Pope Lucius sought compromise. He graciously accepted the tribute Afonso offered and took Portugal under papal protection, but he meticulously described Afonso as a duke (*dux*), rather than a king.⁶¹ Moreover Lucius' successor, Pope Eugenius III (1145–1153), reiterated papal support for the overall authority of the monarch of León-Castile in a series of bulls directed towards Archbishop João of Braga, who ever since the Second Lateran Council in 1139 had dissembled over papal demands that he submit to the authority of Toledo. On 9 May 1145 Pope Eugenius ordered Archbishop João Peculiar to render the necessary obedience within

three months. When the archbishop failed to comply the pope ordered him suspended from office.⁶²

To a large degree the equivocal response to Afonso's submission to Rome was the result of a papal desire to maintain good relations with all parties. At the same time, papal policy was also informed by the prevalent view in the papal curia towards the proper role of secular leaders in the Iberian Peninsula. While those actually living on the frontier with the Islamic world had long been accustomed to the daily reality of a Muslim presence – as a potential threat, sometimes an opportunity, but always only one factor in policy decisions – the papacy considered the overriding duty of all Spanish rulers to be the defence of Christian society. Pope Lucius' willingness to extend papal protection to Portugal was guided by this belief. The pontiff surely anticipated that by placing Afonso's territory under the aegis of St Peter, both Portuguese and Leonese forces would be deterred from attempting a military solution to future disagreements. With peace thus forced upon them, they might instead turn their belligerence southwards. Yet this same papal preoccupation with maintaining the frontier also placed sharp limits on any further encouragement for Afonso Henriques' separatist ambitions, and the curia would move quickly to censure actions that were deemed to be detrimental to a strong local defence.

This papal concern with the fostering of unity among the Iberian leaders was only reinforced by developments within the wider world. Islam was resurgent in the Latin East and the loss of the Crusader State of Edessa in 1144 seemed to threaten the entire Christian presence in the Holy Land. On 1 December 1145 Pope Eugenius issued a rousing papal bull, *Quantam predecessores*, calling the knighthood of Europe to action. Initially the response was muted, but this changed when King Louis VII of France expressed a desire to take part in any such expedition to the East. Pope Eugenius re-issued the crusading bull on 1 March 1146. Bernard of Clairvaux took up the task of promoting the new crusade and on the 31 March the abbot addressed a huge crowd in a field at Vézelay. Scepticism melted before his fiery oratory and popular enthusiasm for the crusade was kindled. Bernard immediately set off on a wider preaching tour to spread word of the crusade across Europe. In a letter to Pope Eugenius the abbot of Clairvaux described his achievement thus: 'I spoke, and the crusaders have multiplied beyond number. Cities and towns are empty, and now they would not find one man for every seven women. Everywhere now there are widows with living husbands....'⁶³

The events that convulsed Latin Christendom after 1145 were to have unexpected repercussions in Portugal. Although the majority of the crusaders marched eastwards, a number chose to take the sea route to Jerusalem. This voyage was to bring the hardy mariners along the Portuguese coast at a decisive point in time. Even as preparations for the crusade were being finalised across Europe, Afonso Henriques was nurturing military ambitions of

his own. In the spring of 1147 Afonso launched a campaign against Muslim lands to the south. The Portuguese enjoyed early success when the strategically vital city of Santarém fell to a surprise attack. Only a matter of weeks after this victory Afonso managed to persuade a fleet of crusaders en route to the Holy Land to participate in a follow-up attack on nearby Lisbon. The combined armies eventually forced the defenders to capitulate on 24 October 1147. This second triumph established Portuguese control over the river Tagus and the rich lands of Estremadura. What is less clear, however, is the degree to which the timely arrival of the northern crusaders was simply a coincidence the Portuguese capitalised upon, or the fruition of Afonso's long policy of engagement with Latin Christendom. Was the advance to the Tagus River a purely local initiative, or should it be seen as a facet of the Second Crusade?

The advance to the Tagus within the context of the Second Crusade

Ostensibly the Second Crusade was triggered by the loss of the Crusader State of Edessa. There are indications, however, that some of the organisers attempted to plan a more general, integrated campaign on several fronts: against the Wends in the Baltic, the Saracens in the Holy Land, and the Moors in Spain.⁶⁴ Is it possible that the Portuguese attacks on Santarém and Lisbon were part of a general strategy, linking the Iberian offensives into a wider strategic campaign coordinated by Rome? Communications between Portugal and the Latin world had grown in frequency and complexity during the twelfth century. Relations had been established between the Portuguese and many of the ecclesiastical and secular leaders most deeply involved in the organisation of the crusade, including Pope Eugenius himself, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Afonso's father-in-law, Count Amadeus – leader of the Italian contingent. On the other hand, there is no actual evidence of advanced planning: no surviving papal documents even hint that Afonso Henriques was kept apprised of the expected date of the crusader fleet's departure. The sole exception is a single undated letter, purporting to be from Bernard of Clairvaux to Afonso, in which the abbot agreed to provide unspecified assistance to the Portuguese leader. Unfortunately neither the authenticity nor indeed the meaning of this letter has been satisfactorily established.⁶⁵ In the absence then of any compelling documentary evidence linking the organisation of the crusade with Afonso's advance to the Tagus River, it is necessary to look more closely at the campaign itself.

Regardless of the setbacks suffered by the crusaders in the East, and the sense of growing threat felt by many in Europe, during the 1140s the pendulum of relative military strength on the Iberian Peninsula was swinging in favour of the Christians. The closing phase of the long reign of 'Alī b. Yūsuf was a time of Almoravid decline in al-Andalus, due

primarily to a rising instability at the heart of their empire in Morocco. A new religious movement, the Almohads (from the Arabic *Muwahhidūn* – those who affirm the unity of God), won many adherents to their stricter interpretation of Islam, particularly among the warlike tribesmen of the Atlas mountains. After failing to contain this threat the Almoravids soon found themselves on the defensive, and their situation rapidly deteriorated. ‘Alī b. Yūsuf died in 1143 and his energetic son Tāshfīn – the last real hope for the regime – was killed in battle against the tribesmen two years later. Almoravid resistance crumbled and their capital, Marrakech, was stormed in March 1147. The surviving members of the Almoravid dynasty were then massacred by the victors. In al-Andalus, meanwhile, the diversion of Almoravid attention and resources away from the peninsula allowed long suppressed local animosities to resurface. Rebellions were fermented against central authority and Muslim Spain once again broke up into a number of small polities. Some of these ‘second *taifa* states’ remained loyal to the Almoravid regime, others swung towards the Almohads and a few loudly proclaimed their independence.⁶⁶

The collapse of the enforced Almoravid consensus provided an opportunity for the Christian rulers of Iberia to expand their territories and influence southwards. With Muslim lands fragmenting into a patchwork of often rival states the Christians adopted the policies of an earlier generation, seeking to divide their enemies with truces and alliances. Thus Alfonso of León-Castile menaced Ibn Ghānīya of Cordoba into concluding a defensive treaty, allowing the Spaniards to concentrate their full strength against the city of Almeria in 1147. On the other side of the peninsula, Afonso Henriques also hoped to take advantage of Muslim disunity to reclaim the territory his father had lost almost half a century earlier. In common with Alfonso of León-Castile, the Portuguese king adopted methods of pragmatic diplomacy to gain his ends. Afonso concluded truces with a number of the new *taifa* rulers and in this way was able to minimise further destructive Muslim raids into his own territory, while at the same time gradually isolating those towns he hoped to attack. His first target was to be Santarém. This fortified city commanded the upper end of the Tagus estuary and was a critical first goal for securing control over the river. Yet how closely was the timing of Afonso’s offensive related to preparations taking place in the ports of Northern Europe?

Two accounts of the Portuguese attack on Santarém, both of which appear to be informed by eyewitness accounts, were written in the monastery of Santa Cruz. The first of these is included in *Vita Sancti Theotonii*, the hagiography of the monastery’s first prior, and describes Theotonio’s own activities in support of the attack. A second account, *De expugnatione Scalabis*, purports to be a first-hand version of events as recounted by Afonso Henriques himself. Both these accounts emphasise that local initiative was the motivating force behind events and make no mention whatsoever of a

foreign dimension behind the planning. A popular later belief that Afonso attributed his success at Santarém to the spiritual intervention of Bernard of Clairvaux, and rewarded him with a grant of land to establish a Cistercian monastery at Alcobaça, finds no corroboration in contemporary documents.⁶⁷ In fact, the author of *Vita Sancti Theotonii* makes clear that one of the few people Afonso discussed his plans with was Theotonio himself, who was privy to the exact time of the attack so that his monks could offer special supportive prayers.⁶⁸ Since the prior of Santa Cruz maintained communications with both Bernard of Clairvaux and Pope Eugenius (Santa Cruz having been taken under papal protection in 1135) it is possible that he may have been in a position to appraise Afonso of the general details of the crusade. This, however, falls far short of the integrated planning a coordinated international operation would require.

In fact Afonso's attack on Santarém began very quietly. The Portuguese leader sent a trusted lieutenant, the Mozarab Mem (or Menendes) Ramirez, to reconnoitre the town's defences.⁶⁹ Because a truce between the Portuguese and the people of Santarém was in force, Ramirez was able to gain easy access to the city. He returned to Coimbra with an optimistic report and, after refining his plans in council with a few close advisors, Afonso decided to commit his forces to the attempt. On 10 March Afonso dispatched messengers advising the rulers of Santarém that the truce would not be renewed. Hard on the heels of these messengers he then led a small army consisting of a few knights and some 250 men-at-arms southwards from Coimbra. Their plan was to approach the city by night with numerous scaling ladders, raise them all simultaneously, and then swarm up to overwhelm the defenders. Initially the Portuguese enjoyed good fortune: the outlying sentinels, unaware that the truce had ended, were asleep at their posts. Under cover of darkness the attackers were able to approach the city undetected. From this point on, however, the loose plan of escalade they had agreed upon was quickly superseded by unfolding events. Mem Ramirez led the attack, clambering on to the roof of a conveniently located house so that his scaling ladder would reach the parapet. Disaster threatened when he dropped the ladder with a dangerous clatter. After a breathless pause, Ramirez climbed down to retrieve their means of ascent and then held it steady while a young boy, by the name of Moqueme, scampered up and roped the top rung to the battlements. Several armoured soldiers were then able to climb up after him onto the wall, where they raised Afonso's standard. Lulled by the recent truce, the guards were slow to react, particularly when the Mozarabic members of the raiding party called out to them in their own language. In the resulting confusion the Christian advance party managed to gain control of the gates; and when the bulk of the army forced an entry the unprepared citizens of Santarém were quickly overwhelmed. The author of the *De expugnatione Scalabis* concludes his vivid account with the poignant vignette of a philosophical Afonso Henriques standing in the broken gateway ruminating

on the workings of divine providence, while from within came the sounds of mayhem.

Although Portuguese sources make no mention of direct foreign involvement in the attack on Santarém there are hints of a more subtle external influence. Latin ideals of social and cultural exclusivity created an ideology of sectarian militancy, and there are several articulations of just such an ideology of violence in the Portuguese accounts of the attack. In the introduction to the *De expugnatione Scalabis* the anonymous author exalts that the Muslims have been cast down and a wonderful inheritance granted to those favoured by heaven. To bring this to pass, the author maintains, God has decreed 'new wars in our times'.⁷⁰ These comments echo the ideology of the crusade, but it is left to Afonso to underline exactly what this new form of belligerence entailed.

Tell me, for the love of God, how can there be any difficulty in killing those who are unarmed and still half asleep? Listen to me carefully: spare neither age or sex, kill the elderly and infants; the maidens and grandmothers! Strengthen your hands! Because the Lord is with us, each of you will be able to kill a hundred of them!⁷¹

This chilling lack of mercy is the rhetoric of total war – the ultimate progression of Latin ideologies of cultural orthodoxy. But is this an accurate reflection of contemporary Portuguese attitudes? The author of this account wrote from the security of the scriptorium in Santa Cruz, an institution that was a centre of Latin cultural influence in the region. His agenda throughout is to emphasise the role of the monastery in this critical operation. Certainly the motivations he attributes to the attackers do not accord well with the events as they actually unfolded.

In fact there was little sign of any great depth of cultural hatred between the Portuguese and the people of Santarém. Agreements made between Christians and Muslims were respected to the letter by both parties. Mem Ramirez was able to scout out the city because a temporary truce had been declared; for their part the Portuguese were scrupulous in sending messengers to cancel this truce prior to the attack. If the Portuguese truly had massacre on their minds what would be the point of such punctiliousness? Throughout the operation the attackers demonstrated the type of familiarity with their neighbours that could only have developed through associations other than conflict. There were a number of Mozarabs among the attacking party, including the leaders Mem Ramirez and Martin Moab, and the Portuguese had sufficient knowledge to identify (and record) Muslim geographical names and their meanings. They were also familiar enough with spoken Arabic to understand the challenges of the startled guards.⁷² Most importantly, despite Afonso's purported exhortations to massacre, there is no evidence that the city was occupied with unusual savagery.

While Muslim sources comment sadly on the loss of Santarém they make no mention of a slaughter taking place. Refugees from the city subsequently made their way south and no shadow of atrocity darkened subsequent negotiations with the citizens of Lisbon.⁷³

Order was soon restored in Santarém and in the weeks that followed Afonso Henriques worked to consolidate his new conquest. These efforts are reflected in a number of charters portioning out the spoils of victory. Among the beneficiaries of Afonso's largess were the Knights Templar, who were given authority over the churches in the town. This grant was later to inveigle the Templars in a long jurisdictional dispute with the bishop of Lisbon and the resulting debate revealed an interesting fact about the original grant to the military order. Afonso gave the churches into their keeping on the understanding that they would be exchanged for other equal holdings elsewhere: 'if it should happen that in a future time God gives to me that city called Lisbon'.⁷⁴ Did this caveat indicate, as indeed some historians have suggested, that Afonso viewed his victory at Santarém as the first step in wider campaign encompassing an imminent attack on Lisbon, possibly following a prearranged timetable to coordinate with the soon-to-arrive crusaders?⁷⁵ In fact the wording of the grant (*si forte evenerit in aliquo tempore*) seems to imply that the capture of Lisbon was a future hope, the next logical step perhaps, but not necessarily the expected result of a clearly envisaged campaign. The overall impression left by the Portuguese victory at Santarém is of a canny policy of opportunism in which Afonso was quick to perceive advantage and acted decisively when he did so. This same policy of pragmatic self-interest was evident a few months later when there arose the possibility of mounting a successful siege of Lisbon.

In the spring of 1147 a large fleet of crusaders gathered in Dartmouth harbour to begin their long voyage to the Holy Land. This fleet consisted of a number of different contingents: Anglo-Normans, Flemish and Germans made up the bulk of the fleet; but Scots, Bretons and even a Pisan engineer were mentioned in various contexts.⁷⁶ Eyewitnesses from both the Anglo-Norman and the German contingents described the crusaders' adventures in considerable detail, as did a later Portuguese author who claimed to have interviewed participants to ensure the accuracy of his account. In combination these reports provide an unusually multilayered description of the crusaders' operations in Portugal.⁷⁷ Before setting sail a council was held to arrange for the disposition of the fleet. A detailed code of conduct was drawn up to ensure that order was maintained and by 23 May the crusaders were ready to cast off. For five days the weather held and the fleet made fair progress until, midway across the Bay of Biscay, a fearsome tempest scattered the ships. The majority were able to make landfall at Gozón on 30 May. After a two-week cruise along the Galician and Portuguese coasts, pausing at several points of interest along the way, the ships arrived safely in Porto on 16 June. There they were welcomed by Bishop Pedro who, forewarned

of their imminent arrival, had been commanded by Afonso Henriques to propose on his behalf a joint attack on Lisbon. Afonso himself, meanwhile, had already led Portuguese forces closer to the city in anticipation of the crusaders agreeing to meet him there.⁷⁸

The high state of Portuguese preparedness is quite striking and might be interpreted as an indication of the guiding hands of Pope Eugenius or Bernard of Clairvaux in the events that followed.⁷⁹ There is, however, a simpler explanation. The ships of the Second Crusade were not the first seaborne pilgrims the Portuguese had encountered – in fact they were simply the latest in a long series of similar fleets. Almost three decades earlier Count Henry had taken advantage of a destructive visit by King Sigurd of Norway to occupy Sintra, and as recently as 1142 the Portuguese had joined with a fleet of northern pilgrims for an abortive attack on Lisbon.⁸⁰ In fact the speed with which Afonso reacted to the arrival of the fleet bound for the Second Crusade can be explained by more mundane factors. Although in 1147 the majority of the storm-battered fleet had made leisurely progress along the Galician and Portuguese coasts, a flotilla of five English ships had been separated from their companions during the perilous crossing of the Bay of Biscay, and had sailed directly for Porto. These harbingers provided the Portuguese with ample time to ready themselves and to greet the remainder of the fleet when it did finally arrive.⁸¹ Yet the strongest argument against any form of advanced planning behind the northern participation is the reaction of the crusaders themselves to the Portuguese request for aid. The Anglo-Norman account, recently attributed to a crusader named Raol, describes in considerable detail the bitter dissention the prospect of a delay in Lisbon caused among the crusaders.⁸² In itself this disagreement suggests that no advance arrangement for cooperative action had been made, and the silence of the Portuguese in the face of resistance would seem to confirm it. Had either Pope Eugenius or Abbot Bernard made any formal undertaking to Afonso Henriques, there is no obvious reason why such an agreement went unmentioned by those seeking to persuade the crusaders of the legitimacy of this course of action.

The simplest explanation would, therefore, also seem to be the most likely. Portuguese links with the Latin world were sufficient to provide a general knowledge of preparations being made for the forthcoming crusade. Aside from information conveyed along official ecclesiastical channels, the proposed expedition to Jerusalem was a popular topic of conversation and speculation in the Atlantic ports – thus, the English mariners heard of the call to crusade by word-of-mouth rather than through any formal announcement.⁸³ Portuguese familiarity with the cycles of wind and ocean current would have enabled Afonso to guess when any crusader fleets might be likely to arrive. Beyond this, however, there are no real indications that any formal arrangements had been entered into prior to the crusaders' meeting with the Portuguese king. This, therefore, was the decisive encounter: armed

with the advice of his senior clergymen and his own awareness of the basic drives motivating the Latin crusaders, Afonso attempted to persuade the new arrivals to hazard their fortunes and their lives in a wayside operation in Portugal. For a time it seemed that his familiarity with the Latin Christian mindset would not be enough. Only after considerable debate were those crusaders most stridently opposed to any delay – primarily the English – at last reconciled to the idea of assisting the Portuguese, and a formal agreement stipulating the terms of their association finally accepted.

As soon as these negotiations were concluded an embassy was sent to Lisbon. In strict obedience to the codes of Iberian warfare the citizens were given the opportunity to avoid the impending danger by surrendering on terms. Raol was clearly quite interested in this embassy and describes in some detail the exchange of argument that resulted. Following a rather confused attempt to legitimise their actions by an appeal to the concept of reconquest the Portuguese emissaries declaimed:

Only surrender into our hands the stronghold of your castle and each of you may preserve the liberties which he had hitherto enjoyed; for we do not wish to drive you out from such ancient seats. Let each one live according to his customs, unless some of you should voluntarily be added to the church of God.⁸⁴

These moderate terms reflected the essential pragmatism of Portuguese aims. Nevertheless, they drew an uncompromising response from Lisbon's defenders. The citizens refused outright to entertain the argument of prior Christian ownership of their city and were even more dismissive of demands based on the threatening presence of the crusaders. 'Do what you can,' Raol recalled them responding, 'we will do what the divine will determines.'⁸⁵

The emissaries returned with this answer and the Christian forces established camps around Lisbon. The Anglo-Normans took up position to the west of the city, the Portuguese royal troops to the north, and the Flemings and Germans on a hill to the east. On the 1 July operations began in earnest with an attack on Lisbon's suburbs. Late in the afternoon the crusaders breached the outer defences and a chaotic running battle developed in the narrow streets of the lower city. Eventually the small groups and stragglers were able to regroup in a cemetery illuminated by the glow of burning buildings, where they spent a long night fending off a series of counter-attacks. When daylight revealed the dangerous situation other crusaders were able to move forward in support. After resisting one final sally by the defenders, the crusaders secured possession of the suburbs and established a siege of the upper city. Eager to capitalise on their early success the crusaders immediately began building a number of siege engines, including a moveable tower over thirty metres in height. When the machines were complete the

crusaders launched a vigorous attack on the city walls, only to have their efforts all end in disaster. The moveable siege tower bogged in the wet sand some distance from the walls and was shattered by a concentrated bombardment of stones. The dismayed attackers were then driven back with heavy casualties and the loss of almost all their siege equipment. For several days despondency reigned in the camp and no further operations were attempted. Morale was raised slightly when a dispatch case was captured containing desperate letters written by the people of Lisbon appealing for assistance from their co-religionists to the south; and rose still higher when several refusals were intercepted. The Anglo-Norman author included a transcript of one such reply, purporting to be from Abū Muhammad Sīday b. Wazīr of Évora, who claimed to be unable to offer aid due to his own alliance with Afonso Henriques. Yet as the siege dragged on, and the defenders continued to resist, the morale of the attackers fell again, particularly when the Portuguese king announced the need to disband much of his army and redeploy resources to Santarém.⁸⁶

By October the stamina of both attackers and defenders was ebbing. Failed attempts at undermining the walls led the Anglo-Normans to begin building another siege tower. Meanwhile the Flemings persevered with their excavations and managed to construct an elaborate series of galleries under the eastern walls. On 16 October the mines were fired and a section of the wall collapsed. The city's defenders rushed to the breach and with the courage of despair were able to prevent the Flemings and Germans forcing an entry. But when the English hurried over to assist their fellow crusaders, their offer of assistance was roughly rejected, with the Flemings insisting that they alone would enter the town through the breach they had made. In disgust the Anglo-Normans returned to their siege machines and launched an attack of their own against the western fortifications. On this occasion, the siege tower was rolled forward across the wet sand without hindrance; but disaster almost struck again when the incoming tide separated the attackers from the main body of the army. Through the hours of darkness a small group of crusaders laboured to protect the tower from the desperate efforts of the defenders to destroy it with incendiary missiles and sallies from the postern gate. With the receding of the tide the following morning the tower was once more pushed inexorably forward and as it creaked to a halt beside the wall the weakened citizens threw down their arms in despair and called for a truce.⁸⁷

Negotiations were swiftly carried forward; yet at the very point of triumph the siege came perilously close to failing. The more disreputable of the crusaders began to suspect that their own leaders, in conspiracy with the Portuguese king and the citizens of Lisbon, were seeking to defraud them. Violence erupted when the hostages demanded under the terms of the truce were handed over into Portuguese keeping. Riotous crusaders stormed through the camp, threatening the lives of both the Anglo-Norman leader

Hervey of Glanville and Afonso Henriques himself. Outraged at this display of ill-discipline, the Portuguese king threatened to break off all agreements with the northerners then and there, claiming he would rather forsake the city than be further associated with rogues. The Muslim emissaries, scenting an opportunity to divide their enemies, suddenly declared that the crusaders were too volatile to be trusted and they withdrew their offer to surrender. Cooler heads among the crusader forces were at last able to prevail and the leaders of each contingent agreed to swear fealty to Afonso for the remainder of their stay in Portugal. With his honour thus respected the king returned to the negotiating table and the citizens of Lisbon were compelled to submit to the terms of their original agreement. Tragically, the following day the discipline of the crusaders broke down once again. The terms of surrender were ignored as groups of Flemish and German crusaders indulged in a violent sack of the city, looting and murdering the citizens without restraint. Among the victims was the aging Mozarabic bishop of the city, who was slain by riotous Flemings.⁸⁸

Only slowly did the explosive passions of the victors subside. A semblance of order was gradually restored and the surviving citizens who wished to leave marched southwards away from Lisbon, lamenting the loss of their city and their livelihoods.⁸⁹ Afonso moved quickly to reorganise the newly conquered city. An Englishman from Hastings was elevated to the abruptly vacant see as Bishop Gilbert (1147–1166). A number of other northern clergymen also elected to stay in Lisbon to oversee the restoration of the city's churches and the establishment of a number of new religious institutions. Notable among these new constructions were two churches built to honour the crusaders killed during the siege.⁹⁰ To the west of the city the Anglo-Normans constructed the commemorative church of Santa Maria dos Martíres; the Germans and Flemish built the church of São Vicente de Fora to the east. In addition to these clergymen, a number of other northerners also decided to stay in Portugal and accept lands and privileges from the grateful Afonso. After wintering in the city and recovering their strength the remaining crusaders continued their voyage to the east. They paused to storm and loot Faro and were then persuaded to take part in Leonese attacks on Almeria and Tortossa. Finally, after a long and eventful voyage, a hardy few reached Jerusalem and fulfilled their vows at the Holy Sepulchre.⁹¹

The capture of Lisbon was a triumph that compounded the strategic significance of the earlier Portuguese success at Santarém. This key campaign was above all a local initiative and there is no compelling evidence that the organisers of the crusade envisaged operations in Portugal as a facet of a wider global strategy. Nevertheless, Afonso's long re-engagement with the Latin Christian world had provided important leverage for winning the support of the sceptical crusaders, as well as in maintaining an often difficult relationship through the months that followed. This was a major

achievement. There can be no doubt that the crusaders played a decisive role, and it is difficult to imagine the Portuguese forcing the surrender of the city unaided. Not only were local troops unable to remain in the field for sufficient periods of time, but they also appeared to lack the siege technologies necessary to reduce a city the size of Lisbon – certainly there is no mention of the Portuguese being involved in either mining operations or the construction of siege engines. The triumphs of 1147 should thus be seen as the fruits of Portuguese initiative and flexibility coupled with Latin Christian military and technical skill.

Yet if cooperation between the Portuguese and the crusaders yielded a remarkable success, it also highlighted the sharp differences that yet remained between the Latin and Iberian attitude to sectarian militancy. The deep tensions that emerged in the besieging army during the long, torrid months of the siege suggest different contingents of crusaders held divergent conceptions of the crusade itself. The Anglo-Norman and English crusaders tended to cleave to an older idea of crusade in which the emphasis was heavily on the notion of pilgrimage. Jerusalem was their goal: hence they exhibited the greater impatience with any delay to their journey. The continental crusaders – the Germans and Flemish – were more willing to accept an obligation to the Portuguese on the basis of their shared faith, an attitude that seems to have been the result of their greater exposure to the newest ecclesiastical thinking on the concepts of holy war.⁹² The Portuguese, on the other hand, appeared far less belligerent than their co-religionists. The moderate terms the Portuguese embassies offered Lisbon's citizens prior to the siege indicate the essential pragmatism of their aims. In the months that followed the Portuguese king consistently sought negotiation and was willing to attempt a diplomatic solution with the defenders whenever possible. Indeed this willingness to compromise was a primary reason many of the crusaders came to distrust their local allies. The mere fact of the Portuguese taking control of the hostages in the final days of the siege was enough to trigger a riot among the rank-and-file crusaders, who suspected Afonso would conclude a separate arrangement with the citizens of Lisbon. For the Portuguese, as they were portrayed by Raol, seemed to have eschewed the ideology of crusade in favour of a concept of reconquest – with all its implications of limited war and legalistic justifications for aggression.

Raol was a keen observer of unfolding events, deeply interested in anything unusual or exotic. He recalled several occasions when he encountered Portuguese people who articulated an awareness of the past and a desire to recreate the world that had existed before the Arab invasion. Thus, he recorded a local legend concerning a sunken Roman pier – that when it had risen above the waves once again the end of the Muslim presence in the peninsula would be at hand. But it was to the ambassadors sent to offer the

citizens of Lisbon surrender terms that he accorded the most developed idea of the reconquest:

We demand that the see of this city shall be under our law; and surely, if a natural sense of justice had made any progress among you, you would go back unbidden to the land of the Moors from whence you came, with baggage, money, and goods, and your women and children, leaving to us our own ...⁹³

This speech is one of the strongest and clearest surviving articulations of the reconquest ideal. Nonetheless the position of the Portuguese emissaries, at least as it was presented by Raol, is not without inconsistencies. Although their claim to an historical mandate was strongly made, they displayed confusion over the past relationship between the Moors and the Visigoths, for they describe the invasion as a breach of fealty. Moreover, the Portuguese were even uncertain about the date of the fall of the Visigothic kings, which they placed in 789 rather than 711.⁹⁴ The attitude of Lisbon's Mozarabic community to Portuguese claims also suggest that this historical argument was generally recognised as a convenient fiction. The Mozarabs had been the primary custodians of the reconquest tradition between the eighth and eleventh century; yet their reaction to the pretensions of their co-religionists was indifference or even hostility.⁹⁵ The Muslims, who knew their Portuguese neighbours well, cut to the heart of the issue in their reply to the emissaries' evocation of the past.

Labelling your ambition zeal for righteousness, you misinterpret vices for virtues. For your greed has grown to such proportions that base deeds not only please you but even delight you.... This city did indeed, as I believe, once belong to your people; but now it is ours. In the future it will perhaps be yours. But this shall be in accordance with divine favour.⁹⁶

In this reply the citizens of Lisbon rejected Portuguese protestations to either crusade or reconquest. Religious justifications for aggression are dismissed as an attempt to cloak evil deeds and the claims of the Portuguese to prior ownership are rejected outright as irrelevant. The citizens perceived behind the glib words of the emissaries the stark desire for gain. As far as they were concerned, the Portuguese were indulging in nothing other than territorial expansion, poorly camouflaged in a superficial pastiche of historical legality and even sanctity. As far as they (and indeed the Anglo-Norman author who recorded the speech) were concerned, the Portuguese king waged war for political dominion and religious militancy was merely a weapon to be used whenever he deemed it useful.

In matters of *realpolitik* Afonso Henriques was very much his father's son. Like Count Henry the Burgundian, Afonso was a canny pragmatist, willing

and able to use his strengthening contacts with Latin Christendom to reinforce his own authority within Portugal. To this end he pursued every opportunity to enhance his prestige in the peninsula, whether by marrying an exotic bride, conspicuously supporting the Cistercian and Templar Orders, or by establishing a close and highly profitable relationship with the papacy. In 1147 the Portuguese ruler's growing international profile yielded spectacular results when a local military success at Santarém was given strategic significance by the capture of Lisbon soon after. Yet Afonso Henriques also gained much from his mother's ancestry and influence, including a deeper understanding of Iberia and its people – both Christian and Muslim – than his father had ever attained. Without this understanding of the local social milieu Afonso would have been unable to consolidate his rule in the unsettled region; and his essentially Iberian mindset is nowhere more evident than in the tensions that arose between him and many of the visiting northern crusaders. Nevertheless, despite the many cultural tensions that had emerged, in the wake of the joint victory at Lisbon Afonso chose to continue his policy of engagement with the wider world. The unrest this created in the society he ruled would continue to smoulder, and occasionally burst into flame, even as Portugal was drawn still further into the Latin Christian sphere of cultural influence.

4

Papal Recognition of Portuguese Royalty (1147–1179)

By the end of 1147 Afonso Henriques could reflect on a year in which sudden military triumph had justified the patient political manoeuvring of decades and given greater substance to his claims for royal dignity. As befitted a man who aspired to be a king, in the aftermath of his spectacular victories at Santarém and Lisbon Afonso rewarded his faithful followers richly. Among the usual role-call of aristocratic and ecclesiastical beneficiaries were a few of more exotic origin. Early in 1148 the Cistercian monks received a generous donation of land in central Portugal; so too did a foreign knight, William, who had rendered important service during the capture of Lisbon.¹ These grants were a recognition by Afonso of the pivotal role Latin Christian forces had played in recent Portuguese successes, as well as an acknowledgement of the ongoing importance of European institutions to his future rule. For while Afonso's self-proclaimed royal status seems to have been accepted by his own subjects, and even by neighbouring Iberian monarchs, the papacy continued to display deep reservations. Yet Afonso could not allow the matter to rest. If he was to establish a lasting royal dynasty he had no alternative but to elicit a favourable decision from the reluctant papal curia.

Portuguese relations with the papacy had grown closer during the late 1130s until in 1144 Pope Lucius rewarded Afonso's formal declaration of loyalty by taking Portugal under papal protection. This decision was guided by the same two considerations that had informed papal intervention in the peninsula for over a century. Hampered by distance and inadequate information, senior clergymen concentrated their efforts on securing peninsular obedience to Roman ideals of correct ecclesiastical and social order, while at the same time assisting wherever possible in the defence of the frontier. Afonso's pledge of obedience had been a calculated appeal to these papal preoccupations; and Pope Lucius' extension of papal protection was primarily intended to curtail frontier skirmishing and so redirect secular belligerence towards the Muslim world. Yet, for much the same reason, the pope had placed a significant caveat upon his endorsement: although

Afonso had ostentatiously signed his declaration of loyalty as a king, Pope Lucius refused to countenance this elevation in status. His carefully worded reply pointedly referred to Afonso as 'the duke of Portugal' and for the next three decades, despite Afonso's growing reputation and open use of royal titles in his own documents, papal replies continued to accord him only ducal rank.

This insistence on overlooking Afonso's adoption of royal titles should not be seen as a studied insult, nor simply as the result of ecclesiastical conservatism. Rather it was the papacy's continued adherence to the two fundamental Iberian policies of enforcing obedience and encouraging frontier defence – until then so advantageous to Afonso – which now formed the major obstacle to any papal endorsement of a Portuguese monarchy. From the vantage point of Rome, Leonese hegemony appeared to be the natural political arrangement for providing effective peninsular government. The reign of 'Emperor' Alfonso VI was viewed by Latin churchmen as a golden age in which strong leadership had welded the disparate kingdoms together, allowing religious reform to proceed apace and dramatic military victories to be won. Several decades later his grandson, Alfonso VII, seemed poised to emulate these achievements. For as long as the papacy believed a pre-eminent Leonese monarchy offered the soundest hope for religious orthodoxy and vigorous military leadership, Afonso of Portugal would find little further support in Rome for his separatist ambitions. Indeed, even those gains Afonso had already won were not secure: they were contingent on his continuing to portray himself as a faithful son of the Church and a staunch defender of Christendom. But in the aftermath of his dramatic successes at Santarém and Lisbon, the Portuguese leader began to find the expectations of a distant papacy more difficult to meet.

The unexpected price of victory

The Portuguese military triumphs of 1147 brought Afonso Henriques to prominence on an international stage. Against a backdrop of dismal crusading failure in the Holy Land the success on the Iberian frontier shone brilliantly. With Santarém already in Christian hands, the capture of Lisbon and the nearby strongholds of Almada, Palmela and Sintra gave the Portuguese dominance over all lands north of the Tagus River. The crusader fleets wintered in Portugal and then sailed on, laden down with their spoils. For the Portuguese, however, the fruits of victory were less easily harvested. By opening the sparsely inhabited lands of Estremadura to permanent Christian settlement Afonso had virtually doubled the territory under his authority. The task of defending and making effective use of this land was a daunting one and – unlike military conquest – would be the work of years, rather than weeks. From the shaded basilicas of Rome these seemed to be mundane and minor problems. Papal eyes turned towards the faraway

frontier in anticipation of the new victories that must surely reward proper secular commitment. Afonso, all too aware of this attention, found himself in a deepening quandary as intractable local realities militated against further dramatic conquests.

Between 1147 and 1157 Afonso expended much of his time and energy on the mammoth task of consolidating his new territories. This campaign to bring abandoned land into productive use, critical though it was, lacked the glamour of military conquest, and so was seldom noticed by chroniclers. Fortunately the busy notaries of Afonso's chancery were more assiduous. They documented their lord's land transactions with lay and ecclesiastical nobles, wrote letters to foreign dignitaries, and drew up *forais* to regulate the development of urban centres. This detailed parchment collage of contemporary land-use suggests that Afonso's attempt to capitalise on his victories was in fact hampered by the very extent of Portuguese territorial gains. Although land had suddenly become plentiful there had been no corresponding rise in population. Instead, the high death toll and widespread displacement of people southwards as a result of Afonso's campaigns had left far fewer hands available or willing to till the soil. Due to this inescapable reality of supply and demand the newly captured Estremadura, far from becoming a productive source of strength, remained throughout these years a burden on Afonso's slender resources and an obstacle to further military initiatives.

At first glance the challenge of effectively utilising fallow land seemed to have been taken up in earnest. Afonso transferred ownership rights over a great deal of territory to the local aristocracy and higher clergy. In 1149, for example, Mendo Eriz and his wife Dordia Reinaldes were acknowledged to be in possession of estates near the old capital of Guimarães. Two years later Soeiro Bispo and his wife Maior were given a vineyard in the same region. Other individuals mentioned in Afonso's charters include the family of Garcia Rodrigues, who received holdings in Moimenta-da-Beira, and Pedro Viegas and his wife Ouroana Daez, who purchased hereditary title to lands in Armamar and Lamego. In 1154 a conditional grant of riverside property near Lousã was made to Paio Alvites and his wife Maria Fromarigues: they received the use of the land for their lifetimes, after which it would pass to the monastery of Lorvão. Other ecclesiastical organisations enjoyed more immediate benefits, with the monasteries at Bouro and Salzeda both receiving valuable lands around the city of Lamego. Nor were the secular clergy forgotten. In December 1149 Bishop Guilbert of Lisbon took control of thirty-two farmsteads – producing wine, olives and figs – which had formerly been the property of the Lisbon mosque. The following year Bishop Odorius of Viseu was given land around the city to fund the restoration of his see. Concrete encouragement for the international military orders came in 1157 when the Hospitallers gained formal confirmation of their holdings throughout Portugal and the Templars were granted additional assets in Sintra and Santarém.²

Judging by the large number of charters surviving from this decade it would seem that a considerable amount of land was being claimed and used. Yet more significant than the number of land transactions was the geographical location of the land itself. Of the estates that can be reliably identified, the overwhelming majority lay in the northern regions of the county, in the Douro Valley, the Trás-os-Montes or the Beiras – areas that had been in Christian hands for at least a generation – rather than the recently captured Estremadura. The most highly prized estates were those north of the Mondego River precisely because they were the more secure. This was the type of land powerful magnates expected to receive in return for their loyalty; this was also the land wealthier people such as Pedro Viegas and his wife were prepared to pay handsomely to secure. The newly conquered wilderness, on the other hand, was a gift few people seemed eager to accept. Bishops of frontier cities or international military orders pledged to the defence of Christendom might feel obliged to take possession of lands in Lisbon, Sintra or Santarém. Ecclesiastical and secular lords who had the luxury of an alternative clearly preferred to consolidate their landed wealth in safer regions. As might be expected, there is every indication that this same spirit of pragmatism pervaded other sectors of Portuguese society.

The magnates of the land were not the only subjects of notarial interest. Numerous chancery records survive from this period detailing the land reclamation undertaken by all levels of society. In order to encourage urban development in sparsely populated regions Afonso granted generous town charters delineating the rights and obligations of residents. Thus, the town of Lousã received a charter in April 1151, Mesão-Frio and Banho in 1152, Sintra at the beginning of 1154 and Freixo de Espada á Cinta between 1155 and 1157.³ The majority of these communities are located in more northerly wilderness areas; only the hilltop stronghold of Sintra actually stood on the border between the Christian and Islamic worlds. In fact settlement in Estremadura was a slow process, and the towns formed there were in a number of ways untypical. Atouguia, for example, was the region granted to William, the northern soldier rewarded by Afonso in 1148 for his part in the capture of Lisbon. The nearby town of Lourinhã was granted to Jordan and his contingent of Frankish veterans. Could it be that these newcomers, having witnessed the Muslims in disarray and defeat at Lisbon, believed the land to be more secure than did the native-born Portuguese? If so, the immigrants may in time have come to recognise the wisdom of local caution. A later Frankish arrival, Alardo (possibly a Portuguese rendering of 'Abelard'), was careful to take possession of lands in the north, at Vila Verde.⁴

The reasons why the majority of settlers, particularly those experienced in local conditions, might prefer not to form communities in the newly captured territories can be readily deduced by reading between the lines of their own town charters. Because land could be obtained with relative ease in many regions of Iberia, enterprising settlers expected to be granted

significant rewards for their services. The *foral* of Freixo de Espada á Cintra, the most detailed extant Portuguese example from these years, is in this respect highly informative. The charter candidly records that generous terms were being offered because Freixo was situated on the frontier (*fronteira*). To attract new inhabitants it was stipulated that any person establishing and maintaining a vineyard or farmstead for a year would thereafter be guaranteed permanent possession of it. As an added inducement this land would be held exempt from an array of customary financial exactions and other obligations. Runaway serfs and *mudejar* Muslim slaves would find their freedom in Freixo. Once established within the town the newcomers would enjoy the same rights as other residents.⁵ Privileges such as these were offered to compensate for the dangers and hardships of the frontier. In the case of Freixo, however, the primary danger came from Leonese rather than Muslim forces, and this had important implications for the settlement of the southern borderlands. The threat of occasional Leonese attack paled before the unrelenting menace of Muslim raiding parties.⁶ Consequently, for as long as more northerly towns were obliged to offer such generous privileges, the new communities in Estremadura (where capture meant enslavement and possible transportation to North Africa) would receive only a trickle of the least experienced, or most resolute.

Yet there was one group, in some ways inexperienced but certainly resolute, which stood out as an exception to this general rule: the monks of the Cistercian order. By 1148 the Cistercians had been a presence in Iberia for over a decade and had already played a significant role in strengthening contacts between Portugal and Latin Europe. The earliest Cistercian chapters in the region had been established by the conversion of existing Benedictine houses. While this was a common means of Cistercian expansion, by and large the monks preferred to obtain grants of marginal territory where they could pursue their spiritual goals free from outside interference. To this end the order had developed institutional mechanisms to facilitate the foundation of new houses in the wilderness. A minimum of twelve monks would be dispatched to fulfil the religious obligations of a new monastery; an equal or greater number of lay brothers would attend to their physical needs and negotiate with the outside world. The unique combination of strict discipline and agricultural expertise brought the order a well-deserved reputation for making barren lands blossom.⁷ The Cistercians were given every opportunity to test their skills in Portugal's Estremadura.

Chancery documents from the mid-twelfth century reveal Afonso's high hopes for a greater Cistercian presence in Portugal. At the same time, however, these records hint that the monks themselves required considerable encouragement. In 1148 the Cistercians were granted full possession of S. Pedro de Mouraz, near present-day Tondela, in an area that was neither particularly exposed nor dangerous. Unfortunately these particular monks proved unable to live up to their order's vaunted reputation: in less than

four years the site had been abandoned. A disappointed Afonso was obliged to turn the land over to the nearby see of Viseu, complaining bitterly to Bishop Odorius as he did so that the Cistercians' neglect had allowed his pious donation to languish unused.⁸ Why did this first attempt fail so completely? In fact the actions of these few monks may well have reflected a growing tension within the order itself over the rapid rate of Cistercian expansion. In 1152, the same year that Afonso passed the deserted monastery to the bishop of Viseu, the spiritual leader of the Cistercian order, Bernard of Clairvaux, was on his deathbed. Bernard had been a major driving force behind the expansion, and in his absence more conservative forces gained control of the Grand Chapter of Cistercian abbots. An unambiguous sign of their desire for a period of consolidation came almost immediately with the imposition of a moratorium on the admission of new houses into the Cistercian fold.

Nevertheless, Afonso refused to be thwarted in his plans for the foundation of a major Cistercian monastery in Portugal. On 8 April 1153 he directed a letter to the ailing Bernard offering the Cistercians a second chance to establish a new house in Portugal. In order to overcome any doubts or resistance among the more cautious brethren, Afonso specified the extent of the land he was prepared to donate. With vast tracts of territory lying unused in Estremadura the Portuguese ruler could afford to be generous. He promised the monks a huge estate consisting of almost 44,000 hectares bordered to the west by the Atlantic and to the east by the Serra dos Condeiros – a royal gift indeed, at least on parchment. To ensure the commitment of the Cistercians, particularly in light of their recent failure at S. Pedro de Mouraz, Afonso added a condition to his grant: 'if through your neglect and without my permission (while I live) you allow this place to be abandoned, you will never recover it!'⁹ Despite this ominous caveat, the proposal was accepted by the Cistercian hierarchy, and a foundation party was duly dispatched to establish a new monastery in the midst of the donated land.

After some prevarication the monks eventually settled on a lonely spot at the confluence of two small rivers, the Alcoa and the Baça, from which the new monastery drew its name: Alcobaça.¹⁰ Significantly, once again it was foreigners who had been lured into Estremadura and, in common with other Latin Christian settlers, the monks may have found the reality less than the expectation. The scale of the initial donation and the intrinsic fruitfulness of the land did not guarantee prosperity. Much formerly productive land had fallen into disuse as the tides of conquest and reconquest ebbed and flowed. Labour was scarce, and the Cistercians may well have found themselves in the uncomfortable position of relying heavily on *mudejar* peasantry to work their farms. Ever present was the danger of Muslim raiders. As a result, even though the monks were committed to remaining on their vast holdings in order to keep them, Afonso soon found it necessary to provide additional encouragement. In May 1157 Alcobaça was granted perpetual exemptions

from transportation taxes throughout Portugal. Eventually the perseverance of the monks – and indeed of Afonso Henriques – was rewarded, and the monastery at Alcobaça grew to become one of the most magnificent Cistercian houses in Europe. Yet this happy culmination must have seemed a very distant dream in 1153, when the foundation was still a highly uncertain enterprise involving prolonged hardship and danger.

Evidence then from monasteries, urban communities and noble estates, all corroborate a rather bleak picture of early resettlement in Estremadura; they also hint at the dire implications of these difficulties for Afonso's wider plans. The struggling borderland settlements could contribute little to the overall maintenance of the county. Poor financial returns to his coffers were no doubt a disappointment for the Portuguese leader, but of more immediate concern was the limited military assistance he could look to the new communities to provide. The immigrant settlers under William and Jordan are a revealing case in point. Although they had initially gained Afonso's favour as a result of their martial efforts during the siege of Lisbon, the veterans clearly did not intend to continue in an active military capacity. They were careful to secure exemptions from future military service as a condition to their agreeing to remain in Portugal.¹¹ Moreover, Afonso's logistical problems went deeper than the weakness of a few frontier communities. Even those individuals who had settled further to the north were aware that they enjoyed a strong bargaining position. The Portuguese ruler had been obliged to grant a number of important privileges to attract residents to his towns, and those reluctant to commit themselves to wide-ranging military forays had seized the opportunity to minimise such obligations, or evade them altogether. Thus, the people of Mesão-Frio could not be compelled to take part in expeditions further than a day's ride from their own walls, while residents in Banho were only obliged to take part in defensive actions. The sole military obligation placed on the men folk of Freixo was simply to defend the settlement against attacks by either 'Moors or evil Christians' with the latter – meaning the Leonese – by far the more likely threat.¹² Later in the century urban communities would come to play a substantial role in the defence of the frontier, but in the 1140s and early 1150s the meagre military contribution of the towns simply underlined the difficulties Afonso encountered in even effectively patrolling, let alone consolidating, the wide, empty spaces of Estremadura.

The perils of overextension and the choices of Afonso Henriques

Oddly enough the slow pace of consolidation does not appear to have dampened Afonso's appetite for further conquests. Throughout this period he continued to launch incursions into Muslim lands, a policy that at first glance seems to have been imprudent to the point of foolhardiness. Not only was

the territory between the Mondego and Tagus rivers more of a burden than an asset, the sudden abundance of land had in some ways actually weakened Afonso's authority over other groups in Portuguese society. Nobles, clergymen and burghers had all been able to demand greater privileges in return for their services. Why then did Afonso seek to complicate his position still further? Possibly this eagerness to continue campaigning was simply a product of his own character. Military command was a central pillar of medieval secular authority, and contemporary chroniclers, both Christian and Muslim, were as one in their recognition of Afonso's eager belligerence. Nevertheless, there were also sound strategic reasons the Portuguese leader might have been willing to press new attacks across the frontier, not least of which was the likelihood that a dramatic victory against the forces of al-Andalus would yield more important rewards than simply further territorial acquisitions.

Arguably much of the Portuguese military success in 1147 had only been possible because the Almohad intervention in the peninsula had dramatically weakened the defensive capability of the Muslim frontier communities. This situation did not seem likely to change. Any hope for a stable and unified al-Gharb under Almohad control had been undermined by the mismatched group of mutually suspicious individuals who were granted political authority there.¹³ Ahmad b. al-Husayn ibn Qasi of Silves provides a striking example of the character of these leaders. Ibn Qasi was a religious zealot who in the course of a tempestuous career had rebelled against the Almoravids, allied himself with Afonso Henriques, and been first to invite the Almohads into the peninsula. Although Ibn Qasi's disruptive influence had played no small part in the Portuguese capture of Lisbon; Almohad backing subsequently returned him to power in Silves. Ominously, however, the religious leader's old adversary, Sīdray b. Wazīr, had also survived these turbulent political tides and retained control in Beja, Mértola and Évora. Other equally colourful characters had risen to prominence under the Almohads, men such as 'Alī b. 'Īsā b. Maymūn, the former Almoravid naval commander, who had rebelled and seized control the coastline from Cadiz west to Faro. Men such as these found it impossible to make even a show of solidarity.

When a revolt broke out among the North African tribes in 1148 Ibn Qasi took advantage of Almohad distraction to throw off his obedience to the new regime altogether. Possibly the irascible ruler of Silves sought to bolster his position by concluding another treaty with Afonso of Portugal, but any such arrangement proved short-lived. On this occasion Ibn Qasi was unable to control the turmoil he had unleashed, and he eventually met a violent death at the hands of his own rioting citizens. Yet his provocative actions had already triggered similar revolts by other local leaders disenchanted with North African rule. Throughout al-Garb individual potentates chose between rebellion and adherence to the Almohad regime; conflicts quickly

flared across the region. It was to take the Almohads a decade of sporadic warfare to finally bring a restive al-Gharb back under their control. Even then the isolated port city of Tavira remained ferociously independent under its brigand-king 'Abd Allāh b. 'Ubayd Allāh, whose indiscriminate raids on neighbouring coastal towns and shipping were not halted until 1168.

From the Portuguese side of the Tagus River the endemic squabbles convulsing the Muslim states seemed to be an open invitation to attempt further incursions. Nevertheless, it was more than just the apparent weakness of the Muslim states that lured Afonso southwards. Even as the Portuguese secured the northern bank of the Tagus their triumphs at Santarém and Lisbon were being overshadowed by the actions of neighbouring Christian rulers. Afonso could only watch jealously as his Spanish rivals enjoyed military success and increasing levels of outside interest in their efforts.¹⁴ On 17 October 1147 Alfonso of León-Castile captured the city of Almeria with the assistance of a large Genoese contingent. The following year Alfonso's representatives at Pope Eugenius' great ecclesiastical council in Rheims received assurances of papal support for future campaigns. The Leonese monarch subsequently launched a 'forgotten crusade' on Jaén, and followed this with attacks on Cordoba, Seville and a number of smaller towns. Meanwhile Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona was mobilising his forces further to the east. In June 1148 the pope offered crusading privileges for Ramon's attack on Tortosa, and a number of Genoese, Catalans and French soldiers joined the operation. After the citizens of Tortosa surrendered on terms in December 1148 the count of Barcelona followed up his advantage with a major offensive in the Ebro Valley, which culminated in the successful siege of Lerida in October 1149. Again these victories were well received in the papal court and calls were made for even greater united effort against the forces of Islam.

In the far west Afonso Henriques faced a dilemma. Prudence would seem to dictate that he husband his resources in defence rather than risk overextension in pursuit of further territorial gain. On the other hand, Afonso was well aware that his political ambitions remained heavily reliant on papal support. As early as 1143 the Portuguese leader had fulsomely declared himself 'a knight of St Peter and of the Roman pontiffs' dedicated to the protection and extension of Christendom.¹⁵ Afonso knew though that words alone would not be enough: only conspicuous martial success on the frontier could guarantee continued papal goodwill. After weighing the need to stabilise the frontier at the Tagus River against both the opportunities provided by Muslim disunity and the possible rewards of victory – and goaded no doubt by his own inclination towards action over consolidation – Afonso decided on attack. Unfortunately for his expansionist plans, despite political turmoil behind them and the discouraging reports of Christian victories to the east, Muslim frontier communities in the Portuguese sector were not prepared to yield without a struggle.

The key to the Muslim defence of the al-Gharb was a stronghold the inhabitants knew as Qasr Abī Dānis, but which the Christians called Alcácer do Sal. In the ninth century the strategic heights above the Sado estuary were fortified, using in part stonework from nearby ancient ruins. The city grew to become an important mercantile and agrarian centre; during the political uncertainties following the collapse of the Caliphate the city's formidable natural and man-made defences had served its people well. Due to Alcácer's convenience as a staging area for land and sea attacks on Portuguese territory the stronghold had long been an important redoubt of Muslim arms.¹⁶ But the city was only a day's ride from the suburbs of Lisbon, and so after 1147 the citizens of Alcácer found themselves on the frontline. For half a century battles raged around their walls, gradually reducing the proud city to a fractured shell. This tragic fate moved Alexandre Herculano to comment upon Alcácer as it appeared in his own time:

The foundations of Muslim stonework rest on Roman columns; Latin inscriptions adorn a wall that was perhaps a great Muslim mosque but today is a small Christian shrine. Ruins upon ruins, cemented with the blood of many battles and amidst them a people enfeebled and sickly....¹⁷

This evocative description serves as a reminder that this town, now relatively insignificant in relation to modern-day Lisbon or even Santarém, was for Afonso and his soldiers a formidable proposition indeed. An indication of the importance of this stronghold in the mid-twelfth century is that Afonso's chronicler devoted as many words to the actions around Alcácer as he did to the storming of Santarém and the capture of Lisbon combined.

Between 1147 and 1157 Afonso led the Portuguese in at least three major attacks on Alcácer. The anonymous *Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis* describes an initial assault being launched in the immediate aftermath of the capture of Lisbon. Emboldened by his recent victories, Afonso led a small group of some sixty lightly armed soldiers southwards across the Tagus River. Operating without armour or heavy equipment, the small force appears to have been engaged in a reconnaissance, a hit and run raid, or perhaps a surprise attack of the type that had succeeded so dramatically at Santarém. This time, however, the Portuguese were not aided by bored sentinels falling asleep on duty. Their stealthy approach was detected long before they reached Alcácer. The defending soldiers had ample warning of the Christian advance and sallied out in full armour to destroy the raiders on the plain before the city. A bitter struggle ensued. Despite being outmanoeuvred, outnumbered and less heavily armed, the desperation of the Portuguese saved them. The raiders staged a fighting withdrawal, inflicting

a number of casualties on the defenders, but also sustaining losses themselves. Among the injured was Afonso himself, who was wounded in the leg by a Muslim lance. Although the chronicler loyally portrayed the Portuguese escape as a miraculous sign of divine favour, the attack was in reality a tactical debacle. The Portuguese leader must have known he had been fortunate to escape with his life.¹⁸

The failure to surprise the defenders of Alcácer was a setback for Afonso's expansionist hopes, but he was not yet prepared to concede defeat. Instead, after a delay of several years, he began to lay plans to repeat the tactics that had brought triumph at Lisbon. The Portuguese leader sought and obtained the assistance of foreign naval forces in the hope that an attack on Alcácer, using greater numbers and Latin Christian siege-engineering skills, would force the stubborn defenders into submission. The Portuguese chronicler notes that two such assaults were made, but does not specify dates or the identity of the non-Portuguese participants beyond their being from northerly climes (*de partibus aquilonis*). Fortunately, other contemporary authors provide various clues as to the identity of these mysterious fleets. John of Hexham recalled that in 1151 Bishop Gilbert of Hastings, the recently installed English-born bishop of Lisbon, had returned to his homeland to recruit soldiers for an attack on the Muslim-held city of Seville. Moreover, Leonese charters issued between July and August 1151 place Alfonso VII outside the walls of Seville awaiting the assistance of a French fleet (*naves Francorum*) which never in fact arrived.¹⁹ Could it be that Afonso of Portugal took advantage of this opportunity (possibly with the prior collusion of Bishop Gilbert) to invite the passing English and French mariners to join him in his attack on Alcácer? If Afonso did indeed risk the emperor's wrath by diverting his reinforcements in this way, the effort was in vain. The attack made by the Portuguese and their mysterious northern comrades ended in failure. Again, however, Afonso refused to allow this setback to deter him and he was soon preparing to mount another combined operation against the city. A possible participant in this second action was Count Thierry of Flanders, who led a crusading fleet along the Iberian coastline and onwards to the Holy Land in 1157.²⁰ Unfortunately, no record of a Flemish wayside action in Portugal survives, perhaps because no vaunted names later wished to be associated with the second joint attack on the stronghold: it failed as signally as had earlier attempts.

As the conglomerate besieging force broke up and the disappointed Portuguese troops retreated northwards for a third time, Afonso must have wondered bitterly what price he would have to pay for another failure. The Portuguese expansion had been halted, as much by the difficulty of consolidating previous conquests as by the stoutly defended walls of Alcácer do Sal. Just as wider considerations of strategic gain had prompted these campaigns, so too ignominious stalemate had wider repercussions. With military initiative came papal favour, but both were shifting inexorably

eastwards at a particularly inopportune time for the Portuguese leader. A new confrontation had developed with Emperor Alfonso of León-Castile, and in the years ahead the attitude of the papacy towards Afonso's leadership would prove decisive.

A royal proving ground: the ecclesiastical battles of Archbishop João Peculiar

Even as Afonso tried and failed to end the military deadlock at Alcácer a different struggle was being waged by his senior ecclesiastic, the archbishop of Braga. Chroniclers described Archbishop João Peculiar as a learned and pious clergyman 'peculiarly the Lord's own', but he was also a tireless and effective campaigner for the rights of his church. The archbishop had enjoyed considerable success in his efforts to secure the obedience of suffragan bishoprics, while at the same time avoiding his own obligation to render similar obedience to Toledo. For over a decade this campaign for archiepiscopal dignity had worked in tandem with Afonso's secular ambitions for regional independence. But when Emperor Alfonso of León-Castile took it upon himself to champion the cause of the Toledan primacy, Archbishop João found himself in an increasingly untenable situation. Demands from Archbishop Raymond of Toledo (1125–1153) for the church of Braga to yield to his authority became insistent and more difficult for Archbishop João to resist. Yet as ecclesiastical and secular politics became more closely intertwined, any capitulation by the archbishop of Braga had important implications for Afonso in his stand-off with the emperor of León-Castile.

The mid-1140s had been eventful years for the archbishop of Braga. In 1145 Pope Eugenius grew tired of repeating commands that the Portuguese clergy acknowledge the primacy of Toledo and suspended archbishop João from office for disobedience. Dire as this penalty appeared, suspension did not prevent João Peculiar from continuing to exercise ecclesiastical leadership in the region or from playing a major part in the Portuguese military successes two years later. Archbishop João was instrumental in carrying out the delicate negotiations between the Latin Christian crusaders and the local Portuguese, so a large measure of credit for the victory at Lisbon was rightfully his. In 1148 Gilbert of Hastings was elected bishop of Lisbon and immediately offered his loyalty to Braga. Soon afterwards the long-abandoned sees of Viseu and Lamego were re-established. The two local men who took control there, bishops Odorius and Mendes respectively, also turned to the archbishop of Braga.²¹ These developments may have been immensely satisfying to regional pride, but they quickly embroiled Archbishop João in a new and complex series of disputes. Lisbon, Viseu and Lamego were all claimed as suffragans by the church of Compostela through the ancient rights of Mérida. The offended Archbishop Pedro Helias (1143–1149) was more than able to answer such a challenge to his metropolitan rights. Claim

and counter claim were soon being heard by the papal curia as the rival archbishops sought to defend and extend their archiepiscopal domains.

This intensification of conflict with Compostela in no way dismayed Archbishop João, nor did it force him to moderate his policy of disobedience to the archbishop of Toledo as primate of all Spain. Nevertheless, this latter struggle was about to take a distinctly discomfiting turn for the clergy of Braga. Secular rulers had always maintained a close interest in the ecclesiastical politics of their realms, but traditionally the actual skirmishing had been left to the clerics themselves. Towards the end of the decade this changed. The gradual Portuguese drift towards autonomy had not escaped the notice of Afonso's titular overlord, Emperor Alfonso of León-Castile. A direct attempt to check Portuguese separatism was a difficult and dangerous proposition militarily and was further complicated by the 1143 grant of papal protection over all of Afonso's territory. In the Toledan primacy the emperor believed he had found the means to enforce his will in the west of the peninsula indirectly, through the agency of his leading clergymen. By establishing categorically the authority of the archbishop of Toledo over the church of Braga, Emperor Alfonso hoped to check and eventually trammel the brazen defiance of Afonso Henriques.²²

Almost eighty years ago Carl Erdmann traced the Portuguese response to this Leonese challenge, concluding that in order to achieve their mutual goal of regional independence Afonso Henriques and Archbishop João formed a close alliance of ecclesiastical and secular power.²³ What is less clear, however, is why ecclesiastical dignity became such a crucial prerequisite to secular autonomy. Certainly on several occasions during the early decades of the twelfth century external interests had been able to impose unwanted ecclesiastical arrangements in Portugal. The most direct form of intervention was the appointment to Portuguese sees of bishops who were hostile to the ambitions of local leaders. One notable example of this possibility had been the election in 1122 of Queen Urraca's favourite, Paio Mendes, as archbishop of Braga. Yet by 1148 the Portuguese Church had developed considerable regional confidence, and Afonso's own energetic leadership had limited the influence other rulers could exert on the Portuguese Church. After coming to power in 1128 Afonso appears to have enjoyed complete control over the election of bishops, as he demonstrated almost immediately by imposing his own candidate, Bernard, on the vacant see of Coimbra.²⁴ After the death in 1136 of Bishop Hugo of Porto, who had been a staunch supporter of Compostela, the Portuguese bishops were notably loyal agents of Afonso's policies. Thus, there arises a paradoxical element to the notion that the autonomy of the church of Braga was a necessary first step to the creation of a regional independence. The installation of the very churchmen who would support Afonso's separatist ambitions demonstrates the freedom of action he already enjoyed in ecclesiastical preferment.

The nature of the relationship between Afonso and Archbishop João also needs to be considered more closely.²⁵ The archbishop, though one of Afonso's most trusted and able officials, was also a powerful magnate in his own right, and pursued a clear, personal agenda. Moreover, according to his enemies at least, the archbishop's rule was autocratic and towards his opponents he could be ruthless.²⁶ To suggest that ecclesiastical and secular leaders shared the ideal of an 'independent Portugal' is both unlikely and anachronistic. Afonso sought to elevate his own status and consolidate the power of his family, his motives and aspirations were well understood within medieval society. Every successful archbishop, on the other hand, placed the status of his own metropolitan church at the apex of his ambition. Frequently Archbishop João's objectives were in step with Afonso's policy, but not in every case. The circumstances surrounding the appointment of Bishop Juan of Lugo in 1152 provide an illustrative example. Because Lugo was a suffragan of Braga, Emperor Alfonso wrote to Archbishop João asking that he consecrate the newly appointed bishop. The emperor made no attempt to support Compostelan claims that this privilege was rightfully theirs. Similarly the archbishop of Braga raised no objection or delay in formalising the installation of the emperor's choice in an area that was disputed by Afonso Henriques. In the event, Bishop Juan proved able to remain consistently loyal to both Braga and the emperor.²⁷ When sensitive negotiations of this type could be carried out to the satisfaction of all parties, why did secular leaders in both Portugal and León-Castile place such high value on an issue of ecclesiastical hierarchy that appears to have had limited practical significance?

In fact any acceptance by Braga of Toledan authority did have clear implications beyond the sphere of ecclesiastical administration: prestige, that most important of royal currencies, was at stake. Although the direct influence Toledo might wield in Portugal was limited, Alfonso of León-Castile seized upon the primacy as a symbol with which to reinforce his own standing as 'Emperor of Spain'. The unfortunate Archbishop João consequently became the unwilling focus of increasing external pressure as the emperor sought to use the church of Braga as a means to deflate the pretensions of Afonso Henriques. Rather than seeking a committed partner in a sweeping process of national formation, the archbishop turned to Afonso for aid because he had no other alternative. Afonso assisted the beleaguered João Peculiar primarily because any lessening of the archbishop's dignity was also a blow to his own prestige. Thus, in the wake of Emperor Alfonso's intervention in the Braga-Toledo dispute, church politics began to take on a greater significance as ecclesiastical courts became the arenas in which a bloodless struggle between secular interests could be played out. Even though it was reputations rather than lives that were at stake, the wider political implications were just as profound.

A crumbling defence: from Rheims to Valladolid

By 1148 the next phase of this ecclesiastical confrontation was already taking form. Pope Eugenius had ordered a general Church council to come together at Rheims, and news of the impending gathering caused consternation among the Portuguese clery. This high-profile event offered the archbishop of Toledo a perfect opportunity to insist that the archbishop of Braga obey papal injunctions and render proper submission to the dignity of the primacy.²⁸ As rumours of the imminent council became more concrete Archbishop João made plans of his own to meet the threat. When the papal representative, Cardinal Boso, arrived in Braga bearing official notification of the council, he was met by a conclave of local clergymen. The archbishop of Braga, the bishops of Porto, Lamego, Viseu and Coimbra, as well as representatives sent by Bishop Gilbert of Lisbon were all in attendance. Later Afonso Henriques also joined the gathering, and the assembly began to resemble a council of war.²⁹ After hearing Cardinal Boso's announcement summoning them to Rheims the Portuguese pondered over the most appropriate response. Ultimately the only means they could devise to avoid the risk of public humiliation was the dangerous option of abstention. Archbishop João Peculiar remained steadfastly in his cathedral, but observers were sent to report on unfolding events.

The council of Rheims convened on 9 March and continued until 18 April. Amid the many heated discussions of ecclesiastical organisation and the maintenance of orthodoxy the Portuguese messengers also witnessed an unsettling demonstration of Emperor Alfonso's commitment to the Toledan primacy. The Leonese delegation included the bishops of Segovia, Coria and Oviedo, and was probably led by Archbishop Raymond of Toledo, although no direct evidence actually places him at the assembly.³⁰ Doubts about the archbishop's presence are largely because, if he did in fact attend the council, his role was overshadowed by the forceful contribution made from a distance by Emperor Alfonso. Acting through his ecclesiastical representatives the Leonese monarch presented a series of requests. The first was in reality an attempt to emphasise Alfonso's military credentials by seeking a papal blessing for his forthcoming campaign against the Muslims. The emperor then broached a more controversial subject by informing Eugenius of the instability caused in the peninsula by papal encouragement of Afonso Henriques' separatist ambitions. The third and final of Alfonso's requests was for the pope to enforce obedience upon the turbulent archbishop of Braga.

Pope Eugenius made no immediate answer to these petitions. After the close of the council the papal entourage travelled to the great Cistercian monastery at Clairvaux, and only after discussion with his old mentor, Abbot Bernard, did the pope frame a reply.³¹ Possibly Afonso gained advantage from

the goodwill his earlier donations to the Cistercian order had generated, for the papal response to Leonese demands was restrained. The pope offered encouragement for Alfonso's proposed military action against al-Andalus, but he declined to discuss his own relations with the 'Duke of Portugal' (*Portugalensium duce*). In an indirect rebuttal of Leonese complaints he merely recalled the memory of Alfonso VI, who had gained lasting fame by focusing his attention on the defence of the Church and the war against the enemies of the faith. On the third of the emperor's requests, however, Pope Eugenius was less oblique:

Henceforth, so that the bishop (sic) of Braga and his suffragans will submit to the archbishop of Toledo as their primate, as was rightly ordered by our predecessors, we have given commands by letter and intend to be obeyed: he who does not yield to Toledo will be held bound by the sentence of suspension.

The papal reply concluded by according the Leonese monarch all honour and offering him the gift of a golden rose, to be conveyed by the bishop of Segovia. This rose was intended as a sign of high favour but also as a symbolic reminder to Alfonso of the might and mystery of the Holy Church.³²

Despite Pope Eugenius' gift and his promises, initial papal efforts to bring João Peculiar to obedience proved ineffective. The first extant communication between the curia and the archbishop of Braga in the wake of the council was issued in September 1148. Far from being a command or even a threat, Pope Eugenius granted Archbishop João a confirmation of his church's many suffragans.³³ Perhaps this was the carrot offered to the archbishop in return for his acquiescence; possibly too the accompanying stick was given in the form of a verbal warning entrusted to the papal messengers. In any event, the archbishop of Braga continued to delay his compliance, until Emperor Alfonso felt justified in speeding further complaints to Rome. This time Eugenius responded more vigorously. At the end of December Archbishop João was once again suspended from office and a notification of this judgement sent to Toledo filled with the confident expectation that the archbishop of Braga must soon capitulate.³⁴ For both Pope Eugenius and Archbishop João were aware that the long running game of Portuguese prevarication on the issue of ecclesiastical obedience might on this occasion have a far higher cost than the oft-repeated sentence of suspension.

The issue of the primacy was only one of many disputes dividing the Iberian clergy, and these cases all fell within the provenance of the papal curia, the only arbitrating authority the contending clergymen might accept. One of the most prolonged and acrimonious of these ecclesiastical squabbles involved the archbishops of Compostela, Braga and Toledo, and concerned the suffragan status of the border see of Zamora. This dispute – aptly described by Richard Fletcher as the 'Zamora imbroglio' – appeared finally to be reaching a point of conclusion. The case had been submitted

once again to the curia and this time a decisive judgement seemed imminent. Archbishop João must have been acutely aware that by antagonising the papacy he was also prejudicing his chances of success in both the Zamora imbroglio and other important outstanding disputes. The price of dignity seems to have finally become too high. In 1149, after weighing carefully the relative advantages of resistance or compliance, the much-harried Archbishop João finally yielded to papal demands.³⁵

João Peculiar was guided first and foremost by the needs of his church, but his decision also had important secular implications and Afonso Henriques was certainly consulted. By the time the archbishop was ready to set out for Toledo the embassy had become something more than an ecclesiastical matter. In addition to the archbishop's own contingent of clergymen the party included one 'Lord Henry of Portugal' who, a contemporary observed, 'was sent to the emperor at that time by the king of Portugal in order to restore peace between them'.³⁶ It is possible, as Erdmann believed, that Emperor Alfonso would only agree to the peace treaty in return for a profession of obedience from Braga. Alternatively, however, because both rulers were acutely aware of papal expectations that Christian concord be maintained in the interests of frontier defence, they may simply have used the opportunity of the archbishop's journey to conclude an agreement that would free both from the threat of border skirmishes and at the same time garner for each ruler the full measure of papal goodwill.

A brief and matter-of-fact account survives of the archbishop's journey. The Portuguese embassy set out in the spring of 1150 and arrived in Toledo on the 16 May. The delegates were met by the triumphant Archbishop Raymond of Toledo and his suffragan bishops Bernard of Sigüenza and Berengar of Salamanca. Also present was Prince Fernando, the younger son of Emperor Alfonso, accompanied by a number of other nobles from his father's court. After the initial ceremonial greetings had been exchanged the ecclesiastical and secular groups set themselves to the completion of their respective tasks. Before an assembly of churchmen and laity the archbishop of Braga at last formally acknowledged the primacy of his Toledan rival. Meanwhile the peace negotiators were able to hammer out the terms of a seven-year truce between the Portuguese ruler and the emperor of León-Castile. When both aspects of the embassy had been successfully concluded the meeting broke up, and the Portuguese delegates were able to return to their homeland. Yet behind the concise contemporary description of events there is much that would seem to require further explanation.

One intriguing aspect of the meeting in Toledo was the absence of its chief architect, Emperor Alfonso. After the many years of effort he had invested in securing a profession of obedience from the archbishop of Braga it seems odd that Alfonso chose not to witness this triumphant conclusion in person. Several charters testify to his presence in Toledo in March and April, but shortly before Archbishop João and his party arrived from Braga the emperor rode out of the city at the head of his army to begin the ultimately

fruitless siege of Cordoba.³⁷ Strangely too, in Alfonso's absence the royal house was represented by his second son, Fernando – then less than twelve years of age and still under the control of a guardian, Count Fernando Pérez – rather than his elder son Sancho, the active sixteen-year-old heir-presumptive. It is difficult to escape the impression that the emperor was seeking to distance himself from these events. Moreover, the mysteries of this encounter do not end with the Leonese party. The identity of Afonso Henriques' emissary is no less puzzling. The only 'Henry' known to be in the Portuguese court at this time was in fact Afonso's eldest son, but in 1150 this 'Henry of Portugal' was a child of perhaps four years of age.³⁸ Even in a society where precociousness was a practical necessity, to find an infant heir leading a diplomatic expedition seems, to say the least, unusual.

Could it be that Afonso Henriques, recognising that the archbishop of Braga had reached the end of his ability to resist Leonese pressure, contrived to have the negotiations carried out in his son's name rather than his own? Perhaps he even had recourse to the ever-effective excuse of a threatened southern frontier to justify non-attendance. Such a feeble ploy would only have been possible in the very particular circumstances of a fluid Iberian political milieu in which papal influence had become a significant consideration – and yet it would certainly explain much about the Leonese reaction. To reject the Portuguese offer of a peace treaty would reflect badly on Emperor Alfonso, particularly in Rome; but at the same time, to negotiate with an infant must also negatively impact on the emperor's local reputation. In the face of these choices a disgusted Emperor Alfonso may well have felt it better to leave the guardians of his own infant son Fernando to conclude the peace treaty. Denying himself the now Pyrrhic victory of witnessing the ceremonial submission of Archbishop João, Emperor Alfonso led his army southwards to invest Cordoba. Nevertheless, if Afonso Henriques and Archbishop João did indeed collude to sour their rivals' triumph even as they met papal demands, their actions have the appearance of a last-ditch defence. It was also a move which ultimately gained them little real advantage.

In the years immediately after the meeting at Toledo Pope Eugenius was careful to support the hierarchy that had been established there. On 6 June 1151 the pope congratulated the archbishop of Toledo on his success. 'We are pleased and gratified that our reverend brother João, archbishop of Braga...has come to you and humbly recognised your primacy and in this has satisfied the just demands of your church....'³⁹ But neither did Eugenius intend the primacy to become a vehicle for the vanity of a single man. The principal objective was to bring stability to the Iberian Church, and the pontiff clearly hoped that the Portuguese prelate could be reconciled to the centralisation of authority in León-Castile. Two years after João Peculiar's submission, in a move no doubt calculated to demonstrate to the church of Braga the benefits of compliance to papal will, the archbishop received a sweeping confirmation of his suffragans. These were delineated as the

Portuguese sees of Porto, Viseu, Lamego, Idanha and Coimbra; in addition to Galician Ty, Orense, Lugo and Mondoedo; and also Leonese Astorga and Zamora. With the exception of Lisbon, which remained within the Compostelan sphere of obedience, the church of Braga had gained acknowledgement of all its long-standing claims.⁴⁰

The archbishop of Braga refused to be mollified. After the death of both Pope Eugenius and Archbishop Raymond of Toledo in 1153, Archbishop Joo saw an opportunity to allow his grudging submission to lapse. However, any hope he may have had of avoiding papal censure proved to be forlorn. As time passed and Archbishop Joo gave no sign of repeating his profession of loyalty, the newly installed Archbishop Juan of Toledo (1153–1166) turned to Rome for assistance. Eugenius' successor, Pope Anastasius VI (1153–1154), was quick to support him. On 8 April the pope forwarded letters to the archbishops of Tarragona, Compostela and Braga instructing them to render their obedience to the new archbishop of Toledo. Five months later Pope Anastasius singled out Archbishop Joo for his continuing refusal to submit to Toledo and threatened the recalcitrant Portuguese clergyman with suspension. In order to ensure the archbishop of Braga would conform to Roman demands Pope Anastasius also ordered his legate, Cardinal Hyacinth Bobo of St Maria de Cosmedin (the future Pope Celestine III), to pursue the matter further.⁴¹ Cardinal Hyacinth was an experienced and highly effective papal agent and after due consultation with Emperor Alfonso the legate announced that a council would be convened at Valladolid the following year, where not only Braga but also Tarragona and Compostela would be called upon to renew their obedience to Toledo.⁴²

In Galicia, meanwhile, the ambitious clergymen at Santiago de Compostela had been observing these developments carefully. They were well aware of the potential discomfiture facing their rivals in Braga. For a number of years the cathedral chapter at Compostela had been uncharacteristically quiescent, possibly as a result of the uncertainty caused by the election of a series of short-lived archbishops.⁴³ In 1153, however, the newly elected Archbishop Pelayo (1153–1155) judged the moment propitious for an attempt to reinvigorate the standing of his church. Encouraged by a papal confirmation of Compostelan authority over the Lisbon clergy, Archbishop Pelayo brushed the dust off the cathedral archives and launched a legal assault on Braga's control over other bishoprics in northern Portugal. The Compostelan legalists were able to construct claims for the obedience of Viseu, Lamego and even Coimbra, the Portuguese capital. Naturally, the archbishop of Braga objected vigorously to this new attempt to subvert his metropolitan rights. Confronted with competing claims from the most senior local clergymen, Cardinal Hyacinth sensibly postponed any decision until the rival cases could be heard before a wider audience.⁴⁴ In the interim, the legate undertook a personal tour of Portugal and Galicia in order to assess the situation first hand. On 8 October 1154 he was received by the canons of Santa Cruz in Coimbra and four weeks later confirmed a donation to their house.

By 15 November he had reached T  y, where he issued another confirmation for the Augustinian canons of Sta Maria de Refoios.⁴⁵

The early weeks of January found Cardinal Hyacinth travelling back to Valladolid to preside over the ecclesiastical council announced the previous year. Great effort had been invested in promoting the conclave, and it was attended by an impressive array of secular and ecclesiastical magnates. Emperor Alfonso was present along with his two sons Sancho and Fernando. The papal legate Cardinal Hyacinth headed an assembly of ecclesiastics, which included the archbishops of Toledo and Compostela, and a host of their dependent bishops. Representatives of the greater Leonese and Castilian monastic houses were also in attendance. From Portugal came the bishops of Porto, Coimbra, Viseu and Lamego, and Bishop Gilbert of Lisbon also arrived after the council had begun. Yet one place at the high table was embarrassingly empty. Realising that he could not resist the combined weight of these gathered opponents, Archbishop Jo  o of Braga refused to attend. A brave attempt by Dean Pedro Martins of Braga and Bishop Mendes of Lamego to excuse the archbishop's absence on the grounds of ill-health was accepted by nobody.

Nevertheless, Cardinal Hyacinth refused to allow the obstreperous Archbishop Jo  o to undermine his plans for the council as a whole. The legate's aim was nothing less than a resounding endorsement of Leonese peninsular hegemony, and the unfortunate Jo  o Peculiar found himself reduced to an object example. The punishment for his latest disobedience was heavy. The bishops of Viseu and Lamego were released from their obedience to Braga, and the bishop of Coimbra was given favourable judgement in a suit against Archbishop Jo  o. The archbishop himself was yet again suspended for his disobedience – a penalty that was subsequently confirmed by Rome.⁴⁶ Yet Cardinal Hyacinth proposed much more than punitive measures intended to break the stubborn pride of a single archbishop. The acts of the council also record a series of wider initiatives that are remarkable for their scope, generosity and comprehensiveness. The papal legate declared both the Peace and Truce of God throughout the peninsula. Alfonso's forthcoming campaigns were also granted a special status:

...to those in any way supporting the defence of Christians and restraining the perfidy of the Saracens will come the same indulgences which Pope Urban conceded to those who marched to Jerusalem for the liberation of the Eastern church.⁴⁷

Moreover, in common with crusaders bound for the Holy Land, the goods of those travelling to fight in Alfonso's border wars would be placed under ecclesiastical protection. The legate went on to ensure the widest possible support for the campaign by drafting a letter addressed to all archbishops, bishops, abbots, Hospitallers and Knights Templar throughout the peninsula. In this letter the obligation to support Alfonso's military effort was laid

squarely on the shoulders of the Iberian clergy.⁴⁸ By the end of the council it had been made clear that, as far as the papacy was concerned, military leadership in Iberia rested in the hands of Emperor Alfonso of León-Castile, and for as long as he could maintain this role all clerical efforts should be directed to his support.

In many ways the council of Valladolid marked the nadir for Archbishop Joao's attempt to assert the autonomy of his church in despite of the Toledan primacy. As a result of his failure to appear in person at the council, the archbishop had once again been suspended; and on this occasion the sentence might prove more damaging than ever before. Braga's privileges were under assault from all sides, with every suffragan except Porto the target of petitions by at least one rival metropolitan. Such suits, moreover, were certain to be well received by a papacy that had clearly lost patience with Archbishop João's attempts to destabilise the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the peninsula. Perhaps most dangerous of all, the united front the Portuguese bishops had managed to maintain in the face of external pressure appeared to be cracking. Local clergymen began to question Archbishop João's leadership, with Bishop João Anaiaes of Coimbra (1147–1158) going so far as to negotiate an individual arrangement with Cardinal Hyacinth for the benefit his own see. From his self-imposed exile in Braga Archbishop João must have begun to wonder whether his dignity might not have come at too high a price. For while he languished in isolation the ecclesiastical edifice he had so painstakingly created seemed to be in imminent danger of collapse.

Afonso Henriques had been kept apprised of Archbishop João's circumstances and he moved to offer what assistance he could. To reinforce the Portuguese prelate's crumbling authority Afonso sought to menace the opportunistic bishop of Coimbra back into the fold. This attempt brought a rapid, stinging rebuke from Pope Hadrian (1154–1159). Afonso was ordered to give complete satisfaction to Bishop João Anaiaes or suffer an interdict over the whole county.⁴⁹ From the chill tone of this order it appeared that Afonso, no less than Archbishop João Peculiar, had all but exhausted his reservoir of papal goodwill. Emperor Alfonso of León-Castile, on the other hand, enjoyed the full support of the papacy and appeared intent on enforcing his authority to the furthest possible extent in the peninsula. His gaze turned southward towards al-Andalus, but also westwards to Portugal. Unless papal attitudes towards the Iberian Peninsula could be fundamentally altered Afonso Henriques' ambitious plans to found a lasting Portuguese royal dynasty seemed doomed to failure.

Papal recognition of Portuguese royalty: a turning of the tide

By the middle years of the twelfth century Portuguese society had been fundamentally altered by the growing influence of Latin Christian culture in the peninsula. Afonso Henriques personified this phenomenon, and his career

demonstrated just how profound the effect of European influences in Iberia could be. As the son of a Burgundian knight and a Spanish princess, Afonso had been able to draw upon two quite different worlds to create a political identity and a local pre-eminence. His hopes for the future were no less a product of this essential duality. Tension between Iberian and European cultural attitudes created the circumstances in which a Portuguese royalty became possible: success though would be reliant not only on the creation of a stable local authority, but also on the association of that authority with the wider horizons of Latin Christendom. This proved to be no simple task. In the decade after the capture of Lisbon Afonso's glittering dreams were in danger of collapse. The lustre of earlier military triumphs had faded before the slow pace of Portuguese resettlement and the failure to achieve additional territorial gains. Emperor Alfonso, meanwhile, had been able to consolidate his authority in León-Castile and strengthen his own relationship with the papacy. In the face of this combination of secular and ecclesiastical power Afonso of Portugal had few viable options. Only by outshining his rival through conspicuous displays of piety and successful military action against Muslim al-Gharb could Afonso hope even to maintain papal support for the level of autonomy he had already won. But with the lands to the south protected by the seemingly immovable fortifications of Alcácer do Sal further spectacular conquests seemed impossible. Uncertainty, however, was the only constant of life on the Iberian frontier and from 1157 onwards political tides began to turn in Portugal's favour.

Changing fortunes on the Iberian frontier

Powerful as the monarchy of León-Castile seemed in the middle years of the twelfth century its stability was ultimately reliant on the fortunes of Alfonso and his closest relatives. During the 1150s the potential for dynastic uncertainty had increased as Alfonso's sons, Sancho and Fernando, grew older and more ambitious. The difficult issue of the succession was brought to a head in November 1155 by the birth of Sancho's heir, the future Alfonso VIII of Castile, at Burgos. The emperor and his greater magnates came together to discuss the future, and it was decided that after his death the realm would be divided between his two sons. Later commentators saw this decision as a retrograde step, blaming the evil machinations of the local aristocracy for ultimately plunging the kingdom into turmoil.⁵⁰ Yet far from being unprecedented, partible inheritance was in fact the time-honoured Iberian custom. Dynastic chance had spared Alfonso VII this disadvantage, but his grandfather, Alfonso VI, had initially inherited only a portion of the ancestral lands. The concept of primogeniture, though strategically advantageous, found only slow acceptance among the conservative ranks of the peninsular aristocracy. In the mid-twelfth century the Leonese and the Castilians found themselves facing the difficult choice between Latin

practicality and Iberian tradition; a generation later Portuguese court society would be torn apart by the same dilemma.⁵¹ Nevertheless, based on local custom though they might be, the arrangements made in 1155 for the division of the realm created uncertainty about the future both in the royal court and throughout the kingdom.

These fears were exacerbated in 1156 when Alfonso fell seriously ill. The emperor's incapacitation forced the cancellation of campaigns planned for the summer, but he was given little chance to recuperate. An ominous threat was building along the frontier. Several important Spanish-held strong-points had been captured by Almohad forces, possibly with great loss to the defenders. This menacing situation worsened dramatically in 1157 when the Almoravid governor of Granada, Maymūn b. Badr al-Lamtūnī, surrendered his city to the Almohads without a struggle – Christian-held Almeria was left dangerously exposed. In anticipation of the expected attack on the southern port city Alfonso began mustering a relief force. Much though had changed in the decade since the capture of Almeria, when Alfonso had been assisted by several Iberian contingents and a flotilla of Genoese ships. In 1157 the Leonese monarch could call upon no fleets, and his only ally was the Muslim emir of Valencia-Murcia, Ibn Mardanīsh. It was an unpropitious beginning to an expedition that was to be dogged by ill-fortune. An arduous southwards march brought the relief force to the outskirts of Almeria, only to find the garrison already tightly invested by Almohad troops. Unable either to reinforce the city or raise the siege, the Leonese army could only retreat northwards once again. During this dispiriting return march the harsh conditions of camp life brought on a relapse of Alfonso's earlier illness. His condition quickly deteriorated and he died on August 21, in a small hut in the village of Almuradiel. Alfonso was fifty-two years of age.⁵²

The ripple-effects of the emperor's death spread rapidly outwards across the peninsula. When the devastating news reached the garrison at Almeria the defenders lost heart and opened negotiations with the besieging Almohad forces, eventually agreeing to surrender the citadel in return for safe passage out of the area. Reports of the death of Alfonso and subsequent capitulation of Almeria were more than enough to panic the surrounding Christian population. A mass evacuation from northern Andalucía was soon underway. Fortunately for the retreating Spanish a tribal uprising in North Africa demanded the recall of the bulk of the Almohad army from al-Andalus almost immediately. Yet substantial damage to the Christian cause had already been done. Three decades of relatively stable leadership in León-Castile ended with the division of the kingdom between the emperor's surviving heirs. According to the later, highly partisan Castilian account by Archbishop Rodrigo Jiménez of Toledo, news of Alfonso's death prompted his younger son to ride immediately for the northwest. There he secured his portion of the inheritance as King Fernando II of León (1157–1188). The elder brother remained faithfully by his father's side and, in the company

of Archbishop Juan, escorted the emperor's body back to the cathedral at Toledo for burial. Only then was he acclaimed as King Sancho III of Castile (1157–1158).⁵³

Considerable distrust had been sowed between the two brothers during their uncertain rise to power, but they were both well aware of the dangers of disunity. To coordinate their plans for the future they agreed to meet at the monastery of Sahagún in May 1158.⁵⁴ Among the many topics they discussed in those hushed and ancient cloisters was the continued defiance of Afonso Henriques. The two monarchs agreed that neither would negotiate a separate treaty with the ruler of Portugal. They clearly hoped to succeed where their father had failed by reimposing central authority over the region and even made tentative arrangements to divide Portuguese territory between themselves. Before any of the accords could be put to the test, however, the unpredictability of dynastic politics intervened once again to disrupt the plans of the mighty. King Sancho died unexpectedly in August 1158, only a matter of weeks after the conference at the monastery, and the crown passed to his three-year old son, Alfonso VIII (1158–1214). This succession completely changed the political complexion of the peninsula. Neighbouring rulers eyed events in Castile carefully, ready to take advantage of any sign of vulnerability. Fernando in particular must have seen the death of his older brother so soon after that of their father as a providential opportunity to reunite the recently divided realm.⁵⁵

News of this series of calamitous events was conveyed rapidly to Portugal. While it imputes too much ruthlessness to Afonso to suggest he rejoiced at the passing of his cousin and the resulting turmoil to the east, he was certainly aware that this new situation was ripe with opportunities. The emperor of León-Castile had remained Afonso's nominal overlord, his presence a constant threat to regional political autonomy. Following Alfonso's death and the division of his authority Portuguese technical obedience was no longer clearly defined. More importantly, the ability of either Sancho or Fernando (or subsequently the young Alfonso) to re-impose that obedience was dramatically reduced. The separation of León and Castile into mutually suspicious kingdoms also produced a far more balanced distribution of power in the peninsula. Four of the Christian states – Portugal, León, Castile and Aragon – were now of comparable size and strength, while the smaller Navarra nonetheless remained staunchly independent. Afonso and his followers moved quickly to exploit the possibilities offered by the changing political environment in the peninsula.

An opportunity seized: Portugal in the ascendant

Afonso Henriques' initial response to developments in León-Castile reflected his own recognition of the value of a military reputation in peninsula politics. As early as April 1158, less than a year after Emperor Alfonso's death

and a month before the meeting of his heirs at Sahagún, Afonso of Portugal launched a new campaign against the Muslim forces in al-Gharb. Perhaps this Portuguese initiative was a genuine effort on Afonso's part to relieve the pressure on his divided co-religionists in León and Castile; yet it seems more likely, particularly in light of the threatening agreements the royal brothers reached at Sahagún, that Afonso hoped to garner wider political benefits from successful military action. Paramount among these possible benefits was papal approbation, and it is a measure of the importance Afonso accorded international opinion that he would decide to launch a pre-emptive campaign on the southern frontier when a Leonese invasion across his own eastern border seemed the more immediate danger. Nevertheless, once the decision to attack had been made, Afonso committed all possible forces to the fray.

The focus of Afonso's effort was a fourth attack on the stubborn defenders of Alcácer do Sal. Although on this occasion the Portuguese were without the aid of outside forces, they were able to invest the Muslim stronghold for almost two months. The long, hard-fought siege eventually wore down the defenders, who finally capitulated on the feast day of St John the Baptist (24 June). Dark rumours of a massacre haunted later Islamic accounts, but Afonso's anonymous Portuguese chronicler specifically noted that the Muslim population was expelled (*ejectis inde omnibus sarracenis*), with the implication being that the defenders were allowed to evacuate under truce in accordance with usual peninsular practice.⁵⁶ The Portuguese rejoiced in their victory, but could not celebrate long. For more than a decade the stronghold of Alcácer do Sal had frustrated Afonso's expansionist plans by withstanding all assault. The final fall of the strategic city exposed the heartland of al-Gharb to further Portuguese incursion and almost immediately the important Muslim cities of Beja and Évora were attacked. Possibly the Portuguese actually seized the two cities for a brief time, but if so they were deemed impossible to defend. Muslim forces soon rallied and in 1161 a major counteroffensive was launched that recovered much of the territory recently lost in the Alentejo and also reoccupied the town of Palmela. Triumphant Islamic authors described the recapture of Évora, Beja and Alcácer along with great hauls of plunder, but in fact the Portuguese were able to maintain their hold on the vital fortress above the Sado estuary. Amid the pendulum swings of advance and retreat this success was to prove decisive.⁵⁷ The much-contested walls of Alcácer became a bulwark of the Christian defence (just as they had previously been for the Muslims) and provided a critical staging area from which to launch further attacks into the south.

The capture and successful defence of Alcácer seemed to infuse the Portuguese people with a new military confidence. In December 1162 the Santarém city militia, under the command of one Fernão Gonçalves and apparently acting on their own initiative, launched an assault on the walled city of Beja.⁵⁸ This proved to be only the first of a series of attacks

organised and carried out by local bands of adventurers. The most famous of these individuals, and the most successful, was Gerald *Sem Pavor* (the fearless). This colourful mercenary-adventurer in the tradition of the Cid rendered important service to Afonso Henriques in the conquest of the Alentejo.⁵⁹ Gerald and his small corps of followers perfected techniques of escalade attack. Choosing moonless, stormy nights the Portuguese soldiers approached in stealth and lifted numerous siege ladders against the walls. The first the shocked inhabitants knew of the assault was the dreaded cry of 'St James!' from their own battlements.⁶⁰ In 1165 Gerald used these commando-style tactics to capture Trujillo and Évora, which he then reputedly sold to Afonso Henriques. Gerald went on to capture Cáceres, Montánchez, Serpa and Juromeña in 1166. After a systematic looting by Gerald's highly organised bandits these towns were also passed into Afonso's control, no doubt for another appropriate financial consideration. Nevertheless, the Portuguese leader certainly received good value for his money. Gerald *Sem Pavor*'s mercenary activities secured strategic control over wide new territories and also maintained a highly visible Portuguese military presence on the frontier at a critical time for Afonso's wider plans.

In the years immediately after the capture of Alcácer the Portuguese leader himself was notably absent from the head of his armies. With trusted lieutenants able to continue pressing southwards, Afonso preferred to turn his attention to matters within his own household. Following the death of his wife Mafalda in 1157 the ageing ruler found consolation in the arms of a young mistress, Elvira Gaultas. This liaison may be the basis of a peculiar anecdote of court romance and murder recounted by the inveterate twelfth-century gossip Walter Map, and later censorious authors have suggested that as Afonso's attachment to Elvira grew, his interest in military matters waned.⁶¹ Yet Afonso's decade-long marriage to Mafalda had been blessed with several children, and the gains from successfully managed dynastic politics could easily equal those of the battlefield. The death of Emperor Alfonso had brought about a rapid unravelling of the web of alliances and arrangements that bound the Iberian noble houses together. As this pattern reformed peninsular leaders began to conceive of new alliances to fill the void created by the sundering of the once hegemonic power of León-Castile. Portuguese political stability and recent military success bolstered Afonso's bargaining position and allowed him to emphasise his practical parity with the more established Iberian monarchs.

The first of a series of negotiations was set in motion only months after the emperor's death, when Afonso Henriques' received a proposal for a marriage between his daughter Mafalda and the young Count Ramon Berenguer of Barcelona. From the Portuguese point of view this was a highly desirable match. Count Ramon was heir to both the wealth of Barcelona and the prestigious crown of Aragon. In return the Portuguese could provide a powerful military counterweight in the west of the peninsula. Representatives

from both houses met at T  y in 1160 to consider the proposal, but then negotiations were broken off two years later under mysterious circumstances. The reason for this abrupt curtailment of discussion may have been the untimely death of the young Mafalda (who disappears from the documentary record at around this time); equally, however, the shifting tides of Iberian politics may simply have rendered the match less politically advantageous to both parties. For even as the prospect of an Aragonese alliance was fading Afonso received overtures from Fernando of Le  n, and the two leaders seem to have arranged a personal meeting to discuss their future relations. While much is uncertain about this rendezvous, including its location, the negotiations were sealed with the betrothal of Afonso's second daughter, Infanta Urraca, to King Fernando. The marriage ceremony took place in 1165.⁶² No doubt both leaders hoped this alliance would secure their shared border; for the Portuguese, moreover, the match had additional attractions. While the receipt of a petitions from neighbouring monarchs for his daughters' hands in marriage was no doubt highly satisfying to Afonso on the personal level of paternal pride, the successful conclusion of nuptials in 1165 was doubly welcome because it provided a clear demonstration that – even if through necessity – other peninsular monarchs had come to consider the Portuguese leader as an equal.

Unfortunately marriage alliances alone, politic though they might be, rarely provided more than a temporary easing of tensions between Iberian leaders. This was particularly true of Afonso Henriques and Fernando of Le  n, whose relationship cooled quite rapidly after 1165.⁶³ The primary cause for this mutual disenchantment was the rival territorial claims the two rulers had staked in Galicia. Even before the marriage Afonso had been gradually extending his influence into the Limia and Toron regions. Fernando countered this expansionism by establishing the town of Ciudad Rodrigo as a royal bastion in the midst of the disputed area. This action antagonised many of his own subjects as much as it did the Portuguese ruler, and the citizens of Salamanca eventually rose in rebellion at the perceived diminishing of their rights and privileges. Afonso Henriques appears to have encouraged their defiance as a means to further his own strategy of gradual encroachment into Galicia. The Portuguese leader was able to suborn a number of local nobles and went on to establish his control in the region by constructing fortresses at strategic locations such as Cedofeita, near Cellanova, and possibly also in T  y. In this way, by taking advantage of Leonese disunity and King Fernando's own many distractions, Afonso was able in these few years to make greater territorial acquisitions in Galicia than at any previous time in his career.⁶⁴

The political environment in the Iberian Peninsula after 1157 favoured those leaders in peripheral areas who were able to seize the opportunities presented by a weakening of centralised authority. Such opportunities were by no means limited to the secular sphere, for the death of Emperor Alfonso

had also profoundly altered the ecclesiastical landscape of the peninsula. As Archbishop Juan of Toledo presided over the funeral rites of his emperor he must have been poignantly aware that he was laying to rest his own greatest champion. Certainly subsequent Castilian monarchs – the short-lived King Sancho and his infant son King Alfonso – were to prove ineffective replacements. Nor could the archbishop stand aloof from secular political reality. The kingdom of León, once friendly but now ruled by the potentially hostile King Fernando, interposed between Castilian and Portuguese territory. In this new situation Toledan ecclesiastical domination of Portugal had become difficult to the point of impossibility. This was also apparent in Braga, where the ever-opportunistic Archbishop João led the Portuguese clergy in a rapid series of initiatives to take advantage of these changing circumstances.

Whether through luck or a remarkable foresight João Peculiar had arranged to visit Rome early in 1156 accompanied by the bishops of Lamego and Lisbon. News of the emperor's ill-health may well have preceded them to the papal court, but on their arrival they were able to confirm that Alfonso's incapacitation had forced the cancellation of the military campaigns planned for that summer. Happily though, they also bore more from the peninsula than simply these bad tidings. Afonso had entrusted the clergymen with the balance of the Portuguese tribute agreed to in 1143, along with a written request that the rich gifts he had recently granted to the monastery of Santa Cruz (an institution under papal patronage since 1132) be accepted by St Peter's earthly representative. In this request Afonso carefully declaimed: 'Holy Father, I wish to be your knight and most devoted son, just as I was of those apostles who came before you, and beyond any measure I desire to enjoy your blessing.'⁶⁵ These tokens of Portuguese loyalty, coupled with Archbishop João's own impressive oratorical skills, won a sympathetic judgement from the papal curia. On 6 August 1157 the archbishop was granted a confirmation of his metropolitan status, while the bishoprics of Coimbra, Viseu, and Lamego were confirmed as suffragans. The following year, after the confused situation in León-Castile had become known in Rome, Afonso Henriques received a warmly worded acknowledgement of his rich donations to the canons of Santa Cruz in which Pope Hadrian made no mention of the threatened interdict or indeed of any tension with the Portuguese leader whatsoever.⁶⁶

Archbishop Joao's hand was further strengthened by Afonso's patronage of other internationally recognised religious institutions. The Knights Templar had been a presence in Portugal for several decades but under the leadership of their first locally born Master, the celebrated Gualdim Pais, the order experienced a period of rapid expansion. Gualdim Pais, a well-travelled former crusader, established a convivial relationship with Afonso Henriques and the Templars benefited greatly as a result. The numerous new holdings they received included a large donation in 1158 centred on the

town of Tomar. Major building works were quickly organised, and the town soon became the focus for the order's extensive operations in Portugal.⁶⁷ Other religious groups also enjoyed Afonso's patronage during this period. In 1160 the Knights of Calatrava, an indigenous Iberian military order organised under the Cistercian rule, was founded in Castile. They received their first recorded grant in Portugal six years later. When the city of Évora was recaptured in 1165 a purely Portuguese military order, the Knights of Évora, was founded to assist in the city's defence. These orders provided an institutional presence in the borderlands that was crucial to the settlement and protection of newly captured territory; at the same time support for these monkish knights added greatly to Afonso's reputation for pious militancy.⁶⁸ Archbishop João, as the leading Portuguese clergyman, was in the perfect position to bask in the reflected glow of papal approval.

This picture of success and stability in Braga stood in striking contrast to the situation in Toledo. Castilian political fortunes were deteriorating rapidly, and with them those of the Archbishop Juan himself. The simmering tension between Fernando and his nephew Alfonso VIII finally broke in 1163 when the king of León led an army into Castile, ostensibly to defend the frontier against a growing Almohad threat. This military intervention sparked fierce resistance from most Castilians. Although the strategic city of Toledo was occupied by Leonese forces, Archbishop Juan loyally cleaved to the cause of the boy king. To consolidate support for his monarch the archbishop called together a Church synod at Segovia in 1166. Citing the threat to the frontier as his justification, the archbishop threatened rebellious Castilians with ecclesiastical penalties and offered crusader-type privileges to those who swore allegiance to the king.⁶⁹ This controversial attempt to direct the ethos of the crusade into domestic politics brought the archbishop little gain: a short-lived rebellion in Toledo against Leonese control was quelled and King Fernando, now openly antipathetic towards Archbishop Juan, then retook the archiepiscopal city. Frequently during this tumultuous period Archbishop Juan turned to Pope Alexander for support. In an indication of the continuing papal preference for a centralised Iberian authority bulls confirming the Toledan primacy were issued in 1161, 1163, 1166 and finally in 1169.⁷⁰ Yet the very frequency of these papal lifelines suggests that in truth Archbishop Juan was failing in his struggle to impose a pan-Iberian primacy. His authority, partial even in Castile, had little practical meaning in either León or Portugal.

After many long years constrained by the firm hand of Emperor Alfonso and by the doughty defenders of Alcácer do Sal, Portugal had become a compressed spring. In 1157 this potential was finally released. Afonso Henriques presided over a dramatic military advance and was ably assisted by dynamic lieutenants when his attention was distracted away from the battlefield. Moreover, Portuguese successes were not limited to victories on the frontier: Afonso was also able to insinuate his family into the ranks of the Iberian

royalty, while Archbishop João Peculiar continued to resist the failing primatial authority of his Toledan rival. Even as Leonese and Castilian fortunes foundered Portuguese ambitions seemed to soar. By the end of an eventful decade Afonso was in a position to turn with renewed optimism to his long-held ambition for a papal acknowledgement of his royal status. For as turmoil engulfed the lands of León and Castile Afonso was able to emerge once more into papal consciousness as a champion of Christendom against the threat of Islam. It was a limelight he was determined to use to the fullest advantage.

Afonso Henriques and Alexander III: a new opportunity?

How could local success be translated into political capital in the papal curia? This quandary, which Afonso Henriques had grappled with for much of his rule, became still more acute towards the end of the 1160s. Personal ambition had been a driving force throughout Afonso's career, but increasingly it was uncertainty about the future that clouded his councils. The Portuguese leader had already been in power for over four decades and was approaching his sixtieth birthday; he could not be sure how much time remained for the fulfilment of his ambitions. This growing sense of urgency was fuelled by doubts concerning the succession. Because Afonso had extended his own authority through the judicious application of force and guile, the inheritance rights of his young, inexperienced son Sancho were by no means guaranteed. Afonso turned to the papacy for dynastic security, and he had every reason to hope Alexander III might at last be prevailed upon to accede to his wishes.

During the 1160s the fortunes of the reform papacy reached a very low ebb. A disputed election following the death of Pope Hadrian in 1159 had left two bitter rivals, Alexander III and Victor IV, both claiming the throne of St Peter. Alexander was supported by the majority of the cardinals, but Victor enjoyed the backing of Emperor Frederick I. The resulting contest of powers split the church in a schism that was to last for eighteen turbulent years. In the midst of this struggle, even as Alexander sought to counter imperial efforts to end his pontificate, he was drawn inexorably into the bitter confrontation between Archbishop Thomas Becket of Canterbury and King Henry II of England. The antagonism of first Emperor Frederick and later King Henry forced Pope Alexander to rely even more heavily on other regions of Christendom. Among his most steadfast supporters were the peoples of Iberia. In addition to statements of profuse loyalty the peninsular rulers offered financial assistance to a pontiff whose administration was consistently on the verge of bankruptcy. So dire indeed were Alexander's financial straits that in 1161–1162 he became the first pontiff to dispatch messengers to the peninsula specifically to gather funds.⁷¹ In return for their unstinting encouragement the Iberian rulers, including

Afonso Henriques, looked forward to the favours a grateful pontiff could bestow.

Yet willing as the hard-pressed Pope Alexander may have been to accept Portuguese support, his gratitude was surely tempered with the realisation that rewarding this display of loyalty too generously could destabilise his own relations with other secular rulers. Any papal encouragement of Portuguese royal pretensions would certainly risk alienating those neighbouring Spanish monarchs on whom the reform papacy also relied. Moreover, the issue of Afonso's formal status had ramifications that extended beyond the peninsula. If Alexander was to recognise a Portuguese king he would be entering a largely unexplored realm of political theory. Did the creation of a king through an act of apostolic will imply that the pope wielded a secular as well as a spiritual power? Was this authority in fact greater than that of kings already crowned? Dangerous questions indeed, and throughout his pontificate Alexander had been careful to leave such questions unanswered. For long adversity had trained the pope in pragmatism. He was well aware that his political survival rested on secular support that could all too easily evaporate in the face of any strident assertion of papal authority. Time and again Alexander's decisions were informed by canonistic arguments for the duality of ecclesiastical and secular powers rather than the more inflammatory demands of Gregorian theorists for the dominance of spiritual authority. Time and again he counselled his followers to exercise moderation in their pronouncements on this fraught issue.⁷² It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when faced with Afonso's royal ambitions Alexander chose the traditional papal policy of prevarication.

Such delaying tactics could never satisfy Afonso Henriques, who continued to use all means at his disposal to break papal inertia. Over many years the Portuguese leader had made strategic donations to religious houses, launched timely frontier campaigns and drafted carefully worded communiqués, all in an effort to project the type of secular authority he believed the papacy wanted to see. In 1163, for example, he reminded Pope Alexander of Portuguese commitment thus: 'I have, with St Peter's aid, taken more from the Saracens than I could ever have inherited; and these lands I have freely given to the apostolic patrimony, acting from the heart, and remaining always a vigorous knight of St Peter and obedient to your paternal commands.'⁷³ This unstinting self-promotion had proved to be largely in vain. By 1169, despite decades of effort, the Portuguese leader appeared no closer to achieving a papal recognition of his self-proclaimed royalty. Clearly Pope Alexander would require a more compelling reason to intervene in the politics of the Iberian kingdoms than simply to reward a faithful follower. Yet Afonso's situation was by no means hopeless. Alexander's continuing concern for effective frontier leadership and ongoing social reform offered the Portuguese leader the leverage necessary to bend papal will, if he could but apply it decisively. Once again the clergymen of Braga – still

resolutely seeking to enhance their own dignity – played a crucial role in keeping these issues alive in the minds of the pope and his curia.

Archbishop João had succeeded in his campaign to frustrate Toledan attempts to re-establish the primacy, but the collapse of a pan-Iberian ecclesiastical authority did not bring tranquillity: it simply cleared the way for a new round of dispute as Archbishop João sought to assert his authority over the bishops of Portugal. Thus controversy flared in 1164 following the death of Bishop Gilbert of Lisbon when his successor, Bishop Alvaro (1164–1184), turned to Braga in defiance of the church of Compostela. Two years later Afonso Henriques secured the election of Bishop Soeiro (1166–1180) to the recently recaptured city of Évora, and the new bishop also offered his submission to Archbishop João. Although Compostelan rights to the obedience of both these sees had been confirmed by the papacy on several occasions, the two incoming bishops were able to secure special exemptions from Pope Alexander. Bishop Soeiro, for example, successfully played the trump card of frontier expedience by arguing that the Almohad threat to his city prevented him leaving his flock.⁷⁴ In each case, however, Alexander emphasised that although the elections would be allowed to stand, neither was to be held up as a precedent. The archbishop of Compostela continued to pressure for the return of the two subverted bishoprics, along with Lamego, Viseu and Coimbra as well. Archbishop João Peculiar, meanwhile, was by no means on the defensive in these ecclesiastical campaigns. Throughout the next decade he continued to pursue acrimonious suits against both Toledo and Compostela, particularly over the obedience of Zamora. A procession of peninsular embassies appeared before the curia to voice their grievances; and despite Pope Alexander's conscientious efforts to settle these disputes, the Iberian churches refused to be reconciled.

In the middle years of the 1170s it seemed that this ecclesiastical impasse might at last be ended. For over three decades the cornerstone of the Braga's defiant campaign had been the redoubtable Archbishop João, but the long struggle had taken its toll. Archbishop João Peculiar appears to have suffered a slow deterioration of his health until in 1175 he succumbed to illness and was laid to rest in the cathedral he had so vigorously defended. Neighbouring clergymen may well have hoped for a period of relative quiet – if so they were to be disappointed. No sooner had the church of Braga's new leader, Archbishop Godinho (1176–1188), come into his authority than he demonstrated himself to be a worthy successor to the indomitable João Peculiar. As a first act Archbishop Godinho accepted the suffragan obedience of several of the disputed Portuguese sees, prompting strident complaints to Pope Alexander from the archbishop of Compostela. Unperturbed by the storm he had provoked, Archbishop Godinho journeyed to the papal curia to collect his pallium and meet his detractors in open session. The long and involved debate that ensued between the delegations from Braga and Compostela sorely tested the patience of their audience. An obviously

frustrated Pope Alexander was unable to temper the obduracy of either party and no amicable agreement could be reached. The Iberian metropolitans had come to an acrimonious deadlock in which ecclesiastical boundaries continued to bear little correlation to political divisions. Thus, while Compostela could lay claim to at least half of the Portuguese sees, Braga could command the technical obedience of all but three of the Leonese bishops.⁷⁵

What then were the wider secular implications of the struggle waged by the archbishops of Braga against their ecclesiastical rivals? A hopelessly tangled pattern of suffragan loyalties seems to be a poor return for the huge investment of ecclesiastical time and effort it had cost. Despite this cost moreover, contemporary Latin Christian authors not directly involved in the ecclesiastical struggles often displayed little knowledge of the issues at stake. Raol, the author of the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, provides a notable example. Although in all likelihood Raol and his correspondent in England were both clerics he made no allusions to Archbishop João Peculiar's suspension (which was in force throughout the siege of Lisbon) or to the local implications of the archbishop's consecration of Gilbert of Hastings as Lisbon's new bishop. Similarly, when Roger of Hoveden described the ecclesiastical structure of Iberia in the late twelfth century he blandly named the seven Portuguese bishops as suffragans of Braga. Eleven Leonese bishops, also named, were assumed to be obedient to the archbishop of Compostela.⁷⁶ The long campaign to defend the prestige of the church of Braga certainly generated high levels of bitterness among the Iberian clergy, but did the efforts of Archbishops João and Godinho have any greater importance than the pride invested in a local church?

While Iberian ecclesiastical boundaries bore little relation to political borders, they did in one important respect mirror secular political reality – particularly the reality as Afonso hoped it would be perceived by Pope Alexander. Emperor Alfonso had strongly supported the primacy in the hope that centralised ecclesiastical government would emphasise his own secular pre-eminence in the peninsula. He was also keenly aware of the symbolic value of the primacy in Rome and: 'as often as the pope was urged to recognise Afonso Henriques as king of Portugal he was reminded by the emperor that the see of Braga was subject to Toledo.'⁷⁷ Nor did the symbolic significance of the primacy end with Emperor Alfonso's death. Toledan ecclesiastical dominance had been the last vestige of Leonese imperial pretension; the competition of roughly equal metropolitan archbishops that replaced a single primate reflected the practical parity that now existed between rival peninsular rulers. Petitions from Iberian churches became a constant reminder to papal policy-makers not only of the fractiousness of the local clergy, but also of the continued discord between secular leaders. And for Afonso of Portugal this would prove perhaps the most decisive repercussion of the decades-long struggle waged by the archbishops of Braga in defence of the rights and privileges of their ancient church.

The politics of kingship

The doubts planted in the curia by the disunity of the Iberian clergy were a critical prerequisite for Afonso in the achievement of his great ambition. To transform these doubts into papal action, however, would require a final great effort from the Portuguese leader, a last great campaign. The object of this campaign would not be the capture of territory or the scattering of armies, but rather the destruction of an idea. The council of Valladolid in 1155 had been the culmination of a papal policy based on the premise that Iberian stability could best be guaranteed by a strong centralised government under a single ruler. Almost two decades later the same lingering assumption remained Afonso's principal obstacle. Unremitting conflict within the local clergy had eroded papal hopes for pan-Iberian unity; to reinforce this disillusionment Afonso sought and found opportunities to further impress upon Pope Alexander that with the collapse of a central hegemony any future hope for the frontier kingdoms lay in the hands of a group of roughly equal, independent monarchs. Ironically, Afonso's most effective asset during these years was his most dangerous rival, King Fernando of León. The Leonese monarch, his attention focused on a host of local concerns, appeared either unable or unwilling to provide the type of rule the papacy expected. The fundamental task of a frontier king was – in papal estimation – to provide effective military leadership. Here at least, Afonso was in a position to easily upstage his Leonese rival.

Portuguese military efforts in the Alentejo had been on the increase throughout the 1160s. At the end of the decade this campaign reached an unexpected crescendo. Afonso had rewarded Gerald Sem Pavor, the leading architect of much recent Portuguese military success, by bringing him into royal service. In the spring of 1169 Gerald sought to capitalise on his new prominence by leading a major attack on the city of Badajoz. The assault bore all Gerald's signatures of stealth, surprise and audacity: by striking suddenly the Portuguese were able to storm the outer walls and force the defenders back into the citadel. Gerald then established a siege around the fortress and dispatched messengers to Coimbra requesting reinforcements. News of this exploit fired Afonso's flickering enthusiasm. The aging ruler of Portugal quickly mustered all available forces and hurried southwards to assist in the takeover of this rich prize. But even as victory seemed within their grasp the Portuguese suddenly found their enterprise resisted from an unexpected quarter.

Fernando of León had watched Afonso's military success with jealousy and anger. Badajoz had great strategic importance and would be the key to any future conquest of Andalucia, possibly too the Leonese monarch had claimed rights over the city at an earlier meeting with Afonso. A Portuguese occupation of Badajoz certainly did not accord with Fernando's

own long-term ambitions. Even as Gerald's weary soldiers were being reinforced by the fresh troops brought southwards by Afonso Henriques, the king of León was making his own plans to re-establish a presence in the region. Fernando mustered his army and led them towards Badajoz, but with no intention of aiding the attackers. Instead, in a gambit reminiscent of his great grandfather's intervention at Graus a century earlier, Fernando formed an alliance of convenience with the Almohads to defend the city against his own co-religionists. Acting in concert the unlikely allies slipped into the city and fell upon the startled Portuguese. A confused running battle developed through the narrow streets of Badajoz. Caught in the midst of this melee the elderly Afonso lost control of his horse and his leg was crushed against the ironwork of a city gate. The gravely injured Portuguese ruler was abandoned in the turmoil to be captured by Leonese troops.⁷⁸

The disaster at Badajoz cost Afonso dearly. Almohad forces reoccupied the city and the leaderless Portuguese fell back in disarray. Although Afonso received immediate and careful treatment from Fernando's royal physicians, the Portuguese leader spent the next two months in captivity while negotiations were carried out for his release. The price for liberty proved to be high: Fernando demanded the return of all the territory Afonso had gradually acquired in Galicia, which a later author numbered at twenty-five towns, along with a ransom of five packhorses laden with gold and twenty warhorses. Worse still, Afonso's injury was so severe that he could never again bear the rigors of campaigning on horse back – his days of personally leading troops into battle were over. Yet as Afonso convalesced at Lafões and bitterly calculated the cost of this failure he may have drawn some comfort from his wider political schemes.⁷⁹ It would not have been difficult to imagine the reaction in the papal curia to the events at Badajoz. Fernando's already dubious reputation was further sullied, while the injuries the Portuguese leader sustained in battle against the enemies of the faith would surely have aroused anger and sympathy. Subsequent events on the frontier were soon to confirm Pope Alexander's worst fears concerning Fernando and allow Afonso further opportunities to cultivate his own reputation in the papal curia.

Immediately on his release from captivity Afonso turned to stabilising his own shaken authority. The Portuguese court was purged of those deemed to have too close an affinity with their Leonese neighbours, most notably the *alferes* (seneschal), Pêro Pais de Maia.⁸⁰ But Afonso also adopted a more constructive policy and, as with so many of his most crucial initiatives, the means he chose had both a local and an international dimension. In September 1169 Afonso made a remarkable grant to the Knights Templar, promising the order no less than a third of all his future conquests in the Alentejo. Senior Templars from across the peninsula travelled to Coimbra to witness the local Master, Gualdim Pais, accept this generous bequest. The

donation bolstered Afonso's local authority by creating a closer alliance with the powerful international order. Moreover, by specifying that revenues from these new lands would not be sent out of Portugal while a Muslim threat remained, Afonso was able to ensure Templar commitment to the development and defence of the local region.⁸¹ Furthermore, the grant also had a larger purpose. By making this spectacular donation to the Templars rather than, for example, the indigenous Portuguese Knights of Évora, Afonso sought the widest possible audience for his generosity. He hoped to remind the papal curia that recent setbacks had not dimmed his enthusiasm, for by offering the Templars a portion of future conquests the Portuguese leader was subtly underlining the fact that he expected such conquests would still be made.

Afonso's diplomatic efforts to attract the support of the papacy were enhanced by subsequent military actions on the frontier. Even though the Portuguese leader was now physically unable to lead an army into battle, other commanders took it upon themselves to maintain the Portuguese war effort. In 1170 his eldest son Sancho underwent the arming ceremony that marked his passage into adulthood. The young infante then seems to have ridden southwards to take part in military operations being conducted on the frontier. For in the wake of the debacle in the streets of Badajoz, Gerald Sem Pavor had withdrawn his troops to the nearby castle of Juromeña. From there he continued to harass the Muslim communities in the region. In May 1170 Gerald demonstrated that he was still a foe to be reckoned with when he audaciously attacked and plundered a caravan attempting to resupply Badajoz, killing its commander in the process. Such Portuguese provocations eventually drew a forceful response. Four months after the attack on the caravan the caliph's brother, Abū Hafs 'Umar, led an army consisting of Almohad and Andalusí troops northwards in a determined effort to end Gerald's depredations. The Portuguese soldiers found it necessary to abandon the castle of Juromeña and retreat to nearby Lobon in the hope of establishing a base of operations there. The following year, however, a second Muslim army forced Gerald to retire northwards from Lobon and out of striking distance of Badajoz.⁸²

Limited as these Portuguese actions were, they nevertheless stood in marked contrast to Leonese inaction. Far from showing any chagrin at the results of the agreement he had struck with Muslim leaders, Fernando's charters triumphantly described the Leonese success at Badajoz as a glorious victory.⁸³ Two years later the king of León confirmed his alliance with the Almohads at a meeting with Abū Hafs 'Umar. Circumstances led the two negotiating parties to come together on the fateful field of Zallaqa – where the previous century Afonso VI had suffered catastrophic defeat – and the irony was not lost on Muslim chroniclers. This alliance effectively split the Christian defence and presented Afonso Henriques with an invidious choice. Because he could no longer trust the king of León even to remain

neutral in a crisis, to continue provocative operations on the frontier was to risk being surrounded by enemies should the Muslims decide to counter-attack in force. Under these circumstances Afonso had little choice but to conclude his own peace treaty with the Almohads. Justifiable as this decision may have been in terms of *Realpolitik*, the ramifications for the wider Christian defence were dire. The Castilians, already divided by civil disorder and under the command of the inexperienced Alfonso VIII, now found themselves isolated in the face of a growing Almohad threat.⁸⁴

Reports of the deteriorating situation in the peninsula troubled Pope Alexander deeply. Although his ability to intervene was limited by his own difficult position he sought to offer what assistance he could. Following the murder of Archbishop Thomas Becket in December 1170, even as shock convulsed the Latin Christian world, Alexander did not wholly forget the Iberian frontier. When King Henry sought papal forgiveness for his role in the murder, Alexander suggested that a military expedition to Spain might constitute a suitable penance. The royal response was muted. Henry, in common with other secular monarchs, was far too preoccupied with the affairs of his own kingdom to commit himself to distant crusading enterprises.⁸⁵ When his efforts to enlist outside support for the peninsular peoples came to nothing Alexander turned instead to mediation between the Iberians themselves. In 1172 the curia's most experienced envoy, Cardinal Hyacinth, was once again dispatched to the peninsula in an attempt to bring the Christian rulers together. The legate who, almost two decades earlier, had been a driving force behind the council of Valladolid and the imperial ideal exemplified there, could now make little headway among the fiercely suspicious monarchs. In fact his zealous intervention seems to have soured his relations with Iberian leaders, and Afonso Henriques in particular appears to have resented the legate's attempt to turn back the clock. A clear signal of Cardinal Hyacinth's failure to establish any real trust among secular rulers came in 1174, when Afonso renewed his truce with the Almohads. To secure this peace, moreover, the Portuguese were required to yield Beja up for Muslim repopulation.⁸⁶ A disillusioned Cardinal Hyacinth must have feared that old policies were failing on all fronts. Neither through adjudication nor the provision of Latin Christian reinforcements was the papacy able to aid in the defence of the Iberian frontier or arrest the slide into regional loyalty.

Despite this generally bleak picture, there did occur during the legate's visit to the Iberian peninsula an incident that was to have enduring local significance in Portugal. In 1173 Afonso Henriques arranged for the relics of the fourth-century martyr St Vicente of Zaragoza to be transferred from their resting place in southern Portugal and relocated to Lisbon. Doubtless Afonso was motivated by personal piety, but he was also certainly aware of the more concrete benefits establishing this famous saint in Lisbon would bring.⁸⁷ St Vicente of Zaragoza was a popular religious figure with a following even beyond the Pyrenees. The translation of his relics to

Lisbon, and the tales of miraculous events that accompanied his journey, brought both Portugal and Afonso himself international attention. The arrival of the relics in the city was greeted with delirious excitement by the citizens, although controversy quickly flared between the canons of São Vicente de Fora, who were eager to take custody of their patron, and Bishop Alvaro, who insisted that the relics must be housed in Lisbon cathedral. A test of local influence followed, during which passions in the city rose and violence broke out between the bishop's supporters and those of the monastery. Eventually Afonso Henriques found in favour of the cathedral and amid scenes of popular rejoicing the relics of the saint were conveyed into the bishop's care.⁸⁸ The securing of this patron saint was to prove an important moral boost for the citizens of Lisbon; his relics became a focus for international pilgrimage, and the saint himself came to be considered the city's special patron and protector.

Yet Pope Alexander had little time to reflect on the mixed reports coming to him from Iberia, for events that would ultimately decide the future of his pontificate were moving towards a climax. In September 1174 Emperor Frederick launched his fifth expedition into Italy with the aim of forcibly imposing his authority in the region. Two years of campaigning ended at the battle of Legnano in May 1176 where, against all expectation, the armies of the Lombard League broke and scattered Frederick's imperial forces. This was to prove a turning point in papal affairs. The emperor, now facing rebellion throughout his Italian lands and simmering discontent in Germany, was forced to seek a rapprochement with Pope Alexander and his allies. In July 1177 Frederick formally submitted to the spiritual authority of the pope, a month later a treaty was ratified, and Alexander marked the end of the eighteen-year schism by making a triumphant entry into Rome in 1178. As the excitement in the Holy City died down Pope Alexander was at last able to devote his full attention to pressing issues that had sprung up during the long years of division and doubt. Among the many questions to be decided was the formal status of the Portuguese ruling house.

In the far west of the peninsula, meanwhile, old age had not deprived Afonso Henriques of his canny sense of timing. Even as the papacy was freeing itself from the distraction of schism the Portuguese were experiencing a notable resurgence of arms. The truce with the Almohads came to an end in 1178 and almost immediately conflict flared. The Muslim leaders of Beja, Alī b. Wazīr and Umar b. Tīmsalīt, launched a surprise raid on Alcaçar do Sal, but were ambushed almost immediately by a militia force from Santarém. Many of the attackers were killed and a number were captured, including the two Muslim leaders. (Ibn Tīmsalīt, the Almohad commander, was put to death, the Andalusi Ibn Wazīr was eventually ransomed for 4,000 dinars). When the survivors of the ill-fated expedition returned to Beja with the news of this disaster the dismayed citizens did not wait for a Portuguese counter-attack, but simply abandoned the city and retreated to Mértola.⁸⁹ Subsequent events

showed the wisdom of their discretion. Afonso's son Sancho led a force to reoccupy Beja and then mounted a revenge attack that penetrated to the outskirts of Seville – where the suburb of Triana was burned – before returning homewards in triumph.⁹⁰ Reports of this exploit spread rapidly, demonstrating to observers that the Portuguese ruling house was once again capable of taking on the burden of field command, while at the same time reinforcing the impression of pious militancy Afonso had for so long sought to create. This military resurgence was also particularly opportune because events elsewhere in Latin Christendom were forcing the curia to accept, once and for all, the ultimate failure of central authority in Iberia.

In order to celebrate the end of the schism and facilitate the great task of ecclesiastical restoration Pope Alexander summoned a general conclave, the Third Lateran Council, to gather together on the first Sunday of Lent in 1179. Amid the guarded optimism and planning for the future a discordant note was struck by the many problems in the peninsula. Eighteen Iberian clergymen, none of whom were from Portugal, are mentioned in the records of the council. These delegates brought with them first-hand accounts of the troubled situation in Spain, but it was their own inability to rise above local prejudices that spoke most eloquently. There is no indication of productive agreement being reached on any local dispute; the only direct reference to the peninsula in the acts of the council concerned the numerous Spanish mercenaries terrorising communities throughout Europe. These soldiers, schooled in violence by unrelenting peninsular warfare, were a bitter reminder to the Latin Christian world of the failure of central authority in Spain.⁹¹ Papal hopes for the future political unity of the peninsula took a further blow almost immediately after the council concluded. Even as ecclesiastical discussions were being held in Rome the kings of Aragon and Castile had come together at Cazola to negotiate as independent equals their future plans for expansion. The signing of a treaty between them in early April confirmed that frontier warfare, the focus of so much papal interest, could never again be the monopoly of a single monarch. With this document, Peter Linehan notes, 'the remains of the notional imperial system which had survived until 1157 were unceremoniously swept away.'⁹²

Only a matter of weeks after the announcement of the treaty, and with the events of the Third Lateran Council still a recent memory, Alexander came to a momentous decision concerning the future of the Portuguese ruling dynasty. In the papal bull *Manifestis probatum*, delivered on 23 May 1179, Alexander greeted Afonso in the following terms:

It has been clearly demonstrated that through military action and strenuous effort you have been an intrepid destroyer of the enemies of the name of Christ and a diligent supporter of the Christian faith; and as a good son and Catholic prince you have also shown various benevolent attitudes to your mother the Holy Church, leaving to posterity a praiseworthy name

and an example to imitate...therefore, recognising that your character is graced with prudence and justice, and thus suitable (*idoneus*) to govern, we receive you and the kingdom of Portugal under the protection of St Peter and ourselves, with all the honours and dignity pertaining to royalty, and by apostolic authority we confirm you in possession of all the places which, with the help of divine grace, you can wrest from the hands of the Saracens (and where your neighbouring kings have no just claim). In order that devotion and obedience to St Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and to the Holy See should increase more and more, that which we have conceded to you personally we also grant to your heirs. We take it as a duty of the apostolic office to defend them and, with the aid of God, all that we have granted.⁹³

In return for this sweeping acknowledgement Afonso undertook to quadruple the Portuguese papal tribute to a total of two marks of gold per annum, along with a one-off payment of a thousand gold coins.⁹⁴ Under the terms of *Manifestis probatum* Afonso gained all that he had for so long sought; his three-decade campaign for an unassailable royal authority had, without fanfare or ceremony of any kind, at last been brought to a triumphant conclusion.⁹⁵ But what did this legalistic success, in some ways so anticlimactic, actually mean for the future of the monarchy and for Portugal itself?

Almost seven centuries after the issuing of *Manifestis probatum* Alexandre Herculano criticised 'the thirst for gold, the inveterate sin of Rome' and dismissed the papal decision to recognise the Portuguese throne as little more than a business transaction.⁹⁶ Certainly a transaction did take place in 1179, but the currency was more valuable even than gold. What Afonso brought to the negotiating table was an image of himself as a loyal and pious soldier defending a threatened frontier where effective central authority had collapsed. Pope Alexander offered the unique legitimating authority of the papacy. Yet beneath this transfer of status a still more pervasive exchange was taking place. Beyond a simple reward for a lifetime of loyal service, *Manifestis probatum* represented a crucial link between Portugal and the Latin Christian world. Afonso's self-proclamation of royalty was only possible within the fluid social structures of the Iberian Peninsula where concepts of kingship were also relatively flexible; papal acknowledgement was the first step in transforming that status into something more profound – a Latin Christian concept of monarchy. This was the great gain Afonso took away from the negotiating table, but there was a price to be paid. By accepting Pope Alexander's acknowledgement of his kingship Afonso Henriques was effectively binding the future of his house not only to the papacy but also to the continuing Latin cultural expansion. It was an agreement that would bring the Portuguese leader wider opportunities and also fresh challenges. While these prospects began to emerge in Afonso's final years, they would ultimately define the reign of his son and heir, Sancho.

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Consolidation and Opportunity (1179–1211)

In 1179 the long campaign waged by Afonso Henriques to secure royal dignity was brought to a successful conclusion. The delivery of the papal bull *Manifestis probatum* by Pope Alexander provided the acknowledgement Afonso required to establish his royal status on the international stage, and guaranteed the transmission of that status into subsequent generations. Six years later, when the ageing King Afonso died peacefully at Coimbra with his ambitions fulfilled, the succession of his son Sancho I (1185–1211) to the Portuguese throne was unchallenged by either his own subjects or the neighbouring Spanish monarchs. Afonso's achievement was an indication of the pervasive influence Latin culture had come to have in the peninsula and was also a testament to the skills Iberian leaders had developed in mediating that influence to their own advantage. The Portuguese campaign for papal favour had hinged on Afonso's self-portrayal as a successful military leader against the Muslim forces of al-Andalus; however, once royal status was secured, there can be traced a clear shift in royal policy from attack to defence, from conquest to consolidation. This policy shift has traditionally been explained in terms of generational change: 'The new monarch lacked the military gifts of his father,' Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão suggests, 'but he found the kingdom standing ready to accomplish a momentous act of resettlement.'¹

Sancho's enthusiastic fostering of municipal growth encouraged later royal biographers to accord him the cognomen *O Povoador* (The Settler). Yet far from reflecting personal weakness, this support for the towns demonstrates a considerable breadth of vision. The expansion and growing wealth of urban communities had the potential to yield significant benefits to the monarchy. Across Europe rulers had realised that such communities could provide large and easily tapped sources of revenue; in Iberia too, the towns represented more than simply convenient foci for taxes and tolls. The dangers of life on the frontier obliged citizens to take responsibility for local defence and, increasingly, to field levies of militiamen to support the king's campaigns. In Portugal, moreover, the towns provided the resources to develop

a seaborne military potential, and it was in the final decades of the twelfth century that the first steps were taken in developing an effective Portuguese navy. Given Portugal's future maritime greatness, these early naval operations are in themselves an important legacy. At the same time, royal support for the Portuguese towns also encouraged a more general political shift. Coastal communities in Portugal quickly developed a commercial network linking them into the mercantile regions to the north, particularly Flanders and England. Relations soon grew beyond mercantile exchange, and the Portuguese kings were able to take advantage of such contacts to secure conspicuous international confirmation of their newly acquired royal status. Gradually, but inexorably, Sancho turned from his father's dynastic contacts in France and Italy towards the northern maritime states in order to reaffirm the independence of the kingdom. It is difficult to overemphasise the significance of this realignment, for it truly marks Portugal's emergence as a future sea-power, and as a people who looked towards the Atlantic ocean as their link to the future.

Afonso Henriques and Infante Sancho: royal policy divided?

The refocusing of royal attention from conquest to consolidation has often been interpreted as the result of the fundamentally different characters of Afonso Henriques *O Conquistador* and his son Sancho *O Povoador*. The martial success of the father was lauded by later authors; the constructive achievements of the son have received far fewer accolades. This theory of sharp generational change is complicated, however, by evidence suggesting that the policies of consolidation were in fact initiated during the final years of Afonso's reign. To explain this apparent contradiction, a 'co-regency' between father and son has been suggested. Under this interpretation of events, Afonso Henriques is portrayed in an almost Shakespearean fashion: seriously weakened by the injuries he suffered at Badajoz in 1169, the ageing king gradually passed the responsibility for the kingdom on to his son, retaining only the dignity of kingship for himself.² This portrayal has appealed to the romantic spirit of many Portuguese – and yet the role of King Lear seems somehow ill suited to Afonso Henriques. Thus a crucial first question in approaching the ramifications of Afonso's success in securing royal authority in 1179 is to consider the dynamics of the relationship between father and son during the six eventful years between the issuance of *Manifestis probatum* and the accession of King Sancho to the throne.

Afonso's second son was born on 11 November 1154, the feast day of St Martin of Tours, and was named in honour of that saint. Yet this was also a name with strong local reverberations, as it recalled St Martin of Dume, a religious figure closely associated with the early church of Braga. Infante Martin was Afonso's fifth legitimate child, he had an elder brother, Henry, and three elder sisters, Urraca, Teresa and Mafalda; the name he was

christened with suggests that he was intended for the priesthood – a sour irony in light of his subsequent strained relations with the Church. The death of Infante Henry during childhood altered the dynastic situation dramatically. Martin became the heir-apparent and in recognition of this elevated status his name was formally changed to the more regal sounding ‘Sancho’.³ Nothing is known of Infante Sancho’s early childhood, although presumably he was placed into the care of one of the great northern noble families to be taught the skills necessary for life in aristocratic society. In 1169, however, events in distant Badajoz brought upheaval to the Portuguese court and pushed the young heir to the throne into the forefront of local politics.

When the wounded Afonso Henriques was finally able to extricate himself from Leonese captivity he returned in wrath to his own realm. All those within the Portuguese court who were suspected of having too close an association with Fernando of León found themselves suddenly out of favour. Perhaps the most influential casualty of this change in mood was Pêro Pais de Maia, who after serving as *alferes* for two decades, abruptly departed Portugal and almost immediately found service with King Fernando. His replacement in this office cast consternation over the court. Afonso installed his illegitimate son, Fernando Afonso, as the new *alferes*, with responsibilities that included military command during the king’s incapacity. Fernando, who had been born in 1140, was in fact Afonso’s eldest child and his appointment to this high office seemed to reflect the Portuguese ruler’s sudden sense of vulnerability and resulting desire to surround himself with blood relations. Nevertheless, Afonso was not unaware of the impact this appointment had on the established line of succession. Even as he elevated his natural son he was careful to bolster Sancho’s position in court. Afonso appears to have countenanced his legitimate son gathering around himself a number of court officials of his own, the most important being Nuno Fernandes de Soverosa, son of Fernão Peres *o Cativo*, who acted as Sancho’s *alferes*. This then appears to have been the beginning of a political parallelism in the court – and in the years that followed this characteristic became even stronger.⁴

By the end of 1169 Infante Sancho had reached the age of fifteen. He was no longer to be considered a child and so on 15 August 1170 he underwent the arming ceremony that marked his passage to adulthood. In striking contrast to Afonso’s act of calculated defiance at Zamora in 1125, Sancho performed the ritual in the cathedral at Coimbra and received his weapons from his father’s own hands. Having formally taken up his sword Sancho proceeded to put it to use, joining forces with Gerald Sem Pavor in his subsequent campaign along the frontier until his father brought hostilities to an end in 1173 by agreeing to a five-year truce with Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf.⁵ But by then Sancho appears to have proved his point. Afonso had used the temporary respite to reorganise the court. Fernando Afonso lost his

influential position – perhaps even Afonso Henriques had come to suspect his motives – and by September he had been replaced by the more trustworthy Mem Gonçalves. Beyond a change in personnel, however, there was also a change in the administrative structure of the court, with the appearance of a new office: the *dapifer regis*, (king's chamberlain). The primary role of this new appointment appears to have been to assist the increasingly sedentary monarch.⁶ More and more, it seems, the active tasks of royal rule devolved on to Sancho and a document recording the donation of the town of Pombal to the Knights Templar describes 'Lord Afonso king of Portugal ruling...and with him his son, King Sancho'.⁷ In the same year a political marriage was arranged between the heir to the Portuguese throne and Infanta Dulce, the daughter of King Ramon Berenguer IV of Aragon and Count of Barcelona. The first of their many children was born in 1176.⁸ A chronicler assessing the political situation in the kingdom during these years claimed that Sancho had come to assume a joint royal authority (*filioque regis eiusdem Sancio conregnante*).⁹

Yet what did this 'co-rule' actually mean? By allowing his son this level of prominence had King Afonso actually divided the authority he had striven for so long to establish? In fact it seems that the Portuguese monarch had avoided the pitfall of becoming, as Lear's Fool would have it 'a 0 without a figure'.¹⁰ Fundamental to Afonso's royal authority was military leadership; this was a skill his son was also careful to develop. Almost as soon as Infante Sancho came of age in 1170 he began gaining military experience in the field. By 1178 Sancho appears to have taken sole command of the kingdom's military forces, leading them to triumph at Triana, and from then until his father's death the prince remained the primary field commander. Yet at the same time, even though Sancho frequently operated far from his father's oversight, there is no indication that he was operating independently. For example, under the terms of a charter drawn up as late as December 1183 to reward one Gocinda Peres for his service in Infante Sancho's campaigns, it was Afonso, rather than Sancho himself, who authorised the grant. Revealing too is Afonso's final charter, a donation to Bishop Paio of Évora (1180–1204) of a tenth of the royal share of locally obtained booty. Even though Sancho was the field commander for these operations, his signature does not even appear on the document. The implication is that, while King Afonso was prepared to delegate to his son sufficient authority and responsibility to satisfy the young prince's ambitions, the ageing monarch was too experienced a ruler not to retain executive authority himself.¹¹

Sancho appeared to accept his long apprenticeship with good grace. He served as a royal lieutenant and in doing so fulfilled every reasonable expectation that might be held for a dutiful prince, maintaining his patience until the end of Afonso Henriques' fifty-seven year reign. When the indomitable first king of Portugal died at Coimbra on 8 December 1185, his son and heir was absent from the city at the head of the army. Three days later Infante

Sancho returned to Coimbra and oversaw the burial of his father in the royal monastery of Santa Cruz. Afonso's funeral marked the end of an era – and yet to emphasise the impact of his passing is to minimise the extent of his achievement. For in fact the king's death made little impression on the affairs of the kingdom. The succession to the throne was a smooth one. Afonso had gained international recognition of his son's right to inherit and had associated Sancho since infancy with the business of government. There is no indication that it was deemed necessary to formalise this transfer of power with ecclesiastical ritual or coronation ceremony.¹² Moreover, the transfer of royal authority brought little change to the makeup of the court and none at all to the direction of royal policy. King Sancho pursued the same goals, with the same determination, as his father had done for over half a century. Central to these goals would be the future role of the urban communities in the kingdom.

Urban development in twelfth-century Portugal: the merchant's tale

The swift resettlement of captured territory remained a primary concern for monarchs across Christian Iberia. Portugal is remarkable, however, for the high number of town charters that have survived from the medieval period. Such charters were an effective means to encourage and organise frontier communities, and they offer the modern historians a remarkable picture of the social dynamics that lay behind the resettlement process.¹³ In the final years of Afonso Henriques' reign there was a dramatic increase in the number of new *forais* granted to urban centres as well as several updated charters issued to already-established towns. This high rate of charter issuance continued throughout the reign of Sancho o Povoador. The developing towns brought stability to the frontier and quickly became an important financial resource. Urban growth and mercantile activity were closely inter-related and, acting in tandem, they supported and encouraged each other. These commercial activities were accelerated by growing international links, particularly with the Atlantic states. The result was an upward spiral of development that created both individual opportunity and unanticipated eddies of social tension.

In May 1179, the same month as the granting of *Manifestis probatum* by Pope Alexander, Afonso issued a new type of *foral* simultaneously to Coimbra, Lisbon and Santarém. The innovative format became a pattern for many subsequent royal charters.¹⁴ In addition to painstaking edicts on internal order, rights and obligations, there were a number of measures that were clearly intended to encourage local trade. Toll remissions were granted on goods being transported between major cities, with commerce between Santarém and Lisbon singled out as particularly important. New officials were made responsible for facilitating trade between towns, while those

who actually did the work, the riverboat crews and *almocreves* (muleteers), received acknowledgement and reward.¹⁵ To further encourage travel in the kingdom the legal rights guaranteed to citizens from a chartered town were generally portable, holding good even in settlements without charters of their own. Citizens of a number of towns, if they became embroiled in legal disputes in other regions, enjoyed a temporarily higher social status in the eyes of the law; others held the right to be tried under the more advantageous rules of their own town.¹⁶ In a further attempt to alleviate the perils of the road harsh penalties were imposed upon anyone who offered violence to merchants or other travellers.¹⁷

This official encouragement of trade acknowledged no cultural boundaries. The importance of the Moorish and Jewish populations to the development of the urban economy can be inferred from the special charters Afonso granted in 1170 to the non-Christian merchants living in Lisbon, Almada, Palmela and Alcácer. These charters guaranteed the Muslim and Jewish minorities in the towns freedom of worship and the use of traditional law-codes. Sancho confirmed these rights and elaborated on them in a subsequent *foral* to the town of Almada in 1190.¹⁸ Nor was this promise of protection an empty gesture. When visiting crusaders rioted in 1189 against the presence of a sizeable population of non-Christians in Lisbon, King Sancho moved quickly to honour both his father's agreements and the on-going economic importance of these minority communities by arresting and forcibly expelling the trouble makers.¹⁹ Perhaps the clearest indication of the equality of the market-place was the punishment meted out to highwaymen found guilty of preying upon merchants. Local ordinances specified that the penalties exacted for robbing either Christian, Moorish or Jewish wayfarers were to be of equal severity.²⁰

The pragmatic cultural tolerance codified in town charters was matched by a high level of social flexibility. Charters make clear that in urban society significant gains in civic status were possible. Because the various towns were often in competition for likely settlers, particularly in the frontier zone, charters routinely included generous enticements for newcomers. Thus, in the middle years of the twelfth century, Moors or Christians were promised an equal welcome in Freixo de Espada á Cinta and could expect to receive full citizenship. In 1187 the town of Bragança went even further: 'Escaped serfs, murderers, or adulterers who come to live in the town will be accepted and made free.'²¹ More reputable citizens in towns could also hope for social advancement. The status of knight (*miles*) had initially been granted to townsmen in recognition of an individual's ability to perform cavalry service. The prerequisite for this status was often nothing more than possession of a horse and suitable weapons. Over time, however, this skill-based category gradually took on many of the characteristics of a socio-economic class. In some towns the status of knight became a valued hereditary right and members of this group could opt to pay a fixed fee in lieu of military

service. Knightly status could thus be maintained financially rather than martially. In some towns, indeed, a wealth threshold was imposed, which obliged those with sufficient assets to take on the responsibilities of cavalry service.²² Social position in the towns could thus be a result of inheritance, military proficiency, or economic success; and the rising status of merchants can be inferred from their appearance in the signatory lists of official documents during the 1180s.²³

The growth of local trade between towns facilitated by these merchants was paralleled by an even more lucrative rise in international commerce. The crusaders who assisted at the siege of Lisbon in 1147 were clearly involved in such commerce, and they requested wide-ranging trade concessions as a component of their remuneration.²⁴ By 1190 an *alcaide dos navios* (commander of the ships) had been appointed in Almada to oversee the regulations governing the transport of various goods, including oil, foodstuffs and wine. Four years later a fully loaded Flemish cargo ship was reported wrecked off the Portuguese coast.²⁵ By the turn of the century the pace of economic development was accelerating. In 1203 King John of England granted safe passage and trading rights to a number of Portuguese merchants; additional documents were issued in 1205 and 1208.²⁶ In Flanders too there are indications of a permanent mercantile settlement, with A. H. Oliveira Marques reasonably suggesting that the men of 'Lischebom' mentioned in Flemish charters of 1212 were in fact Portuguese from Lisbon.²⁷ This growth was also reflected in Lisbon itself, where letters patent from 1204 and 1210 elaborated the role of the *alcaide dos navios*, and the office was later redesignated as the *alcaide do mar* (commander of the sea).²⁸ By the 1220s this trade appeared to be booming and in one year, 1226, English authorities issued more than 100 safe conducts to Portuguese merchants. The growing importance of this trade was reflected in the adoption by many Iberian merchants of the English silver standard as the medium of international commerce.²⁹ Exactly what goods and services these merchants were trading in is unclear. While a reasonable hypothesis might be that agricultural products impossible to grow in northern climates made up the bulk of materials, the only definitive reference is to rabbit fur and wax.³⁰

How much of this flow of wealth was the king able to divert from the merchants' coffers into his own? While no detailed empirical data remains, there are many indications that the crown managed to amass considerable financial reserves as a result of growing trade. In 1147 Afonso Henriques claimed that, due to his own parlous financial state, he could only offer the visiting crusaders the right to pillage Lisbon and a promise of future trading concessions. The reason for his impecunious state was easily explained:

...having been constantly harassed by the Moors, so that sometimes not even our lives are safe, it has not been our fortune to accumulate [great] wealth.³¹

Four decades later the situation had changed dramatically. In 1189 Sancho faced a similar situation when he obtained the assistance of a fleet of crusaders in an attack on Muslim-held stronghold of Silves. As the city was about to fall Sancho offered the crusaders 10,000 gold coins as an alternative to the previously agreed right of pillage. Even when he doubled the amount the crusaders refused, for they had come to distrust the Portuguese king and preferred ready loot to the possibility of some subterfuge on his part.³² Further evidence of Sancho's growing wealth can be found in his will, drawn up in 1188 and then updated in 1210.³³ These documents present a remarkable picture of royal largess. While the bulk of Sancho's assets were divided among his many children, sufficient funds remained to make grants of 10,000 coins to each of the three great Cistercian houses, 2,000 to the archbishop of Braga and 1,000 to each of the Portuguese sees. An indication of the source of this wealth came at the beginning of the reign of Sancho's successor, Afonso II (1211–1227), who was obliged by his subjects to renounce the 'evil old practice' of exacting tax of 33 percent on all mercantile activity in the towns.³⁴

The first Portuguese monarchs appear to have reaped a rich financial harvest by supporting the towns and their enterprising merchants. Yet the development of urban communities and of the trade that was their life-blood had ramification that went far beyond a rapid rise in disposable income for the kings. Fortified frontier towns had long formed the backbone of local defence. In the event of enemy attack, the local citizenry were expected to maintain an effective resistance until relief could be mustered. During the final decades of the twelfth century, however, the towns took on a greater strategic significance. Growing urban populations allowed the creation of larger and more effective local militias. Initially the role of these citizen militias was primarily defensive; but as time passed, they also began to develop an impressive offensive capability. Meanwhile, the rise of maritime trade provided the skills, the resources and indeed the need to police the sea-lanes. In the final decades of the twelfth century the Portuguese were able to construct and crew their first effective navy. The launch of these warships, which in light of Portugal's subsequent maritime pre-eminence is of considerable historical significance, was only made possible by the urban growth that took place under royal fosterage.

Town *forais* granted in the final decades of the twelfth century illustrate several important royal initiatives designed to realise the military potential of the towns. Two types of military service were required of city militias: the defensive *apelido* and the offensive *fossado*. The former was an alarm raised if hostile forces were detected and the obligation to render *apelido* service remained a central feature of town charters throughout the century. Defaulters faced heavy fines along with, presumably, considerable opprobrium from their fellow citizens. Far greater variation can be found in the terms governing the other form of military service, *fossado*, which involved

participation in raiding operations against distant enemies. These more mobile expeditions, often consisting solely of horsemen, provided opportunities for rich booty but at greater peril, not only to individuals involved, but also for the town itself. Such raids drew directly on the militia's defensive capability. Early charters frequently stipulated that no more than a third of available horseman could be committed to a single raid each year. Usually too, time limits were placed on their period of service.³⁵ Gradually, however, charters appeared in which the ratio of horseman was reversed. In Évora, for example, only a third of available cavalry forces were obliged to remain on guard duty. Frontier communities such as Santarém might also choose to commit a fixed number of troops to raids across the frontier rather than a percentage of their total reserves. To bolster the defence of towns in the possible absence of the knights, skilled archers were granted a higher status – and with it greater obligation – equivalent to that of a horseman.³⁶ These developments were directed towards ensuring that the military potential created by the growing populations and affluence of the towns could be used as efficiently as possible. The effectiveness of such initiatives was soon to be put to the test.

A period of Portuguese military success had culminated in 1178 with the destruction of the suburb of Triana, across the river from Seville. This conspicuous triumph had provided important political capital during Afonso's bid for papal acknowledgement of the Portuguese crown; but it also goaded a swift response from Almohad forces. For the next decade the southern marches of Portugal became the theatre for perennial frontier skirmishing during which the urban militias demonstrated their abilities in resolute defence and sudden assault. The campaign was opened in 1179 by the army of Seville. Eager to avenge the destruction of Triana the Sevillian troops launched an attack on the border community of Abrantes. The town was subjected to a brief, unsuccessful siege over the course of which the local militia inflicted a large number of casualties on the attacking army for the loss of only nine defenders.³⁷ The following year Almohad forces struck with greater determination against the Portuguese stronghold of Coruche. In an effort to divide the strength of the besieging army the Santarém militia, possibly acting in concert with forces from Toledo, launched a diversionary attack on Guadalquivir. The Almohads refused to be drawn, however, and continued their assault on Coruche – eventually the defences were overwhelmed and the unfortunate townsfolk carried back to North Africa in chains.³⁸ In 1181 the Almohads attacked again, this time probing the defences of Évora. The townsfolk resisted stoutly and the Muslim troops eventually retreated with nothing to show for their efforts. Militia forces from Santarém and Lisbon then combined the following year in a raid on the fertile region to the west of Seville that penetrated to within sight of the city itself.³⁹

This pattern of annual attack and counter-attack came to a dramatic climax in 1184 when the Almohad caliph, Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf, led a major

assault against the strategically vital town of Santarém. The Muslim army, numbered by Portuguese sources at almost 80,000 troops, launched a ferocious attack and according to several accounts managed to breach the outer walls at several points, forcing the defenders back to the inner keep. Fortunately for the hard-pressed citizens of Santarém a relief force gathered at Coimbra and began marching southwards. Possibly too, a Leonese army had mustered under the command of King Fernando, although such was the residue of distrust between the Portuguese and their Spanish neighbours that the defenders of Santarém were later portrayed as being unsure which side their co-religionists intended to assist.⁴⁰ To meet these twin threats the Almohad caliph gave hurried orders for a redeployment of his own troops, and it was at this point that disaster struck. The manoeuvre was poorly organised and when confusion began to break out in the Muslim ranks the caliph found himself all but abandoned before the walls of the hostile town. From atop their battlements the watching defenders recognised an opportunity. The Portuguese launched an audacious attack on the disorganised Almohad army and were able to scatter the royal bodyguard. Before the Almohad forces could recover, one of the soldiers dealt the caliph what was to prove a mortal blow; the Portuguese troops then fell back to the safety of their town. Dismayed at this turn of events, the Muslim forces retreated southwards, and an uneasy peace descended on the frontier zone as the Almohads sought to cope with the sudden loss of their caliph.⁴¹

Along the Portuguese seaboard, meanwhile, a more mobile threat had presented itself. In 1179 the Almohad fleet stationed at Ceuta was placed under the command of Ghānim b. Mardanīsh and given orders to mount a campaign in support of the land forces attacking into central Portugal. The fleet sailed northwards along the coast, spreading terror among the seaboard communities, attacking even to the suburbs of Lisbon. After a successful season the fleet returned southwards, bearing a heavy cargo of booty and prisoners. In earlier years, the Portuguese had responded to such maritime threats by strengthening their coastal defences; on this occasion, they began to build up a fleet of their own. The construction of these ships is a testimony to the growing financial strength of the towns and their closer relationship with the monarchy. In earlier years the prohibitive cost of equipping and crewing specialised military vessels had been far beyond Portuguese means.⁴² The fleet was placed under the command of Fuas Roupinho and sailed out to meet the attackers at sea. Details of the naval skirmishes that followed are unclear, but the Portuguese appear to have launched a retaliatory raid on the island of Saltes, at the mouth of the Rio Tinto. Ghānim attempted to halt their depredations, but in 1180 his fleet was ambushed by the Portuguese flotilla and lost nine vessels, including his own flagship. Despite this setback, the following year the Almohad navy returned to contest the sea-lanes once again, apparently meeting the Portuguese fleet off Cape St Vincent. In

this engagement the Muslims were victorious, capturing twenty Portuguese ships for the loss of one of their own. Among the casualties was Roupinho himself.⁴³ Yet the nascent Portuguese fleet was able to recover from this dramatic defeat and within a few years visiting northern ships were escorted along the coast of southern Portugal by a numerically significant and tactically able local flotilla.⁴⁴

In the final decades of the twelfth century strengthening trading links with the northern maritime states had a subtle but pervasive influence in Portugal. Afonso Henriques and Sancho both encouraged mercantile development as a means to enrich their subjects and thus to increase returns to the royal fisc. The growing wealth and cosmopolitanism of the towns had significant social implications along with important military benefits. Economic success provided a means for social advancement in the towns and by the end of the century leading merchants had come to enjoy the privileges and status previously accorded only to the military elite. This widening of the upper echelons of society appears to have enhanced rather than compromised the military capacity of the towns. Urban militias proved themselves to be more than capable of acting independently in defence or attack, while the economic strength of the towns allowed the Portuguese to at last meet the prohibitive expense of building and equipping effective warships. King Sancho came to be remembered by later generations primarily for his encouragement of the towns; yet due to this farsighted royal policy he was also able to call upon military forces far superior to those available to any previous Portuguese ruler. In the years that followed he was to have dire need of all the military resources he could command.

Buttressing a collapsing frontier: Spanish disunity, fractious crusaders and a new Almohad offensive

The Almohad threat had not ended with the death of Caliph Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf outside the stoutly defended walls of Santarém in 1184. The caliph was succeeded by his son Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb al-Mansūr (1184–1199), who was determined to take vengeance on the Portuguese for his father's humiliating death. This new and dangerous phase of the long struggle against the Almohads came at an awkward moment for King Sancho. The death of his long-term rival King Fernando II of León in 1188 provoked a dramatic rise of tensions on the border between León and Castile, sapping what little solidarity had existed between the fractious Christian kings. As the situation on the frontier deteriorated it became apparent that Sancho could hope for neither support nor encouragement from his Spanish neighbours. Providentially for the anxious king of Portugal, the declaration of the Third Crusade in 1187 provided an unexpected opportunity to recruit reinforcements from more distant lands. Large fleets of Jerusalem-bound crusaders provided timely assistance to the hard-pressed Portuguese and at the same

time did much to consolidate the strengthening links between Portugal and the Atlantic states.

Even as Sancho came to power in 1185 it was clear that clouds were gathering on the southern horizon. The Portuguese kings had often used diplomatic initiatives to isolate the Muslim cities they intended to attack, and such tactics had been an important factor in the capture of Lisbon in 1147. By the late 1180s Sancho was forced to recognise that the situation had been reversed. A few years earlier the rumour of an approaching Leonese army may well have been a significant factor in the disaster that befell Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf at Santarém. His son Ya'qūb al-Mansūr was determined to obviate the threat of any such assistance complicating his own campaign against the Portuguese. The death of King Fernando of León on 22 January 1188 provided the caliph with a diplomatic opportunity not to be missed. The heir to the throne of León was King Alfonso IX (1188–1230), the son of Fernando and Urraca of Portugal (a marriage that had been repudiated in 1175). Alfonso was perhaps seventeen years old at the time of his accession and almost immediately he faced a number of serious challenges to his authority, the greatest of which came from his Castilian first cousin, King Alfonso VIII. In this fraught situation the young king of León was in no position to make new enemies. When Ya'qūb al-Mansūr held out the possibility of a truce the Leonese king could do little but agree, despite the dangers this posed to his uncle, Sancho of Portugal. Nor was this the end of the Almohad caliph's diplomatic offensive. King Alfonso of Castile was eager to concentrate his own efforts on the opportunities for expansion that were appearing in León. When Ya'qūb al-Mansūr offered him a similar truce in 1190 the Castilian accepted with alacrity.⁴⁵ Yet even as the Almohad storm was gathering on Portugal's southern horizon, events triggered by the sudden collapse of Christendom's eastern frontier were to combine in unforeseen ways to provide a partial remedy to King Sancho's dangerous isolation.

In 1187 the entire Latin Christian world was shaken by a string of disasters in the Holy Land. On 4 July forces led by Saladin out-manoeuvred and destroyed the army of King Guy of Jerusalem on the parched plain of Hattin; four months later Muslim forces captured the Holy City itself. The terrible news reverberated around Europe and for Pope Urban III (1185–1187) the shock reportedly proved fatal. On 29 October 1187 his successor, Gregory VIII (1187), issued the papal bull *Audita tremendi* in an attempt to channel widespread popular anger into a new crusading effort in the East.

On hearing with what severe and terrible judgement the land of Jerusalem has been smitten by the divine hand, we and our brothers have been confounded by such great horror and affected by such great sorrow that we could not easily decide what to do or say; in such a situation the psalmist laments and says: "Oh God, the heathens are come into thy inheritance."⁴⁶

The pontiff beseeched his audience to restore the Holy Land to Christendom and offered full crusading benefits to individuals prepared to undertake the eastward journey. His plea was enthusiastically received and people from across Europe pledged themselves to the Third Crusade. In the interests of Christian unity King Richard I of England (1189–1199) and King Philip II Augustus of France (1180–1223) agreed to postpone their many disputes and began preparations for a major combined expedition to recapture Jerusalem. The elderly Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (1155–1190) also heeded the call, gathering an army reported to number over 100,000 troops for the journey to the East.⁴⁷ There is an unlikely later tradition that King Sancho was initially caught up in this enthusiasm and resolved to join the other monarchs on the road to Jerusalem. If so, cooler counsel soon prevailed and he was persuaded to remain in Portugal to meet the growing Almohad threat.⁴⁸ For the king and his counsellors recognised that a new crusade raised the possibility of large fleets of northern crusaders whose assistance in Portugal might prove invaluable.

The main French and German armies marched eastwards across Europe, but a great many crusaders from the Atlantic ports once again chose the sea-route to Palestine. The first such fleet, a mixed Danish and Frisian flotilla consisting of fifty or sixty vessels, arrived off the Portuguese coast in 1189. King Sancho was able to persuade these new arrivals to assist in a pre-emptive attack on the Almohad stronghold at Alvor, a town on the southern Portuguese coast which commanded the estuary of the same name. The crusaders subsequently took Alvor by storm and the unfortunate inhabitants – almost 6,000 in number – were massacred in an act of brutality that was completely contrary to the usual conventions of Iberian warfare. Even Latin commentators were surprised by this level of ruthlessness and implied that the primary motivation had been simple greed. When the crusaders stowed the spoils of the town aboard their ships they immediately cast off to continue their eastward journey; the Portuguese returned northwards in nervous anticipation of the arrival of further crusader fleets.⁴⁹ They did not have long to wait. In July a flotilla of thirty-six ships containing crusaders from Germany, Holland and England sailed into Lisbon harbour. Like their Danish and Frisian predecessors, the crusaders of this second fleet allowed themselves to be persuaded to assist in a local operation. Portuguese ships joined the flotilla and together they sailed around Cape St Vincent, then eastwards past the melancholy ruins of Alvor, until they reached the Muslim city of Silves. On 21 July the allies established their camp before the city walls and the attack began in earnest.

The joint operation mounted by the Portuguese and the crusaders at Silves was described in considerable detail in an anonymous eyewitness account. What little is known about this author has been deduced from the account itself. He was clearly a German crusader, probably a minor clergyman, and he seems to have had limited affinity with the Portuguese cause. Certainly

he made no effort to gloss over the sharp animosities that divided the besiegers' camp. Almost from the outset of the operation against Silves, the crusaders found cause to doubt the commitment of their local allies. King Sancho delegated command to an unnamed lieutenant who openly doubted their chances of success and initially attempted to persuade the northerners to attack an easier target instead. Only when the crusaders refused to be diverted did the local troops reluctantly join in the siege.⁵⁰ To the crusaders this apparent half-heartedness on the part of their allies became more and more galling. 'The Portuguese neither worked nor fought,' the German author maintained, 'indeed they taunted us for labouring in vain, because they believed the town was impossible to take.'⁵¹ This atmosphere of acrimony only worsened when, after the failure of a general assault on the walls, the Portuguese began advocating retreat. However, the crusaders took heart from reports obtained from deserters. According to these informants the governor of Silves, 'Īsā b. Abī Hafs b. 'Alī, had not adequately prepared the city to resist a prolonged assault and the defenders faced a critical shortage of water. As weeks passed the citizens' suffering became acute. The Portuguese saw the opportunity to negotiate a surrender, but the crusaders would accept nothing less than everything the people of Silves possessed. Even when King Sancho offered a cash settlement of first 10,000 and then 20,000 gold coins in compensation for the promised right to sack the city, the crusaders refused to countenance any change in the original agreement.

On 2 September the despairing people of Silves could withstand no more. In order to preserve their lives they agreed to abandon their goods, and the city was yielded up to the attackers. In their eagerness for booty a number of the more unsavoury crusaders assaulted and robbed the citizens even as they sought to surrender. This behaviour drew sharp rebukes from the local Portuguese; yet the German author harboured suspicions that King Sancho's anger sprang from his regard for the defenders' possessions rather than a concern for their wellbeing.

With the city taken the king endeavoured to secure from us the food-stuffs, which were abundant and of greater value than any other thing, as his share. Yet because we had forbidden anything to be taken from the city, so that we could divide the booty there, some of our men, particularly the men of Flanders, secretly sold grain outside the walls to the Portuguese. This greatly angered the king, who declared that it would be better not to have captured the city than to lose it through lack of bread....In fact the king took all for himself and distributed nothing to us. So the crusaders, having been treated so badly, took their leave of the king with less friendship.⁵²

Believing themselves to have borne the brunt of the fighting, the crusaders found it difficult to accept the demands placed upon them by their hesitant

allies, and King Sancho eventually resorted to sending royal troops into the city to forcibly expel the belligerent northerners. After twelve days the disgruntled crusaders grew tired of demanding readmission, divided their spoils and returned to their ships. So soured were they by these experiences that they could not be prevailed upon even by the newly installed Bishop Nicholas of Silves (1189–1191), though he was a Flemish cleric and a crusader like themselves, to take any further action against the surrounding Muslims. Instead, the crusaders found sullen satisfaction as they sailed away in ruminating on the opportunities for the advancement of Christendom which the king's shoddy treatment of them had brought to nothing.⁵³

Petty though this dispute might at first seem, the intractable positions of both the crusaders and King Sancho are in some ways quite revealing. In the decades following the Second Crusade churchmen had emphasised the holy war aspect of the crusade in an effort to persuade the soldiery of Europe that warfare in defence of their Spanish co-religionists was meritorious in itself. Thus, from the late 1140s, crusading indulgences were granted for purely Iberian operations, and a decade later Pope Hadrian could declare that assistance given to the Spanish Templars was an acceptable fulfilment of the crusading vow.⁵⁴ By the final quarter of the twelfth century the official ecclesiastical attitude appeared to be that while to labour in the defence of the Holy Land was a highly meritorious act, to do so in Spain was a viable alternative for those lacking sufficient time or money for the long journey eastwards.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the attitudes of the northern soldiers operating at Silves hint that the inherent tension within the crusade, between the popular ideal of pilgrimage and the more controversial ecclesiastical notion of holy war, remained as yet unresolved. The primary ambition of many of the crusaders was to redeem their vows in the Holy Land; the defence of Christendom in Iberia was at best a corollary aim, and their justification for assisting the Portuguese at Silves was to obtain the means to continue their journey. Hence their anger when that justification was thwarted. To what extent, however, was their anger merited? King Sancho's insistence on retaining possession of the foodstuffs was not inherently unreasonable; nor was he impelled by simple cupidity. The Portuguese had expended their resources and risked their lives attacking Silves not merely to secure booty but rather to establish an advance base in the face of the imminent Almohad assault. Retaining possession of the city was imperative for the maintenance of an aggressive defence, so to leave Silves under-supplied in the face of the inevitable counter-attack from North Africa would have been the height of folly. King Sancho's resolve in the face of the hostile crusaders was to be vindicated the following year when the Almohad storm finally broke.

Caliph Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb al-Mansūr had been distracted for the first six years of his reign by revolts in various parts of the Almohad empire and by a conspiracy within his own family. Not until 1190 did Ya'qūb al-Mansūr feel secure enough to undertake his long-planned expedition against the

kingdom of Portugal. In April the Almohad caliph, at the head of a large Berber army, crossed over to al-Andalus, where he was joined by local Andalusi forces from Seville and Granada. By the first week of June Muslim armies had taken up position around their initial objective, the recently captured town of Silves; a month later the Almohad navy joined them to complete the investment of the walls. Ya'qūb al-Mansūr left the siege of Silves in the hands of his local allies and proceeded to Cordoba with the bulk of his land army. On reaching the city he met with a Castilian embassy to ratify the truce that would complete the diplomatic isolation of King Sancho. Thus secured, the caliph launched his main assault on the Portuguese heartland. The Almohad army blazed a trail of destruction across Alentejo to the town of Torres Novas. The defenders prudently surrendered in return for their lives and liberty – and the town was destroyed. Ya'qūb al-Mansūr pressed on to the Templar stronghold at Tomar, hoping a demonstration of overwhelming military strength would intimidate the knights into a similar capitulation.⁵⁶ It was at this point, even as the Portuguese were being forced back into a desperate defence, that new fleets of maritime crusaders came unexpectedly to their aid.

The harbinger of these timely, potential reinforcements was a lone ship bearing a crew of Englishmen. This vessel had been separated from the main London flotilla by a fierce storm in the Bay of Biscay; the weather-beaten crew made hesitant landfall at Silves, and were so disorientated that there were unsure whether the city was in Muslim or Christian hands. And they were right to be concerned. In the face of the Almohad threat the citizens of the town were close to panic. Bishop Nicholas, the Flemish former crusader, seized upon the propitious arrival of over a hundred heavily armed foreign troops and immediately petitioned them for aid. The crusaders might well have chosen discretion by insisting on a meticulous obedience to their pilgrimage vows, but any departure was forestalled when the desperate citizens took matters out of their bishop's hands by forcibly scuttling the crusaders' ship. With their means of escape resting on the harbour-bed the crusaders had no choice but to remain. After receiving a guarantee of a replacement vessel and compensation the crusaders agreed with what grace they could muster to take their places on the battlements.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, the remaining nine ships of the London flotilla had also survived the turbulent crossing of the Bay of Biscay and come safely to Lisbon. Like their compatriots, they found a scene of confusion and barely controlled panic as local forces prepared to resist the Almohad incursion. Aware that the bulk of the invading Muslim army was marching against Santarém, King Sancho had mustered all available troops to reinforce the town. Roger of Hoveden recorded with evident pride that 500 of the boldest and most adventurous of the crusaders left their more timid companions in Lisbon and marched inland to join in the defence of Santarém. 'They preferred to die in battle for the name of Jesus Christ,' Roger claimed, 'than to see

his people slain'.⁵⁸ Their arrival greatly heartened King Sancho, and he was emboldened to refuse an Almohad offer for a seven-year truce because it included the stipulation that Silves should be abandoned. In the face of this defiance, and with his army meeting stiff resistance at Tomar, the caliph was obliged to retreat southwards. As the immediate threat receded the triumphant crusaders returned to Lisbon bearing with them the goodwill of their hosts and a promise from King Sancho that he would also find a more tangible reward for their valour.⁵⁹

Unhappily these cordial relations were not to last. Portuguese gratitude to the crusaders was soon strained with the arrival at Lisbon of sixty-three additional English ships. The disembarking crusaders were quite unprepared for the exotic reality of a frontier society. When they encountered members of the Moorish and Jewish minorities living peacefully within the city they promptly assaulted and robbed them. These skirmishes quickly escalated into a violent street riot. When reports of this civil unrest reached King Sancho he hastened back to Lisbon in order to protect his Jewish and Muslim subjects. Royal troops gradually restored order and Sancho demanded that the offenders swear oaths to refrain from further acts of violence in the city. Three days later, however, a second dispute degenerated into another wild street brawl and this time the Portuguese king acted more forcefully. Sancho ordered his troops to close the city gates and arrest any Englishman within the walls. Some 700 surly crusaders were gaoled – to be released only when they returned the property they had stolen and renewed their broken oath to act peacefully towards all the king's subjects. The riotous attack on Lisbon's Muslim and Jewish minorities was the last recorded action by English crusaders in Portugal; on 24 July the fleet weighed anchor and continued their interrupted voyage to the Holy Land.⁶⁰ Behind them they left a kingdom still very much under threat.

Following the retreat from Santarém Ya'qūb al-Mansūr wintered his army in Seville; however, he had no intention of abandoning the Portuguese campaign with so little to show for his efforts. In April 1191 the Almohad army marched westwards once again. This second offensive was directed against the strategic stronghold of Alcácer do Sal on the Sado estuary – the scene of so many sanguinary battles during the reign of Afonso Henriques. When an initial assault failed to take the walls by storm the attackers established a siege. Eventually the defenders asked for terms of surrender and were allowed to retreat in safety. Ominously for the Portuguese communities to the north, Ya'qūb al-Mansūr chose to reoccupy the town rather than simply destroy the fortifications. Alcácer was placed under the command of the Andalusī leader Muhammad b. Sīday b. Wazīr, with its financial viability secured by the arrangement of cash subsidies from Ceuta and Seville. Having established the garrison at Alcácer the caliph led his army southwards to address an item of unfinished business. Towards the end of June the Almohad army launched a sudden assault on Silves and managed

to breach the city's outer defences. The shocked survivors retreated to the citadel where they were besieged. Ya'qūb al-Mansūr allowed the defenders to send a messenger seeking King Sancho's permission to surrender and, having obtained his sanction, the keys to the keep were yielded up on 25 July.⁶¹ This quiet capitulation marked the end of a long campaign in which the Almohad army had forced the frontier back to the Tagus River. Only Évora remained in Portuguese hands as a very lonely Christian outpost in a suddenly hostile land.

In the first five years of his reign King Sancho led the Portuguese defence against a bruising series of Almohad military incursions. Though Christian resistance buckled, it did not break, and the integrity of the Tagus frontier was maintained – if only barely. During the course of this desperate defence the perspectives of the visiting Latin crusaders and the local Portuguese were both brought more sharply into focus, and while the differences between them remained stark, there were also clear indications of a gradual convergence of attitudes. Visiting crusaders had begun to demonstrate a greater level of identification with the Portuguese, for while many northerners persisted in focusing their ambitions on the distant goal of Jerusalem, others – notably the 500 bold Englishmen who marched to the aid of Santarém – were prepared to acknowledge a sense of obligation to their Iberian co-religionists. The Portuguese, for their part, continued to foster a pluralistic Iberian society and their monarch, in common with other Spanish kings, had no compunctions about negotiating across sectarian lines. Nevertheless, there can be glimpsed occasional hints that a subtle process of cultural change was in fact taking place. In 1188 Sancho granted a *foral* to Valelhas that included an unusual addendum noting 'the land of Jerusalem has been captured by King Saladin and in this year King F[ernando] died.' These few words succinctly reflect a growing Portuguese awareness that some events touched all Iberians, while others had significance for Christendom as a whole.⁶²

Twelfth-century ecclesiastical links between Portugal and the Atlantic states

Merchants might open trade routes between distant markets; crusaders could have an immediate, dramatic impact in local campaigns; but the most significant foreign cultural influence in Portugal was exerted by Latin Christian society's educated elite: the clergy. By the middle of the twelfth century foreign-born clergymen had become a conspicuous presence in the Portuguese Church. Such men took the lead in fostering the transfer of Latin cultural institutions into the region, and while initially the overwhelming majority of immigrant ecclesiastics had been of French origin, increasing engagement with the northern maritime states led to more clerics from England, Flanders or Germany making the voyage to Portugal. A number of these adventurous clergymen took up high office

in the Portuguese Church as bishops, archdeacons, or deans; others founded religious institutions that gradually developed into important foci of Latin culture in the region.

The late eleventh and early twelfth century had brought a cadre of immigrant French clergymen to positions of authority in the Portuguese Church. The archdiocese of Braga, the ecclesiastical centre of the region, provides an illuminating example. During this period four archbishops ruled in Braga of whom only one, Archbishop Paio, was locally born. The other three archbishops – Gerald, Maurice, and João Peculiar – were either French or French-trained clergymen. Even more conspicuous is the foreign presence in the former Mozarabic stronghold of Coimbra. Between 1092 and 1148 four men secured the pallium in Coimbra and all of them – Cresconio, Maurice, Gonçalo and Bernard – were French. The majority of these men had travelled to Iberia under the auspices of Archbishop Bernard of Toledo. They were appointed to positions of authority in order to impose ecclesiastical conformity on the Iberian clergy and shepherd the local churches into the Latin Christian fold.⁶³ However, in the latter years of the twelfth century the predominance of immigrant clergymen was challenged by the rise of locally born ecclesiastics trained in the new Roman orthodoxy. Thus the death of Archbishop João Peculiar in 1175 led to the elevation of the Portuguese-born Archbishop Godinho. His successor fourteen years later, Archbishop Martinho Pires (1189–1209), was also a local man. Similarly in Coimbra, following the death of Bishop Bernard in 1148, Bishop João Anaia (1148–1155) became the first in a long line of Portuguese bishops to hold the see.⁶⁴ But there were two noteworthy exceptions to this general trend towards indigenous churchmen. Bishop Gilbert of Lisbon, elevated in 1148, was an Englishman; Bishop Nicholas of Silves and then subsequently Viseu came originally from Flanders. Significantly, both of these men owed their appointments in Portugal to similar, highly unusual circumstances.

Gilbert of Hastings first came to Lisbon as a member of the crusader fleet that assisted Afonso Henriques in his assault on the city in 1147. The Englishman was proposed for the see made vacant by the murder of Lisbon's Mozarabic bishop and Raol, the Anglo-Norman eyewitness to these events, recalled 'the king, the archbishop [João Peculiar], the clergy and the laity all gave their assent to his election.' Thus on 1 November 1147, only a matter of days after the capture of Lisbon, Gilbert took responsibility for the restoration of the religious life of the city.⁶⁵ Little is known of Gilbert's career prior to his arrival in Portugal, although his actions as bishop indicate a careful and diplomatic royal official. A later Portuguese account of the reordering of the city in the wake of the Christian takeover portrays Bishop Gilbert as a man of noteworthy learning and judgement, who was also well aware of his reliance on Afonso's continued support.⁶⁶ Immediately upon assuming office, Bishop Gilbert took the politic step of offering his obedience to Archbishop João of Braga – in defiance of claims made by Archbishop Diego

of Compostela based on the ancient metropolitan rights of Mérida. Having established his position within the regional hierarchy, Gilbert next turned his attention to defending the rights of his new cathedral. Perhaps the most delicate problem Bishop Gilbert faced was a prolonged disagreement with the Knights Templar centred on possession of the churches in Santarém (which had been granted to the military order by Afonso Henriques following the fall of the city). This dispute dragged on for more than a decade and only ended in a compromise brokered in 1159 by Afonso himself, under which the Templars renounced their rights in Santarém and as compensation received undisputed control over the castle at Tomar.⁶⁷

Bishop Gilbert also fostered what was to prove to be an enduring international character to his cathedral. The new bishop was accompanied by a retinue of exotic followers including his brother Robert, who became dean of the cathedral, and Eldebredus, the Anglo-Norman archdeacon who represented Bishop Gilbert at the council convened by Archbishop João in 1148. Signatures appearing on charters issued by the bishop over the next decade confirm the presence of several non-Portuguese, including Walter of Hastings, Gilbert of Kent, Luke of Selsey, Walter of Flanders, Alfred of Carentan and Jocelin of Bayeaux. Bishop Gilbert is also thought to have been responsible for the introduction of the breviary and missal of Salisbury – both of which continued to be used in Lisbon's cathedral until the sixteenth century.⁶⁸ Moreover, Bishop Gilbert maintained links with his homeland and was on occasion able to use them to render important services to Afonso Henriques. Thus, in 1151, the bishop agreed to return to England in order to recruit volunteers willing to participate in further campaigns against Moorish strongholds in Portugal. Perhaps a hint of his wider activities during this visit to his homeland is contained in an undated charter granting an indulgence of twenty days' penance to all who visited the church of St Mary at Earls Colne. More tantalising still is a letter, again of uncertain date and authorship, introducing Bishop Gilbert to King Louis VII of France.⁶⁹ Following his return to Lisbon the English bishop exercised an effective and relatively controversy-free authority in the city. He is thought to have died in 1166 and his successor, Bishop Alvaro, was obliged to overcome objections from both the canons and the archbishop of Compostela before he was able to take office.⁷⁰

Four decades after the elevation of Bishop Gilbert to the see of Lisbon a Flemish clergyman, Nicholas, became the bishop of Silves under comparable circumstances. Like Gilbert of Hastings, Bishop Nicholas initially came to Portugal as a maritime crusader journeying eastwards to the Holy Land. After the successful joint assault on Silves in 1189 the Flemish bishop was offered the task of restoring the newly captured diocese. Bishop Nicholas gathered together a group of his compatriots to aid him and a charter issued in the following year boasts a number of exotic signatories including William the dean, Peter the treasurer, and Lambert the archdeacon. Like Bishop Gilbert

before him, Nicholas attempted to make use of his foreign contacts to assist his Portuguese hosts. Following the fall of Silves, Bishop Nicholas sought to persuade his disgruntled countrymen to participate in further attacks on several nearby Muslim towns. Unfortunately for the bishop's hopes, a common heritage provided insufficient leverage to overcome the crusaders' distrust for King Sancho, and they refused to remain any longer in Portuguese territory.⁷¹ The following year Bishop Nicholas enjoyed greater success in persuading the crew of the single weather-tossed English ship to contribute to the desperate defence of the city – although his case was strengthened by the sabotage of the crusaders' vessel.⁷² Little more is known of Bishop Nicholas' period in Silves. He does appear to have won King Sancho's confidence and in 1189 received as a royal gift a villa at Mafra and a number of other privileges. Nicholas lost his cathedral less than two years later when the city was forced to surrender to the Almohad caliph; however, the death of the bishop of Viseu in 1192 created a vacancy, and Nicholas was quickly installed in this more secure see.⁷³ The Flemish bishop was also prepared to use his international links more generally to assist the Portuguese. Where Bishop Gilbert had journeyed to England and possibly also to France in an effort to recruit soldiers, Nicholas – who was serving a different king in different circumstances – sent William the dean back to Flanders to induce settlers, rather than warriors, to hazard a southward journey.⁷⁴

The international origins and associations of men such as Bishop Gilbert and Bishop Nicholas strengthened relations between Portugal and the Atlantic states; so too did their encouragement for the foundation in their dioceses of religious institutions possessing a distinctively international character. Among the more durable of these institutions have been two memorial churches, Santa Maria dos Martíres and São Vicente de Fora in Lisbon, built in the cemeteries set aside for the crusaders killed during the siege of the city in 1147. The early development of these two churches was described briefly by the Anglo-Norman priest Raol, and at greater length in the chronicle, *Indiculum fundationis monasterii S. Vincentii* (Index of the Foundation of the Monastery of São Vicente), penned by an anonymous hand in Lisbon towards the end of the twelfth century.⁷⁵ These authors recount that Santa Maria dos Martíres was sited to the west of the city, in the cemetery for the fallen English crusaders. On assuming ecclesiastical authority in Lisbon, Bishop Gilbert also took responsibility for the church built in memory of his fallen comrades. Meanwhile, the church of São Vicente de Fora was established to the east of the city, in the cemetery set aside for Flemish and German dead. After consultation with Bishop Gilbert, Afonso Henriques retained control over this church and made a considerable effort to ensure that it reflected the cultural heritage of those who were buried there. A German named Winand was appointed as rector and one of his countrymen, Henry, was employed to maintain the building and to ring the church bell in exactly the same way he had done in his homeland.⁷⁶

Two Englishmen, Hicia and Salericus, subsequently held authority there, followed by a Flemish immigrant named Gauthier, who arrived in Lisbon with four compatriots and a desire to modernise the Augustinian monastery. His attempt to bring São Vicente under the rule of the Premonstratensians provoked resistance from within the cloisters and also from the Portuguese king himself, possibly due to an unwillingness to place São Vicente under the control of a distant French house.⁷⁷ Neither man would yield and eventually Gauthier felt it best to return to his homeland.

São Vicente de Fora quickly developed into an important cultural landmark in Lisbon. The canons gathered together an impressive number of literary works, and their collection had a distinctly international character to it. A thirteenth-century catalogue lists 116 volumes of theological and historical writings reflecting influences from across Europe; but even more revealing are the original literary works written within the monastery's own busy scriptorium.⁷⁸ The most significant surviving product of this creative effort is *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, which records events during and immediately after the capture of Lisbon. Because this account was written at least four decades after the events described, eyewitnesses such as Raol or the Teutonic authors have come to be preferred for information concerning the siege itself. Nevertheless, the work by the anonymous author in São Vicente de Fora is not without its own merits. The author claims to have interviewed two participants in the siege and its aftermath, the Portuguese nobleman Fernando Peres and an elderly German canon named Otho, to ensure the verisimilitude of his description.⁷⁹ On the basis of these sources the anonymous author produced an account which accords in most respects with the descriptions provided by the Anglo-Norman and Teutonic correspondents – despite there being little chance he was actually able to consult these letters himself (since they had been sent to their distant recipients decades earlier). More importantly, even though the chronicle deals with events that occurred almost half a century earlier, the attitudes it reflects are in fact those prevalent at the time of composition. For the author added numerous highly charged glosses to his account of the siege and also included a detailed description of the foundation and early development of an unusual religious cult that developed around the crusaders buried at São Vicente de Fora.⁸⁰

One important feature of eyewitness accounts of the siege of Lisbon is the window they provide into the confused early development of the crusade itself. During the Second Crusade the Portuguese, and indeed many of the northern crusaders, displayed uncertainty about the fundamental nature of the crusade and questioned whether the precepts of holy war justified, let alone demanded, military aggression in Iberia. Echoes of these same doubts were revealed four decades later when soldiers of the Third Crusade participated in Portuguese operations against the Almohads. Yet the anonymous author in Lisbon, who wrote his account even as preparations for the

Third Crusade were underway, harboured no such misgivings. *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii* contains nothing of the moral introspection of the Anglo-Norman priest Raol or the pragmatic cultural tolerance displayed by the Portuguese towards their Muslim neighbours. Instead, the author in São Vicente de Fora produced a bellicose account of the siege in which the city's defenders are portrayed as enemies of the faith whom the crusaders attacked 'for the love of Christ and, even when mortally wounded, fought on to the death'. These acts of self-sacrifice were described unequivocally as martyrdom, though this was a controversial claim and one the priest Raol had been careful to avoid.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the author of *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii* chose to focus squarely on the deeds of one of these crusader 'martyrs' – Henry of Bonn, a knight serving with the contingent from Cologne – and on the miracles subsequently attributed to him.

As the siege of Lisbon dragged towards its conclusion the crusaders' camp was disturbed by reports of a number of supernatural events. Both the Teutonic and Anglo-Norman eyewitnesses briefly recalled the miraculous healing of two youths who had been mute since birth. The subsequent Portuguese account, on the other hand, includes a far more elaborate version of the same story in which the two fortunate youths were loyally guarding Henry's tomb when they received a vision of the martyred crusaders bearing a palm frond, the symbol of the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and were then freed from their congenital infirmities.⁸² Another supernatural incident was described by Raol, in which the Flemish camp was cast into uproar when the bread used for the Mass was found to be permeated with blood. Many of the Anglo-Normans interpreted this portent as a divine warning to those blood-thirsty crusaders whose covetous nature had overcome their religious motivation. However, by the time the author of the *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii* came to record the same events a more satisfactory explanation had emerged. In this account the troubled priest eventually traced the source of the 'blood' to a store of discoloured grain. Since this grain had been the gift of a recently killed crusader, the miraculously bleeding bread could now be interpreted as a sign of his martyrdom.⁸³

The author of *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii* also included two miracle stories that went unrecorded by the earlier correspondents. The first of these involved Henry of Bonn's anonymous squire. Soon after Henry's death the squire was also killed in battle and buried in the cemetery at São Vicente de Fora. In the haste to decently inter the fallen the squire was buried some distance from his lord. This oversight was soon made good when the martyr appeared to the custodian of the cemetery in a number of visions, each more insistent than the one before, until the faithful squire was relocated to a grave alongside his master. A second, still more striking supernatural event reportedly took place some time after the capture of the city.

A palm frond, such as pilgrims take onto their shoulders in Jerusalem, was placed at the head of [Henry's] tomb, and after a short while it sprouted living from the earth. This grew taller and became a tree, clad in vigorous foliage. All who were ill came to the tomb to ask for succour and took pieces from the palm, which they suspend around their necks or ground into powder to drink; and immediately they were cured of whatever infirmity troubled them. [The palm] stood there, so those who had seen it reported, until the hands of the sick had taken it all away. But there are some who say that when nobody was on guard it was secretly uprooted and transplanted elsewhere....⁸⁴

It would be difficult to imagine a more effective piece of crusading propaganda. The repetition of the palm motif had powerful symbolic reverberations. Traditionally such palm fronds were gathered in the Garden of Abraham, although by the end of the twelfth century a whole street in Jerusalem was given over to the selling of fronds to visiting pilgrims. So prevalent was this practice that returning crusaders came to be known as 'Palmer'.⁸⁵

The monastery of São Vicente de Fora and the church of Santa Maria dos Martíres, built as they were to be memorials to the fallen crusaders, remained highly visible symbols of the spiritual dimension to holy war. Over time they also became a conspicuous reminder to the people of Lisbon of the wider relations between Portugal and the Atlantic States. Through their literary efforts canons in the monastery's scriptorium laboured to preserve and to propagate this twin message; yet it is difficult to judge the degree to which these attitudes did actually reach beyond the high walls of the two religious institutions. A popular acceptance of the ethos of holy war seemed to permeate only slowly through a Portuguese society accustomed to constant interaction with non-Christian cultures.⁸⁶ Yet at the same time a citizen of Lisbon who contemplated the two new churches, with their notably exotic clergy and their steady stream of newly arrived visitors and pilgrims, could not help but be impressed by the quickening pace of communication and commerce along the sea-lanes.

Nor were the many ecclesiastical relationships created by the participation of early crusading fleets in local campaigns the only links established between the Portuguese clergy and churchmen in more northerly climes. The catalogues of several Portuguese monastic libraries clearly demonstrate the intellectual exchange that took place along the Atlantic trade routes. The great Cistercian monastery of Alcobaça in the Estremadura could boast collections of papal legal decisions (decretals) compiled in southern England, along with volumes of pious English homilies produced towards the end of the twelfth century.⁸⁷ At the venerable Benedictine house of São Mamede de Lorvão, located some ten miles northeast of Coimbra, the monks were able to gather together a remarkable cache of material pertaining to the life,

martyrdom and miracles ascribed to St Thomas Becket. In their devotion to this quintessentially English saint the monks of Lórvão obtained the earliest surviving copy of Benedict of Peterborough's *Liber miraculorum beati Thome* (Book of the Miracles of St Thomas), the anonymous English *Passio sancti Thome Cantuariensis archiepiscopi* (The Passion of St Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury) and an original letter from Thomas Becket himself to Hyacinth, cardinal deacon of S. Maria in Cosmedin (who at the time of Becket's exile from England was the papal legate to Spain).⁸⁸ An interest in the cult of St Thomas of Canterbury was shared by the Portuguese Templars, and there are indications that a chapel dedicated to the English saint was constructed at Tomar during the twelfth century and ornamented with important relics including a small vessel containing a measure of the murdered archbishop's blood.

Both Afonso Henriques and Sancho o Povoador actively recruited foreign clergymen in the expectation that such men would couple a wide knowledge of religious developments in Latin Christendom with a loyalty guaranteed by their reliance on the crown. In the early decades of the twelfth century these men were predominantly former monks trained in the Cluniac tradition, but as the century progressed, the dominance of French ecclesiastics in Portugal began to wane as local men rose to high office within the local church. Closer relations with the Atlantic states created some of the most significant exceptions to this general trend. Clergymen from England, Flanders and Germany assumed important positions of authority in Portugal or were provided with the means to found new religious houses. Unlike their predecessors a generation earlier, these men were invited by the Portuguese rulers rather than imposed from without; nevertheless, they were instrumental in a widening of Portuguese cultural horizons and at the same time a deepening of the many links created by enterprising merchants or occasional fleets of Jerusalem-bound crusaders. Such links were to prove extremely useful to a Portuguese monarchy eager for means to re-emphasise its royal credentials on the international stage.

Fruits of royalty: the politics of dynastic marriage under Afonso and Sancho

The most important relationship that could be forged between aristocratic families during the medieval period was the bond of dynastic marriage. Marriage created a kinship link between noble houses that had personal, political and religious ramifications. Only through marriage could the status of an ancient lineage be transferred across generations, and of critical importance in the arrangements for a dynastic wedding was the relative status of the two houses to be joined in matrimony. For a Portuguese ruling family conscious of its relatively recent elevation to royalty, the creation of kinship links with the more established monarchies was greatly to be desired – since

the ultimate demonstration that royal status had been achieved was the acknowledgement of that status by other royal families. Increasing communication between the Portuguese and the Atlantic states during the twelfth century created far greater opportunities for advantageous international marriages; these dynastic arrangements would in turn strengthen still further relations between Portugal and the northern kingdoms.

International dynastic marriage was not new to the Portuguese ruling family. The progenitor of the royal dynasty, Count Henry of Burgundy, had achieved his position through a political marriage to Infanta Teresa. A generation later Count Henry's Burgundian connections had been instrumental in the marriage negotiations for Afonso Henriques' wedding to Mafalda of Savoy. This match greatly extended Afonso's international kinship network and Mafalda's foreign ancestry was reiterated by a later hand in the *Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium regis*.⁸⁹ International recognition of his local pre-eminence had been an important source of prestige for Afonso during his long struggle to achieve royal status, but when he came to negotiate marriages for his own children, peninsular political reality had obliged him to focus his attention closer to home. Thus in 1160 Infanta Mafalda was betrothed to Count Ramon Berenguer, son of the Count of Barcelona (although the marriage does not appear to have actually taken place); five years later Infanta Urraca married King Fernando of León, a match subsequently dissolved by papal order on the grounds of consanguinity. Afonso's son and heir Sancho was married in 1174 to Dulce, the daughter of King Ramon Berenguer IV of Aragon and Count of Barcelona – thus cementing the link proposed almost fourteen years earlier. However, following the promulgation of *Manifestis probatum* Portuguese horizons widened and the marriage of Afonso's youngest daughter, Infanta Teresa, reflects this desire to take on a more conspicuous international role.

In 1184 Infanta Teresa was married to the recently widowed Philip of Alsace, Count of Flanders (1157/67–1191). The romantically inclined have chosen to see this marriage as the result of personal attraction between the principal people involved. Ralph of Diceto, a generally well-informed English contemporary, portrayed a love-struck Count Philip fervently petitioning an unenthusiastic Portuguese monarch. Although Ralph states that rumour alone was sufficient to inflame the count's ardour, the two could conceivably have met during Philip's earlier sojourn in Portugal while en route to the Holy Land in 1177.⁹⁰ Alexandre Herculano painted a poignant and highly influential picture of an ageing Portuguese king doting over his youngest daughter, and yielding only grudgingly to Philip's persistence.⁹¹ Subsequent historians, uneasy with a romantic explanation, have pointed to the growing trade relations between the two regions to account for the marriage.⁹² Yet while such relations may explain how Philip came to learn of the infanta, it seems highly unlikely that Afonso Henriques, jealous as he was over the dignity of his newly established throne, would have been

willing to broker a favourite daughter to secure preferential treatment for his merchants. To explain this marriage, it is necessary to consider the wider patterns of alliance and understanding that linked the Atlantic maritime states together.

Although negotiations for Infanta Teresa's marriage to Count Philip were conducted between the ruling houses of Flanders and Portugal, King Henry II of England also appears to have taken a direct and personal interest in seeing these nuptials take place.⁹³ Entries in the Pipe Roll accounts for the year 1184 record that the task of transporting the bride, along with the costs entailed, fell to citizens living on the south coast of England. Why was it that English, rather than Portuguese or Flemish ships, carried Teresa safely to her expectant bridegroom? Certainly King Henry had long pursued an interest in Iberian affairs. In 1176 his second daughter, Eleanor, married King Alfonso VIII of Castile, and in that year too he acted as an adjudicator in a territorial dispute between the kings of Castile and Navarra.⁹⁴ At the same time relations between England and Flanders had grown closer, and it is possible that Henry simply desired to assist his friend Count Philip or, less charitably, place a weight of obligation upon an ally.⁹⁵ On the other hand, more duplicitous motivations might also have played a part in the English king's intervention. From Henry's point of view Teresa was a safe matrimonial choice for Count Philip, since such a match did nothing to encourage Flanders into the French sphere of influence. In fact, whether by chance or English design, the final marriage terms quickly embroiled the count in a disagreement with Philip Augustus of France over possession of his new wife's dowry lands.⁹⁶ The English king thus had much to gain from forwarding the Portuguese-Flemish marriage; Afonso Henriques, for his part, acquired a formidable and well-connected son-in-law, along with the gratitude of the Angevin king – arguably the most powerful monarch of his age.

The arrangement of his youngest daughter's wedding was among Afonso Henriques' final acts and he died in Coimbra in December 1185. King Sancho had spent many years as heir-apparent and when he finally came to the throne he already had several children of marriageable age. He was thus able to continue his father's policy of negotiating international marriages wherever possible. In 1199 the unexpected death of Richard I of England reshaped the political map of Europe. His younger brother John (1199–1216) succeeded to a troubled English throne and in the same year the new king sent embassies to Portugal in the hope of securing the hand of one of Sancho's daughters. While chroniclers claim John's attention was attracted by tales of the beauty of the Portuguese princesses, there were also clear political motives in John's choice. Richard the Lionheart had wed a princess from the border kingdom of Navarra, and with Philip Augustus' son already linked by marriage to Castile, it was perhaps logical that John's eyes should turn to Portugal. King Sancho was sufficiently interested to send

ambassadors to the English royal court, but by the time they arrived John had secured advantage closer to home by marrying Isabelle of Angoulême.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, although these negotiations were ultimately to prove fruitless, they indicate that the long-established royal houses of Europe were coming to accept the presence of the Portuguese kings among their ranks.

Afonso Henriques and Sancho ruled over a changing kingdom in a changing world. Both monarchs recognised the benefits of supporting the development of the towns and derived important local advantages as a result. This fostering of the towns increasingly linked the Portuguese into the trading networks that were forming across the Atlantic world. Such links were further strengthened by the immigration of clergymen from the northern seaboard states and ultimately by the dynastic marriages that confirmed the Portuguese royal family on the international stage. The advantages the Portuguese gained from their growing links with the Atlantic world were many, and the impact on the development of Portuguese society was profound. These can be seen as a growing and widespread cultural confidence when dealing with the wider world particularly with those institutions which had previously dominated Portugal's international horizons. For as the twelfth century came to close old relationships with the great institutions of Latin Christendom, in particular the papacy, came under increasing pressure.

6

Shifting Priorities: Portuguese Relations with the Latin Church in the Thirteenth Century

During the twelfth century a careful embrace of European cultural influence had brought significant advantages to the Portuguese ruling family. Afonso Henriques' effective use of his status as a pious defender of Christendom's southern frontier was instrumental in the achievement of political independence from Leonese authority. In the wake of this success, Portuguese society at all levels had benefited from a greater engagement with the economic and cultural life of the Atlantic seaboard, and royal power had been consolidated as a result. Yet even as the monarchy grew in stature and in confidence, royal relations with the Church began to show signs of strain. For the political advantages Afonso had won through his shrewd dealings with the papal curia were not without price. In order to secure the support of Rome in his bid for royal status, Afonso had been obliged to make significant concessions to the religious institutions in the new kingdom. All too soon, his successors were to find that the position of virtual autonomy the Portuguese clergy had won was incompatible with their own ambitions for a centralised royal authority. The stage was set for what was to prove a prolonged and bitter confrontation between secular and ecclesiastical power in Portugal.

Exacerbating a growing friction between the monarchy and the Church were developments within the religious life of the Portuguese themselves. Throughout his reign Afonso Henriques had been an enthusiastic supporter of international ecclesiastical institutions, with the Cistercian monks and the Knights Templar in particular receiving rich donations from the king. These orders had grown to become important exemplars of Latin cultural influence in the region; indeed their very exoticism had been a contributing factor in the royal support they had enjoyed. By the thirteenth century, however, the situation had changed. To a monarch eager to centralise authority into royal hands, wealthy religious houses represented an important resource within the kingdom; but their international connections could all too easily

become an irritating complication. Individual Cistercian and Templar communities came under pressure as royal agents sought to intervene in their affairs. Moreover, such direct royal pressure was reinforced by the more subtle opportunities for persuasion presented by the emergence during the twelfth century of Iberian religious orders. These indigenous organisations, which drew inspiration from the international orders but focused their efforts exclusively on the peninsula, offered frontier kings an alternative means to satisfy their spiritual and practical needs. One result of these combined pressures towards integration into local society was to compromise the effectiveness of the international religious orders as cultural bridges between Portugal and the Latin Christian world.

Developments within the Portuguese Church also impacted on royal dealings with the papal curia. Initially cordial relations gradually grew strained as a distant papacy attempted to defend local ecclesiastical privileges in the face of an increasingly confident monarchy. These smouldering tensions burst dramatically into flame during the final years of the twelfth century. On 8 January 1198 Lothar dei Conti of Segni was elected to the throne of St Peter and took the name Pope Innocent III (1198–1216). Pope Innocent was thirty-seven years of age at the time of his elevation and came to the papal throne in the wake of a long series of elderly and relatively cautious pontiffs. Almost immediately Innocent demonstrated that a new era of papal government had dawned. Armed with a sweeping interpretation of the *plenitudo potestatis* (fullness of papal power) the pontiff embarked on an energetic campaign to restore the authority of Rome. Papal agents began to involve themselves more forcefully in peninsular affairs. Unsurprisingly, Iberian leaders soon came to resent such interference – none more deeply than King Sancho of Portugal.

Obligations deferred: Sancho's early relations with the papacy

King Sancho's first extant communication with Rome as ruler of Portugal was a petition sent to Urban III (1185–1187) requesting a papal confirmation of privileges for the royal monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra. The dating of the document is uncertain, but would seem to fall between January 1186 and May of the following year. In this letter Sancho sought to maintain the tone of loyalty and orthodoxy his father Afonso had so assiduously cultivated. Like his father, Sancho was also careful to emphasise his own military role.

Let it be known, your holiness, that I aspire to be your knight and a devoted son of the Roman curia, just as my father was to you and to your predecessors. In the hope of receiving the same blessings, I will render obedience to you in all things. ...¹

Friendly relations between the Portuguese king and the papal curia continued. In May 1190 Pope Clement III (1187–1191), although distracted

by the loss of Jerusalem and by the complicated planning for the Third Crusade, nevertheless found time to respond favourably to Sancho's request for a re-promulgation of *Manifestis probatum*. Possibly Sancho expressed his gratitude by pledging himself to the anticipated crusade. If so, he was subsequently persuaded to remain in Portugal to lead the defence against the more immediate Almohad threat. He may thus have lacked the special cachet of the formal crusader; nevertheless, for much of the next decade, King Sancho waged a torrid, high-profile struggle against the forces of Islam on his own southern border.²

Yet even as Sancho sought to assume the role of pious frontier defender assigned to him by papal expectation, underlying tensions within this relationship were beginning to be more keenly felt. The most obvious symbol of Portuguese subordination to the papal throne was the payment of the annual gold tribute. Under the provisions of Afonso Henriques' agreement with Pope Alexander III, in return for a papal acknowledgement of his royal status, Afonso had agreed to pay an annual census of two marks of gold. Following Sancho's accession to the throne the tribute was allowed to lapse. It seems unlikely that this reluctance to dispatch regular consignments of gold to Rome was the result of financial concerns alone. The annual tribute amounted to perhaps 120 gold coins per year. Though sizeable, this sum would hardly have been overly burdensome to a monarch who in 1188 drew up a will under which more than 110,000 morabitinos were to be distributed among his children. Two years later King Sancho was prepared to offer visiting crusaders 10,000 gold coins as an alternative to the agreed right to sack the city of Silves.³ Instead Sancho appears to have disliked the formal admission of dependency implied by this payment into the papal fisc. When Pope Clement reissued *Manifestis probatum* in 1190 the question of the gold tribute was raised, and King Sancho responded by arguing that a large cash grant made to the Holy See under the terms of his father's final will constituted an advance payment. With the papacy distracted by a host of more pressing questions, and the Portuguese facing a mounting Almohad threat largely unaided by the neighbouring Spanish monarchs, Pope Clement decided not to press the issue further. However, even as royal negotiators celebrated this concession from the pontiff, a more complex and potentially more damaging issue between their king and the papal curia was looming over the canonical status of royal marriages in Iberia.

Marriages between the noble houses of Europe formed the very bedrock of dynastic politics. As generations passed, however, and noble families throughout Christendom became ever more closely interrelated, the problem of consanguinity between prospective marriage partners became acute. Politically advantageous marriages were frequently found to fall within the 'forbidden degrees' of kinship – meaning that the prospective partners were deemed by ecclesiastical canon law to be too closely related to wed. Across Christendom there was a growing tension between an aristocracy eager to

cement their political relationships with formal nuptials and ecclesiastical authorities determined to protect the integrity of canon law. In the Iberian Peninsula this friction was particularly severe, partially due to the high level of intermarriage that had already taken place among the Spanish aristocratic houses, but also because of a critical difference between the Iberian and Latin Christian definitions of consanguinity itself. Traditional Spanish interpretations allowed marriages that were within nine degrees of relationship; the Latin Church sought to limit legal marriages to a narrower seven degrees of kinship.⁴ The result was a potentially explosive combination of ecclesiastical dogma, cultural misunderstanding and Iberian dynastic ambition.

Quite early in his reign King Sancho was to find to his cost just how complex the issues surrounding royal marriage could become. In 1191 King Sancho's eldest daughter, Infanta Teresa, was married to King Alfonso IX of León in order to cement an alliance formed between the two monarchs.⁵ Almost immediately, the marriage attracted the censure of Pope Celestine III (1191–1198), who declared the match uncanonical on the grounds of consanguinity and ordered an annulment. The young couple had by then come to care deeply for each other and attempted to resist ecclesiastical pressure to separate. Pope Celestine would brook no defiance. He placed both Portugal and León under interdict and excommunicated the newly wedded couple.⁶ The standoff continued for some months until the intensifying pressure on both kingdoms finally forced the royal families to accede to the pope's authority. An agreement was negotiated between Sancho and Alfonso to dissolve the marriage and within two years Teresa had returned sorrowfully to Portugal.⁷ While papal intervention to destroy this royal marriage appears at first sight to have been a dogma-inspired attempt to impose Latin Christian standards on an unwilling Iberian society, there were also more pragmatic issues underlying Pope Celestine's actions.

The disunity displayed by the Christian kings, even in the face of a rising Almohad threat, had dismayed papal onlookers. Caliph Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb al-Mansūr proved highly adept at taking advantage of rivalries among his enemies and through clever diplomacy had in 1190 effectively prevented cooperation between the Portuguese and their Spanish neighbours. Pope Celestine was adamant that such a situation would not be repeated. Yet the marriage between Teresa and Alfonso formalised an alliance between Portugal and León that was an integral part of a wider Leonese strategy to isolate King Alfonso VIII of Castile. Contemporary writers certainly suspected that the urgings of Alfonso of Castile lay behind the pope's intractability when it came to a strict interpretation of canon law, and such a suspicion is corroborated by the events immediately after the enforced separation of the young couple.⁸ Following the annulment of the marriage between Teresa and Alfonso (and with it the dramatic weakening of the alliance between Portugal and León) papal agents worked hard to bring

the Christian kingdoms more closely together in the interests of mutual defence. These efforts met with some success and there were hopeful signs of a thawing of relations among the Iberian monarchs. All to soon, however, the strength of this halting rapprochement was to face a decisive test.

In the summer of 1195 the Almohads renewed their offensive against Christian lands. Towards the end of June Caliph Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb al-Mansūr led a huge army northeast from Seville with the intention of punishing Castilian defiance. King Alfonso mustered his own army and marched southwards to meet the threat. The Castilian army took up position around the castle of Alarcos.⁹ Although the Leonese monarch had promised to send reinforcements, Alfonso of Castile refused to wait and offered battle to the Almohad invaders on 17 July. The result was a disaster for the Christian forces; the Castilian army was scattered with heavy loss, and King Alfonso himself barely escaped. Worse though, the fragile unity among the Christian rulers immediately shattered. In the wake of the disaster at Alarcos, far from rallying to the cause of his co-religionists, King Alfonso of León allied himself with the victorious Almohads and launched an attack on Castile. Pope Celestine moved quickly to make his outrage clear. The king of León was excommunicated; his subjects were released from their allegiance; and his Christian rivals were granted crusader privileges for their campaigns against him. Sancho of Portugal, ever ready to seize an opportunity, took advantage of his former son-in-law's precipitous fall from papal favour to attack and annex the city of Túl.¹⁰ As warfare flared along the internal borders of the Spanish kingdoms, the integrity of the frontier with Islam was only maintained because the Almohads were prevented by unrest in North Africa from effectively capitalising on their victory. Papal and royal embassies shuttled between Christian armies and gradually order was restored. So fragile was this unity, however, that it could only be secured by another marriage, this time between King Alfonso of León and Infanta Berenguela, the daughter of Alfonso of Castile. Such a match would be no less consanguineous than the Leonese king's earlier marriage with Teresa of Portugal; nevertheless, Pope Celestine allowed himself to be persuaded to permit the ceremony. The reason for the pope's new flexibility was pure expediency, albeit expediency of the most positive sort: *pro bono pacis*.¹¹

Relations between Rome and the Iberian kingdoms in the closing decades of the twelfth century were generally based on a fundamental pragmatism on both sides. In the face of a resurgence of Muslim arms in the peninsula, papal policy-makers sought wherever possible to assist secular rulers in defending the frontier. In return for vague professions of loyalty and evidence of military activity popes were prepared to allow Iberian rulers a relatively wide latitude in other areas. Even when the curia did intervene more forcefully, the ground rules for such an intervention were understandable to all. Individual kings might be temporary losers, and so seek to resist papal demands; at the same time, they could also hope for more favourable

decisions in the future; therefore, such resistance seldom became implacable. Certainly this was King Sancho's experience. His efforts to avoid the payment of the gold tribute met with success, and if his first forays into the politics of dynastic marriage foundered in the face of papal resistance, he could look to the territorial gains he had won across his northern borders as some compensation. Crucially, the relationship between King Sancho and the papacy during this period was flexible enough to accommodate the growing confidence of the Portuguese monarch. A similar flexibility can also be traced in the developing relationship between the Portuguese kings and of the other great Latin institutions active in the peninsula: the international religious orders.

The development of the international religious orders in Portugal under Sancho I

By the beginning of the thirteenth century the most successful religious orders in Portugal were the Templar knights and the Cistercian monks. Afonso Henriques had granted extensive lands to the two orders in recognition of their ability to secure frontier territory, but also with an eye to the important political capital such support garnered in Rome. In the prevailing climate of consolidation under King Sancho, members of both orders discovered that the very scale of their early success brought them more closely under royal oversight. To justify and protect their own great holdings the Templars were obliged to focus more and more of their attention to the security of the Portuguese frontier rather than the defence of the distant Holy Land. The Cistercians, for their part, had been granted huge estates by Afonso, particularly in the newly conquered frontier territory. As these lands were gradually brought into productive use the monks' rising wealth and local influence attracted the attention of a monarch eager to impose royal authority throughout the kingdom. Continued Cistercian growth became reliant less on the international reputation of the monks than on their ability to negotiate the troubled waters of local politics.

The military orders had been warmly received in Portugal by Afonso Henriques. The Templars, and to a lesser extent the Hospitallers, brought much-needed military and organisational capabilities to the frontier, along with a unique means of providing Rome with timely reminders of the Portuguese king's own pious loyalty.¹² The growth of the Templar Order had begun slowly, with a grant from Infanta Teresa in 1128 at Soure, which was subsequently confirmed by Afonso. For almost two decades the order was given no further encouragement until in 1147 they received holdings in newly captured Santarém. The period of greatest expansion for the Templars began a decade later under the first Portuguese master, Gualdim Pais. In 1157 the knights received the citadel of Tomar (Nabão) on the northern bank of the Tagus River, which subsequently became the commandery for

the Portuguese chapter of the order. In 1169 Afonso grandiloquently promised the order a third of all future conquests. More grants followed, and by 1186, a papal confirmation of Templar holdings included Soure, Ega, Pombal, Tomar, Ozezar and Almoural. Subsequently, the Templars granted *forais* to the towns of Ferreira, Castelo Branco, Idanha-a-Velha, Idanha-a-Nova, Salvaterra, Cardossa, Açafa and, briefly, Monsanto.¹³

The function of the military orders in Europe was primarily to raise revenue and support for the Holy Land; in Iberia, however, the orders were expected to take a more active part in local defence and resettlement. The Portuguese Templars were no exception. When Pope Innocent had confirmed their rights over the churches of Ega and Pombal the pontiff had made clear that the Templars had been actively involved in wresting the region from Muslim control. Knights of the order played a pivotal role during the dark days of the Almohad invasions in 1189–1190 where, despite the size of the attacking army, they doggedly refused to surrender Tomar to destruction. The knights were also directly involved in other campaigns, both in attack and defence, sometimes operating alone, or in conjunction with royal troops or units of urban militia.¹⁴ Yet the growing military capabilities of the order made neutrality a difficult posture to maintain in the tumultuous world of Iberian politics.

Far from Palestine and its original mission to protect pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem, the Templars in Portugal became a key element in the Portuguese Reconquista, identifying themselves with the interests of the Portuguese kings to the point of becoming virtually a 'national' military order.¹⁵

This process of assimilation into Portuguese society was already well advanced by the second half of the twelfth century. Even though the knight drew considerable inspiration from their international standing, they could not ignore the realities of their local position. Naturally reluctant to become involved in regional disputes, the Templars were nevertheless sometimes placed under considerable pressure to take sides. On the difficult border between Portugal and León, for example, members of the military orders were certainly made aware of royal expectations of unconditional support. Thus, in 1172, Afonso Henriques reassigned control over the town of Monsanto from the Templars to the knights of Santiago with the stipulation that the commander must be Portuguese and would yield up the town to royal forces even in the event of war between Christian peoples. Meanwhile, on the other side of this troubled frontier, the Leonese kings compelled the Hospitallers to accept similar responsibilities for the lands and castles they controlled.¹⁶

Military obligations to the crown were not the only factor undermining the international order's autonomy in Portugal. In 1169, in an act of

remarkable generosity that brought the Portuguese ruler to papal attention at a crucial political juncture, Afonso Henriques promised the Templars a third of all his future conquests. This act of calculated largess secured the prosperity of the order in Portugal, but it also imposed a fundamental change on local Templar operations. Stipulated in this grant was the proviso that all revenues from the lands thus granted to the order must be expended on the defence of Portugal, rather than forwarded to the Holy Land, for as long as a domestic Muslim threat remained.¹⁷ This caveat was primarily intended to ensure that the focus of the Portuguese Templars remained firmly on local defence, but it also implied detailed royal oversight of their finances. Since not all Portuguese Templar holdings were under this prohibition, monies that were actually sent to the Holy Land would presumably need to have been accounted for. The very success the Templars enjoyed thus brought them more closely under royal authority. For although the Templars might claim technical immunities from secular influence, the reality appears to have been substantially different. The crown was quite prepared to intervene in Templar affairs, as demonstrated by the transfer of Monsanto from Templar control to the newly formed Order of Santiago in 1172. Significantly, though their rights were theoretically guaranteed by the papacy, there is no indication that the Templar knights made any attempt to resist this diminishing of their holdings. By the latter years of the twelfth century the Templars seem to have become reconciled to the reality that the continued growth of the order in Portugal was reliant less on associations with wider Latin Christendom than on the ability of the knights to adjust to the needs and expectations of their Portuguese hosts.

Even as the Templars were undergoing this gradual process of assimilation into local society many Cistercians were discovering that their initial success in Portugal had also complicated their relations with secular authorities. Afonso Henriques' advance to the Tagus River during the middle years of the twelfth century had brought wide lands under royal control, and the Cistercians had been major beneficiaries of his largess. The most extensive individual grant was made in 1153 to establish a monastery at Alcobaça, which after an uncertain beginning grew to become the dominant Cistercian house in Portugal, and subsequently, one of the most magnificent in Europe. In many ways the early development of Alcobaça is representative of the growth of the Portuguese order as a whole. On parchment the initial grant to Alcobaça was rich indeed, but it was to take some years for this wealth to be harvested. After two decades of land improvement and careful husbandry the abbey was in a position to establish its first daughter-house, at Bouro, in 1174. Abbot Martinho I, who oversaw this first expansion, was also able to marshal the financial resources to initiate a major rebuilding programme at Alcobaça. The centrepiece of the new complex was the famous abbey church, arguably the finest surviving example of Cistercian architecture in the world today. A persistent legend that a

number of monks were massacred in the new abbey during the Almohad invasions of the 1190s appears to be a groundless sixteenth-century fable. No such atrocity was reported in contemporary documents, and the monastery's expansion continued apace throughout this period: in 1195 a second daughter-house was founded at Seíça, and five years later a third subordinate house was established at Maceira Dão.¹⁸

Later pious invention created a myth of martyrdom at the hands of Almohad invaders; in fact the real shadow over further Cistercian development was the threat of royal intervention. Unlike his father Afonso, who had allowed the monks to develop their holdings without interference, King Sancho appeared eager to impose a level of royal authority over them. A tantalising suggestion of the scope of royal interest in the affairs of the Portuguese Cistercians emerged during a debate that took place in 1208 at the Chapter General – the annual gathering of abbots from across Latin Christendom held in the original monastery at Cîteaux. Among the many concerns facing the assembled abbots was a dispute over the selection of a new abbot for Alcobaça. It was alleged that King Sancho had forcefully imposed his own candidate upon an unwilling monastery. Yet because the complainant, the abbot of Bouro, may well have harboured ambitions for the abbacy of Alcobaça himself, his descriptions of monastic dismay at their new superior must be treated with some suspicion. Unfortunately there is no record of the final decision taken by the Chapter, but documents drawn up in Alcobaça from 1210 onwards were authorised by Abbot Fernando, who seems to have been King Sancho's preferred candidate. Certainly Abbot Fernando subsequently maintained a close association with the king and was a frequent attendee at the royal court.¹⁹ Such a comfortable relationship with secular power was far from the ideal of spiritual retreat advocated by the founders of the Cistercian order; but for their successors living in a more complicated age, it was a practical necessity.

The ultimate success of the monastery of Alcobaça was a testament to the ability of the Cistercians to bring large tracts of frontier territory into productive use. But such grand donations in the wilderness were not the only means by which the monks were able to extend their presence in Portugal. An equally important form of Cistercian expansionism was the conversion of existing monastic houses, usually either Augustinian or Cluniac houses, to the newer monastic rule. Expansion by conversion was only one of several issues complicating relations between the Cistercians and the older orders, and this ill-feeling could on occasion burst into invective. Even the most senior figures in the monastic orders were not above entering such disputes, with Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter the Venerable of Cluny maintaining a lively correspondence in which the common Cistercian complaint of spiritual backsliding among the older orders was met with the observation that the new forms of devotion lacked only the necessary sense of humility.²⁰ Yet both men were certainly aware that the protestations made by individual

monks, or indeed by entire houses, to be in pursuit of the most rigorous form of spiritual discipline were all too often a façade for more complex pressures and ambitions. Certainly this was the case in Portugal. The transfer of existing religious institutions to the Cistercian rule was not simply the result of a local acceptance of foreign ecclesiastical innovation; not was it an acknowledgement of the inferiority of existing local practice. Instead, proposals to adopt the Cistercian rule often met with serious opposition in Portuguese monasteries, and the conflicts that resulted suggest that, on some occasions at least, the real motivation for change was the pursuit of social, political or economic advantage.

In 1196 the Benedictine monks of Castro de Avelãs, located some five kilometres east of Bragança, were charged with unlawfully assuming the white garb of the Cistercian order. Far from being moved by piety, at least so their accusers claimed, the monks were simply attempting to avoid their obedience to Archbishop Martinho Pires of Braga.²¹ In response to the archbishop's complaints, Pope Celestine charged the abbot of Salzeda, a former Benedictine monastery that had recently adopted the Cistercian *ordo*, and Bishop João of Lamego (1190–1196), with bringing the recalcitrant monks to submission. They were authorised to impose the complete Cistercian rule over the Avelãs monks if necessary. The threat of being forced to adopt a more rigorous observance appears to have been sufficient to cow the enterprising Benedictine monks. The archbishop made no further complaints and the monastery of Avelãs retained its traditional organisation. Unfortunately, not all disputes provoked by the Cistercian expansion were so easily dealt with. Early in the thirteenth century the Benedictine monastery of Pombeiro was cast into a state of uproar when a Cistercian by the name of Martinho was raised to the abbacy. The monks of Pombeiro objected to his being placed in authority over them, claiming that lay interference had secured him the office. When the new abbot then sought to bring the monastery under the Cistercian rule the monks objected as vigorously to his initiatives as they had to the character of the abbot himself. In a move that indicates the seriousness of the dispute, and perhaps also the high-level interests involved, Pope Innocent III empowered canons from the royal monastery of São Vicente de Fora to force a compromise settlement. Under an agreement reached in 1214 the authority and actions of the abbot were confirmed, but numerous caveats guaranteeing future conditions within the monastery were committed to writing.²²

The controversial events at Castro de Avelãs and Pombeiro were overshadowed in 1210 by a furore that erupted at the venerable monastery of São Mamede of Lorvão.²³ This monastic house, one of the most prestigious in Portugal, was founded in the tenth century. After an eventful early history – including a supporting role in the capture of Coimbra in 1064 – the monks had adopted the Benedictine rule in 1085 or possibly 1087. For the next century the monastery was an economic and cultural centre, enjoying the

support and patronage of successive kings and bishops. At the turn of the century, however, this was to change dramatically.²⁴ In 1195 the marriage between King Sancho's daughter Teresa and Alfonso IX of León, which had been celebrated four short years earlier, was annulled by papal order. On returning to Portugal the queen decided to retire to a religious house, and her father deemed that the ancient monastery of Lorvão, re-founded as a nunnery, would be best suited to accommodate royalty. King Sancho negotiated an agreement with Abbot Julian to surrender the house in return for a new residence and appropriate compensation. Yet when the time actually came to leave his familiar cloisters, the abbot had second thoughts and suddenly reneged on this agreement with his king.

What lay behind this abrupt volte-face? Perhaps a clue to Abbot Julian's state of mind can be found in the monastery scriptorium. Lorvão had become a centre for the cult of St Thomas of Canterbury – and as a champion for the privileges of the Church against the interference of secular powers, Thomas Becket had few equals.²⁵ Could it be that the martyrdom of the archbishop of Canterbury inspired a similar self-destructive defiance on the part of Abbot Julian? In any event, the abbot chose to flee the kingdom and take his case directly to Rome. There he claimed that undue pressure had been placed upon him to agree to abandon the ancient monastery. Pope Innocent III, a pontiff ever vigilant of the rights of the clergy, threw his support behind the abbot and forced the deal to be dropped. The result was royal outrage, and the unfortunate monks of Lorvão found themselves at the centre of the storm. There followed a war of words between the monks and Sancho's agent, Bishop Pedro Soares of Coimbra (1192–1233). Eventually, Pope Innocent was persuaded that the monks were in the wrong and had in fact been guilty of numerous infringements to their rule. It was agreed, therefore, that the monastery at Lorvão would be disbanded and reformed elsewhere under the Cistercian *ordo*. In November 1210 Teresa took control of Lorvão and established a community of Cistercian nuns there, which she ruled until her death four decades later.²⁶

By the beginning of the thirteenth century the focus of royal policy in Portugal had shifted to the consolidation of a central authority. In this new political climate the supra-national character of the Templar and Cistercian orders became less important to secular rulers; indeed attempts by the orders to emphasise their international standing could instead embroil them in destructive confrontation with local authorities. There was considerable pressure on individual institutions to integrate more closely into Portuguese society – and to accept the imposition of at least a measure of royal oversight of their affairs. This pressure was compounded during the later decades of the twelfth century by the development of Iberian alternatives to the international orders. These new institutions drew upon the Templars and the Cistercians for inspiration; at the same time, however, the Iberian religious orders presented a direct challenge to their European models.

Local initiatives in frontier defence: the orders of Santiago, Calatrava and Évora

The fluid and often perilous Iberian frontier was an environment that tended to encourage social experimentation and institutional novelty. Among the most striking and indeed successful institutional innovations during this period was the development of indigenous military orders. A number of militaristic fraternities sprang up across Iberia in the closing decades of the twelfth century and three of these became significant in Portugal: the Leonese-based order of Santiago, the predominantly Castilian knights of Calatrava, and the Portuguese order of Évora (subsequently Avis). The origins of these orders are shrouded in uncertainty and have as a result been the focus of considerable scholarly debate. Theories that such fraternities were an autochthonous Iberian development, possibly influenced by the militant Islamic groups known as *ribat* bands, have been all but dismissed in recent years.²⁷ Instead the indigenous orders appear to have been the result of a complex interplay between Latin influence, local initiative and a certain tyranny of circumstance.

The early history of the knights of Santiago of the Sword has been ornamented by the storytelling propensities of later authors, but the facts supported by contemporary evidence are rather more sparse.²⁸ In 1170 a small group of knights under the leadership of one Pedro Fernández bound themselves together into a military brotherhood. On 1 August King Fernando of León granted the knights possession of the recently captured castle at Cáceres, close to the border with Portugal. The following year the Leonese king entrusted the order with further castles at Almofrag, Alconcher, Montemayor, Luchena, Cantañana and in the Albuera valley; and the grateful knights joined the royal army in attacks on Jerez and Oruña. Meanwhile the new military fraternity also attracted early support from King Alfonso VIII of Castile, who in 1171 offered them possession of castles at Mora on the approaches to Toledo and Oreja in the Tagus valley, along with the hamlet of Monzot de Campos and buildings in Toledo and Maqueda. Three years later the Castilian king granted the knights title to the town and castle of Uclés – later to become their headquarters. The order was further strengthened by the affiliation of smaller religious communities, including the military brotherhood of Avila in 1172 and also, according to later tradition, the Augustinian canons of Santa María de Loyo. The growing importance of the knights of Santiago was recognised at an ecclesiastical council convened at Soría in the early summer of 1173. There the papal legate, Cardinal Hyacinth, at the request of the attending kings of León, Castile and Aragon, took the knights under papal protection and formally ratified their order. Master Pedro then prudently travelled to Rome where on 3 July 1175 the knights of Santiago were officially recognised by Pope Alexander III.

Although the knights of Santiago won immediate and sustained support from the Spanish kings, their relationship with the developing Portuguese

monarchy was more equivocal. In the prologue to their formal rule the knights of the order spoke grandiloquently of 'containing the ambitions of the Moors'. The reality was slightly more complex. The town of Cáceres, the first grant made to the order in 1170, had been wrested not from Muslim forces but from Portuguese royal troops – as a result indeed of the discomfiture Afonso Henriques had suffered at Badajoz the previous year, after King Fernando formed an alliance of convenience with the city's Muslim defenders. The establishment of the knights of Santiago on the troubled border between the two kingdoms appears to have been in large part an attempt to solidify Leonese control in the region and to prevent further Portuguese eastward expansion. Nor was the political dimension to the foundation of the new military order lost on other Iberian monarchs. The generous grants made to the knights of Santiago by King Alfonso of Castile were quite clearly intended to dissuade them from identifying their interests too closely with his Leonese rival. On the other side of the peninsula, Afonso of Portugal attempted to pursue a similar strategy towards the newly created military order. In June 1172 he granted the knights authority over the town of Abrantes and in September added Monsanto, close to the Leonese border. The second grant included a highly significant caveat: no non-Portuguese commander was to be given control over the town, and members of the royal family would have unrestricted use of the castle as a base of operations 'whether against Christians or Saracens'.²⁹

Any doubts Afonso may have harboured concerning the loyalty of the knights of Santiago proved to be well founded. In 1179 relations between the Leonese and Portuguese kings deteriorated into armed conflict, and the knights were obliged to choose on which side of the border their allegiances lay. Ultimately, they based their choice on economic pragmatism and so rode out in support of their greater benefactor: Fernando of León. Pragmatic though their actions might have been, the price was royal favour in the Portuguese court. The order received no additional privileges, lands or responsibilities from Afonso; and in the first years of King Sancho's reign he showed little inclination to improve relations with the knights of Santiago. Not until 1189, a full ten years after the knights had sided with the Leonese king, did they again receive positions of trust on the Portuguese frontier – and even here it appears that King Sancho had little option. In the face of the renewed Almohad offensive, the order was charged with the defence of the frontline castles at Almada, Palmela and Alcácer. The knights proved incapable of securing their new acquisitions, and all three castles were recaptured by the Muslims before the end of the century. There is no record of the knights receiving further encouragement or indeed taking an active role in Portugal for the remainder of King Sancho's reign.

Even though the order of Santiago aspired to rise above narrow regional interests in the name of Christian unity, there can be little doubt that behind their rapid early expansion in León and Castile lay the royal rivalry between the Leonese and Castilian kings. In Portugal, on the other hand,

such secular entanglements had the opposite effect, and during the reigns of Afonso and Sancho the knights enjoyed only limited success in attracting royal support. Yet the order of Santiago of the Sword was not the only indigenous Iberian military order seeking to establish a presence in Portugal. The knights of Calatrava, a Castilian-based order, had been established almost a decade earlier than the knights of Santiago. Although the Castilian order received no direct grants from the early Portuguese kings, the knights of Calatrava came to wield an indirect influence through their affiliation with a Portuguese military fraternity, the knights of Évora. The nature of the relationship between these two indigenous Iberian military orders during their formative years has been the focus of considerable academic controversy. What is clear, however, is that in both cases the orders arose in response to purely regional concerns, and while they appear to have drawn inspiration from international models, both organisations remained heavily reliant on continuing support from their respective monarchs.

Much of what is known of the remarkable origins of the knights of Calatrava is derived from an account by Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo.³⁰ According to the archbishop's version of events, which he claims to have based on his recollections of the tales told by the participants themselves, the order was founded as a result of a series of serendipitous events. In 1147 Alfonso VII of León-Castile granted the frontier castle of Calatrava to the Templars; a decade later the order deemed the stronghold impossible to defend and petitioned King Sancho III to allow them to return the castle into royal control. Among those present at court was the abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Fitero, Raymond Serrat, who had come to the king seeking royal confirmation of his monastery's rights and immunities. In the abbot's retinue was an ageing knight, Diego Velásquez, who believed that Calatrava could be held if the defenders only possessed sufficient resolve. To prove this brave claim he offered to garrison the exposed fortress on behalf of his monastery. Having nothing to lose, King Sancho agreed, and in January 1158 he signed possession of the fortress over to the abbot of Fitero. Archbishop Juan of Toledo undertook to encourage local support, reputedly offering absolution of sins to those willing to contribute to the defence of Calatrava, and as a result recruits and resources converged on the castle. The soldiers arranged themselves into a military fraternity and adopted the rule and habit of the Cistercian monks – although whether this was the original intention of Abbot Raymond, or simply a result of the spiritual enthusiasm of the knights themselves, is unclear. Following the death of Abbot Raymond, probably in 1161, the knights consolidated behind one of their own number, Garcia, who subsequently appeared before the General Chapter of the Cistercian order to request a confirmation of their rule. After some debate the assembled abbots welcomed the knights as brethren within the order. Master Garcia then travelled to Rome where on 26 September 1164 the status of the knights was confirmed by Pope Alexander III, and the

order was taken under papal protection. Ambiguities remained, however, in the knights' relations with other Cistercian houses and also with the Iberian ecclesiastical hierarchy. Subsequent masters found it necessary to have their rights confirmed by papal decree in 1187 and again in 1199.

The knights of Calatrava were the recipients of considerable support and encouragement from the kings of Castile. Under the initial grant made to Abbot Raymond, King Sancho granted the knights full authority over the town and castle of Calatrava; the following month he added the nearby village of Cirugares to the knights' estates. During the next three decades the order gained, primarily through royal donations, some 340 square miles of arable land in the surrounding districts. So extensive were these holdings that the region subsequently became known as the Campo de Calatrava.³¹ Meanwhile, the knights also received substantial donations of land in León; indeed the close relations the Castilian order enjoyed with the Leonese kings eventually became the cause for considerable tension between Calatrava and the order of Santiago.³² In Portugal, however, the knights of Calatrava developed a more complicated and a more distant relationship with the royal court.

Rather than receiving direct grants in the Portuguese frontier territory the knights of Calatrava affiliated themselves with the local knights of Évora – a fraternity that was the beneficiary of considerable royal largess. Unfortunately the specific nature of the relationship between Évora and Calatrava, particularly during their formative years, is unclear.³³ Certainly the unusual nature of the affiliation was apparent to contemporaries and in 1189 a passing German crusader attempted to describe the novel local institution he had encountered.

There were knights of the Cistercian order who, when at home, had the indulgence of being able to eat meat three days a week, but only one dish each time; when they were on active service they lived as other men. The head of the order is Calatrava in Castile and Évora in Portugal, but Calatrava is the mother and Évora is the daughter.³⁴

In this description the visiting crusader implied a question that has also troubled subsequent commentators. Was the order of Évora from its outset a branch of the order of Calatrava? The existence of the order was first documented in 1176 – over a decade after Évora was captured from the Muslims – when Afonso Henriques granted resources to the knights in an effort to support the defence of the city. This document makes no mention of Calatrava, and there is no inference that the local knights had any allegiance outside Portugal. Certainly the first master of the order, Gonçalo Viegas, was a Portuguese rather than a Castilian nobleman.³⁵

In fact it was not until 1187 that the order of Évora was expressly linked with the knights of Calatrava. The document making this claim, the papal

bull formalising the status of Calatrava within the Cistercian hierarchy, listed the possessions of the Castilian order as including those held 'in Portugal, in the city called Évora'.³⁶ A strange discordance emerged in the documentary record through the years that followed: papal registers made no mention of the knights of Évora as an independent institution; but charters produced by Portuguese notaries never refer to the knights of Calatrava operating within the kingdom. Certainly the knights of Évora continued to maintain their own hierarchy and their own locally born masters. Still more problematically, communications from the papal curia occasionally acknowledged the existence and authority of separate masters of Évora and Calatrava without actually defining the relationship between them. Maur Cocheril, who has studied this incongruity most closely, postulated that the authority of Calatrava was tacitly limited to spiritual rather than material matters. Only thus could the knights of the Évora reconcile the spiritual imperative of the order to defend all imperilled Christians with the narrower loyalties demanded by jealous and ambitious local monarchs.³⁷

The early development of the indigenous military orders in Portugal highlights two profound social currents. The establishment of militant religious orders was, on one hand, a striking indication of the level to which Latin Christian attitudes had come to be accepted in the peninsula and demonstrates a growing sense among Portuguese people of cultural identification with wider Christendom. At the same time, however, the indigenous military orders were shaped by the ambitions and expectations of secular rulers. During the reigns of Afonso Henriques and Sancho the monarchy had consolidated political authority, established a solid economic basis for rule and was increasingly confident in religious matters – the success of any new ecclesiastical institutions was largely dependent on attracting royal favour. Until the end of the twelfth century these two distinct social forces had operated in relative harmony: Latin cultural influence tended to enhance royal power, enhanced centralised authority in turn encouraged further cultural permeation. But during the final years of King Sancho's reign this was to change. The pervasive influence of Latin culture and the consolidation of royal authority in Portugal, forces that previously had reinforced each other, were suddenly diverted into collision. The result would be disastrous for individuals and institutions; the cause was the elevation of a new pope to the throne of St Peter.

Innocent III and the Iberian frontier

During the twelfth century the Iberian kings had developed an effective *modus operandi* in their dealing with the papacy. Their status as defenders of Christendom's threatened southern frontier was respected by the curia, and negotiations could usually produce compromises on both sides. On

8 January 1198 the election of Pope Innocent III to the throne of St Peter brought this comfortable relationship to an abrupt end. The new pontiff possessed a formidable energy and a highly developed conception of papal power. He was adamant that supreme authority in Christendom, and with it ultimate responsibility for the well-being of Christian society, resided with the papacy alone. This conviction was to lead Pope Innocent into bitter confrontations with secular powers across Europe and would place considerable strain on his relations with the peninsular kingdoms. For far from being disinterested in the frontier, the new pope exceeded most of his predecessors in crusading zeal. Yet this zeal prompted the pope to increase, rather than lessen, his demands on the Iberian kings.³⁸

At thirty-seven years of age, Lothar of Segni was unusually young to be elected as pope – indeed his consecration was delayed until the end of February 1198 because he had not yet been ordained as a priest. The new pontiff possessed the advantages of youthful vigour and confidence, but he was also relatively inexperienced in worldly affairs, particularly the affairs of the peripheral regions of Latin Christendom. In his youth Lothar had studied in Paris, possibly also in Bologna and may have travelled widely in France and Flanders, but his formative political life was spent in the corridors of ecclesiastical power, rather than on diplomatic missions as a papal representative.³⁹ In the absence of first-hand experience of the more distant regions of Christendom Innocent tended to rely on theological and legal precepts to guide his decisions, sometimes with explosive results. Pope Innocent frequently had recourse to a highly charged phrase, *plenitudo potestatis*, to describe his idea of papal authority. This term, which in earlier times had referred to the power delegated to a papal legate by the Holy See, came to be used by Pope Innocent to emphasise the unrestricted authority of the pontiff himself. Emperors and kings, magnates ecclesiastical and secular, might all wield the lesser *pars sollicitudines*, but only the pope ruled without condition and subject to the will of God alone.⁴⁰ Under Innocent's conception of the world, the pope stood at the apex of an intricately ordered earthly realm and his role was to guide the faithful in accordance with an unfolding divine plan. Lesser churchmen had a part to play, as did secular rulers, but all must ultimately yield to the supreme spiritual authority of the 'vicar of Christ'.

An early target for Pope Innocent's attention was the unsuspecting King Sancho of Portugal. The delicate question of the annual gold tribute promised by Afonso Henriques to Pope Alexander in 1179, but later evaded by his son, had been in abeyance for several years. This was not a situation Pope Innocent was prepared to accept. The amount of the census, though relatively small, was nonetheless significant and such financial obligations in combination represented an important financial resource for the papacy.⁴¹ Of more importance though, to both the king and to the pontiff, was the symbolic implications of payment: the tribute was a concrete reminder of

royal subordination to the throne of St Peter. For this reason Pope Innocent refused to accept excuses from King Sancho, and in the face of papal intransigence the Portuguese ruler grudgingly acknowledged this financial obligation. On 9 December 1198 he at last agreed to a payment of 504 *morabitino* gold coins, representing the cumulative tribute of perhaps four years.⁴² But the new pope's unsolicited intervention in the peninsula did not end with this financial chastising of King Sancho.

Innocent was even more troubled by a decision his predecessor Celestine had made while under considerable pressure from the Iberian rulers. In the interests of bringing peace to Christian Spain, Pope Celestine had allowed himself to be persuaded of the practical necessity of permitting the marriage between Alfonso of León and Berenguela of Castile to go ahead, despite the pair falling within the forbidden degrees of kinship. After reviewing the case Innocent set aside Celestine's pragmatic decision. Despite King Alfonso reportedly offering the pontiff 20,000 gold marks and the service of 200 knights in the defence of Christendom if he would simply allow matters to stand, Innocent insisted on complete obedience to canon law and declared against the marriage.⁴³ This threat to the stability of the Spanish kingdoms was met with dismay in the peninsula and a contingent of both Castilian and Leonese clergymen, led by the archbishop of Toledo himself, attempted to change Pope Innocent's mind. Appealing to the needs of frontier defence, the Iberians claimed that the imposition of ecclesiastical censures on the Spanish kingdoms would only encourage the rise of heresy and weaken the ability of Christian Spain to resist the Muslim onslaught. Iberian embassies to the curia had long deployed such arguments to good effect, but on this occasion Innocent angrily rejected the petition and reminded the Iberian clergymen of the biblical injunction that the misdeeds of the ruler would rebound upon his subjects.⁴⁴ Pope Innocent's uncompromising response to the Spanish bishops reflected the conventional medieval belief that the king and his subjects were inextricably linked in an essentially organic relationship. On occasion punishments inflicted on the people were necessary to curb an errant monarch.⁴⁵ Yet papal anger appears in this case to have been given an extra edge because in this petition the Iberian clergy attempted to apply pressure by evoking the perils of the frontier.

Few pontiffs could rival Pope Innocent's zeal in promoting military action against those he perceived to be enemies of the faith; and his view of the crusade combined two extremely powerful lines of thinking into a dynamic theoretical position. The principles of holy war were predicated on the concept of a wider Christian community (a concept that for Pope Innocent was a self-evident truth) and on the duty of the arms-bearing classes to rise to that community's defence. Another fundamental cornerstone of medieval military thinking was the assumption that divine providence linked victory to the righteousness of those involved, particularly when war was to be waged against non-Christians. During the long development of the crusade

these two concepts became tightly interwoven, first as a belief that the personal piety of individual crusaders was crucial to success, but increasingly as a conviction that even those not directly involved in military action must nevertheless also maintain the highest moral standards. Just as the crusade was deemed to be an operation waged on behalf of Christendom as a whole, so too the whole of Christian society would be weighed in the divine scales of justice before victory was apportioned. Pope Innocent embraced this belief in communal Christian accountability: and so for him the crusade became a crucible of Christian faith and obedience, rather than a test of military proficiency.⁴⁶ Victory could only be secured by attracting the favour of God through complete submission to sacred law. Therefore, in Pope Innocent's conception of sectarian warfare, a reformed, devout and independent clergy was, if anything, more crucial to success than castles or knights. This belief added considerable heat to Pope Innocent's reply to the request from the Iberian clergy that in the interests of military expediency he moderate the demands he placed upon secular leaders. To the pope such a suggestion indicated nothing less than a basic misunderstanding among senior Iberian churchmen of the fundamental nature of Christendom itself.

The election of Pope Innocent in the final years of the twelfth century thus brought a sudden crystallisation of several slowly developing concepts in Latin Christian thought. Many in distant Iberia – both secular authorities and ecclesiastical leaders – found themselves struggling to catch up with the ideological underpinnings of the new regime. Pope Innocent's sweeping assertion of papal authority and responsibility impelled him to intervene more forcefully in Iberian affairs than his predecessors had done, and he was more than ready to inflict wide-scale ecclesiastical punishments to secure secular obedience. Yet the hostility this intervention provoked in Iberia was exacerbated by the ramifications of Pope Innocent's attitudes towards frontier warfare. Because the pontiff viewed secular obedience to clerical authority as the crucial prerequisite for victory, the use of the threat of Islam in pleas for papal leniency received an unsympathetic hearing from Innocent precisely because of his personal enthusiasm for the crusade. As a result the peninsular kings found one of their most effective bargaining chips had suddenly, and to them unaccountably, been devalued. The tensions this produced were nowhere more deeply felt than in Portugal, where Pope Innocent's attempts to impose his convictions on Portuguese society led to a remarkably bitter confrontation with King Sancho.

The ecclesiastical reorganisation of north-western Iberia

A critical first phase of Pope Innocent's plan for general social reform was the establishment of an effective and independent clergy throughout Christendom. The fundamental overhaul of the Iberian Church became an early priority for the new pope and from the vantage point of Rome

there seemed great need for change. The administrative organisation of the Iberian Church had developed as an uneasy fusion of Visigothic traditions and post-reconquest expediencies: the result was a pattern of suffragan bishoprics owing allegiance to metropolitans widely separated by geography and political borders. Pope Innocent took up the challenge of settling ecclesiastical disputes that had dragged on for decades, or even centuries. The pontiff adopted a logical, legalistic approach but was also prepared to use the fullness of papal authority in order to force solutions. Pope Innocent's aim was to strengthen the local church and prepare the Spanish clergy for the role he expected them to play in wider society. In his dealings with the Portuguese clergy, however, the pope made few concessions to King Sancho's plans to consolidate his own royal authority in the region. As a result, the pope's well-meant efforts to reorder the local church provoked the first rumbles of secular resistance.

One of the more convoluted and acrimonious of the many ecclesiastical disputes troubling the peninsular church centred on the see of Zamora. This highly strategic diocese was located on the border between Portugal and León and had been claimed as a suffragan by the archbishops of Compostela, Braga and Toledo. The 'Zamora Imbroglio', as Richard Fletcher aptly described this interminable disagreement, had absorbed the energies of generations of Iberian clergymen.⁴⁷ Pope Innocent resolved to settle the dispute once and for all. On 5 July 1199 the pope gave notice of his interest by forwarding to the disputants a long outline of the history of the debate as Innocent saw it. At the end of this summation the pope acknowledged that the archbishop of Compostela presently held the see but granted the church of Braga leave to press for their own rights should they so wish.⁴⁸ This apparent invitation was quickly revealed to be illusory, for Braga's case was almost immediately compromised by Innocent's next decision. When the Portuguese churchmen requested papal confirmation of a crucial bull promulgated by Pope Eugenius on 13 June 1153, Innocent acknowledged the document was genuine, but denied that he would accept his predecessor's opinion as binding.⁴⁹ With their cause thus undermined, the clergy of Braga appear to have abandoned the case. Zamora passed under the control of Compostela, where indeed it remains to the present day.

The conclusion to the Zamora imbroglio was a major disappointment to the church of Braga and could not but have irked King Sancho of Portugal. Worse was to follow. Pope Innocent embarked on a wide-scale reorganisation of the ecclesiastical arrangements in north-western Iberia, and the decisions handed down by the papal curia were to prove highly detrimental to the Portuguese king. In June 1199 Pope Innocent signalled his intention to reassess the convoluted patterns of suffragan loyalties in the region by issuing a papal bull carefully delineating the parameters and history of the problem.⁵⁰ The following month reorganisation began in earnest with a letter forwarded to Archbishop Pedro Suárez of Compostela (1173–1206),

confirming his right to the obedience of the bishops of Lisbon and Évora.⁵¹ Less than a fortnight later four more bulls were sent to Portugal. Archbishop Martinho Pires of Braga was advised that while the dioceses of Coimbra and Viseu were to remain under his control, Lisbon, Évora, Lamego and Idanha (Guarda) would pass to his rival. Pope Innocent added a warning not to allow local interests to compromise these decisions.⁵² Another letter was sent to the bishops of Lisbon, Évora and Lamego, and the clergy and people of Guarda ordering them all to offer their obedience to Compostela. A final bull was issued to the non-Portuguese suffragans of Braga, the bishops of Lugo, Astorga, Mondoñedo, Orense and Túc, ordering them to intervene with both the archbishop of Braga and King Sancho himself to ensure the bishops of Lamego, Lisbon, Évora and Guarda recognised the authority of Compostela.⁵³ Pope Innocent was correct to anticipate resistance from both clerical and secular interests in Portugal. In December 1200 the pope was obliged to forward another series of letters to Portugal. These bulls reiterated the decisions reached the previous year, and the bishops of Lugo, Astorga, Mondoñedo, Orense and Túc were this time authorised to excommunicate the king should he continue obstructing papal policy.⁵⁴

When the dust had settled Braga commanded the obedience of the Portuguese bishops in Porto, Coimbra and Lamego; and the Leonese sees of Lugo, Astorga, Mondoñedo, Orense and Túc. Compostela held the obedience of the Portuguese sees of Lisbon, Guarda and Évora; along with Leonese Zamora, Coria, Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo; and Castilian Ávila. 'This division', the great ecclesiastical scholar Carl Erdmann disapproved, 'though geographically and politically absurd, nonetheless remained for two hundred years, until the confusion of the Great Schism forced a renovation based on political borders'.⁵⁵ Certainly in light of the subsequent development of the Iberian kingdoms this distribution was to prove unworkable. Yet from Pope Innocent's perspective the ambitions of kings were transitory in comparison to the transcendent role of the Holy Church, and in the furtherance of that role there were clear advantages in obliging the local clergy to forge meaningful links across secular political boundaries. For all that the pontiff justified his disposition of suffragans in north-western Iberia on historical grounds, his new arrangements seem also to have been intended to force the peninsular prelates to rise above parochial issues.⁵⁶

Under Innocent's leadership clergymen throughout Christendom were encouraged, then later obliged, to take on a more active pastoral and administrative role.⁵⁷ In Spain, particularly in the wake of Innocent's reordering of suffragan loyalties, this more active role for the senior prelates included the responsibility for overseeing dioceses in different kingdoms. In pursuit of these duties, therefore, archbishops were encouraged to become visible symbols of ecclesiastical neutrality. To develop this role further Pope Innocent forced an agreement between the archbishops of Braga and Compostela under which each guaranteed the other's rights of visitation. The pope also

ensured such visitations did not become an opportunity for provocative ostentation or divisive displays of parochial pride, for he insisted that travelling archbishops abide by the traditions of their hosts.⁵⁸ Moreover, in order for senior Iberian clergymen to be effective in this role, their neutrality had to be emphasised wherever possible. Innocent was thus extremely wary of allowing any individual clergyman to accrue disproportionate personal authority. Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo found this to his cost in 1211 when he sought to resurrect the issue of the primacy of Spain, only to be firmly rebuffed by Pope Innocent. More modest attempts at concentrating ecclesiastical authority upon individuals were similarly discouraged. When King Alfonso of Castile requested legatine powers for the bishop-elect of Palencia, Innocent chose instead to entrust authority to a ecclesiastical committee comprising representatives from each of the rival kingdoms and metropolitans.⁵⁹ Innocent consistently sought to force the Iberian clergy to act across the boundaries of kingdoms and wherever possible obstructed churchmen from forwarding narrow regional agendas.

The tasks Innocent entrusted to the Iberian prelates provide further indication of his expectations for the Iberian clergy. When there was a need to threaten King Sancho with excommunication due to his resistance to papal decisions over the distribution of dependent sees, the invidious task was delegated to the Leonese suffragans of Braga who, despite having a legitimate standing in proceedings through their relations with the Portuguese metropolitan, were far less susceptible to intimidation from the Portuguese king.⁶⁰ Senior clergymen throughout Christendom had traditionally sought to intercede as peacemakers between rival secular leaders – this function too was enhanced by their having responsibilities and contacts in more than one kingdom. Thus, in March 1206 the archbishops of Compostela and Toledo, and the bishop of Coimbra, were charged with arbitrating a territorial dispute between the kings of León and Castile.⁶¹ Five years later the punitive and mediatory roles of the prelates were combined when Spanish clergymen were ordered to intervene forcefully to maintain Christian unity. Pope Innocent went so far as to authorise the excommunication of any monarch attempting to undermine the peace.⁶² These ecclesiastical efforts were to prove critical as the Spanish kings struggled to maintain a fragile alliance in the face of an increasingly threatening Almohad military build-up on the frontier.

Unlike the many of his predecessors who had made little real headway in arbitrating the seemingly intractable disputes within the Iberian Church, Pope Innocent was largely successful in imposing workable solutions upon the fractious prelates. The resulting ecclesiastical landscape bore little correlation to the borders of secular kingdoms, but from the perspective of the papal curia this overlapping of loyalties had clear benefits. Prelates with responsibilities and affiliations that straddled secular borders were more likely to become effective vehicles for the supra-national influence

Pope Innocent sought to exert. Secular leaders, however, may well have felt less sanguine, with King Sancho of Portugal having particular grounds for resentment. As a result of Pope Innocent's reorganisation the Portuguese Church had lost control over the kingdom's southern dioceses – areas which Afonso Henriques and Archbishop João Peculiar had laboured long and successfully to maintain – and Sancho had received nothing tangible in return for this loss of prestige and influence.

A rising tide of acrimony: King Sancho and the Portuguese Church (1200–1211)

During the early years of his reign King Sancho had been obliged to maintain cordial relations with the papacy. In return for rather nebulous statements of loyalty and a conspicuous martial presence on the frontier the curia had continued to endorse the Portuguese throne. As time passed, however, the Portuguese king found the submission implicit in the terms of this agreement increasingly irksome, for Sancho was an energetic, determined monarch and he had gradually been able to extend royal authority across the kingdom and even to some degree over the Portuguese Church. Yet at the beginning of the thirteenth century the seemingly inexorable consolidation of monarchical authority was checked by the contrary ambitions of Pope Innocent to reinvigorate the Universal Church. In the final years of Sancho's reign the king's growing irritation with papal efforts to intervene in the affairs of his kingdom finally exploded into open conflict between the king and a number of his most senior prelates. Personal animosities exacerbated a dispute between royal and ecclesiastical powers, but at stake was nothing less than the future viability of the monarchy itself.

From the beginning of his reign King Sancho had encountered considerable resistance to his centralising aims from sections of the local clergy, but in the first decade of the thirteenth century clerical opposition grew more effective as a number of Portuguese clergymen took advantage of the changing mood in Rome and sought papal support against the crown. Long and expensive negotiations were the usual result, and the process of claim and counter-claim clearly tried royal patience. One such dispute focused on the status of the royal monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra. Because Santa Cruz housed his father Afonso's tomb, Sancho was particularly solicitous to its needs. Among the earliest documents from his chancery was a confirmation of the monastery's privileges promulgated by Pope Urban III at King Sancho's request.⁶³ Inevitably the success and independence of Santa Cruz antagonised the local prelates and squabbles between the monastery and the cathedral were common; however Bishop Pedro Soares of Coimbra raised the ante in this dispute by taking his grievances against the royal monastery to Pope Innocent. In his letter of support for the beleaguered canons King Sancho allowed his irritation to surface: 'I do not wish to

hear of the destruction of the monastery my father built, but that is for you to judge, Holy Father, as this is not the business of the laity....' After a prolonged investigation, and only after a heavy investment of royal time and resources, papal representatives found in favour of the status quo.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, further friction between royal and ecclesiastical interests was being generated by the monks of Lorvão, who had reneged on their agreement with Sancho to provide a suitable residence for his daughter Teresa. The outraged monarch was drawn into an unwanted distraction as Pope Innocent intervened on behalf of the defiant monks. King Sancho was forced to conduct yet another long campaign to secure the terms of his earlier agreement.⁶⁵ Although the king was ultimately successful in both cases, a formal injunction against the wounding of clerics as satisfaction for injuries, promulgated by the archbishop of Braga in February 1206, hints ominously at a dwindling royal patience with the limits and delays imposed upon him by the Church.⁶⁶

Unfortunately for the tranquillity of the kingdom these disputes were to be only the first skirmishes in an increasingly bitter confrontation between royal and ecclesiastical power. Bishop Martinho of Porto was the son of an influential aristocratic house and he would brook no interference, royal or otherwise, in the affairs of his church. His original point of dispute with King Sancho is unclear, but by 1208 relations had degenerated into open conflict.⁶⁷ In response to Bishop Martinho declaring an interdict over his diocese, Sancho ordered the arrest of the bishop's brother, Pedro Rodrigues, and the seizure of episcopal assets. Bishop Martinho deemed it prudent to flee the kingdom and report his woes to the papal curia. Innocent's initial response was moderate. The bishop and dean of Zamora, along with the dean of León, were instructed to intercede with the angry monarch. Their mediation on this occasion proved effective. Sancho released his prisoner, allowed the bishop's return to the kingdom and made restitution to him for his losses. Bishop Martinho agreed to raise the interdict and to maintain concord with his king.⁶⁸ Innocent's measured response to the dispute suggests he saw at least a measure of blame on the prelate's part, and Bishop Martinho's promise to refrain from further confrontational behaviour seems to have been a tacit acknowledgement of his own fiery temperament. It was a temperament, indeed, that was too similar to the king's own for concord to long endure between the two men.

The peaceful interlude negotiated by the pope's representatives lasted less than a year. In the final months of 1208 Sancho's eldest son Afonso married Urraca of Castile, daughter of King Alfonso and Eleanor of England.⁶⁹ Once again the politics of royal marriage ran contrary to canonical prohibitions, but with the transgression less flagrant than those of earlier Spanish marriages, churchmen locally and in Rome seemed willing to overlook such complications. The bishop of Porto was the sole exception. When the young

couple visited his diocese, Bishop Martinho flatly refused to welcome or even acknowledge them. Whether these actions were motivated by obedience to canonical tenets or personal malice, Martinho soon found that he was ill-placed to make new enemies. His high-handedness had already alienated his own canons and the burghers of the town. Taking advantage of the king's wrath they rose up against episcopal authority, replying to his interdict by breaking open the church doors, bringing excommunicates inside and arranging the burial of the dead themselves. The clergy were divided in their support for the bishop, and services continued in many churches. Meanwhile city officials joined with the burghers to besiege Martinho in the episcopal palace for almost five months. Only when Martinho submitted to the king and agreed to refrain from further trouble-making was he allowed to leave, but at the first opportunity he fled by night and made for Rome. His bedraggled appearance on arrival provoked widespread sympathy, and Pope Innocent responded by speeding urgent bulls to neighbouring churchmen ordering them to attempt to intervene with the hostile King Sancho. Orders were given for widespread excommunication, both of city officials and their servants, along with a number of the leading burghers – several of whom are mentioned by name.⁷⁰

Even as the struggle with Bishop Martinho of Porto was attracting the indignation of Rome, tension was growing between the king and another of his leading churchmen. Relations between King Sancho and Bishop Pedro Soares of Coimbra had long been equivocal, with the status of the royal monastery of Santa Cruz a frequent source of tension between the two men, but in the early years of the thirteenth century additional points of friction arose. Bishop Pedro was one of Pope Innocent's most active agents in Iberia and was a favoured choice when secular leaders needed to be cajoled into obedience to papal policy. Of all the Portuguese bishops, he was the most likely to feel impelled and indeed able to resist royal imposition on ecclesiastical rights.⁷¹ Certainly Bishop Pedro found much to rail against in the king's dealings with the Church. The bishop accused royal authorities of appropriating church revenues and buildings without compensation, prosecuting clergymen in secular courts, and forcing priests to take part in military expeditions. Attempts by the bishop to curb such behaviour provoked a royal campaign of harassment that culminated in his arrest and imprisonment. Fortunately for the incarcerated Bishop Pedro, an enterprising servant managed to escape the kingdom in disguise and bear tidings of these events to Rome.⁷² The papal response was rapid and uncompromising, but Sancho was in no mood for moderation. The Portuguese king flatly warned the pontiff that he was considering a wholesale seizure of ecclesiastical holdings. This great wealth, Sancho suggested, had been unwisely lavished on ungrateful clergymen by his father, to the great detriment of those who sought to defend the kingdom from the forces of Islam. But this

allusion to the needs of frontier defence did nothing to dull the edge of Pope Innocent's response.

No great prince, however powerful, unless perchance a heretic or tyrant, has ever attempted to write so irreverently or arrogantly to us or to our predecessors....⁷³

Pope Innocent went on to utterly reject Sancho's complaints and to insist that the goods of the Church must remain inviolate. Yet the pope also displayed a certain perplexity at the Portuguese king's vehemence. Innocent sought to attribute Sancho's hostility to the machinations of the royal chancellor Julião, whom the pope believed had been misrepresenting his position to the king. To counter this the papal envoy was ordered to present letters to Sancho in person and explain them to him.⁷⁴

Pope Innocent's care to ensure his message was accurately conveyed reflected the delicate position in which Sancho's open defiance had placed him. Zealous papal policies had embroiled the Church in conflicts with secular authorities across Europe. Even as Innocent received Sancho's defiant missives he was facing threats far closer to home. Relations between the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire were strained and in March 1211 Emperor Otto IV would suffer excommunication. King John of England was deeply hostile: his kingdom had been placed under interdict in 1208 and the king himself excommunicated in 1209 – both penalties remained in force until 1213. Philip Augustus of France, while nominally obedient to the papacy, had a history of successful resistance to Pope Innocent's interventions.⁷⁵ Papal authority was being tested to the limit. King Sancho, in contrast, was in a strong political position from which to resist papal pressure. The Portuguese king faced no challenges to his throne from within or without the kingdom; he had amassed considerable wealth, and royal writ commanded obedience throughout the land. Moreover, the Portuguese Church was by no means united in opposition to their king. Although the bishops of Porto and Coimbra were defiant, they themselves could not look for unconditional support even from their own subordinates. The most influential churchman in the kingdom, Archbishop-elect Pedro Mendes of Braga (1209–1221), stood squarely in the royal camp and was more than willing to frustrate papal objectives.⁷⁶ It would appear that if any of the European monarchs could negotiate with Pope Innocent from a position of strength, it was Sancho of Portugal. Yet there was one crucial commodity which the Portuguese king lacked, and that was time.

The great weakness of the monarchy as an institution was its ultimate reliance on the well-being of a single individual, and during the final years of Sancho's reign the king's health began to fail. Exactly when Sancho's medical condition deteriorated is uncertain, although Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo recalled the king's illness being a long one, and in 1206 Pope

Innocent likened the strain of royal disobedience to the degeneration of leprosy in a warning that may have been more than metaphorical.⁷⁷ By 1210 the symptoms had become severe enough for the king to redraft the will he had first drawn up in 1188, and the amended version included a number of extremely generous grants to the Church. In acknowledging his receipt of a copy of this will Innocent noted that, as far as he could tell, although the disease had eroded the king's health, his mental faculties were unimpaired.⁷⁸ Yet his consciousness of mortality, and growing fears of what might lie beyond, sapped the king's resistance to ecclesiastical remonstrance. In a series of capitulations that began on Christmas Day 1210 the king conceded virtually every issue he had for so long contended with his bishops. Over the three months that followed there was a comprehensive confirmation of ecclesiastical rights and immunities, and many additional privileges were granted to the clergy. Notable among this avalanche of concessions was a royal undertaking to exempt clergymen from all military service except when the kingdom faced Muslim invasion.⁷⁹ The irascible Bishop Martinho of Porto seized the opportunity to extract yet greater concessions from the ailing king. The rights of the bishop over the city were confirmed and the burghers ordered to accept his authority. Earlier charters establishing civic rights were quashed.⁸⁰ Only then was Sancho able to obtain absolution from the Church at the hands of the Archbishop-elect of Braga, an action subsequently confirmed by Pope Innocent.⁸¹

King Sancho's long decline ended with his death in the final days of March 1211. Only through his complete capitulation and deathbed reconciliation were his followers able to obey his final command: he was laid to rest in the royal monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra, within sight of his father's tomb. It was a maudlin end to a reign which had seen regional authority consolidated into royal hands and the monarchy firmly established on strong political and economic foundations. Nevertheless, despite Sancho's submission to the Church, the political currents he had directed could not be reversed. The foundations of the monarchy proved to be more enduring than those who had laid them, and the struggle between ecclesiastical and royal authority would be taken up again by Sancho's descendants. For even as Sancho lay on his deathbed, the reconquest once again moved to the centre of relations between Rome and the secular rulers of Iberia. Even though the Portuguese kings had little direct involvement in these military operations themselves, the climax of the Spanish struggle against the Almohads would have far reaching effects on their future relations with their own clergymen and with the distant papacy.

The road to Las Navas de Tolosa

The defence of Christendom through military means had been a central theme of Innocent's pontificate. The pope frequently had recourse to the

crusade, offering spiritual privileges for military operations against political rivals in Italy, against the Albigensians in southern France, in support of operations in the Baltic and most of all in the hope of reclaiming the Holy Land. During the twelfth century the practice and ideology of the crusade had gradually been applied, and to a large degree accepted, in the Iberian Peninsula. Yet Pope Innocent's frequent exhortations to renew the southern expansion in Iberia were only slowly heeded by secular rulers. Hampered as they were by mutual animosities and distrusts, the kings were unwilling or unable to answer papal calls for united military action against Almohad forces. But circumstances were slowly changing. Although in Portugal and León there was little renewal of enthusiasm for the southern expansion, in the east of the peninsula a new confidence was emerging. Treaties signed between the Spanish kingdoms had brought to an end the strength-sapping border wars that had done so much to compromise frontier defence. Ambitious and energetic monarchs had emerged to take the lead in expansionary warfare. King Pedro II of Aragon (1196–1213) petitioned the papacy for spiritual encouragement to undertake campaigns against the Muslims; in Castile Alfonso VIII and his eldest son, Prince Fernando, waited eagerly for their truce with the Almohads to expire. Pope Innocent sensed the time was right and on 10 December 1210 he promulgated a bull offering spiritual rewards for those willing to assist in the impending struggle.⁸²

The Aragonese launched campaigns into the Valencia area; the Castilians attacked Jaén and Baeza; the knights of Calatrava conducted wide-ranging raids from their stronghold at Salvatierra. In response to the quickening pace of these assaults the anxious Muslim defenders dispatched messengers to the Almohad caliph, al-Nāsir (1199–1213), requesting military assistance from North Africa. Al-Nāsir – known to the Christians as Miramamolín – was the son of Caliph Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb al-Mansūr, the victor at Alarcos, and he had become the focus for considerable Christian anxiety.⁸³ In May 1211 a distant menace became a direct threat when al-Nāsir crossed over into the peninsula at the head of a large Almohad army, intent on punishing Spanish incursions into his territory. Salvatierra, the headquarters and advance base of the knights of Calatrava, was besieged in June 1211. The garrison resisted bravely for more than a month; however, King Alfonso was in no position to forcibly raise the siege, and so he gave the knights permission to negotiate terms of surrender. Content with the capture of a town with such high symbolic and strategic value, the caliph left a strong garrison in control of the castle and retired to Seville. Yet the Castilian king was given little time to ponder this military setback, for only a few months later a far worse blow fell. In October King Alfonso's eldest son, Prince Fernando, fell sudden prey to a disease that was ultimately to prove mortal. The prince died on 14 October 1211 at the age of 21.⁸⁴

The combination of a resurgent Almohad threat and the tragic death of the crown prince prompted King Alfonso of Castile to dispatch ambassadors

across the Pyrenees in search of assistance. Initially these requests provoked a mixed reaction. King Philip Augustus resisted a personal petition from Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo, but other recruiters enjoyed greater success.⁸⁵ A groundswell of interest among the arms-bearing classes is suggested by a number of songs produced by popular troubadours in support of the Spanish cause. (Not all their motives were pure, however, and one balladeer, Guilhem Adémar, longed for the crusade that would lure his lover's husband away from home!)⁸⁶ Meanwhile Pope Innocent moved immediately and decisively to offer whatever aid lay within his power. On 31 January 1212 the pope authorised prelates in France to offer spiritual rewards to all those willing to support the Spanish defence, either materially or through personal involvement. Innocent also took steps to ensure unity among the Iberian kings by sending stern letters imposing concord among them and singling out King Alfonso of León for special admonition.⁸⁷ Additionally, in accordance with his own view of the crusade as the responsibility of Christian society as a whole, the pontiff sought to obtain divine aid for the campaign by instituting elaborate liturgical ceremonies of intercession in Rome and possibly also in France.⁸⁸

The city of Toledo was chosen as the rallying point for the Christian armies. The Castilian contingent, numbering perhaps 2,500 knights and a great number of infantry, formed the backbone of the army. King Pedro of Aragon commanded a host of perhaps 1,500 horsemen. Later, as the campaign was already underway, the army was joined by King Sancho VII of Navarra with a force of some 200 knights. A notable absentee was King Alfonso of León, who preferred not to involve himself in an operation commanded by his Castilian rival; however, contingents from the Leonese military orders did ride to Toledo to join their brethren from across the peninsula. The massed ranks of the Iberian troops were further swelled by the addition of a sizeable force of French crusaders. The most numerous came from Gascony, Vienne and Poitou and were accompanied by the archbishops of Narbonne and Bordeaux and the bishop of Nantes. In a subsequent letter to Pope Innocent, King Alfonso of Castile numbered this force of crusaders at 2,000 knights, 10,000 other horsemen, and 50,000 footmen. Although this is certainly an exaggeration, the combined army was the largest Christian host ever mustered for an Iberian campaign. It was also one of the more unruly. On reaching Toledo the culturally intolerant northerners violently assaulted Jewish and Mozarabic citizens and had to be forcibly restrained by Spanish soldiers.⁸⁹

A number of Portuguese also marched to the assembly point at Toledo. In addition to members of the military orders there came a large number of irregular troops who were probably militiamen from the frontier towns. Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo remembered these troops with considerable regard:

Many soldiers from Portugal gathered at the city [i.e. Toledo], a great multitude of infantry, who with a miraculous agility easily bore the burdens of the campaign and were audacious fighters in attack.⁹⁰

The archbishop made no mention of Portuguese royal or even aristocratic participation; more distant contemporaries, however, seem to have assumed some form of noble military leadership.⁹¹ Yet there is no reason to mistrust Archbishop Rodrigo's memory. The Portuguese urban militias had frequently shown themselves to be more than capable of operating independently. The local nobility, on the other hand, rarely displayed enthusiasm for frontier warfare, preferring instead to concentrate their attention on the maintenance and expansion of their estates in more settled northern regions. Moreover, in the final decade of King Sancho's reign there had been little royal encouragement for expansionism. The Portuguese monarch seemed content to maintain the territorial status quo and initiated no new military offensives into Muslim lands.⁹² In the difficult months following Sancho's death at the end of March 1211 his son and heir, King Alfonso, was in no position to reverse his father's policy – even had he wished to. Under these circumstances then it seems probable that the military orders and members of the city militias were the main Portuguese contribution to the decisive campaign that took place in the summer of 1211.

The combined army marched southwards from Toledo on the 20 June, and almost immediately it became clear that the most difficult task facing the commanders was the maintenance of unity within the host. While the regional differences and animosities among the Iberians might be temporarily suppressed, the rigours of the campaign quickly revealed profoundly different attitudes between the Iberian troops and the northern crusaders. The northerners had already demonstrated their cultural and religious intolerance towards the unfortunate citizens of Toledo, and as the campaign continued this violent xenophobia became even more pronounced. On 24 June an advanced guard of crusaders stormed the Muslim-held stronghold of Malagón and slew the defending garrison.⁹³ This act of barbarity, while highly unusual in frontier warfare between Christian and Muslim Iberians, was tragically common when crusader contingents took a hand in peninsular operations. Three days later the entire army reached Calatrava and established a siege around the castle. After a short resistance the Andalusí commander, Abū'l-Hajjāj b. Qādis, negotiated terms of surrender with the Spanish leaders. The garrison was granted much the same conditions as the knights of Calatrava knights had themselves obtained two years earlier at Salvatierra: in return for abandoning the castle and their goods the defenders were granted safe conduct out of the area. The unfortunate Muslim commander was soon to rue this agreement. When Ibn Qādis returned to the main Almohad force and reported his actions the infuriated caliph ordered his execution.

Nor were all the Christian participants content with the events that had transpired at Calatrava. Only a few days after the surrender of the garrison the majority of the northern crusaders broke ranks with the combined Iberian army and turned for home. Less than 200 crusaders remained, among them the belligerent prelate Archbishop Arnaud of Narbonne and also Tibaldo of Blazon, a nobleman who had strong links with Spain.⁹⁴ The most charitable view of the crusaders' departure is that following the capture of Calatrava they believed that their task in Spain had been accomplished. Yet the Spanish they left behind clearly thought otherwise. Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo attributed their actions to the machination of the devil. The king of Castile, writing subsequently to the pope, took the more diplomatic position that the northern crusaders had found it difficult to endure the Spanish summer heat. Behind these convenient explanations seem to lie a more fundamental cultural tension. The readiness of the Spanish to negotiate with the Muslim defenders of Calatrava may well have antagonised the crusaders – who from their own actions had clearly demonstrated that they had no interest whatsoever in cross-cultural diplomacy. Certainly the Spanish rulers seemed to anticipate criticisms from beyond the Pyrenees. Both Archbishop Rodrigo and King Alfonso were careful to present their own version of the surrender of Calatrava. The archbishop suggested that Spanish flexibility reflected the king's desire to avoid exhausting the army prior to the main engagement; the king himself argued that the knights of Calatrava had requested a settlement because they feared any damage to the fortifications would render the castle useless as a Christian bastion.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, despite these protestations, the king's immediate reaction to the departure of the crusaders suggests the characteristic Iberian pragmatism remained very close to the surface. Initially, on learning of the withdrawal of the zealous northerners, Alfonso is claimed to have suggested that local troops might now be induced to shift their focus away from the Almohads and towards a more familiar foe: the king of León! Fortunately for the King Alfonso's reputation in Rome, and for his place in history, cooler heads at last prevailed and the Christian army continued its southward march.

With the departure of the crusaders the campaign became an almost wholly Iberian enterprise, and the Spanish army pressed onwards to contest the future balance of peninsular power with their Almohad adversaries. After recapturing Alarcos, scene of the disaster in 1195, the Spanish army by-passed Salvatierra (even though the Muslim occupation of this stronghold had initially provoked the campaign). Meanwhile, al-Nāsir attempted to halt the Christian advance by blocking the narrow passes descending from the Sierra Morena. Fortunately for the Spanish, a local shepherd was able to lead them by a little-known path down to the plains, and they established their camp on the Mesa del Rey, within striking distance of the Almohad army at Santa Elena. The Muslims immediately launched a series of harassing assaults on the Christian army, hoping to lure them into a disorganised general

engagement. For two days action was limited to this desultory skirmishing until on 16 July the Spanish drew up their ranks and advanced against the waiting Almohad army. Battle was joined early in the morning and raged across the plain until by midday, as losses mounted and weaker hearts began to quail, the Christian ranks seemed in peril of collapse. Sensing that the crisis had come, the Christian kings seized the moment and committed all their reserves in a desperate charge. The shock of these tactics broke the Muslim line. As fortune turned against him the Muslim caliph was unable to match the resolve of his opponents. Despairing of victory, al-Nāsir fled the growing rout, leaving his army to be scattered or destroyed. Less than a year later, unable to restore his reputation, he was assassinated in Marrakech – possibly by his own courtiers. Almohad power in the peninsula had been decisively broken.⁹⁶

From the vantage point of Rome the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa was a divinely delivered triumph and Pope Innocent exalted: 'rejoice in the victory God has granted over the godless.'⁹⁷ In a description of the battle sent by Alfonso to Pope Innocent the king did everything possible to suggest he shared this belief. Alfonso characterised the Spaniards as soldiers of God, fighting for the Christian faith, and he assured the pope that the crisis point of the battle came when the army's banner, bearing the cross and an image of the virgin and child, came under attack. The righteous anger of the Spanish troops flared and the Muslims were driven back.⁹⁸ Yet many Iberians, who remembered all too well that the majority of the crusaders had abandoned them long before the battle took place, felt that victory had a quite different significance. In an account of the action written by Archbishop Rodrigo, intended for a primarily local audience, an alternative picture of the victory emerges. The archbishop eschewed the crusading themes that thread Alfonso's letter to the pope, and instead emphasises the courage and skill of the Spaniards themselves. It was the calculated decision of the kings to risk total destruction by committing all reserves that was decisive, rather than popular indignation at an attack on the image of the cross. When Rodrigo does mention this banner, the context is quite different. In a piece of well-considered parochial propaganda, the archbishop simply recalls that the army marched under a standard venerated by all Spaniards, but most of all by the contingent from Toledo.⁹⁹ The whole emphasis of Archbishop Rodrigo's account was on the local, most notably the Castilian, rather than on any external influence playing a role in the Spanish victory. It is difficult to escape the impression that the letter Alfonso sent to the pope, rather than reflecting the king's own feelings, was in fact carefully constructed to appeal to papal conceits.

Of the two attitudes revealed in these different Iberian accounts of the events leading up to the victory at Las Navas de Tolosa, the emphasis on the local reflected by Archbishop Rodrigo also seems to have been shared by the greater part of the Spanish army. Despite the militant fervour Alfonso

represented to Pope Innocent, the king himself seemed more than willing to negotiate with the defeated enemy. Following the flight of the Almohad army Alfonso was inclined to accept tribute from the surrounding Muslim strongholds to spare them further attack. This plan was so strenuously opposed by the Latin bishops that Alfonso felt obliged to exhaust his troops undertaking a needless siege of Ubeda before he concluded a peace treaty with the Almohads. Once the relative stability of the frontier had been re-established, the king turned his attention to the pressing concerns of his own kingdom.¹⁰⁰ Such pragmatism was certainly shared by King Sancho of Navarra, who in earlier years had maintained close relations with the Almohads, accepting Muslim money and military support in confrontations with his co-religionists. For this reason Caliph al-Nāsir was reportedly surprised to see King Sancho among his enemies, and attributed the king's presence to papal threats he had no doubt received.¹⁰¹ A similar ambivalence towards sectarian fervour can also be detected among the rank and file of the army. The inducement of spiritual reward may have encouraged participation from across the social spectrum, but individuals clearly also had more fiscal concerns. In recognition of these mixed aims the clergymen accompanying the army took the unusual expedient of imposing anathema upon any soldiers who indulged in looting before the outcome of a battle had been decided.¹⁰² Clearly the senior prelates believed that many of the soldiers, no less than their commanders, needed to be forcefully guided towards victory for the faith.

In fact in many respects the campaign that culminated in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa represents the zenith of Latin cultural influence in the Iberian Peninsula. Pope Innocent had invested a large measure of the papacy's moral and spiritual authority encouraging the venture: his agents had worked tirelessly to gather an army of French crusaders to assist in the campaign; but more importantly, the pope himself had laboured to create and maintain a fragile unity among the Christian forces. Pope Innocent clearly saw the victory as a triumph for the concept of Christendom he espoused and a justification of the policy of intervention in secular affairs he had for so long pursued. Yet events in summer 1212 also demonstrated the practical limits of this supra-national influence and the fundamental differences in attitude that still separated the Latin and Iberian worlds. Ironically too, in the aftermath of the Christian victory, these divisions only widened. The belief among many Iberians that the battle had been won by the Spanish alone, despite the desertion of their fickle northern allies, consolidated local cultural confidence.¹⁰³ Meanwhile, as a direct result of the destruction of the Almohad army, popular opinion in Europe came to believe that the Muslim threat in the peninsula was effectively over. Papal attention quickly turned to other frontiers and other enemies. On 30 April 1213, in the hope of directing potential crusaders to more distant theatres of war, Pope Innocent formally revoked the spiritual rewards granted to foreign

participants in Spanish campaigns.¹⁰⁴ Thus, even as the attention of the Iberian peoples was being directed inwards once again, the eyes of the Latin world were turning elsewhere.

What were the implications of the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa for Portugal? In fact the Portuguese participation in the campaign of 1212 demonstrates the profound changes that had occurred within the kingdom during the reign of King Sancho. The most conspicuous contingent from Portugal was the large force of urban militiamen who arrived in Toledo apparently acting on their own initiative. These men, so warmly remembered by Archbishop Rodrigo, provide a clear indication of the strength and confidence urban communities had attained. Less conspicuous perhaps, but still noteworthy, were the knights of the local military orders, who reflected an alternative facet of the selective Portuguese embrace of Latin culture during this period. But most revealing of all is the complete failure of the Portuguese kings to take advantage of the opportunity the campaign represented. A generation earlier Afonso Henriques had based his bid to secure royal authority on his status as a defender of a threatened frontier. King Sancho, facing a more complicated world, found this status far less politically advantageous and in the final decades of his reign the Portuguese king had virtually abnegated leadership of the reconquest. The inability of King Afonso II to recoup this loss through a presence at the climactic battle of Las Navas de Tolosa is an indication of just how low the fortunes of the monarchy had ebbed. Yet as the world changed again in the wake of the defeat of the Almohads, the struggle between the kings of Portugal and the supra-national forces arrayed against them was by no means over.

7

The Science of Kingship: Institutional Innovation during the Reign of Afonso II (1211–1223)

Few Portuguese monarchs have come to the throne under less auspicious circumstances than Afonso II. The deathbed capitulation of his father, King Sancho, dramatically weakened the authority of the monarchy as an institution. Worse perhaps, even though Afonso had been designated as heir to the throne from at least 1188, at the time of his accession he had seven siblings, all of whom were ambitious and strong-willed. The king was to face challenges to royal authority from many quarters, but among the most serious came from within his own closest family. Nor were these political and dynastic complications the only problems clouding the beginning of the new king's reign. While posterity granted Afonso Henriques the honorific *O Conquistador* and King Sancho became *O Povoador*, Afonso II received a less flattering cognomen: *O Gordo* (the Fat). This sobriquet alluded to the king's health, which may have been quite delicate. Certainly Afonso seems to have had a limited capacity for physical exertion and exhibited none of the military élan that his predecessors – particularly his grandfather – had so conspicuously displayed.

The bleak catalogue of liabilities the new king faced was at least partially offset by some significant advantages. Afonso was fortunate in the calibre of his advisors and, just as importantly, he possessed the wisdom to heed their advice. Moreover, despite the dispersal of royal resources that had taken place at Sancho's death, his heir retained one crucial asset: Afonso alone was the king. This singular status, though eroded by the circumstances of the succession, nevertheless provided unique access to the world outside the borders of the kingdom. Afonso was quick to seize upon this international lifeline and to develop inventive royal strategies to take full advantage of every opportunity to recoup the authority his father had dissipated. To this end, Afonso conducted a wide-ranging and ambitious international diplomacy that aimed at re-emphasising the pre-eminent position of the monarchy within the kingdom. Meanwhile, in order to reimpose royal authority

upon his more powerful subjects, especially within his own family, the king appealed to Latin political and legal principles over Iberian custom. Initially these innovative policies proved highly successful, but in the longer term the dangers Afonso's strategy posed to the future autonomy of the monarchy became clear.

A fractured inheritance: Afonso II assumes the throne

Afonso was born on 23 April 1186, the Feast day of St James, probably at the royal palace in Coimbra.¹ The prince had three elder sisters: Teresa, Sancha and Constança, although Constança did not survive childhood. Within a month of his birth Afonso was named in a royal donation made to the bishop of Coimbra, and this grant may well have reflected the joy and relief in the royal court at the birth of a male heir to the throne.² In the years that followed, however, the royal family was to be blessed with four more sons: Pedro, Fernando, Henrique and Raimundo; along with three daughters: Mafalda, Branca and Berengária. The two younger sons, Henrique and Raimundo, died before reaching maturity, leaving the king with eight legitimate adult offspring. Sancho's natural paternal satisfaction was no doubt moderated by a growing recognition of the potentially destabilising implications of this large family. Afonso Henriques had been the only legitimate son of Count Henry and Infanta Teresa, so too Sancho himself had succeeded to the throne without contest. Because in both cases there had been a direct transfer of authority to an obvious and unchallenged male successor, the Portuguese ruling family had never faced the conundrum of how to deal with multiple potential heirs.

A traditional approach for Iberian royalty had simply been to divide the kingdom between all surviving sons. This practice had brought disunity and civil war to Christian Spain following the death of King Fernando in 1065 and again in 1157 when León and Castile were separated in obedience to the last wishes of Emperor Alfonso VII. Well aware of these dangers, King Sancho moved quickly to emphasise his own preference for a succession based on the principle of primogeniture. In 1188, facing a resurgent Almohad threat and conscious of his own vulnerability, the king dictated a will 'to preserve the tranquillity of security of the kingdom' in which the line of succession was formalised. Afonso was designated as the heir-apparent, followed by his brothers ranked in order of age, then his sisters, with Teresa as the eldest similarly give precedence over her female siblings.³ In the next two decades Sancho was careful to consolidate Afonso's position. Documents issued by the royal court consistently described the crown prince as the presumptive heir. While the royal status of his siblings was acknowledged, so too was their lesser political status, and occasionally they would not even be specified beyond 'the other royal children.' Afonso's superior position was emphasised once again when a marriage was negotiated on his behalf with

Urraca, the daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile, with the ceremony taking place before February 1209.⁴

What though of the heir presumptive himself? Although King Sancho made his intentions concerning the succession clear, Afonso seems to have done little on his own behalf to ensure an unchallenged transfer of authority at the end of his father's reign. Most obviously, there is no indication the crown prince was able to demonstrate that most critical of royal virtues: military proficiency. Prior to his accession to the throne Afonso does not seem to have led troops in either offensive or defensive campaigns. Later Portuguese commentators interpreted this aversion to field command as evidence of a delicate royal constitution, an interpretation to a degree corroborated by the clearer symptoms of ill-health that haunted the king's final years. On the other hand, however, no contemporary author so much as alludes to King Afonso suffering medical problems early in his reign, and it is unlikely that the accession of an ailing prince over his vigorous younger brothers would have elicited no comment. Instead it seems that Afonso's lack of military experience merely reflected the relative peace from external threat the kingdom enjoyed during the final decade of King Sancho's rule. The crown prince was hardly to be held remiss because his father had pursued a policy of consolidation rather than confrontation with either the Leonese or the Almohads. Nevertheless, the absence of any form of early military success, or even heroic failure, could only have been an awkward lacunae in the curriculum vitae of a future king on the volatile Iberian frontier.

Dynastic imperative, rather than military ability, guided Afonso towards the throne; ironically though, the Castilian marriage that confirmed his position also proved to be a trigger for much of the chaos that surrounded his accession. The bishop of Porto apparently used the dubious canonical status of the marriage to provoke a conflict with King Sancho that escalated into a dramatic confrontation with Pope Innocent, and ended with complete royal submission. In the final months of his life the mortally ill King Sancho granted away a wide swathe of privileges to the Portuguese clergy; but even more damaging for the political viability of his successor, was that the ailing king reissued his will. Two decades earlier a younger and more vigorous King Sancho had feared for his life, and so had sought to ensure the smooth succession of power. In 1211, older and racked by disease, the king feared for his soul, and his last testament became a dispersal of royal assets. Pope Innocent received a gift of 6,000 gold coins, the bishop of Ty 3,000, the archbishop of Braga 2,000 and the other Portuguese prelates were granted 1,000 coins each. Alcobaa and Santa Cruz received 20,000 and 10,000 coins respectively, and numerous smaller gifts were made to the military orders and other religious institutions. Much of what remained in the treasury was divided between members of the royal family. In this final distribution Afonso's seven surviving siblings received 40,000 gold coins each along with important territorial concessions; King Sancho's eight illegitimate children received between 7,000 and 8,000 coins each, again in

addition to substantial lands. The new king received the balance of some 206,000 coins along with clothing, horses and arms.⁵

As soon as possible after his accession, in a recognition of the damage done to royal authority and in an attempt to address the resulting instability in the kingdom, Afonso II summoned a *cortes*, or general council, made up of representatives from the higher clergy and nobility. While the *cortes* of 1211 has often been interpreted as a first gambit of the newly enthroned king to improve his position, with legal principles being established there that would subsequently underpin a restoration of royal fortunes, in the short term the gathered magnates were able to extract significant concessions from the crown.⁶ The secular nobility imposed restrictions on the taxes the king might claim and also limited the arbitrary use of royal judicial rights. Chief among royal concessions was the remission of the one-third sales tax levied on all foodstuffs sold in the kingdom and a 'cooling-off' period of twenty days between sentencing and punishment in capital crimes. Significantly too, in an indication of the growing importance of international mercantile interests, and indeed of the political power of merchants, the king was obliged to abandon his rights of salvage over wrecks along the Portuguese coast. The ship and cargo remained the legal property of the original owner, regardless of their nationality.⁷

The Portuguese Church secured still more sweeping guarantees: ecclesiastical law was upheld; royal officials were sworn to defend ecclesiastical privilege; and the clergy received further exemptions. Individual prelates were exempted from the burdensome obligation to entertain King Afonso and the royal entourage during his travels around the kingdom, in addition to immunity from extraordinary financial exactions and relief from the duty to assist in the maintenance of fortification. The only condition placed upon the church was a prohibition on the ecclesiastical purchase of land – a relatively hollow measure, as most acquisitions by the church came through pious donation.⁸ Nor were all the concessions wrung from the crown financial in nature. Stricter rules of segregation were imposed upon non-Christian minorities within the kingdom and, in obedience to the dictates of the Fourth Lateran Council, Jews and Muslims were prohibited from holding authority over Christians, even to the point of preventing them from employing Christian servants within their homes. Non-Christians who converted were forbidden from continuing to live under the same roof as former co-religionists, while a return to their previous faith was punishable by death.⁹ The *cortes* thus represent more than simply another episode in Afonso's failing struggle to maintain a semblance of royal authority in the kingdom: 1211 also marked a major victory for Latin ideological expectations over local Iberian tradition.

By the conclusion of his first year as king, Afonso might have been forgiven for succumbing to a sense of despair. The royal authority he had inherited on his accession was a shadow of the centralised power his father had

wielded only a few years earlier. The wide-ranging concessions King Sancho had granted to the clergy, along with the extremely generous bequests he had made for his many legitimate and natural children, undermined the very foundations of the monarchy as an institution, and at the *cortes* of 1211 the weakness of Afonso's position was emphasised throughout the kingdom. Yet the king himself still held a few important assets. Although he had only limited experience in military affairs, he was relatively seasoned in court life. As a sovereign monarch Afonso also retained several important prerogatives and one of the most significant was the ability to negotiate as an equal with the rulers of other realms. The Portuguese king was to make full use of this opportunity, and in the years that followed he developed a series of international arrangements linking the kingdom of Portugal into a wider alliance of Atlantic maritime states.

Afonso II and the alliance of Atlantic maritime interests

During the reign of King Sancho relations with the Atlantic states had become a major pillar of royal policy. The monarchy made concrete gains from a growing Portuguese engagement in the Atlantic trading networks, both in terms of enhanced royal revenues from taxes and tolls and from the growing proficiency of the citizen militias on land and sea. Unfortunately for King Afonso, his father's capitulation to the Church damaged royal relations with the urban communities, and the agreements forced upon him in 1211 dramatically reduced the flow of commercial wealth into royal coffers. Nevertheless, the towns remained a valuable royal asset and one which the new king was careful to cultivate.¹⁰ Of greater importance, at least in the longer term, was the status to be gained from royal relations with foreign rulers. King Sancho's links with the political elites in the Atlantic states had done much to enhance the reputation of the Portuguese crown, and his son Afonso was eager to pursue these relations still further. Dynastic marriages were successfully negotiated between members of the Portuguese royal family and the ruling houses of Flanders and Denmark. These strengthening relations did much to reaffirm the prestige of the beleaguered Portuguese monarch and, at the same time, they also accelerated a more general realignment of Portugal away from France and towards the Atlantic maritime states.

In 1183 an important early relationship had been forged between the ruling houses of Flanders and Portugal with the marriage of Count Philip to Afonso Henriques' youngest daughter Teresa. On her arrival in her new home Teresa had assumed the less exotic sounding name of Matilda and over time became thoroughly acculturated to Flemish life. After Philip's death at the siege of Acre in 1191 Matilda chose to remain in Flanders and so was in a position to forward the cause of her Portuguese relatives during a crisis point of Flemish history. The rulers of Flanders had a proud crusading

tradition and Count Baldwin IX (1194–1206) heeded the call to the Fourth Crusade. When the so-called unholy crusade was redirected against the city of Constantinople Count Baldwin was one of the few leaders to emerge with his reputation intact. Elected emperor of the newly captured city, Baldwin ruled in the East until his untimely death at the hands of the Bulgarians. When news of the count's fate reached Flanders authority in the county devolved onto his eldest daughter, Joanna, who became as a result one of the most eligible heiresses in Europe.¹¹ In 1208 Joanna came under the guardianship of King Philip Augustus of France, her father's liege; three years later Enguerran of Courcy offered the king first 30,000 and then 50,000 *livres* for Joanna's hand. It was at this point that Matilda intervened. The countess petitioned the French king on behalf of her nephew Fernando, the younger brother of Afonso II, and offered to match Enguerran's offer.¹² The negotiations were carried through speedily, and the couple were wed in the royal chapel at Paris in January 1212. Fernando did homage to Philip Augustus for his new lands, and the French king no doubt anticipated that a little-known nobleman from distant Portugal would present scant threat to his own intricate political strategies in the region. This was to prove a major miscalculation. Not only did the marriage create stronger links between Portugal and Flanders but, more dangerously for Philip Augustus, Fernando also became a central partner in an alliance of Atlantic states forged by King John of England (1199–1216) in an effort to counter the influence of his powerful French rival.

Whatever Fernando's initial feelings towards the French royal house may have been, his relations with Philip Augustus were soured even before he reached Flanders. The French king had previously secured the support of Count Baldwin by ceding to him the strategic towns of Aire and St Omer. The death of the crusading count left the status of these towns in doubt, providing Prince Louis of France with a pretext to seize them by force.¹³ It is unlikely that the French prince was acting without his father's permission, and Philip Augustus certainly made no attempt to mediate with or compensate the affronted Fernando. When the Portuguese prince finally did reach Flanders he was received with derision by his new subjects. Unsurprisingly, after such a welcome, Fernando's relations with the French king quickly deteriorated. The new count exiled prominent Francophiles among the Flemish nobility and opened negotiations with King John of England. This policy went at least some way to restoring the count's reputation among his own subjects, since due to their reliance on cross-Channel trade the merchant classes in the Flemish towns were already inclined to support the English. Indeed in recognition of this dependency, the Flemish towns had gone so far as to swear fealty to King John in September 1208, saving only their loyalty to their own ruler, and this pledge was renewed in April 1213. Meanwhile, many of the Flemish nobles were eased away from their traditional pro-French orientation by dwindling financial

returns from their French fiefs and by the carefully directed largess of the English king. Consequently, when King Philip sought to force Fernando's hand the following month by insisting that he formally commit to aiding French efforts against King John, Fernando chose to prevaricate. Discussion between the two men quickly grew heated and ended in acrimony as the recalcitrant count was curtly dismissed from the royal court.

From this point on Count Fernando gravitated ever more closely into the orbit of the English monarch. King John was quick to offer military assistance to the Flemish ruler, and the allies enjoyed early success towards the end of May 1213 when a flotilla of ships assembling to carry a French invasion force to England was caught at anchor in Damme, the harbour of Bruges. In the resulting action the English and Flemish ships all but destroyed the French fleet, and by doing so dashed King Philip's hopes for an amphibious invasion across the Channel. In July King John and Count Fernando concluded a formal alliance and six months later the count of Flanders arrived in England to a hero's welcome. Together he and King John began to lay plans for a more sustained campaign against the French. Yet the unfortunate people of Flanders and indeed of northern France were to pay a heavy price for the count's choice of loyalties. Following the destruction of the fleet at Damme Philip Augustus and Prince Louis launched a series of retaliatory raids into Flemish territory, and Count Fernando soon responded in kind. Devastation was wrought on both sides of the border. Rich farmlands were destroyed; wealthy urban communities were attacked and on several occasions razed to the ground. But English money and promises of further military support helped to stiffen Flemish resolve. The alliance held firm and the people of Flanders maintained their resistance to French incursions.¹⁴

This alliance with Flanders was only one of the arrangements King John entered into in order to contain the French monarch. Another leading ally was the mercurial Renaud of Dammartin, the exiled count of Boulogne. Renaud had gained title to Boulogne in 1191 by repudiating his wife, abducting the widowed heiress Ida, and forcibly marrying her. Philip Augustus had allowed this scandalous arrangement to stand in the hope of securing the count's future support, but Renaud repaid him by joining forces with the Plantagenets – first Richard and later John. By 1201, however, the promise of a marriage between his daughter Matilda and Philip Augustus' natural son Philip Hurepel had lured the count of Boulogne back into the French sphere of influence. Philip Augustus subsequently granted the count considerable additional lands and other signs of royal favour. But these amicable relations were not to last. When a conflict broke out between the king's cousin, Philippe de Dreux, the bishop of Beauvais, and Renaud's kinswoman, the countess of Clermont, Renaud felt obliged to intervene. This decision placed him on a collision course with the French king. Count Renaud refused a royal demand that he yield up the strategic castle at Mortain, and Philip

Augustus responded by storming the castle walls. Unable to resist the full force of his sovereign's wrath, Renaud abandoned his county and went into exile; but for a man of his talents, new opportunities soon beckoned. In 1212 he did homage to King John of England and became one of his most active agents, operating as chief negotiator and recruiter of further allies on John's behalf.¹⁵

King John could also anticipate the support of another important continental ally in the person of Otto of Brunswick. Following the death of Emperor Henry VI in 1197 the imperial throne was claimed by a Hohenstaufen, Philip of Swabia, and also by Otto, the Guelf candidate. Otto initially enjoyed the support of the papacy and was also aided both morally and financially by the Plantagenet kings of England, to whom he was related by marriage. The only practical option for Philip Augustus was to oppose this kinsman of his English rivals, but the French attempt to support the Hohenstaufen cause was brought to nothing when the assassination of Philip of Swabia in 1208 left Otto as the only viable contender for the throne. After receiving a formal acceptance from the German princes, Otto of Brunswick travelled to Rome for coronation at the hands of Pope Innocent III. Almost immediately, however, the new emperor proved himself to be the incarnation of all papal fears as he sought to bring the Church more firmly under imperial authority. Pope Innocent was forced into an abrupt and humiliating change of policy. Less than a year after he had placed the imperial crown on Otto's head, the pope excommunicated the emperor, declared him deposed and freed his subjects from their oath of loyalty. Despite his own distrust of the Hohenstaufen family, Pope Innocent had no choice but to turn to the young son of Emperor Henry VI, Frederick, as the sole alternative to Otto. In response to the petitions of Pope Innocent, but also with an eye to his own political advantage, King Philip of France entered into negotiations with the young Frederick and in November 1212 a formal agreement was reached. This alliance only reinforced Otto's hostility towards Philip Augustus, and the German emperor became an eager partner in King John's efforts to contain the power of the French monarch.¹⁶

It was to this loose coalition of aggrieved northern rulers that the fortunes of the Portuguese royal house were to be indirectly linked. King John's long fermented plans to make war upon his French rival were finally set in motion at the beginning of 1214. The English king arrived in La Rochelle in February and enjoyed initial success in recruiting a number of disaffected local nobles to his cause. At the head of this conglomerate army the English king marched into the Loire valley; Philip Augustus responded by dispatching a force under the command of Prince Louis to defend the region. Reports of the approach of French royal troops caused consternation in the allied camp and the local Poitevan barons began to prevaricate. Faced with this suddenly lukewarm support, King John felt obliged to retreat back to La Rochelle without confronting Prince Louis' forces. Nevertheless, the English

king may have been satisfied enough with unfolding events. Though he had been unable to bring about a decisive battle in the Loire valley, he did succeed in achieving his strategic goal of dividing the French army. In the north, meanwhile, a combined force under Emperor Otto, Count Fernando, Renaud of Boulogne and King John's representative, William of Salisbury, marched against the main French host led by Philip Augustus. After a period of inconclusive manoeuvring the two armies finally confronted each other at Bouvines on 27 July 1214. A pitched battle ensued in which, after a prolonged and bloody struggle, the allied troops were overwhelmed. Otto managed to escape, but found his political position in Germany fatally weakened; the other allied leaders were all captured on the field and imprisoned by the victorious French king. Count Renaud of Boulogne ended his days chained to a log in a royal dungeon. Count Fernando, who had been seriously injured in the battle, was gaoled in a tower at the Louvre until 1226. Any hope for a strong alliance of kindred interest among the Atlantic states were dashed as Philip Augustus became the dominant figure on the European stage.¹⁷

Count Fernando paid a heavy price for the two short years he spent at the epicentre of international affairs. Yet during his brief period in the political limelight the Portuguese prince was a subject of considerable scrutiny and contemporary accounts of his career provide an unusual insight into the attitudes of many northern peoples towards distant Portugal. The count's exotic origins were from the outset a point of friction with his own subjects and on his arrival in Flanders he was greeted with jeers and ethnic slurs. Fernando suffered similar parochial taunts from his enemies, and a French chronicler recalled with evident relish the merriment the Portuguese count's unfamiliar foreign name provoked among local peasants.¹⁸ Nor was this hostility towards the Portuguese presence in the county limited to Fernando himself. The events that culminated at Bouvines were described by William the Breton, who as King Philip's personal chaplain and biographer had both the opportunity and the training to produce a clear and fast-paced narrative. At the end of his account of the battle, William included an interesting vignette.

It was well known to us all that the old Countess of Flanders, the aunt of Count Fernando and daughter of the king of Portugal (who was thus called "the royal Countess") sought to learn the outcome of the battle by casting an augury according to the customs of the Spaniards...and while the prediction proved accurate it was open to numerous interpretations. For the Devil speaks ambiguously and always deceives those who appeal to him.¹⁹

This passage suggests the existence of considerable ambient prejudice in the more central regions of the Latin world, even among educated and

well-travelled people, towards societies on the fringes of Christendom. The implication seems to be that due to their substantial minority communities of Jews and Muslims (groups that European fancy imagined as being steeped in occult knowledge) the Iberian kingdoms were dangerously unorthodox in matters of Christian faith. Fernando's brief period of international prominence did little to challenge such prejudices, and the conspicuous failure of his rule in Flanders can only have had a detrimental effect on the international reputation of the Portuguese royal house, and perhaps of the kingdom as a whole.

Yet for King Afonso of Portugal, not all was lost on the bloodstained fields of Bouvines. English efforts to construct a network of alliances binding the Atlantic states together stretched even to the kingdom of Denmark. Though the Danish ruler, King Valdemar II (1202–1241), took no direct part in the battle against Philip Augustus, his sympathies certainly seem to have been with the allies. In addition to the usual tensions between neighbouring monarchs, the Danish king had good reason to feel considerable animosity towards Philip Augustus. In 1193 Valdemar's sister Ingeborg had married the French monarch, but the match had proved to be a disaster. For unclear personal reasons Philip Augustus repudiated and imprisoned his unfortunate wife, then began a relationship with Agnes of Méran, whom he later married in defiance of ecclesiastical prohibition. Ambassadors sent by Valdemar to remonstrate with Philip Augustus were arrested; even the intervention of Pope Innocent left the French monarch unmoved.²⁰ Danish royal relations with Otto of Brunswick, on the other hand, charted an almost diametrically opposite trajectory. Early in their respective careers Valdemar and Otto had been territorial rivals, but by the end of the first decade of the thirteenth century the two men had established a workable *détente* and were moving towards formal arrangements of mutual support. Danish encouragement for the alliance between Otto and John was evident from at least 1207, when the German ruler was conveyed to England on Danish ships to secure an emergency subsidy of 6,000 marks from the English king.²¹

The convergence of these many spheres of influence provided the king of Portugal with a valuable opportunity. King Afonso had a number of marriageable female relatives and King Valdemar of Denmark was a recent widower. Even as the Atlantic allies prepared for their ill-fated offensive against the French, negotiations were taking place between representatives of the Portuguese and Danish monarchs. Agreement was eventually reached and terms concluded for a marriage between King Valdemar and Afonso's younger sister, Berengária. The Portuguese princess had embarked for Denmark by 1214 and although she was queen for only a few short years Berengária made a lasting impression on her husband's subjects. Remembered as both beautiful and perilous, her unfamiliar name came to be pronounced 'Berngerd' (the bear keeper) and on her death she was buried in a church at Ringsted, where fearful locals believed her restless spirit haunted the building. King

Valdemar was nevertheless eager to maintain his links with Portugal and to this end his son, the future king Valdemar III, subsequently wedded Afonso's daughter (and thus Berengária's niece) Leonor in 1229.²² These marriages represent important milestones in the development of the Portuguese monarchy. Although negotiations with potentates outside the peninsula had been conducted several times in earlier years, the Danish marriages were the first to be concluded successfully, demonstrating that the kings of Portugal had at last secured their place among the more established royal families. For the hard-pressed King Afonso such a reinforcement of royal prestige was valuable currency indeed.

It is a fascinating exercise in counter-factual history to hypothesise on what the result of an allied success at Bouvines might have been, both for Europe as a whole and for the Portuguese king. Victory over Philip Augustus would have elevated the Atlantic allies to political predominance in Europe; the rewards for King Afonso's brother Count Fernando could have been rich indeed. More importantly though, from a Portuguese point of view, French defeat would have sharply curtailed the influence of Pope Innocent, for the pontiff was embroiled in bitter disputes with the leaders of the Atlantic alliance and had been a consistent supporter to Philip Augustus. A weakened papacy could only have been to the long-term benefit of King Afonso in his struggle with the local church. Yet these hopes, along with those of all the allies, were dashed on the field at Bouvines. Out of the wreckage, Afonso was at least able to rescue one corollary advantage: marriage of his sister Berengária to King Valdemar of Denmark. But Afonso of Portugal had not limited his strategies for the restoration of royal authority to marriage alliances alone. He also intended to take a more direct hand in re-establishing the authority of the monarchy within the kingdom itself.

Constraint by other means: the legal innovations of Afonso II

Numerous siblings could be a mixed blessing for a reigning monarch. Close relatives provided the means to establish links with other ruling houses, but an extended family was also a drain on royal resources and could raise the spectre of pretence to the throne. Afonso's younger brothers, Fernando and Pedro, left Portugal soon after the death of their father to pursue adventurous careers outside the kingdom. For Infante Fernando, the opportunities in Flanders beckoned. Infante Pedro, on the other hand, chose to remain in Iberia. After a period of service in the Leonese court he took command of the Christian mercenaries employed by the Almohad caliph at Marrakech. He later accepted an Aragonese offer to become ruler of the Balearic Islands.²³ Afonso's sisters, Queen Teresa and the Infantas Sancha, Mafalda and Branca, posed the more intractable problems for the king. Beyond the substantial lands and privileges the sisters held, Queen Teresa had also been careful to maintain amicable relations with her former husband, King Alfonso of

León. Confident of Leonese support, the sisters were more than ready to defy their brother's authority within the kingdom.

Under the terms of King Sancho's will his daughters Teresa, Sancha, Mafalda, and Branca received huge, potentially autonomous estates, and on his deathbed Sancho had forced his heir to swear to abide by his final wishes. Nevertheless, in anticipation of an attempt by Afonso to curtail their independence, the sisters petitioning the pope for a ratification of their rights as specified in Sancho's will (even though the pope had in fact already ratified the document). On 7 October 1211 Pope Innocent responded with letters recognising these rights and authorising the archbishop of Compostela and the bishop of Zamora to excommunicate any persons presuming to infringe upon them.²⁴ King Afonso, though aware of his sisters' actions, refused to be daunted by this papal intervention. He took the first steps towards reimposing royal authority over the kingdom by insisting that his troops would occupy strategic frontier castles and that royal taxes would be paid. The sisters were resolved to resist these demands by every means at their disposal. Mafalda attempted the subterfuge of granting her lands to the Hospitallers, to be taken over after her death, thus gaining the immunity of the order while enjoying the revenues of the estates during her lifetime. Teresa, Sancha and Branca adopted a more direct approach of strengthening their fortresses and manning them with troops hostile to the king.²⁵

In the face of such deliberate provocation Afonso was determined to force his sisters into submission. Royal officials seized Mafalda's disputed lands from the Hospitallers; the knights raised a storm of protest and immediately petitioned Rome for aid. Meanwhile Teresa and Branca continued in their defiance and suffered sieges of their fortresses as a result. The infantas responded by speeding messengers eastwards to King Alfonso of León, Teresa's ex-husband. Despite the papal truce imposed upon the Iberian leaders in anticipation of a new offensive against the Almohads, the king of León promptly invaded the Minho region accompanied by Afonso's brother Pedro and Queen Teresa's son Infante Fernando. Afonso could only watch in dismay as his forces were forced back and the invaders devastated the Portuguese countryside. Nevertheless, because his enemies could claim that royal troops had struck the first blow and therefore provoked the Leonese response, in addition to the destruction of their crops and farmsteads, the Portuguese also faced ecclesiastical sanction. The archbishop of Compostela and bishop of Zamora put their papal mandate into effect: the king was excommunicated, and Portugal was placed under interdict.²⁶

With his soldiers thus outmanoeuvred, Afonso turned the fight over to his lawyers, and they were more than ready to take up the challenge. From the final decades of the twelfth century a quiet revolution in Portuguese royal administration had been taking place. Surviving documents reveal a growing professionalism in court functions which paralleled a more general trend throughout Latin Christendom – particularly in England. The spectacular

rise of the universities of Paris and Bologna had produced a steady supply of intelligent, erudite and highly trained scholars. Many of these men found employment in the highest levels of regional administration and brought to these tasks the fruits of their specialised training. The most obvious indication of the presence of these scholars in royal entourages was the appearance in documents of individuals bearing the honorific *magister* (master), a term which recognised the successful completion of an advanced course of study and the award of the coveted *licentia docendi* (licence to teach).²⁷ The mastery such scholars gained over the developing disciplines of civil and canon law was coupled with the broader benefits of viewing wider horizons and being exposed to the newest international ideas. In Portugal the efforts of such men to improve the administrative effectiveness of the royal court were to come to a culmination in the early thirteenth century, during the reign of Afonso o Gordo.

When Afonso came to the throne in 1211 a gradual process of procedural reform had already clarified and codified many of the functions of the royal court. The transmission of royal authority into concrete action had become less haphazard as general spheres of influence were gradually consolidated into three higher offices. The *mordomo-mor* (majordomo) oversaw the royal finances as guardian of the treasury and supervisor of revenues and expenditures. The *alferes-mor* (seneschal), primarily a military office, had responsibility for ensuring the preparedness of the kingdom's defences and for operating as commander of the royal army in the king's absence. The third leading royal official, the chancellor, had developed into the both the facilitator of royal communication and the custodian of official memory. His primary responsibility was to guard the king's seal, and oversee the production and storage of royal documents. The offices of *mordomo-mor* and *alferes-mor* were the purview of the higher aristocracy, men who had grown up in the presence of the king and owed their positions to such long association. The office of chancellor, which required a more specialised training and a long apprenticeship in junior offices, was usually held by men from more modest backgrounds. During the reign of King Sancho the functions of these three court offices became more clearly defined and greater consistency was achieved as individuals remained in their positions for longer periods of time.²⁸ This was particularly true of the chancellorship, which for over three decades was held by the remarkably durable Master Julião Pais.

A memorial inscription to Chancellor Julião in the cathedral of Coimbra proudly recalls his service to three generations of royalty.²⁹ Master Julião was in all likelihood a student at the University of Bologna and first appeared as a signatory in a charter issued by Afonso Henriques in 1176. Four years later he was himself the recipient of royal generosity in recognition of his valuable service, and by April 1183 Julião had achieved the office of chancellor. He retained royal confidence in the years that followed

and remained a trusted confidant of King Sancho throughout his reign. During this long incumbency the chancellor carefully developed the role of his office, bringing a higher level of systemisation to chancery business. Charters produced under his guidance were increasingly consistent in their use of nomenclature and the official ranking of signatories. New forms of seal were introduced and their use was more tightly controlled. Letters patent were adopted to record official decisions more efficiently than through the laborious production of ornate charters. With this extension of functions the chancery grew larger, and a degree of specialisation seems to have developed among Master Julião's subordinates. Royal gratitude for the chancellor's efforts was expressed in a number of valuable grants, although during the final years of Sancho's reign Master Julião also knew the frustration of witnessing the policies of years unravelling as the king's health deteriorated. Yet the chancellor was well schooled in diplomacy and he managed to weather the crisis. He remained in office and so was able to offer his assistance to the vulnerable new king. Under the guidance of his experienced chancellor, King Afonso responded to the failure of royal arms against his sisters and their allies by making a carefully considered appeal to Rome.³⁰

The king was represented in the papal court by three highly skilled legalists: Master Silvestre, the archdeacon of Braga; Master Vicente, dean of Lisbon; and Master Lanfranc of Milan.³¹ The royal case hinged upon raising questions about the validity of King Sancho's final, controversial will. The primary argument utilised by Afonso's agents was that because the royal patrimony should remain inviolate down through the generations, Sancho did not have the legal right to alienate lands he had himself inherited. Such an argument was in fact an appeal to a Latin rather than an Iberian interpretation of the law. Even though there had been in the Iberian kingdoms a gradual move away from a traditional division of lands towards the concept of primogeniture, an acceptance of the overriding rights of the first-born child was by no means universal. 'The system in place was a mixed one,' Maria João Branco has noted, 'in principle agnatic, but retaining many residual cognatic elements'.³² Under Iberian custom King Sancho's division of the kingdom was a perfectly acceptable – albeit a politically problematic – disposition of his assets. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this was the inability of King Afonso's agents to find local precedent for overturning a will dividing the royal patrimony. Instead they were forced to seek justification in the opinions of Pope Alexander III, as phrased in the terms of the bull *Manifestis probatum*.³³ Nevertheless Pope Innocent, a man closely attuned to the legal development of his age, was prepared to consider such an argument.

In response to King Afonso's petition the pontiff promulgated a series of supportive papal bulls. On 16 April 1212 Pope Innocent reissued *Manifestis probatum*, thus demonstrating his endorsement of royal authority in the

kingdom. In June the bishops of Astorga, Burgos and Segovia were ordered to oversee the restoration of royal rights over the lands Mafalda had granted to the Hospitallers. Two months later the abbots of the Cistercian houses at Espina and Osseira were authorised to lift the ecclesiastical sanctions imposed upon King Sancho and to establish a workable concord between the king and the infantas. The two abbots undertook this delicate task with considerable hesitation and were soon reporting back to the pontiff with doubts concerning the king's conduct, but in May 1213 the pope issued a second letter to the two abbots, overriding their objections and insisting they complete their task as ordered. King Afonso expressed his gratitude to the pontiff in December by paying the arrears of the annual gold tribute, a gesture that in addition to being a symbolic acknowledgement of papal authority, also involved the transfer of more than 3,000 gold coins. In January the following year the king's strategic diplomacy was rewarded as the abbots formally lifted all ecclesiastical sanctions imposed on the king and his realm. Initially, at least, Queen Teresa and her sisters refused to accept the implications of the improving relations between their brother and the pope; instead, they continued to maintain their resistance to royal authority. The sisters busied themselves forwarding further letters to the weary pontiff, until eventually he agreed to allow representatives from both camps to argue the case before the papal curia in Rome. The result was an overwhelming victory for the monarchy. In April 1216 Pope Innocent confirmed the lifting of all ecclesiastical penalties imposed upon Portugal and against Afonso himself. The king's punitive actions were found to be justified, and the sisters were denied compensation for the damages sustained. Provisions in King Sancho's will limiting the authority of his successor were declared void. The castles that had sparked the controversy were to be given into the keeping of the Templars, on the understanding that they would not be held against royal interests.³⁴

A recourse to legal measures had provided King Afonso with a resounding triumph over the members of his own family. Pope Innocent's comprehensive judgement against the infantas removed many of the shackles King Sancho had placed upon his son's authority and so formed the basis of a major restoration of royal fortunes. The victory had been engineered by royal agents familiar with the legal principles of the Latin world and had been won through an appeal to those principles over long-accepted local custom. Yet this innovative policy did have a serious drawback. As a result of his confrontation with the infantas Afonso had been forced to acknowledge the right of the papacy to render a final judgement on the very foundation of royal authority in Portugal. Nor was the king unaware of these wider implications. The reissue of *Manifestis probatum* and the payment of the gold tribute had re-established the symbolic dependency of the Portuguese crown on the throne of St Peter and in obedience to

papal expectations for secular rule, Afonso began to associate himself more closely with the prosecution of the reconquest.

Observing from a distance: Afonso II and the reconquest

The reign of King Afonso II coincided with some of the most dramatic chapters of the reconquest, both in the peninsula as a whole and in Portugal itself. For reasons that are not clear, but may well have been related to Afonso's own delicate health, the king played a limited personal role in these campaigns. Although Portuguese militiamen and knights of the military orders had contributed to the Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, it is unlikely that they were accompanied by royal or even aristocratic contingents. Afonso thus lost a major opportunity to win unparalleled prestige throughout the Latin Christian world. Four years later, the focus of the reconquest shifted to Portugal when a combined operation mounted by local troops and a fleet of visiting crusaders besieged and captured the important Muslim-held stronghold at Alcácer do Sal. Once again, however, King Afonso was conspicuously absent from the field of battle. Yet the king of Portugal was certainly aware of the wider political benefits of being associated with military operations on the frontier. In his correspondence with the papacy and his relations with the increasingly powerful Portuguese military orders Afonso was able, despite his own indifferent crusading credentials, to garner considerable political advantage from the reflected glory of distant military success.

The Spanish victory at Las Navas de Tolosa had been for Latin Europe a welcome change to the long saga of military failure against Muslim forces in the Holy Land. The following year Pope Innocent sought to reinvigorate popular enthusiasm for the Eastern crusade by issuing *Quia maior*, a stirring call to faithful rulers and knights to restore Jerusalem to Christendom. Unfortunately for Innocent's hopes, the soldiery of Europe was already fully occupied fighting internal conflicts and his summons to crusade received a disappointing response. The pope refused to be discouraged by this apparent lack of enthusiasm and immediately began the long task of building popular support for a new expedition to Palestine. Spiritual rewards for military operations on other frontiers were curtailed in order to direct all aspiring crusaders eastwards. Papal agents sought to bring peace to the fractious leaders of Europe and rally the arms-bearing classes to the support of the Holy Land. These efforts reached a climax in 1215 when the pope summoned prelates from across Christendom to the Fourth Lateran Council. Although attempts by the pope to arbitrate the many internal tensions within Europe were largely ineffective, he was able to extract from the assembled prelates a public statement of support for a new crusade. This was formalised in a document, *Ad liberandam*, and appended to the acts of the Council. Under the provisions of this agreement the benefits and duties of crusaders were carefully delineated and the date of departure fixed as June 1217.³⁵ But Pope

Innocent did not live to see his long-anticipated crusade come to pass. He died on 16 July 1216, leaving to his successor, Pope Honorius III (1216–1227), the task of overseeing the progress of the Fifth Crusade.

The call to crusade was answered by people from across the Latin Christian world. In the Atlantic ports ships were made ready to carry eager crusaders eastwards and by May 1217 a large flotilla of ships from the Rhineland and Frisia was ready to sail.³⁶ Several participants left descriptions of their eventful voyage. The perspective of the German crusaders was reflected in two accounts, the *Gosuini de expugnatione Salaciae carmen* (Goswin's song of the capture of Alcácer) and the *Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum* (Deeds of the Rhineland crusaders). A Frisian author recalled the reactions of his own countrymen in *De itinere Frisonum* (On the journey of the Frisians). As had become usual practice with such maritime expeditions, the ships marshalled at Dartmouth, where they bound themselves together under a code of laws governing the organisation of the fleet. Count George of Wied was elected to overall command, while the important responsibility for the ships of the rearguard was given to Count William of Orange (who less than three years earlier had fought with the allies at Bouvines). The fleet struck out across the Bay of Biscay and, like so many of their predecessors, was savaged by the unpredictable weather in that unforgiving stretch of ocean. The battered flotilla made a brief stop at Compostela to visit the shrine of St James, before continuing down the coast to reach Lisbon in July. On their arrival the crusaders were met by Bishop Soeiro Viegas of Lisbon (1210–1232) and Bishop Soeiro II of Évora (1205–1229), along with the local commanders of the Templars, Hospitallers and the order of Santiago based in Palmela.³⁷ The bishop of Lisbon took the lead in the negotiations, preaching a sermon to the newcomers at the culmination of which he proposed a joint assault on Alcácer do Sal – which had been in Muslim hands since the Almohad offensives of the 1190s. It was at this point that the accounts provided by the German and the Frisian authors begin to diverge.

According to the more florid version of events provided by the *Gosuini de expugnatione Salaciae carmen*, Bishop Soeiro explained to his listeners that the castle of Alcácer was the key to the Muslim defence and had long been used as a staging area for devastating raids by land and sea. These attacks had become so effective that the garrison at Alcácer were able to send a tribute of 100 prisoners each year to the Almohad caliph in Morocco. The bishop also reminded the crusaders that the travelling conditions to the East were worsening. If they must winter somewhere, he suggested, why not turn a necessary delay into a profitable military operation? The author of the *Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum* tells much the same story, although he is more careful to emphasise the contribution made by the leaders of the fleet to the argument for attacking Alcácer. According to the Rhenish eyewitness it was these men, rather than the bishop, who pointed to the deteriorating weather conditions. They reinforced their case by reminding their fellows that the other crusading contingents mustering in the Mediterranean

ports were already behind schedule and could not be expected to arrive in the East until the following season.³⁸ Such then is the Germanic recollection of the discussion. However the Frisian author presented a markedly different picture. The account in *De itinere Frisonum* glosses over the points emphasised by the German authors and focuses instead on the pecuniary inducements laid before the crusaders. In this account Bishop Soeiro simply offered the northerners the usual reward of all moveable spoils in the city.³⁹ These differences are highly illuminating when set against the reactions the bishop's request drew from the various contingents.

The two named leaders of the expedition, Count George of Wied and Count William of Orange, were both strongly in favour of their joining in an attack on Alcácer, as were the majority of the Germans. Not so the Frisians. A groundswell of opposition was led by the formidable Abbot Heribert II of Werden (1197–1226) and the reservations he raised were serious ones. The abbot argued that both Pope Innocent and Pope Honorius had actively discouraged impromptu wayside campaigns by contingents en route to the Holy Land. Moreover, as the abbot pointed out with all the confidence of an eyewitness, at the Lateran Council two years earlier, Innocent had expressly refused to extend spiritual support to these same Portuguese bishops for just such an operation.⁴⁰ Abbot Heribert insisted on total obedience to papal will and neither he nor his followers would agree to take part in an unauthorised campaign. Despite strenuous efforts by the Portuguese and the Rhinelanders at a reconciliation, the Frisians refused to be swayed and so on 28 July, amid considerable rancour, they continued eastwards with almost a third of the entire fleet. The remaining crusaders boarded their own vessels and prepared to advance against Alcácer.⁴¹

Discord between different contingents of northern crusaders was a common feature of their participation in earlier Portuguese campaigns, but never before had such disagreement proved stronger than the oaths binding the crusaders together. In this case, however, the nature of the argument seems to have changed. In earlier disputes, beneath the layers of cultural prejudices and misunderstanding, there frequently lurked fundamental doubts about the legitimacy of applying crusading ideology to warfare in the Iberian Peninsula. Yet every indication suggests that by 1217 both Frisians and Rhinelanders shared a conception of the crusade as incorporating both armed pilgrimage and the duty to assist fellow Christians. Certainly none of the eyewitnesses sought to deny the obligation to defend Christendom in Portugal or that the Muslims of al-Andalus were a valid target for attack. On their arrival in Lisbon too, the crusaders visited the tombs of the soldiers killed during the siege of the city in 1147, and clearly viewed them as martyrs capable of working miracles on their behalf.⁴² Suggestive too is the greater moral weight the thirteenth-century crusaders gave to their own motivations. While earlier mariners had been unselfconscious about their hopes for financial benefit, those who elected to stay in 1217 were reticent about

such inducements. The departing Frisians, on the other hand, recalled the promise of spoils as the major point in the argument they rejected. By the very differences in their recollections both groups reveal that the desire to secure financial benefit, even for use in meeting the expenses of pilgrimage, had come to be seen as unworthy of the higher aims of the crusade.

If crusaders from both camps could accept the legitimacy of launching an attack against the Muslims of al-Andalus, where was the point of contention? The most voluble objections had been raised by Abbot Heribert on the grounds that the papal organisers of the crusade had forbidden wayside campaigning in order to direct all possible effort towards the Holy Land. In an ironic reversal, resistance came not from lay soldiers pursuing an earlier, simpler concept of pilgrimage, but rather from the very clergymen who throughout the twelfth century had sought to broaden the concept of crusade to include an obligation to defend fellow Christians. Yet the explanation for this clerical volte-face was simple: from the outset of the crusading movement successive popes experienced great difficulty controlling a crusade once it had been launched. The redirection of the Fourth Crusade away from the Holy Land and towards Christian Constantinople – in direct defiance of papal orders – provided the organisers of the Fifth Crusade with a salutary reminder of scope of this problem. One of the few effective levers the papacy possessed after a crusade had been launched was the obligation represented by the crusading vow. In 1217, therefore, papal insistence on concentrating all efforts onto the recapture of Jerusalem led to this anachronistic ecclesiastical re-emphasis of the pilgrimage aspect of the crusade.

Following the departure of Abbot Heribert and the Frisian ships the remaining crusaders joined with the Portuguese to invest the walls of Alcácer. Throughout August the allies maintained a fruitless siege of the town as attempts at assault and undermining were thwarted by the tenacious defenders. Meanwhile, the rulers of neighbouring Muslim communities, who also recognised the strategic importance of Alcácer, moved quickly to assemble a relief force. Troops from Badajoz, Seville, the Algarve and other more distant towns were joined by cavalry from Cordoba. To the dismayed crusaders this force appeared overwhelming: they estimated the enemy at as many as 100,000 troops led by a number of 'Saracen kings'. The flagging morale of the Christian army was lifted by the fortuitous arrival of local reinforcements led by Pedro Alvaritis, the commander of the Portuguese Templars, even as the crusaders were preparing themselves for the fray.⁴³ On the following day (10 September) the two armies were drawn up on the plain in front of the city, where a prolonged and sanguinary battle was fought. The Portuguese military orders took a prominent role, particularly the knights of Santiago under their pugnacious commander Martim Barregão, who was remembered by his comrades as small of stature, but possessing the heart of a lion. Many among the crusaders also believed they had received divine

assistance in their struggle, with eyewitnesses reporting the participation of a spectral, white-clad army bearing the sign of the cross. This combination of inspiration and desperation proved unstoppable, and the Muslim army was eventually overwhelmed and scattered with great loss.⁴⁴ Yet despite the destruction of the relieving army the defenders of Alcácer continued to resist for several weeks, before finally capitulating on October 21. While the majority of the unfortunate inhabitants were enslaved, to avoid this fate a number converted to Christianity, including the governor of the town.⁴⁵ For the first time, it seems, the Portuguese condoned the common crusading practice of allowing Muslim defenders to avoid the worst repercussions of defeat by accepting baptism.

The battle at the gates of Alcácer was a decisive victory not only because the Portuguese were able to recapture this strategically vital stronghold, but also because the destruction of the Muslim army left the lands further to the south all but undefended. Both the Portuguese and their German allies recognised the opportunities this situation presented. Bishop Soeiro of Lisbon sped a messenger to Rome asking that the northern fleet be allowed to remain in Portugal for an additional year. The conquest of the entire peninsula, the bishop assured Pope Honorius, had become a clear possibility. Count William of Orange reinforced this appeal with a letter of his own, in which he emphasised the decisive nature of their victory and claimed that the Muslim governor had converted to Christianity after witnessing miracles on the battlefield. Welcome as these tidings of victory may have been to Pope Honorius, they did not distract him from his primary goal. The pontiff offered warm congratulation to the victorious allies, but insisted that only those crusaders physically unable to continue their pilgrimage might be released from their vows. All others were ordered to complete their voyage eastwards as soon as was practicable.⁴⁶ The crusading fleet, therefore, wintered in Portugal until the easterly breezes returned in March the following year. Then, obedient to the pope's commands, they set sail once more for the Holy Land.

Where had King Afonso been during these decisive months? Surviving documents suggest that the Portuguese king and his court remained steadfastly in Santarém even as the siege of Alcácer was reaching its climax. There is no indication that Afonso took initiative in the planning of the operation or offered royal leadership once it had been launched; instead the organisational force behind the attack was the local clergy, particularly Bishop Soeiro of Lisbon, while the backbone of the Portuguese contingent was provided by the military orders. Nevertheless, King Afonso was certainly aware of the political benefits of being seen to be associated with the reconquest. At critical points during his reign, despite his own often straightened circumstances, the king had directed considerable royal largess towards the military orders. On 30 June 1211, as one of his first official acts on coming to power, Afonso had granted the knights of Évora full title to the castle of

Avis. The king was also careful to re-emphasise his close relations with the order in September 1217 – even as the siege of Alcácer was underway – by formally extending royal protection to the knights themselves and all of their holdings.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, in his communications with the papacy, the king moved adroitly to deflect any potential criticism for his failure to provide strong military leadership by suggesting that the semi-autonomous position of the *infantas* had undermined his ability to mount successful campaigns against the Muslims.⁴⁸ Such arguments proved effective and indeed did much to turn his absence from the battlefield into political advantage. For on 11 January 1218, only a matter of months after the fall of Alcácer, Pope Honorius reissued *Manifestis probatum*, confirming the king's pre-eminence in relation to the members of his own family. Implicit in this grant was a papal recognition that royal leadership was of central importance in maintaining a credible frontier defence.⁴⁹

Alcácer do Sal had been a frontline bastion since the Christian capture of Lisbon in 1147. The town changed hands several times in the decades that followed until, in 1217, al-Qāsir was finally lost to the Islamic world. The capture of the riverbank stronghold and the destruction of the relieving Muslim army hastened the eclipse of Almohad power that had begun at Las Navas de Tolosa four years earlier. But the fall of Alcácer also marked the close of another significant chapter in Portuguese history: this campaign proved to be the final documented instance of close cooperation between visiting crusaders and local troops. For more than a century northern fleets bound for the Holy Land had offered their co-religionists in Portugal assistance that was sometimes unwanted, occasionally decisive, but always unpredictable. The final stages of the reconquest would be completed by the Portuguese alone. Yet at the same time, the success of the final attack on Alcácer in 1217 also highlighted a growing crisis within the Portuguese government itself. During the campaign the local church had displayed a willingness to take the lead in matters that were by definition secular concerns. Bishop Soeiro in particular had demonstrated a remarkable ability for independent action, first presenting the proposal to the Lateran council and then blithely ignoring papal refusals to countenance his plans. His role in the military success had been pivotal – but in his triumph he had also usurped royal leadership over the reconquest itself.⁵⁰ This was to prove an unacceptable provocation. Royal moves to curb the power of the clergy in Portugal, until then hesitant and circumscribed in scope, began in the wake of Bishop Soeiro's military endeavours to become far more aggressive.

Conflicts between crown and mitre in Afonso's final years (1218–1223)

By 1218 King Afonso had made great strides in re-establishing royal authority, and a large measure of his success had been the result of a careful

re-engagement with the Latin world. Closer links with the ruling families of the Atlantic states brought the Portuguese king a valuable reinforcement of royal prestige, even as an appeal to Latin legal principles restored at least a measure of the resource base necessary for effective royal rule. Throughout these long years of reconstruction the Portuguese clergy had remained defiantly outside secular control; indeed the bitter struggle Afonso waged to assert royal pre-eminence over his own family had further entrenched the authority of the Church. Bishop Soeiro may have epitomised this dangerous independence, but he was by no means unusual among the prelates of the kingdom. Yet victory over the infantas, in conjunction with the long-anticipated papal reissue of *Manifestis probatum*, had finally loosened the trammels on royal action. From 1218 onwards Afonso stepped up his campaign to limit the financial and legal privileges enjoyed by the Portuguese Church, and this was to lead him into a series of bruising disputes with his own bishops and ultimately into a dramatic confrontation with papal authority.

Legalistic methods had served King Afonso well in his early efforts to re-establish royal pre-eminence, and this success encouraged the king to hope that similar techniques might be used to undermine the position of the Portuguese Church. The administrative institutions of royal government were more than ready to take up this new challenge. Although the venerable Chancellor Julião Pais, loyal servant to three generations of Portuguese royalty, had died in July 1215, his passing had brought little disruption to the official functions of the court. The new chancellor, Gonçalo Mendes, was a man who had served a long apprenticeship under Master Julião, and his appointment simply reinforced continuity of administration. Under Chancellor Gonçalo the chancery continued to improve in capacity and efficiency. Among the new chancellor's innovations was the institution from November 1217 of an official registry of royal documents. Under this more structured arrangement, important charters were copied and retained in separate archives for future reference. Order was brought to these archives by the imposition of filing systems to allow the rapid retrieval of material.⁵¹ These advances in the management and use of information provided the Portuguese king with a solid administrative base from which to launch a new royal assault on the formidable position the Church had established within his realm.

Even before the reissue of *Manifestis probatum* in 1218 Afonso had begun testing the limits of the many privileges enjoyed by the Portuguese clergy. As a result of the struggle with his own family the king had succeeded in obtaining a crucial papal confirmation that the royal patrimony could not legally be divided. Yet this was a principle that had wide implications. By arguing from this precedent that many of his father's other donations might also be considered an illegal diminishment of the royal patrimony, Afonso launched a formal investigation of land ownership and financial immunities

across Portugal. Between 1216 and 1220 royal agents scoured the kingdom, examining documents and questioning the oldest of local residents. Their findings were carefully tabulated by chancery notaries for presentation to the king. The *Confirmações* examined the rights by which the aristocracy and clergy held their lands, while the *Inquirições Gerais* sought to establish the legitimacy of earlier royal donations and exemptions. The result is a Portuguese Domesday Book, a snapshot of property ownership in many regions of the kingdom. In the course of their investigations the royal auditors discovered numerous abuses and recouped a significant amount of dissipated royal revenue. This success came at the cost of seriously antagonising the Portuguese clergy, with relations deteriorating still further when Afonso began to seek legal loopholes to impose additional financial obligations on individual churches.⁵² Attempts by royal agents to bring ecclesiastics who defaulted on these new obligations before secular courts raised simmering tensions to the boiling point.

Open conflict between the king and his highest clergymen broke out in 1218. An obscure crisis, seemingly instigated by firebrand preachers denouncing innovative royal policies, drew Bishop Pedro Soares of Coimbra into a war of words with his king. A potentially more serious confrontation flared between King Afonso and Bishop Soeiro of Lisbon, the belligerent prelate who had played such a pivotal role in the capture of Alcácer the previous year.⁵³ During the bishop's absence from the city at the siege Master Vicente, dean of the Lisbon cathedral and a leading royal agent, introduced several new measures for local administrative reform. On his triumphant return from the battlefield the bishop reacted angrily to these unauthorised initiatives. Never a man for half measures, Bishop Soeiro ousted Master Vicente from office and expelled him from the city. King Afonso was quick to offer Vicente his support; together they launched a campaign of intimidation against Bishop Soeiro and the canons of the cathedral. In the face of such blatant secular interference in his affairs the bishop turned to Rome for assistance. Pope Honorius hoped mediation might restore calm to the city and so on 25 October 1218 the pope ordered the abbot and prior of Alcobaça, along with senior representatives from the cathedral of Coimbra, to bring the groups together in negotiation. This intercession proved successful: Bishop Soeiro and Master Vicente were eventually reconciled and the latter returned to his office in Lisbon.⁵⁴

However even as this conflict was being resolved, other clergymen were finding reasons to defy royal authority. In 1218 King Afonso demanded the *colheita* (maintenance of the court) from religious institutions, in direct contravention of the agreements made at the *cortes* in 1211. The leading prelate in the kingdom, Archbishop Estêvão Soares da Silva of Braga (1212–1228), responded by summoning together an ecclesiastical council where he publicly berated Afonso's policies and moral character. The archbishop also appears to have opened negotiations with nobles hostile to

the king, including Martim Sanches, the illegitimate son of King Sancho o *Povoador*, who was at that time a rising power in the Leonese court.⁵⁵ The response of royal officials was to exert pressure on Archbishop Estêvão by concentrating their auditing efforts on the estates and privileges held by the prelate himself in the Braga region. In answer to the challenge thrown down by the royal accountants Archbishop Estêvão peremptorily excommunicated Afonso and his closest advisors, then for good measure imposed an interdict throughout the kingdom. This high-handed defiance enraged the king, who ordered the systematic seizure or destruction of the archbishop's revenues. The burghers of Coimbra and Guimarães enthusiastically joined forces with local knights and royal officials to obey the king's orders – prompting the archbishop to excommunicate everyone involved. Yet with this final flurry of ecclesiastical sanctions Archbishop Estêvão seems to have overplayed his hand. Violence broke out and the archbishop was obliged to flee the kingdom with only a few loyal companions.⁵⁶

The archbishop made his way to Rome and sought the support of the papal curia. His petition was well received and Pope Honorius issued a long series of letters in his defence. On 21 December 1220 bishops of Osma and Palencia were ordered to establish a special fund, to which all the dependent churches of Braga would contribute, for the purpose of supporting the archbishop financially during his struggle with Afonso. The bishops of Astorga, Orense and Túy were commanded to remonstrate with the king not only about his treatment of the archbishop, but also over his attempts to try clergymen in civil courts, and the taxes he had levied on the Church.⁵⁷ On 22 December the pope sent King Afonso a sharp rebuke in which the archbishop's actions were upheld and the monarch was warned against the blandishments of untrustworthy royal counsellors, with Chancellor Gonçalo Mendes and Pedro Anes, the *mordormo-mor*, singled out for particular censure. Nor was Pope Honorius above issuing threats:

...absolving your vassals from their oaths of loyalty, and binding with excommunication any who adhere to you, we grant your land to kings, magnates or any other to occupy, and to hold perpetually. After the ruin which you refused to avoid when you were able to, you will at last learn penitence.⁵⁸

To give these threats an even greater impact, on the same day Afonso was sent this hard-edged warning, the pope also forwarded a letter to King Alfonso of León, commending him on his loyalty and exhorting him to support in every way possible the unfairly persecuted archbishop of Braga.⁵⁹

These measures were far more comprehensive and indeed more menacing than those launched by Pope Innocent III against King Sancho I at the height of their dispute. Yet Afonso refused to be cowed. No doubt the king was encouraged by the fact that the Portuguese clergy were by no means

united behind the archbishop of Braga. Bishop Pedro of Coimbra, for example, though a steadfast defender of ecclesiastical rights and a man not afraid to defy royal authority, refused on this occasion to promulgate the archbishop's interdict in his see.⁶⁰ Despite escalating papal anger, Afonso was able to continue the business of royal government without apparent difficulty. Pedro Anes and Gonalo Mendes remained in office and indeed were rewarded for their efforts. Measures to restrict clerical privilege continued, and for three years the archbishop remained absent from his palace.⁶¹ On 16 June 1222, in a tacit acceptance of the failure of these measures to impose a settlement upon the king, Honorius issued a second wave of letters. The pope reiterated his threat to free Afonso's subjects from their oaths of loyalty and to sanction attacks on Portugal by other rulers. The abbots of Osseira and Celanova were ordered to excommunicate any defiant partisans of the king and to suspend from office Master Vicente, the dean of Lisbon, along with other royal officials in Porto and Coimbra.⁶² On this second occasion papal fulmination was to have greater effect, although not in quite the way Pope Honorius might have expected.

In the years following Archbishop Est v o's flight from the kingdom his secular ally Martim Sanches – Afonso's half brother – continued to threaten the northern borders of the kingdom. Taking advantage of the licence Pope Honorius had granted to Afonso's enemies, Martim led an army of Galician troops into Portuguese territory. The defenders were worsted in a series of skirmishes and several border towns, including Chaves, were occupied. Yet it was not so much the invasion itself that unsettled the court – for embassies sent to the king of Le n sought and gained reassurance that he did not support Martim's campaign – but rather the wider implications of the incursion. The ease with which the border had been compromised seems to indicate some deeper trouble within the kingdom, and for the first time there is direct evidence that Afonso may have been afflicted by some form of physical debilitation. An aristocratic chronicle, the *Livro de Linhagens*, recorded a popular story that Martim refused to give battle to royal forces until the king's banners had been removed, not due to any squeamishness about combating either his kinsman or his compatriots, but rather because it would be a blemish on his personal honour to be seen attacking the standard of a physically ailing foe.⁶³ The impression that the king's health was widely known to be deteriorating is to some extent corroborated by Afonso's decision in November 1220 to redraft his will. Doubts over the king's health cast royal policy into confusion as once again the fundamental weakness of the institution of the monarchy – its reliance on a single individual – unravelled ten years of patient effort.

In the face of the inescapable reality of his own mortality King Afonso, like his father before him, lost the will to resist the spiritual pressure applied by the Church. However, by the 1220s, the situation for the monarchy as an institution was worse even than it had been a decade earlier. The

heir-apparent, Prince Sancho, was perhaps thirteen years of age at the time of his father's obvious physical decline. Thus, in addition to Afonso's own fears for his prospects in the next world, he had also to face the virtual certainty of his son coming to the throne as a minor. In a kingdom faced with threats on all sides, the king needed to ensure that his son enjoyed at least a measure of support from the local prelates as well as the protection of the distant pope. The trusted royal agent Master Vicente of Lisbon was commissioned to open negotiations with Archbishop Estêvão of Braga in an effort to bring about a reconciliation. The archbishop, recognising the strength of his position, drove a hard bargain, and before any formal compromise could be reached the still-excommunicated king died on 25 March 1223. The Portuguese clergy appear to have stood on the letter of the law and refused to allow the king a church burial. This final impasse was only broken when the monks of Alcobaça, the beneficiaries of considerable royal largess, allowed Afonso's body to be laid to rest in their own chapel.⁶⁴

The reign of King Afonso II *o Gordo* is a tantalising story of potential never quite realised. Although Afonso inherited a weakened throne and a dwindling authority, he initially managed to use his one great asset, royal status, to great effect. By exploiting his unique access to the world beyond the peninsula Afonso was able to re-establish the pre-eminence of the monarchy within the kingdom and to recoup a large measure of the royal resources dissipated in the years before he came to power. But Afonso lacked his forbears' martial talents and, just as importantly, their good fortune in military matters. Portuguese royal forces were notably unsuccessful on the battlefield against local rivals, so too Afonso's allies in the Atlantic states experienced a long series of disasters that culminated at Bouvines in 1214. Most telling of all, other powers within the kingdom were able to usurp royal leadership over the struggle against Islam on the southern frontier. Without the unparalleled prestige successful military command could provide, Afonso was unable to overcome the entrenched power of a Portuguese Church bolstered by a pope more than ready to intervene in local affairs. Afonso's failure to counter this weight of ecclesiastical influence undermined all the gains his innovative approach to royal government had brought, and the authority he passed on to his young heir Sancho was in many ways weaker even than he had inherited himself.

8

The Final Campaign: Sancho II, Afonso III and the Completion of the Reconquest in Portugal (1223–1250)

The death of the ailing King Afonso in August 1223 marked a nadir in the fortunes of the Portuguese monarchy. Authority devolved onto Afonso's eldest son, Sancho, who had been born during the reign of his grandfather and namesake, Sancho *o Povoador*. The new king's childhood and early adolescence were spent under the shadow of his grandfather's deathbed capitulation, and much of Sancho's own reign would be shaped by the policies his father had adopted to restore royal fortunes. Although Sancho had four younger siblings, Afonso, Leonor, Fernando and João (who died before reaching adulthood), the establishment of the twin principles of primogeniture and the indivisibility of the royal patrimony ensured that he succeeded to the throne without challenge. Nevertheless, it was a bleak inheritance. Many of the aristocratic houses and the senior prelates of the kingdom had been deeply antagonised by his father's efforts to recoup royal resources at their expense. The close of Afonso's reign saw these discontented magnates in the ascendant, and they were determined to prevent the royal heir from similarly attempting to intervene in their affairs.

King Sancho came to the throne lacking a strong base of political support, but with one critical prerogative left to him. Unlike the sedentary Afonso *o Gordo*, the new king was a skilled and energetic soldier. In many ways the youthful Sancho harkened back to his great grandfather, Afonso Henriques, and like the first Portuguese king he recognised the political benefits of being seen as an active defender of the frontier. By enthusiastically embracing the crusade, Sancho was able to galvanise local forces under his leadership and secure invaluable papal support in his efforts to re-establish the position of the monarchy. Yet in a world that had grown more sophisticated, relations between Portugal and the wider Latin Christian world had become correspondingly complex. When martial proficiency alone proved insufficient

to bring lasting stability to the kingdom, Sancho grew impatient with the delicate international negotiations required simply to maintain a tottering Portuguese throne. Not so his younger brother, Infante Afonso. Although the adoption of Latin principles governing royal inheritance had excluded the second-born son from power in Portugal, Infante Afonso developed a greater familiarity with the world outside the peninsula. As the focus of Sancho's rule narrowed onto Iberian affairs, his younger brother emerged as the champion of Latin expectation. The ultimate result of this rivalry between the two royal brothers was to be a direct confrontation between local and external influence that plunged the kingdom into the chaos of civil war. Only when this fundamental tension had been resolved could the reconquest in Portugal be brought to its long-delayed conclusion.

Taking up the sword: the early reign of Sancho II (1223–1229)

At the time of his father's death Sancho had not yet reached the age of majority, which in Iberian society was fifteen years, and may himself have been of delicate health.¹ Despite these concerns, King Afonso appears to have made little provision for the maintenance of royal authority during the uncertain early years of his son's reign. There is no indication that a formal regency was established. Instead, royal authority was exercised by the senior members of the royal court on behalf and in the name of the boy king. The leading court figures at the close of Afonso's reign continued to manage the affairs of the kingdom. Foremost among them were Chancellor Gonçalo Mendes and the experienced royal counsellor Master Vicente of Lisbon. The formidable political and administrative talents of these two men were supported by the frequent attendance in court of the former *mordomo-mor*, Pedro Anes da Nóvoa, and Enrique Mendes de Sousa, his successor in office.² These men were very aware of the fundamental weakness of their position and the vulnerability of the young monarch. The most valuable service they could render at this dangerous time was to open negotiations with their long-standing political adversaries.

Archbishop Estêvão of Braga had become a formidable opponent of royal policy during Afonso's final years, but with the dawn of a new reign the royal officials saw an opportunity to improve relations with the most senior churchman in the kingdom. Financial compensation was offered to the archbishop for the damage done to his lands. Royal agents agreed to pay Archbishop Estêvão 6,000 *morabitino* gold coins outright and to deposit an additional 50,000 coins with an ecclesiastical council which would adjudicate subsequent claims. In June 1223 the archbishop accepted the proposal and lifted the ecclesiastical censures he had laid on the kingdom. Meanwhile, agreements were also reached with the new monarch's formidable aunts who, despite the setbacks they suffered in the papal courts, had vigorously maintained their resistance to royal authority throughout the previous reign. Under the settlement reached with King

Sancho's representatives, the aunts were guaranteed possession of their castles for life along with an annual grant of 40,000 *morabitinos*. In addition, the infantas were granted control over the settlements of Alenquer, Montemor and Esqueira. Town *forais* they had granted during the troubles were to be honoured by the king. After the infantas' deaths the towns would revert to royal control, except for Esqueira, which was to be donated to the monastery of Lorvão.³

These agreements with the senior clergy and the infantas effectively defused the two most divisive disputes Sancho had inherited from his father – although at considerable cost to the monarchy in both assets and prestige. Yet the royal representatives had little real choice. The authority they wielded was, in the absence of formally constituted regency, a tenuous one, and all too quickly rival interest groups within the court began to vie for position around the young king. The winter of 1224 appears to mark the beginning of a two-year period of considerable uncertainty as no less than four noblemen succeeded each other as *mordomo-mor*, while the average tenure in the equally important position of *alferes-mor* was only marginally longer, with three different men holding office in the space of months.⁴ This rapid turnover of court officials seems to reflect the ebbs and flows of a complex factional struggle for power. Further indications of a rising level of disorder in the kingdom can be glimpsed in the town charters granted during this period. A number of communities received royal *forais*, including Barqueiros and Sanguinedo in 1223; Cidadelhe, Noura and Murça in 1224; and Santa Cruz and Abreiro in 1225. The townsfolk accepted royal assurances of protection from unwanted aristocratic impositions and promised in return to provide militia troops to support King Sancho when required.⁵

The clergy also appear to have suffered in this rising tide of lawlessness. The archbishop of Braga may have reached an accommodation with the new regime, but not all the prelates of the kingdom were so fortunate. Letters from Pope Honorius to the abbot of Alcobaça and to the churches of the region urged them to support Bishop Soeiro of Lisbon in his efforts to punish those who infringed on ecclesiastical rights or threatened members of the clergy. These letters hint at deep social divisions within the city and the scope of the problem is indicated by a papal demands for action against Teresa and Sancha – both of whom were hitherto noted for their pious donations to the Church – for the deaths of several senior members of the bishop's household. Finally, in a long letter forwarded to the young king early in 1224, Pope Honorius issued a pointed warning against his following the unfortunate precedent set by his father Afonso. Yet despite the dangers faced by members of the clergy, the prelates themselves were unable to present a united front. Complaints from rival bishops accusing each other of managerial and moral failure reached the curia with depressing frequency. Meanwhile, royal agents worked tirelessly to present the king as a victim rather than a perpetrator of the disorder. Before the end of the year their efforts were rewarded. On 22 October 1224 Pope Honorius wrote to thank

Master Vicente for his efforts and for his assistance to the apostolic nuncio Gonzalo García, and he urged Vicente to serve the king faithfully and well in the office of chancellor. The pope then formally took Portugal under the protection of the Holy See, in recognition of the king's youth and the dangers presented by the volatile frontier with Islam. The bishop of Évora and the abbots of S. João de Tarouca and Salzeda were ordered to promulgate the edict through the kingdom.⁶

This gesture of support from the papacy was welcome indeed in the beleaguered royal court, and the year 1225 seems to have marked the beginning of a new phase in King Sancho's reign. At fifteen years of age, the king finally left childhood behind and could undergo his official arming ceremony. This ritual, the fundamental rite of passage throughout Iberian aristocratic society, was for the young king of particular importance. The act of taking his weapons from the high altar had become far more than merely symbolic. Despite his youth, King Sancho seemed well aware that only by successful military leadership could he hope to unite the disparate factions of the kingdom under his own authority, and only by leading these united forces southwards against the Muslim states could he expect to retain the all-important support of the Church. Certainly the opportunities for martial glory on the frontier had never seemed brighter. In the early decades of the thirteenth century the strategic situation in Iberia was swinging inexorably in favour of the Christian kingdoms. The hour appeared to have arrived when a bold and resolute monarch might reclaim political authority of the troubled kingdom of Portugal through a decisive demonstration of military prowess.

Muslim forces had suffered disastrous defeats at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 and again five years later at Alcácer do Sal. The eclipse of Almohad power in the peninsula that began on these battlefields was hastened by political uncertainty at the heart of their empire. A little over a year after his failure at Las Navas de Tolosa Caliph Muhammad al-Nāsir met a violent death and authority passed to his young son, Yūsuf al-Mustansir. The new Almohad caliph was a retiring and solitary personality, content to allow his father's courtiers to rule on his behalf. His ten-year reign was a period of slow decline, but his death without heirs in 1224 precipitated a sudden crisis. The accession of Yūsuf's great-uncle 'Abd al-Wāhid b. Yūsuf, a formidable sexagenarian, provoked opposition that soon became violent rebellion. As attention focused on the resulting power struggle in Morocco, the Muslim frontier towns in Iberia found themselves without even the uncertain military support the Almohad regime had provided.⁷ Fortunately for these exposed communities, the Christians to the north were in no position to take immediate advantage of this weakness at the heart of the Almohad empire.

In Portugal, internal problems and an absence of royal leadership had prevented any sustained southern expansion during the reign of Afonso o Gordo. The Spanish kingdoms were beset with similar problems, for the

victorious kings of Las Navas Tolosa did not long survive their vanquished foe. In 1213 King Pedro of Aragon was killed at Muret by the soldiers of the Albigensian crusade, leaving behind an infant son, Jaime, and a kingdom in turmoil. In October the following year King Alfonso VIII of Castile died unexpectedly and the throne passed to his young son Enrique. However ill-fortune continued to haunt the Castilian royal house, and, after a reign of only three years, the youthful King Enrique was killed in an accident, throwing the realm into crisis. With the line of succession unclear, Queen Berenguela, the former wife of King Alfonso IX of León, stepped in to claim the throne, only to abdicate almost immediately in favour of her own son, who was then acclaimed as King Fernando. This unconventional solution steadied the kingdom, but it would be another two long years before the young king of Castile even came of age. The result of this series of dynastic misfortunes and court machination in three of the Iberian kingdoms was an extended period of minority rule and a royal absence from the frontier, but by 1225 this hiatus was coming to an end. Young and ambitious monarchs in Aragon, Castile and Portugal eagerly took command of royal armies and began turning their martial attentions southwards.

A first indication of military preparations underway in Portugal at this time was the formalisation of the young king's will, a sensible precaution to ensure the smooth disposition of royal assets in the event of his death on campaign. In the summer of 1225 the communities of al-Andalus began to bear the brunt of this rising Christian belligerence when a Portuguese raid on the town of Tejada succeeded beyond expectations. A disastrous attempt at defence by the citizens of Seville led to Muslim casualties that some estimated as high as 20,000. This incident, as Hugh Kennedy has noted, starkly illuminated a growing crisis in al-Andalus as the withdrawal of Almohad leadership left local populations unprepared to resist Christian incursions.⁸ King Sancho saw in this situation an opportunity to make more lasting territorial gains and, since the agreements reached with the infantas three years earlier had normalised royal relations between Portugal and León, he was able to coordinate a campaign with his neighbour King Alfonso. Consequently, when the Leonese launched an assault on Badajoz in June 1226, the king of Portugal supported these efforts by leading an attack of his own against the city of Elvas.

King Sancho commanded from the front, as is made clear by the reward one Afonso Mendes Sarracines later received for protecting the king from harm during the assault; nevertheless, the operation did not go quite as planned. Although the breakdown of Almohad power in al-Andalus made outside support unlikely, the courageous citizens of Elvas mounted an effective defence. The Portuguese were thrown back from the walls (as indeed were the Leonese at Badajoz) and the dispirited attackers forced to retreat northwards empty-handed.⁹ Later chroniclers laid the blame for this failure on the contrariness of Sancho's own troops, and the king himself seems to have shared this opinion. On his return to Portugal King Sancho undertook

a major reorganisation of royal administration. Several of the most troublesome aristocrats appear to have been ushered out of the court, including members of the powerful northern clan of Mendes de Sousa and possibly Sancho's own younger brother, Afonso. The important office of mordomo-mor was re-entrusted to the experienced Pedro Anes da N6voa, who had held the office at the beginning of the reign. Consequently, even though King Sancho's first military operation on the frontier proved to be a tactical failure, it was in many ways a strategic success. This success was compounded on 13 July 1226 when, in the interest of encouraging further military operations, Pope Honorius allowed the archbishop of Braga to absolve members of the king's retinue who had been guilty of transgressions against the clergy.¹⁰

This willingness to look beyond past injuries seems to have reflected a papal curia unusually eager for any sign of crusading initiative from secular leaders. Pope Honorius had invested heavily in the Fifth Crusade, both financially and morally. All possible effort had been channelled across the Mediterranean (as the victors at Alcácer do Sal discovered in 1218); yet the campaign had ended in ignominious failure on the muddy banks of the Nile in 1221. Recriminations came from many quarters: the reputation of the papacy suffered and a heavy weight of criticism fell on Emperor Frederick II for his apparent indifference to the fate of Christendom in the East. Papal pressure for the emperor to redeem his publicly given crusading vows grew intense, and for his part Frederick seemed willing to accept the burden of an Eastern campaign. In March 1223 Frederick met at Ferentino with the pope and John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem by virtue of a politic royal marriage. During their discussions Frederick reiterated his support for the Holy Land and pledged to lead a new crusade within two years. As an earnest of his good intentions he agreed to marry John of Brienne's daughter, Yolande, heiress to the kingdom of Jerusalem. The ceremony took place in 1225, initially by proxy at Acre in August, and then again in person three months later in the cathedral at Brundisi. But John of Brienne soon found that he had miscalculated the character of his son-in-law. The newly wed Frederick claimed the throne of Jerusalem on the basis of his wife's rights of inheritance – effectively dispossessing his unfortunate predecessor. Meanwhile, Pope Honorius was also growing disillusioned with the emperor. The months of 1225 passed without the promised crusade materialising; Frederick continued making excuses to an ageing and increasingly despondent pope.¹¹ Against this background of general disappointment in the Holy Land, Pope Honorius no doubt found reports of the resurgence of military activity on the Iberian frontier a welcome change.

Moreover, in addition to presenting the pontiff with a heartening contrast to the mercurial Emperor Frederick, the activities of the young Iberian kings also highlighted the less than enthusiastic support the Spanish clergy had given to the crusade. The increasingly desperate situation in

the East had led Pope Honorius to seek financial aid from the churches of the Latin Christendom. His requests received a cool reception in Iberia, and when requests became demands the peninsular prelates adopted their customary approach to difficult papal directives by simply reinterpreting them along lines they preferred. Honorius' efforts were consistently stonewalled, and the difficulty his agents encountered in securing payment of funds intended for the defence of the Holy Land drew angry but ultimately ineffective remonstrations. Papal relations with the Spanish churches grew strained and the reputations of some of the leading Iberian ecclesiastics – notably Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo – were irreparably damaged as a result of their murkier financial dealings. Nor were the Portuguese churches more forthcoming with concrete support for the Eastern crusade. On 19 October 1225 the archbishops of Braga and Compostela were ordered to oversee the collection of the crusading tithe from the churches under their authority. A year later Pope Honorius was still dictating letters to the Portuguese prelates, attempting without apparent success to cajole them into supporting the defence of the Holy Land.¹²

The resulting tension between Pope Honorius and the Portuguese prelates appeared initially at least to have worked in King Sancho's favour. On the young king's return from Elvas he had undertaken a major reorganisation of the court and as his confidence grew he began to turn his attention to the task of stabilising royal authority within the kingdom. He found the balance between ambition and discretion a difficult one to strike, and tensions began to emerge in his relations with those ecclesiastical magnates whose privileges he sought to encroach upon. Initially complaints of royal heavy-handedness went unanswered by the papal curia, but when the death of Honorius brought Pope Gregory IX (1227–1241) to the throne of St Peter, the tenor of papal relations with Portugal began to change. On 5 May 1227 letters were addressed to King Sancho warning him against seeking to intimidate ecclesiastics, with his treatment of Bishop Martinho of Porto singled out for particular censure. Nor were these disagreements over rights and resources the only issue the new pope felt was in need of attention. In 1226 Bishop Martinho of Guarda had breathed his last, and the canons of the isolated cathedral elected Chancellor Vicente as his successor. The former dean of Lisbon no doubt welcomed the greater status the bishop's mitre conferred, but he was also loathe to surrender the many perquisites of high royal office. His prevarication eventually drew admonition from Pope Gregory, who pointedly reminded the bishop-elect of Guarda that his primary responsibility was the spiritual wellbeing of the Christian communities under his care. However, Chancellor Vicente chose to ignore papal pressure and continued to claim the authority of a bishop even as he remained in royal service.¹³ For their part, the prelates of the kingdom maintained the steady stream of complaint across the Pyrenees. Yet the papal response, when it finally came, was not quite what they had anticipated.

Pope Gregory had come to the papal throne after a long career as lawyer, legal scholar, judge and administrator. A man both complex and resolute, he was fully prepared to take up the challenge of settling affairs in the Iberian kingdoms. To this end, he dispatched Jean de Abbeville, cardinal bishop of Saint Sabina and a renowned Paris academic, as papal legate to the peninsula. Between 1227 and 1229 the legate travelled across the region carrying out a personal assessment of the situation in Spain and Portugal, and he was deeply distressed by what he found. Foremost among his concerns was the permissive attitude the Iberian prelates adopted towards female companionship – with clergymen customarily maintaining concubines within their households. The legate, former academic that he was, also found much to censure in the quality of ecclesiastical learning, and in the management and financial extravagance of the churches he visited. The uncompromising papal legate left in his wake a long trail of dismayed and chastened Spanish churchmen, and the Portuguese must have viewed his approach as a coming storm. But on whom would his fury ultimately fall?

In 1229 Jean de Abbeville convened a general council at Coimbra and summoned the ecclesiastical and secular magnates of the kingdom to attend. If the local bishops hoped for action to be taken against King Sancho and his royal officials they were to be disappointed. Instead the legate turned his attention to the ecclesiastical organisation of the kingdom and found much that he felt was in need of correction. Almost 2,000 clergymen of all levels fell victim to the legate's reforming zeal, with their various infractions attracting steep penalties and even deposition from office. In addition to this widespread censuring of ecclesiastical transgression, the legate also attempted to resolve several of the outstanding issues dividing the Portuguese Church. Judgement was rendered on the border disputes between Viseu, Coimbra and Guarda. The latter bishopric was combined with Idanha to the south, and Master Vicente was given the option of accepting the newly consolidated see or withdrawing his claim. After some prevarication the chancellor accepted the proffered mitre. Jean de Abbeville then turned his attention to the responsibilities of the king. Sancho was encouraged to support to restoration of Idanha and assist the new bishop in the task of attracting settlers to the region. Generous town charters were granted in rapid succession to Castelo Mendo, Idanha-a-Velha, Salvaterra do Extremo and Sortelha. The pope had also granted his legate the authority to offer spiritual rewards to those prepared to take up arms in defence of the frontier and King Sancho, recognising the way the wind was blowing, was more than willing to comply. Once again the young king mustered his army and began making preparations for another campaign against the deteriorating military forces of al-Andalus.¹⁴

The legatine mission of Jean de Abbeville left a deep imprint on the consciousness of a generation of dismayed Iberian clergymen, but the actions of the legate in Portugal in many ways confirmed the gradual restoration

of royal fortunes that had taken place during the first few years of King Sancho's reign. The youthful monarch had survived the dangerous period of his minority and while the realm had suffered considerable internal turmoil, with his coming of age the king had begun the task of reimposing order on the more turbulent of his own subjects. By 1229 this task was well in hand. The political situation in the kingdom demanded that the king take advantage of the strategic superiority the Christians had come to enjoy over the Muslims on the frontier, since successful military leadership brought internal unity to the fractious realm and provided the king with a justification for encroaching upon the privileged position of the Portuguese clergy. Yet a great question-mark still hung over the future. Would King Sancho prove capable of transforming the short-term advantages he had won by assuming a military role on the frontier into the basis of a more lasting royal authority?

The practical limitations of militarism

By taking up the sword Sancho had done much to establish himself at the centre of Portuguese affairs. Powerful nobles, the military orders and the civic militias were all prepared to follow strong royal leadership; yet the forces arrayed against the king remained formidable. As a group the aristocratic houses were inclined to resist centralised authority and any support they gave was calculated on the gains royal gratitude might yield. Furthermore, though the Portuguese prelates might have been briefly discomfited by the papal displeasure expressed through the legatine mission of Jean de Abbeville, the roots of their local power ran deeply. Success on the frontier gave the king a temporary ascendancy over these groups; but wars could not be maintained forever, even against a weakened foe. The young king seems to have gradually come to the realisation that the greater threat to his authority lay within the kingdom rather than without, and the use of indirect force, wielded against the vulnerable communities of al-Andalus, could only postpone more decisive confrontations.

The legatine mission of Jean de Abbeville coincided with an intensification of Christian military activity all along the frontier. The deposition and eventual murder of the elderly Caliph 'Abd al-Wāhid b. Yūsuf in 1224 had proved calamitous for the Almohad cause. The leader of the successful rebellion, 'Abd Allāh al-Ādil, was unable to control the disorder he had unleashed, and the empire quickly broke up as ambitious leaders scrambled for power. Despite the dangers facing al-Andalus, these jealous rivals refused to rise above their mutual hostilities, indulging instead in ruinous internal conflicts and forming alliances with Christian forces for temporary advantage. Popular opinion gradually turned against them and a growing anti-Almohad sentiment was harnessed by Muhammad b. Yūsuf b. Hūd al-Judhāmī, who may have been a direct descendent of the old taifa rulers

of Zaragoza. Ibn Hūd enjoyed early success in unifying the majority of al-Andalus under his leadership and by the end of 1228 Almohad influence in the peninsula was effectively over. The rulers of the new regime were then free to turn their attention to the looming threat on the frontier.

Early in 1230 Ibn Hūd raised an army with the intention of halting the implacable Christian advance by breaking the Leonese siege of Mérida. Although the operation enjoyed widespread popular support it was dogged by ill-fortune. The relieving army was intercepted near the town of Alanje by a strong Leonese army led by King Alfonso and numbering among its commanders Infante Pedro of Portugal (King Sancho's uncle). A decisive engagement was fought during which the Muslim army was out-manoeuvred and destroyed. In the bitter aftermath of defeat confidence in Ibn Hūd's leadership ebbed away, and the last vestiges of Muslim unity collapsed.¹⁵ Mérida – the ancient metropolitan for southern Portugal – was taken almost immediately by Leonese forces led by Infante Pedro, and the city of Zaragoza fell soon afterwards. When news of these defeats spread across al-Andalus many of those living precariously on the frontier yielded to despair. The people of Elvas, who had defended themselves so effectively against the Portuguese king only four years earlier, abandoned their homes and retreated southwards. King Sancho's forces were able to occupy Elvas without difficulty and he formalised his possession by immediately issuing a generous charter to encourage resettlement in the town. King Sancho then pressed on to occupy with similar ease the strategically placed town of Juromenha, overlooking the Guadiana River.¹⁶

Yet the Leonese victory at Alanje was followed almost immediately by a dramatic setback. On 24 September 1230 King Alfonso died unexpectedly, leaving the kingdom in the grip of considerable dynastic uncertainty. Alfonso had married Infanta Teresa of Portugal in 1191, but was forced by papal pressure to separate three years later. The couple had three children: Fernando, Sancha and Dulce. The king of León then wedded Berenguela of Castile in 1197; the five children of this marriage were Leonor, Fernando, Alfonso, Berenguela and Constance. Alfonso's second marriage lasted only seven years before papal resistance once again forced a separation. Berenguela and her children returned to Castile where, following the accidental death of King Enrique I in 1217, she was in the position to have her own son Fernando acclaimed king at an emergency council in Valladolid. Relations between father and son deteriorated during the years that followed. King Alfonso became adamant that Fernando would not be his heir, but due to the death in 1214 of his eldest son, borne to him by Infanta Teresa and also named Fernando, there seemed to be no alternative viable heirs. Yet events in the Holy Land were to impact unexpectedly in the Iberian Peninsula and present the king of León with an opportunity to at least partially disinherit Fernando of Castile.

Following the failure of the Fifth Crusade John of Brienne, the widowed king of Jerusalem, had travelled through the kingdoms of the West in a

largely unsuccessful effort to obtain financial and military support for the Holy Land. However in 1224, when at last he reached Iberia, King Alfonso of León suggested assistance of a different, more personal kind. John of Brienne had gained title to the kingdom of Jerusalem through marriage and his hold on the crown was tenuous; King Alfonso raised the possibility that a similar, more durable situation might be arranged for John in Spain. The Leonese monarch offered the king of Jerusalem the hand of Sancha, the elder daughter from his marriage to the Portuguese Infanta Teresa, in an agreement that implied John of Brienne would succeed to the throne of León after Alfonso's death. But before these negotiations could be concluded, Queen Berenguela of Castile intervened decisively on behalf of her son, King Fernando. John of Brienne was induced to accept a counter-proposal, the hand of Berenguela's own daughter, also named Berenguela, in marriage.¹⁷ A looming dynastic crisis was thus averted and five years later, despite the continuing hostility between royal father and son, when Alfonso breathed his last King Fernando inherited the crown of León.

The accession of King Fernando of Castile to his father's Leonese throne was a decisive moment in the historical development of the Iberian Peninsula. For the first time since the death of Alfonso VII in 1157 the kingdoms of León and Castile were united under the authority of a single monarch. This new unity of command had dire implications for the faltering defenders of al-Andalus; but King Sancho of Portugal might also have found cause to rue the choice of marriage partner made by John of Brienne. Dissention between León and Castile had frequently been turned to Portuguese advantage, while from King Sancho's perspective, an independent León ruled by a foreign monarch linked by marriage to his own house could well have been an attractive prospect. This though was not to be, and for the first time in more than seventy years, a Portuguese monarch was faced with the threat of a unified León-Castile. Fortunately for King Sancho of Portugal, the first priority of his powerful neighbour was to re-establish royal authority within his own territory. To this end Fernando was willing to make concessions to the Portuguese ruler. The two monarchs met at Sabagul and eventually were able to reach a workable *détente* under which, in return for Portuguese assurances of friendship and future military support, King Fernando ceded his rights to the disputed town of Chaves – seized by the Leonese during the reign of Afonso o Gordo. King Sancho formally took possession of the border strongpoint in April 1231.¹⁸

The agreement reached at Sabagul secured the western border of Portugal and allowed King Sancho to concentrate his attention on the southern marches of the kingdom. In the months that followed Portuguese forces moved against the strategically important towns of Serpa, Beja and Moura. Popular legend – venerable, but unsupported in contemporary documents – links one of the saddest stories from the Portuguese reconquest to the capture of the latter. According to this tale, the Portuguese came to learn of an

intended marriage between Salúquia, daughter of the municipal governor, and a youth from the nearby town of Arouche. An ambush was set for the bridegroom and his escorts, all of whom were killed. The Portuguese then dressed themselves in their victims' finery and in this disguise were able to enter the town unchallenged. They fell upon the startled guards, seized control of the gatehouse, and the main body of Portuguese troop stormed in to overwhelm the defenders. The unfortunate Salúquia, realising only then the terrible fate of her intended husband, leaped to her death from a high tower that still bears her name. The truth of this popular tale is uncertain, but what can be established by contemporary documents is that by the end of 1232 King Sancho's forces were in control of the town. Three years later royal troops, with the assistance of the knights of Santiago, captured Aljustrel, which was subsequently granted to the military order. In the years that followed the Portuguese king concentrated his efforts in the Guadiana valley, and by 1238 the city of Mértola along with nearby Alfar de Pena had been occupied by the Portuguese. Both these towns were also given into the keeping of Paio Peres Correia, master of the knights of Santiago.¹⁹

By the end of this eventful decade Portuguese troops had forced the frontier with the Islamic world more than a hundred kilometres southwards. In addition to these very significant territorial gains King Sancho had also secured important additional benefits as a result of his campaign against the communities of al-Andalus. The Portuguese prelates found during this time that their efforts to secure papal support against the king elicited limited sympathy. In October 1232 Pope Gregory made his views clear by formally admonishing the local bishops for stirring up unrest in the kingdom and thus undermining the war effort. He indemnified the king against any locally imposed ecclesiastical sanctions by forbidding the Portuguese prelates their powers of excommunication, for as long as royal forces were involved in military campaigns on the frontier. Further murmurings from the Portuguese bishops two years later drew another strongly worded response in support of royal authority.²⁰ Pope Gregory was also prepared to encourage King Sancho's military efforts more directly. On 24 October 1234 the pontiff conceded indulgences equivalent to those received by crusaders journeying to the Holy Land for campaigns undertaken by the Portuguese king. This offer was to remain in force for the next four years, and the benefits were extended to include troops under the command of the king's younger brother, Fernando of Serpa, who acted as his lieutenant during the southern offensive. This was the first time in the long history of crusading involvement in Portugal that spiritual rewards equivalent to those granted to travellers to Jerusalem were offered to local soldiers for specifically Portuguese campaigns. It was a royal indulgence indeed.²¹

Nevertheless, despite his victories and the papal approbation they had attracted, as the year passed, King Sancho found the role of pious frontier warrior more and more difficult to maintain. Military success against the

faltering defences of the Islamic south could only mask the many political problems within the kingdom; it did little in itself to resolve them. Efforts to restore monarchical authority had been partial at best, and the Portuguese clergy maintained a steady stream of complaint to Rome over the breakdown of central authority, even as they railed against any royal attempts to limit their own independence. Part of the problem faced by King Sancho during this period was a significant turnover of personnel in the highest of the kingdom's ecclesiastical offices.²² On one hand his own most effective administrator, Chancellor Vicente, had finally taken up his episcopal responsibilities in Guarda. After 1229 Bishop Vicente became a less frequent attendee at court and his absence created a vacuum that was difficult to fill. His successor in the office of chancellor, Durando Froiaz, proved far less capable of the delicate touch required to maintain a policy of gradual erosion of ecclesiastical privilege.²³ Meanwhile new clergymen, highly trained and proud in their accomplishments, were rising up through the ranks of the local churches. The doughty Archbishop Estêvão of Braga died in 1228; his successor, Archbishop Silvestre Godinho (1229–1244), was an experienced legalist, more than able to counter the king's best courtiers. The next year Bishop Soeiro of Évora breathed his last and after several years of uncertainty Bishop Fernando (1235–1246) was elevated to the see. The death of fractious Bishop Martinho of Porto at around the same time led to the election of Bishop Pedro Salvadores (1235–1247), and the new prelate soon demonstrated his own abilities by journeying to Rome to secure from Pope Gregory the authority to overturn the ecclesiastical penalties imposed by Jean de Abbeville almost two decades earlier.²⁴ Under the leadership of men such as these, the Portuguese clergy steadily became more effective in resisting further secular usurpation of Church privilege.

This rising tension between royal and ecclesiastical authority in Portugal came to focus on several key dioceses. Ironically, the first of these was the Idanha region, where Bishop Vicente – the former royal chancellor – was attempting to restore a semblance of episcopal authority in the troubled south-eastern borderlands of the kingdom. His efforts were consistently undermined by the actions of King Sancho's younger brother, Fernando of Serpa. An exasperated Bishop Vicente reported to the pope that the infante had established a lawless rule of violence, extorting money from innocents and churches, murdering those unwilling or unable to pay. So blatant did these offences become that in 1237 Prince Fernando was excommunicated. Meanwhile Bishop Pedro Salvadores of Porto was suffering similar depredations at the hands of the king's uncle, Rodrigo Sanches, whom the bishop accused of riding roughshod over ecclesiastical rights and threatening violence to anyone attempting to hinder him.²⁵ Yet even more volatile was the diocese of Lisbon, and it was here that the most dramatic scenes of confrontation would be played out.

The long and destabilising tenure of Bishop Soeiro had left the cathedral of Lisbon in an extremely traumatised state. The bishop had imposed an autocratic and wilful rule over the spiritual life of the city: his relations with the citizens had been delicate and his dealings with the royal court characterised by mutual mistrust. For the last five years of his life Bishop Soeiro had preferred to remain in Rome, in the entourage of Pope Gregory, where he lost no opportunity to tarnish King Sancho's name. When the bishop eventually died, far from his cathedral, he left the city and its churches deeply polarised. King Sancho was determined in future to exercise greater influence in the activities of the Lisbon clergy and to this end appears to have secured the election of Bishop Estevão Gomes to the turbulent see. The new bishop's disgruntled rivals immediately appealed the result to the papal court. Pope Gregory opened investigations in July 1237 and the following year declared that secular interference had indeed rendered the election void. Bishop Estevão was deposed and the pope authorised the consecration of the former bishop's chief rival, João Rolis, dean of Lisbon. However, Estevão's supporters refused to accept this ruling, and as tempers in the city frayed violent partisan struggles erupted. Royal troops played an active role in the resulting turmoil on behalf of the king's favourite, with events reaching a tragic climax when Fernando of Serpa surrounded a group of João's partisans in a Lisbon church. The royal troops refused to fight on holy ground, so the enraged Fernando incited the local Muslim citizens to launch an attack. The situation span rapidly out of control. A riot ensued in which blood was spilt and the church was savagely looted. This thoughtless act of violence proved to be a public relations disaster. Sancho and Fernando had shared the glory of crusading success, now they were linked together in sacrilegious infamy.²⁶

Against a background of clerical outcry the royal brothers were forced into a humiliating submission. Fernando was apparently struck with remorse for his actions and undertook a journey to Rome in search of absolution. Eventually the pope heard his confession and laid upon him a heavy penance, which included financial restitution to the offended bishops, the ransoming of twenty Christian captives, a promise to have no further dealings with the Muslims, and an undertaking to fight on the frontier for three years. His elder brother King Sancho also had contrition forced upon him. Facing the threat of excommunication and a kingdom-wide interdict Sancho capitulated to the authority of the archbishop of Braga. Substantial damages were paid to all the injured prelates, and the king added to this a number of valuable donations to the archbishop himself. Finally, Sancho agreed to devote himself to warfare against the enemies of the faith.²⁷ For a time at least the Portuguese king made every effort to fulfil these promises.

In 1240 King Sancho's troops captured Ayamonte at the mouth of the Guadiana River and then the important port of Cacela a few miles further along the coast. In recognition of the significant assistance provided by the

knights of Santiago the towns were subsequently granted to the military order. Two years later the Portuguese took control of the harbour town of Tavira, which also passed into the possession of the order of Santiago.²⁸ This advance down the Guadiana valley to the coast had effectively isolated the last Muslim strongholds in Portugal from their co-religionists to the east, and the reconquest looked to be entering its final phase. King Sancho and his commanders began formulating plans for a campaign to overwhelm this final Muslim enclave. The papacy was petitioned for crusading indulgences for operations by land and by sea, and these were duly granted. Those who agreed to take part in the campaign, as well as those willing to contribute financially, were offered the spiritual rewards of the crusader. Furthermore, the churches of the kingdom were ordered to assist the king with a subsidy to support the costs of the campaign. Yet even as these preparations were moving towards completion, Sancho allowed himself to be distracted by domestic issues. His interest in frontier warfare waned and eventually the campaign was ignominiously abandoned.²⁹

This was to prove a very costly mistake. Early in his reign King Sancho had recognised that military leadership was the most important royal prerogative remaining to him. For as long as he was prepared to take the lead on the frontier the papacy would support his authority in the face of the often obstreperous local prelates. Yet King Sancho lacked the crucial ability to translate military success on the frontier into a consolidation of royal power. The breathing space his victories gained was never effectively capitalised upon, and the lurid tales of violence and disorder in the kingdom circulated by his enemies ultimately compromised the king's reputation. By failing to complete the final phase of the reconquest, Sancho forfeited the opportunity to restore at least a measure of his own tarnished prestige, and instead drew down upon himself further papal opprobrium at what was to prove a critical juncture. For by the end of 1242, the possibility of reconciliation between the king and his opponents within Portugal was dwindling, and a viable opposition had begun to coalesce outside the borders of the kingdom. The attitude of the papacy would prove decisive in the bitter civil struggle that was to come.

A new religious fervour: the arrival of the mendicant friars in Portugal

From the closing decades of the twelfth century the political development of Portugal was largely shaped by a tension between the monarchy, seeking to establish a centralised authority, and the clergy, insisting on the absolute independence of the Church. Yet even as thirteenth-century kings struggled to counter the entrenched power of the Portuguese clergy, other manifestations of this same tension between secular and ecclesiastical society were emerging across Christendom. The success of the reform movement

in excluding secular society from the inner sanctum of the Church had created a spiritual vacuum in the lives of many lay people. Growing popular disenchantment with a seemingly aloof and worldly clergy provided a fertile seedbed for unorthodox, or even heretical movements, most notably the Albigensians of southern France. Yet these same popular spiritual yearnings also led to the foundation of a new form of orthodox religious institution: the mendicant friars. The two main mendicant organisations were the Order of Friars Minor, more commonly known as the Franciscans, and the Dominican Order of Preachers. Both the Franciscans and the Dominicans would come to exert an important long-term influence in Portugal.

The Order of Friars Minor was founded in the first decade of the thirteenth century by Francesco (Francis) Bernardone, the son of a prosperous merchant family from the northern Italian town of Assisi. Following a gradual spiritual crisis Francis renounced wealth and social position to pursue a life of personal austerity and service. He soon drew together a group of like-minded followers and together they sought to inspire those around them. By 1210 Francis had received verbal encouragement from Pope Innocent and thirteen years later the Franciscan order was formally recognised by Pope Honorius. The Franciscans attracted financial support and numerous recruits from across Latin Christendom, and Portugal was no exception. Local tradition holds that the first Portuguese convent was established at Bragança in 1214; more reliably documented is the mission sent two years later by Francis himself, led by Zacharia of Rome. Initially these early friars received a cool welcome from the conservative Portuguese, who mistook their ostentatious poverty as indicative of Albigensian leanings. The friars' prospects brightened when they won the support of Infanta Sancha and Queen Urraca (the wife of King Afonso *o Gordo*), and with their encouragement Franciscan houses were founded in Lisbon, Guimarães, Coimbra and Alenquer. More houses were to follow. In 1224 a convent was founded in Évora and another was subsequently established at Leiria. In 1233 Pope Gregory IX sent two bulls to Bishop Pedro Salvadores of Porto advising him to support the foundation of a convent within the city. The decade that followed saw the rapid growth of these houses and the foundation of additional Franciscan convents, including Estremoz in 1240 and Santarém in 1245.³⁰

If secular society offered the Franciscans an enthusiastic welcome, the reaction of the Portuguese clergy was more measured. Ecclesiastical institutions already established in Portugal were frequently dismissive of, or even openly hostile towards, the strange newcomers at their gates. Pope Gregory was a staunch friend to the Franciscans and on several occasions he felt obliged to intervene in Portugal on their behalf. In 1233 a general letter was circulated to the Portuguese prelates exhorting them to support the preaching efforts of the friars. The bishops of Viseu and Lamego were specifically enlisted to aid the Franciscans in Guimarães and Coimbra, where the

mendicants were being harassed by the Augustinian canons and the local clergy. Similar letters were forwarded to Bishop Pedro Salvadores of Porto, warning him to desist from obstructing the activities of the Franciscans. In Porto, however, the friars became a focus for the traditional tension in the city between the bishop and the burghers. Emotions soon began to run high. In the face of popular support for the mendicant preachers – and a perceived threat to his own dominant position – the bishop declared the Franciscans to be thieves, liars and heretics. He revoked their right to preach and ordered his troops to expel them from city. In the violent fracas that followed two friars were arrested, and the new convent was burned to the ground. The remaining Franciscans took flight, seeking shelter in the houses of sympathetic townsfolk, and then speeding reports of these events to Rome. An incensed Pope Gregory responded by ordering the archbishop of Braga and the bishops of Viseu and Lamego to intervene; fiery letters were addressed to Bishop Pedro threatening harsh ecclesiastical sanction. All was to no avail. In a papal bull dated 17 May 1241 Pope Gregory thanked the people of Porto for their continuing assistance to the friars and for their suggestion that the matter be adjudicated by the archbishop of Compostela, whose neutrality might be relied upon. Yet Pope Gregory died before anything concrete could be decided, and it was not until 1244, through the intervention of Pope Innocent IV, that the friars were finally able to return to Porto.³¹

The Franciscans thus made an immediate impact in Portugal; at the same time, however, the Portuguese were also to have an important influence on the early history of the order. Central to the Franciscan vocation was evangelicalism, and friars eagerly sought opportunities to preach their message of repentance to audiences of all kinds. In 1219 five Franciscan friars – Beraldus, Petrus, Adiutus, Accursius and Otto – arrived in Portugal with the intention of crossing into al-Andalus and preaching to the Muslims living there. Beraldus, who spoke a little Arabic, had taken charge of the mission after the original leader, Vitalis, fell ill in Aragon. Infanta Sancha welcomed the friars and provided them with disguises to facilitate their journey across the frontier to Seville. Once secure within the city the friars revealed themselves and attempted to enter the main mosque, only to be hindered by an angry crowd of worshippers. Eventually they were arrested by the ruler of the city who, faced with their refusal to leave peacefully, dispatched the friars to Morocco. On their arrival the Franciscans crossed paths with another member of the Portuguese royal family, Infante Pedro, the adventurous younger brother of King Afonso, who was at that time resident in Marrakech as commander of the Christian mercenaries in Almohad service. Initially Pedro sought to protect the friars, even going so far as to confine them to his house, but the new arrivals would not be gainsaid. Finally their persistent attempts to preach to the crowds led to their re-arrest and eventual execution on 16 January 1220, possibly at the hands of the sultan himself.³² The mortal remains of the five martyrs were

subsequently brought back to Coimbra by Infante Pedro, where they were received as holy relics by a delirious crowd. Meanwhile, tidings of their sacrifice spread northwards, eventually reaching the ears of Francis himself. On learning of the fate of these first Franciscan martyrs their leader reputedly exclaimed: 'Now I can truly say that I have five brothers!'³³

Among the many Portuguese who were deeply influenced by the actions of the five martyrs was one Fernando de Bulhões, a canon at the monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra. Fernando was born into a Lisbon merchant family and at the age of fifteen had defied his parents by entering the monastery of São Vicente de Fora. His family refused to accept his decision and made frequent attempts to lure him back into the world. Fernando found their efforts deeply embarrassing and eventually he retreated to the less accessible monastery of Santa Cruz. It was here that he first encountered the Franciscans, for friars from the convent at Olivares would sometimes visit the monastery to beg for food. Initially attracted to the Franciscan ethos of personal poverty, Fernando's interest was transformed into fervour when news of the martyrdom of the five friars in Morocco reached the city of Coimbra. With the permission of his superiors he joined the Franciscan order the following year and to mark this transition adopted a new name, Anthony. In emulation of his Franciscan role models Anthony embarked on his own journey to Morocco, but ill-health prevented him from preaching to the Muslim crowds. Rather than return to Portugal, Anthony travelled to Italy, where his skills as an orator were soon put to use countering the rise of heretical movements in the north of the country. In 1224 he journeyed to the Languedoc to preach against the spread of the Albigensian movement, further enhancing his reputation as orthodoxy's most effective speaker. By the time of Francis of Assisi's death in 1226 Anthony had become a leading figure in the order, appointed as the Franciscan representative at the papal court and minister for northern Italy. Ultimately these many tasks proved too much for his fragile health and, after four exhausting years, Anthony retired to Padua, where he died on 13 June 1231. Within a year he had been canonised by Pope Gregory as St Anthony of Padua – Fernando de Bulhões had travelled a long way indeed from the small house in the shadow of the Lisbon cathedral where he was born.³⁴

Iberian influences were even more pronounced in the early development of the second major mendicant order, the Dominicans, for the founder of the order, Dominic de Guzmán, was born in Caleruega in Castile. While on a diplomatic mission in the party of Bishop Diego of Osma, Dominic travelled through the south of France, at that time a hotbed of heretical thought, and he was deeply troubled by the ineffectiveness of church efforts to counteract the growing Albigensian presence in the region. Dominic conceived of the need for a corps of highly trained, orthodox preachers able to combat heretics on their own ground, using both measured argument and personal example. Gathering together a small group of followers, Dominic

established a base in Toulouse. On 22 December 1216 Pope Honorius took the order under apostolic protection on the understanding that the preachers would adhere to the Augustinian rule. The following year Dominic abruptly dispersed his followers, instructing them to seek further training and found additional convents in more distant lands. One of this early group of mendicant preachers, Soeiro Gomes, was of Portuguese birth, and in 1217 he returned to his homeland, intent on carrying out Dominic's instructions. Soeiro Gomes was successful in winning local support, and soon after his arrival founded the first Dominican house in Portugal at Montejunto, near Alenquer. A second Dominican convent was built at Santarém in 1219. Through the decades that followed more houses were established: at Coimbra in 1228, Porto in 1238, and Lisbon in 1241.³⁵ In common with the Franciscans, however, the Dominicans were unable to remain aloof from the political uncertainties they found within the kingdom.

Almost from the first the Dominicans became embroiled in local controversy. The arrival of the friars coincided with a period of rising tension between ecclesiastical and secular authorities throughout Portugal. On reaching Coimbra, Soeiro Gomes obtained licence to preach from Bishop Pedro, and used it to denounce what he considered to be an impious abuse of secular power. His vehement sermons culminated in the promulgation of a set of mysterious laws, the exact nature of which has been the cause of considerable speculation.³⁶ This behaviour hardly endeared the Dominicans to King Afonso, particularly when royal attempts to silence the turbulent friars embroiled the king in another unwanted confrontation with the Portuguese prelates. Over time, however, the Dominicans were to adopt a less confrontational posture towards royal government and came to be valued as intermediaries in delicate negotiations between ecclesiastical and secular interests. Thus in 1223 the Dominicans were appointed to oversee the agreements reached between King Sancho, the infantas and the archbishop of Braga. Yet even after the order had received this measure of trust, the ardent nature of the preaching friars could easily jeopardise their relations with both secular and ecclesiastical authority. In 1237 Bishop Pedro of Porto granted the Dominicans a house in the city, ostensibly because their presence was needed to counter the extreme misuse of royal authority in the region. Within a year, however, the bishop himself was in contention with the friars – who appear to have been too even-handed with their criticism for episcopal comfort.³⁷ Bishop Pedro's change of heart, particularly in light of his violent hostility towards the Franciscans, suggests that his initial support for the Dominicans was little more than a cynical attempt to use the preachers to discredit King Sancho, both locally and in Rome. They had, in essence, become unwilling pawns in a wider political struggle.

In fact the vicissitudes of the Dominicans in Porto highlight an important characteristic of the mendicant orders' early influence in Portugal more generally. Although the Franciscans and the Dominicans were strongly

supported on their arrival in the kingdom, the impact of the friars was in some respects very different to that of the earlier waves of monastic reform. The Augustinians, the Benedictines and the Cistercians had each in their turn won the support of secular rulers in Portugal who, while no doubt impressed by the spiritual discipline of each new reform, also quite clearly saw in these religious movements a means to garner important political advantages. This was far less the case when the mendicants came to Portugal. Individual kings might be personally attracted to these new forms of religiosity – indeed King Sancho's purported wish to be buried in the habit of a mendicant led later authors to give him the cognomen *o Capelo* (the cowled) – yet as an institution the friars could offer little support to the beleaguered monarchy. The mendicants appealed to a deep need in society and so won the confidence of kings, bishops and townspeople; but this wider base of support also encouraged the friars to preach as they saw fit, and to castigate perceived iniquity at any level. The Franciscans and the Dominicans thus became another random element in a political situation that was already highly charged. The growing influence of the friars, particularly during the reign of Sancho *o Capelo*, ultimately became simply one more complicating factor in royal relations with the Church.

Yet the early development of the mendicant orders, and the role Spanish and Portuguese people played in that development, is also suggestive of a more profound cultural shift in the relationship between the Iberian Peninsula and wider Latin Christendom. Earlier waves of religious reform had originated in the heartlands of Europe, predominantly in France and Italy. Religious and cultural innovation had been transferred southwards across the Pyrenees and adopted by Iberian peoples. The needs of local societies might lead to gradual modification of such institutions, most obviously in the development of indigenous military orders, but these were local variations on an exotic theme. By the thirteenth century this situation seems to have changed. Spanish and Portuguese people played pivotal roles in the early development of the mendicant orders from the outset, most notably in the persons of St Dominic and St Anthony of Padua. Rather than being simply recipients of cultural innovation, the Iberian peoples had emerged as active participants in the creation of European culture. In particular, the central role played by the Portuguese in the formative years of the Franciscan order is indicative of the degree to which the kingdom of Portugal had become more closely integrated into Latin Christendom. Yet the tumultuous closing years of King Sancho's reign were to demonstrate that such cultural realignment could also create considerable social dislocation.

A descent into anarchy

In the final years of the 1230s the rising tide of political crisis in Portugal appeared to have peaked as, under threat of ecclesiastical censure, King

Sancho negotiated settlements with the turbulent Portuguese prelates. To demonstrate his contrition for the violence perpetrated against members of the clergy the king had publicly dedicated himself to the defence of the frontier. However, this uneasy calm proved a very brief interlude, for tumultuous events in Italy were to produce unexpected reverberations in Portugal. The stormy relationship between Pope Gregory and Emperor Frederick finally collapsed in 1239, and as Italy descended into turmoil King Sancho saw an opportunity to renege on the agreements forced upon him by the Church. Consequently, even though the two secular monarchs were widely separated geographically and seem never to have communicated directly, their policies became interlinked; and in the end, this was to rebound on the king of Portugal in the most devastating fashion. For the renewal of conflict between King Sancho and the local clergy became more than simply a confrontation between royal and ecclesiastical power in Portugal, it also developed into a decisive test of Latin cultural and political influence in the Iberian Peninsula. Individual loyalties would be divided and families pitted against each other as the kingdom descended into the chaos of civil war.

During the 1220s Pope Gregory had been forced by political reality to moderate his initially uncompromising stance towards Emperor Frederick. By 1231 a fragile peace had been brokered between them, but this concord grew strained as Frederick strengthened his hold on northern Italy. Relations broke down again in 1239, following a decisive victory by Frederick's forces over the combined armies of the Lombard League. The danger that Rome and all the papal lands would come under Frederick's dominion had become immediate; Pope Gregory responded to this threat by once again excommunicating the emperor and summoning a general council to consider how best to meet imperial aggression. In obedience to Pope Gregory's call the most senior Portuguese prelates undertook the journey north, and by the end of 1240 the archbishop of Braga and the bishops of Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra had all reached Rome. Their sojourn outside Portugal was to prove far longer than any of them had anticipated. The flotilla of Genoese ships conveying the majority of the ecclesiastical delegates to Rome was captured by an imperial fleet, and the proposed council had to be abandoned. Before alternative arrangements could be made, the death of Pope Gregory on 21 August 1241 plunged the curia into a confusion that only worsened when the duly elected successor, Celestine IV, died less than three weeks after his elevation to the papal throne.

This prolonged crisis at the centre of papal affairs detained the Portuguese prelates in Rome, and during this absence from the peninsula their authority suffered. The departure of almost the entire cadre of the senior clergy had encouraged King Sancho to renew his campaign against ecclesiastical privilege. Even more dangerously for the churchmen of the kingdom, many nobles took advantage of royal animosity towards the clergy to make impositions of their own upon religious institutions. The local churches, lacking

either secular defenders or ecclesiastical champions with influence at court, found themselves at the mercy of aristocratic rapacity. Bishop Pedro Salvadores managed to return to Portugal by the end of 1242 to defend his threatened authority; the other prelates could only chafe as reports reached them of secular encroachment on ecclesiastical rights – and await their opportunity for revenge. Finally, on 28 June 1243, their most fervent prayers were answered with the election to the papal throne of Sinibaldo Fieschi, who took the name Innocent IV (1243–1254). The new pontiff wasted no time in demonstrating a determination to bring secular government to obedience. Abandoning Italy for the greater security of France, and the protection of the future saint King Louis IX, the new pope convened another council to meet at Lyon in 1245.³⁸

King Sancho, meanwhile, had done little during these years to indemnify himself against the hostility of the absent prelates. His failure to halt secular infringements on ecclesiastical rights was only one of the king's offences against Church sensibilities. Despite a very public undertaking to lead the final campaign against the last Muslim enclaves in mainland Portugal, and receiving generous crusading privileges to do so, the king allowed enthusiasm for the proposed crusade to ebb away. To critical observers the reason for King Sancho's sudden preoccupation with domestic matters was all too clear. The death of Count Álvaro Peres de Castro had left his wife, Mécia Lopes de Haro, as a young and attractive widow. Rather than pursuing the tasks ordained for him by his clergymen, King Sancho's mind turned instead to dynastic politics, and by 1241 he and Mécia were married. This marriage was highly controversial, not only because of its implication for the balance of power between local aristocratic houses, but also because of the relationship between Sancho and his new bride. Sancho was the great-grandson of Afonso Henriques; Mécia was the first king's great-great-granddaughter; therefore, the newly wedded couple fell within the 'forbidden degrees' of consanguinity. That Sancho pressed ahead with his nuptials in the face of ecclesiastical prohibition was a direct challenge to the moral authority of the Church.³⁹ Moreover, the king's choice of wife also had implications for the future of the royal family, since an uncanonical marriage complicated the status of any heirs Sancho might father. For the more perceptive in the royal inner circle, this final complication might have seemed the most ominous: the marriage between Sancho and Mécia greatly enhanced the prospects of another possible successor to the throne.

Sancho's younger brother, Afonso, had left the kingdom in the mid-1220s, possibly in haste, due to the failure of an aristocratic plot to place him on the throne. The Portuguese prince journeyed northwards to France and was welcomed into the highest circles of court society. He spent his formative years among the French aristocracy and in 1239 married Matilda, the daughter of Count Renaud of Dammartin, and thereby became count of Boulogne. Afonso thus followed in a family tradition of marrying advantageously in

the Atlantic states; yet he was to prove more fortunate in his political affiliations than had his uncle, Fernando of Flanders (or indeed his father-in-law, Renaud of Dammartin). The new count of Boulogne rendered loyal and effective support to King Louis and in 1242 played a conspicuous role at the Battle of Saintes, at which the continental ambitions of King Henry III of England were brought to an abrupt end. Yet even as his star was rising in France, the count of Boulogne still kept himself appraised of Portuguese affairs, for Count Afonso was second in line to the throne of Portugal, at least until his elder brother fathered a legitimate heir – an eventuality made far less likely by Sancho's ill-considered marriage to Mécia Lopes de Haro. Just how active a role Afonso took in the growing resistance to his brother's rule in Portugal is unclear, but by 1243 the count was certainly aware of the opportunities arising in his homeland. On 29 June of that year the Patent Rolls for Bordeaux record the grant of a safe passage for Afonso of Boulogne to undertake a pilgrimage to Compostela, and local chroniclers confirmed that his journey took place in 1244.⁴⁰ The true purpose of this visit would seem to have been to carry out a first-hand appraisal of the situation in Portugal.

By the beginning of 1245 then, a combination of waning papal fortunes in Italy and Sancho's own erratic behaviour had brought the king's most dangerous opponents into close proximity with each other in France: Count Afonso was returning from his 'pilgrimage' to Compostela; Pope Innocent and the Portuguese prelates were gathered at Lyon in readiness for the ecclesiastical council planned for the end of June. The threat posed by this concentration of hostile forces became clear almost immediately. On 30 January Pope Innocent encouraged the count of Boulogne to raise an army for a crusade in the Holy Land. Just as pilgrimage had been used by the count as pretext for reconnaissance, the crusade now become an excuse to mobilise troops under Afonso's banner. Three months later the pope made his intention clear by granting formal permission for the newly raised army to be used in Spain.⁴¹ A further papal bull issued on the 12 February, ostensibly in reply to a petition from Count Afonso, commanded the archbishop of Compostela and the bishop of Astorga to annul the marriage between King Sancho and Mécia.⁴² Only then, on 20 March, did the pontiff address Sancho directly. The king was admonished for the deplorable state the kingdom had reached under his authority. Significantly, the long list of royal transgressions, which included all manner of illegal exaction and crime, culminated in an alleged failure to adequately defend the frontier. The pope warned the king that the bishops of Porto and Coimbra, along with representatives from the Dominican order, had been appointed to investigate his behaviour and present a full report to the Council of Lyon.⁴³ Sancho seems to have made an effort to win favour with Bishop Pedro of Porto by granting to him possession of the castle of Marachique in April, but this belated generosity was to no avail. When the Council of Lyon convened at the end of June

the Portuguese delegates loudly condemned their king. This was the public justification Pope Innocent sought and on 25 July, a week after the close of the council, the pontiff issued a formal bull of deposition. The Portuguese were freed from their oaths of loyalty to Sancho, though he would remain king in name only. Their obedience was to be given instead to the count of Boulogne, who would act as regent of the kingdom.⁴⁴

What was Innocent's motivation for this drastic action? Papal documents insist that the pontiff's overriding concerns were the security of the kingdom and the salvation of the king's own soul. Sancho was portrayed as not so much evil (*rex iniquus* or *tyrannus*) as ineffective (*rex inutilis*).⁴⁵ However, some six weeks after the promulgation of the bull of deposition, the Portuguese prelates made clear the more concrete benefits they expected to receive as a result of this papal intervention. In September Count Afonso met with Archbishop João Viegas of Braga and Bishop Tibúrcio of Coimbra in Paris, and learned from them the price he was expected to pay for the throne. The count swore an oath to uphold ecclesiastical privileges and immunities and also agreed to a raft of additional grants to the Portuguese prelates.⁴⁶ Yet Pope Innocent's intervention also seems to have reflected wider political issues. On 17 July 1245, during the final session of the Council of Lyon, the pontiff had taken the dramatic step of formally deposing Emperor Frederick and freeing his subjects from their allegiance to him.⁴⁷ This was a highly controversial use of papal authority and sparked consternation across Christendom. Against this background, it seems likely that Pope Innocent seized upon the situation in Portugal as an opportunity to demonstrate to other monarchs the fullness of papal power. Certainly Emperor Frederick appears to have interpreted the papal attack on King Sancho in this light. The emperor responded to these events by speeding letters to the kings of Europe, attacking the impropriety of Innocent's actions and stressing the danger it represented to all secular rulers.⁴⁸ Yet agitation in the imperial court provided scant comfort to Sancho: he had sought to make opportunistic use of Frederick's dispute with the papacy in his own struggle with the Portuguese prelates and had in return been made an object lesson to the still-defiant emperor.

The Portuguese people would also come to rue the actions of Pope Innocent, for regardless of the pontiff's ultimate aims, his intervention precipitated a civil war that convulsed the kingdom for the next two years. Even before the agreements in Paris were concluded, skirmishes had broken out between partisans of the rival brothers. King Sancho's lieutenant Martim Gil waged a shadowy but merciless campaign in the Porto region during which a number of local nobles were killed, among them Rodrigo Sanches, uncle to both Sancho and Afonso. Pope Innocent, meanwhile, succeeded in securing for Count Afonso the support of another uncle, the celebrated Infante Pedro, who had returned to the peninsula after an eventful career in Morocco, the Mediterranean and the Latin East. Hostilities began in earnest

in the final days of 1245 when Afonso finally arrived in person. The count decided to begin his campaign in Lisbon, rather than Porto, which suggests that his strongest support lay in southern Portugal, perhaps because it was here that the military orders – his most important initial allies – were particularly influential. Royalist forces had consolidated north of the Tagus River, concentrating their defences around Coimbra. Any citizens thought to be loyal to Bishop Tibúrcio, including the cathedral chapter, were mocked and expelled from the city. Nor was King Sancho without external allies of his own. The Portuguese monarch sent messengers requesting aid and moral support from King Fernando of León-Castile. In response, the Spanish king forwarded an angry communiqué to Rome, accusing Count Afonso of merely exacerbating the problems of the kingdom. Pope Innocent replied with a repeat of the charges he had levelled against Sancho and a promise to remonstrate with the count of Boulogne. This response, however, did little to dampen Spanish concerns, and King Fernando's son, Infante Alfonso, began preparing an army to intervene more forcefully on Sancho's behalf.⁴⁹

Unfortunately for the Portuguese king, even though the Spanish were willing to assist his cause, their forces were already heavily committed to operations on the frontier. In April 1246 King Fernando had succeeded in reducing the Muslim stronghold of Jaén and he was eager to capitalise on this victory by attacking nearby Seville. Meanwhile, the situation for King Sancho's forces in Portugal deteriorated. Through the spring and early summer of 1246 Count Afonso's invading troops advanced on all fronts, occupying towns and castles, many of which yielded to him willingly. To make matters worse, during this long summer a disaster struck the royalist cause which had both personal and political implications: Queen Mécia was kidnapped from the palace at Coimbra by a band of enterprising nobles led by Raymond Viegas, brother to the archbishop of Braga. This forcible imposition of Pope Innocent's annulment of the marriage effectively removed the possibility of King Sancho producing an inconvenient royal heir to the throne. The king's dwindling hopes rose slightly in December, when Infante Alfonso finally crossed the border, leading a force of Spanish troops to support Coimbra. The archbishop of Braga immediately excommunicated the infante and his soldiers; Spanish protests at this high-handed action drew a conciliatory response from Pope Innocent and a promise to send papal representative to assess the situation in the kingdom. But by then, as the pope must surely have known, the royalist cause was already lost. Following a military skirmish near Leiria the Spanish troops retreated, taking King Sancho and his few remaining loyal retainers with them. The broken-hearted king went into exile in Toledo where he died early in January 1248.⁵⁰

When news of King Sancho's death reached Portugal, Afonso dropped the euphemistic titles he had used during the war – titles such as 'defender

of the kingdom' or 'procurator' – and openly adopted the trappings of royalty.⁵¹ Yet the kingdom he had usurped remained in a highly unstable state. Although local clergymen and Roman canonists might hail the wisdom and indeed the legitimacy of Pope Innocent's intervention, popular attitudes seemed quite different. Whatever Sancho's faults might have been, there was considerable local opposition to his deposition by a brother who had lived outside the kingdom for two decades and seemed to many to be all but a foreigner. One poignant example of popular sentiment came during Count Afonso's long siege of Coimbra. The royal governor, Martim de Freitas, displayed such unbending loyalty to his king, even after the royalist cause had clearly become hopeless, that he won the admiration of his enemies. But when Afonso offered to retain Martim in his office, the governor refused and cursed any of his descendants who would serve the new government.⁵² Nor was Martim de Freitas alone in these feelings. The *Livros de Linhagens* contain a number of clear expressions of disapproval for those knights who joined with Afonso for profit against their rightful king. Mem Cravo, who commanded Lanhoso castle, and Soeiro Bezerra and his sons, who held castles in Beira, were accused of treason for surrendering to Count Afonso. The inference in both cases was that they acted from self-interest alone.⁵³ Another secular source, the *Cantigas d'Escarnho* (songs of scorn) performed by troubadours in noble courts, are also heavily critical of Afonso's actions and impeached the honour of all those who had broken faith with their king.⁵⁴

Given the nature of the surviving evidence there is no way to know whether the many accusations made against King Sancho were based in fact, for the allegations of royal weakness and personal depravity were levelled by the very ecclesiastical interests that were working to depose him. What is clear, however, is the fundamental differences in character between the two royal brothers. Sancho, though he was the elder sibling, nevertheless projected a more youthful persona. His was a passionate nature, and his strengths included courage, military skill and the ability to excite great loyalty from those he led. Yet his horizons were narrow: he never adequately comprehended either the opportunities or the dangers Latin influence presented to a reigning peninsular monarch. Afonso, the younger brother, emerges as a matured, more experienced figure. There is a calculating quality to his character and he combined this with a greater cosmopolitanism. He was fully acculturated to European society and understood papal expectations all too well. With the full weight of Latin Christendom supporting him the usurping brother was able to overcome local resistance – and in this respect the deposition of King Sancho might be seen as a victory for Latin universalism over Portuguese regionalism. But it was a victory that had a very high price. Afonso came to rule over a war-weary population, large elements of which had acquired a profound distrust for the foreign influence in their affairs he himself personified.

The end of an era: the final phase of the reconquest

By the end of 1247 the count of Boulogne had secured executive power in Portugal through force of arms, and the death of his brother Sancho at the beginning of 1248 enabled Afonso to openly adopt the title of king. Although it seems probable that King Afonso summoned the Portuguese ecclesiastical and secular nobility to swear allegiance to the new regime early in 1248, and indeed Portuguese historians have sought to invent just such an assembly at Guimarães, the first documented gathering of the kingdom's leading figures did not take place until November 1248, at Ourém. In addition to senior court officials and a large number of local nobles, the assembly was attended by Archbishop João Viegas of Braga, along with the bishops of Lisbon, Coimbra, Lamego, Porto, Idanha, Évora and Viseu. Representatives from the military orders were also present to accept valuable donations from the grateful king. Yet the main subject of discussion appears to have been neither the unsettled internal order of the realm or the king's tense relations with neighbouring León-Castile. Instead, the assembled dignitaries turned their attention to planning the final assault on the fading remnants of the Muslim al-Garb.⁵⁵

Why did Afonso place such importance on the completion of the reconquest? The king of Portugal was well aware of papal expectations that the Iberian monarchs take active military leadership on the frontier. 'He had contracted a debt of blood to Rome and to Europe,' Alexandre Herculano stated bluntly: 'and he was obliged to pay it.'⁵⁶ Moreover, additional pressure was placed on Afonso by the conspicuous success other Iberian rulers enjoyed during this period against the crumbling Almohad defence. King Jaime I of Aragon (1213–1276) earned the epithet 'the Conqueror' through a series of spectacularly successful frontier campaigns. Between 1228 and 1235 King Jaime's forces captured and resettled the Balearic Islands. A still greater enterprise was the conquest of Valencia, which Pope Gregory IX proclaimed a crusade in 1232. The long campaign finally ended with complete Christian victory in 1245.⁵⁷ These victories were carefully recorded in a number of histories, including the autobiographical *Llibre dels feyts*, in which Jaime portrays himself as a crusading king to the virtual exclusion of his many administrative and social advances.⁵⁸ For the Leonese and Castilians too, this was a period of almost constant military triumph. Even as Portugal was descending into the chaos of civil war, King Fernando made vast territorial gains in the south. The city of Jaén was captured in 1246 and two years later, after a long and difficult siege, Seville also capitulated to Fernando's forces. In a public relations triumph the Spanish king was able to return to Compostela the church bells seized by al-Mansūr during his devastating campaign in the final years of the tenth century. These dramatic events were dutifully woven into an overall framework of triumphant reconquest by Leonese and Castilian authors and subsequently celebrated

in the courts of Europe.⁵⁹ King Afonso, who had only recently come to the throne due in large part to papal intervention, simply could not afford to disappoint ecclesiastical hopes for similar activity in the westernmost sector of the Iberian frontier.

Beyond a concern for his reputation in the papal court, a consideration of the situation within the kingdom could only have encouraged King Afonso to expedite an offensive against the Muslim south. In the wake of the deposition of King Sancho and the strife between the two royal brothers Portugal was a deeply divided land. One means to unify the troubled realm, and to bring secular and ecclesiastical interests together in common cause, was to wage a successful campaign against an ancient enemy. Not only would such a campaign provide the king with a valuable opportunity to demonstrate military leadership in an uncontroversial theatre of operations, the anticipated victory would also yield the means to reward faithful followers with booty or estates. Yet perhaps the most pressing reason why Afonso might seek to launch an immediate campaign across the frontier was simply the very real danger that if he did not quickly secure the southernmost territories of Portugal, his political rivals might do so first, for King Fernando's capture of Seville in November 1248 had opened the Algarve to further Spanish incursion. The rich lands of southern Portugal were a prize to be coveted by both kings; yet the legal rights to this territory were unclear. This was particularly true when the knights of the military orders took a leading role, since their supranational character could complicate the overall title to the lands they secured. Personal participation by the Portuguese king himself was the most effective way to establish royal rights over such disputed border territory.⁶⁰ It would seem, therefore, that a combination of several essentially pragmatic considerations, rather than any great antipathy towards the Muslim peoples of al-Garb, lay behind Afonso's decision to give immediate priority to launching a last, major offensive into the south. Such pragmatism was also the outstanding characteristic of the campaign that followed.

As a result of King Sancho's advance down the Guadiana valley a decade earlier the last Muslim enclaves were surrounded on all sides by Christian-held lands. The inevitable final assault must have seemed to both Christian and Muslim forces a foregone conclusion. The attacking army consisted of a number of royal troops, militiamen from the frontier towns, and a contingent from the order of Santiago. King Afonso does not seem to have sought or received any form of practical or moral assistance from outside the kingdom. No foreign soldiers were recruited for the operation; no crusading privileges were offered to participants. The final offensive was thus a purely Portuguese operation and it began in spring 1249 with an assault on the coastal town of Santa Maria de Faro. A later account, the *Crónica da Conquista do Algarve*, written under the auspices of the knights of Santiago, provides some indication of the progress of events.⁶¹ A remarkable picture

of tolerant restraint emerges in which, after a long and fairly desultory siege, the defenders were able to negotiate extremely generous terms:

The agreement that the king made with the Moors was as follows: he gave to them the same laws in all things as they had received from their own king, and they retained all their houses, vineyards, and inheritances; and the king undertook to defend and aid them against any other people who would do them ill. Those who wished to move to other Moorish lands might do so feely, with all their goods. The Moorish knights who remained were to become his vassals and come to him when summoned, and he would treat them with honour and mercy. In this way the king took Faro.⁶²

These businesslike negotiations were carried through without any indication of culturally based animosity. The following year the knights of Santiago were given custody over the town; the nearby castle of Albufeira was placed under the care of the military order of Avis. By the end of 1250 the last remaining Muslim strongholds at Porches, Loulé and Aljezur had also surrendered to royal forces. By and large the defenders appeared to display a weary resignation to the inevitable; the attackers an eagerness to complete a long-delayed task as expeditiously as possible. Thus, in a few short months, without fanfare or great bloodshed, the Portuguese reconquest was at last brought to an end.⁶³

The fall of these last Muslim strongholds in the Algarve has for modern historians marked the end of an era; contemporary authors, on the other hand, allowed these events to pass virtually unrecorded. This apparent indifference seems almost suspicious, particularly when compared to the wealth of laudatory historical writing supported by other Iberian rulers. Yet perhaps this silence is in itself revealing. Portuguese royal chroniclers had long tended to downplay the significance of what might be called the traditional *reconquista*, which emphasised the hegemony of the Leonese and Castilian kings as the heirs to Visigothic authority. For Afonso of Portugal to portray the final capture of the Algarve as the culmination of a three-hundred year campaign would also have implied an acknowledgement of King Fernando's claims for suzerainty over that same disputed territory. Yet the alternative narrative may have become equally discomfiting. During the twelfth century Portuguese authors had sought to avoid the more uncomfortable implications of the Visigothic inheritance by embracing the language of the crusade – and the wider Latin Christian identity it presupposed – to contextualise warfare against Muslims. By 1250, however, King Afonso may also have wished to distance himself from this tradition. During the thirteenth century the interests of the Portuguese monarchy had diverged from those of the papacy. The result had been three generations of rising turmoil, during which the Portuguese people had seen their kings attacked and deposed,

civil war sanctioned and the crusade itself put to controversial use. A high level of disillusionment with Latin institutions and influence would have been readily understandable – and it was against this background that the last offensive of the reconquest in Portugal was launched. Ultimately, this campaign was fought for purely practical ends, and King Afonso seemed to see no benefit in attempting to make it appear otherwise. As far as the king was concerned, the political significance of the frontier was dwindling even as the last Muslim enclaves surrendered. His attention, and that of his people, was already turning to fresh challenges, and new opportunities.

Conclusion: The Reconquest Kings of Portugal

In the mid-twelfth century Theotonio's anonymous hagiographer sought to illustrate his hero's integrity by describing an encounter between the saintly founder of Santa Cruz and Afonso Henriques. The Portuguese ruler was returning north after one of his many successful forays across the frontier – this time into the hinterland of Seville – and his troops were marching their enslaved captives back to Coimbra. These unfortunate prisoners included both Muslims and Mozarabs mingled indiscriminately together, but when Theotonio learned they were all destined for the same servitude he immediately intervened:

O king [he said] you and your nobles are all children of the one Holy Mother Church. Why then do you subjugate your kindred as slaves? In doing this you sin greatly against the Lord your God.¹

Initially Afonso and his troops were perplexed by Theotonio's attitude; but they soon yielded in the face of the saint's oratorical skill. A chastened Afonso released more than a thousand Mozarabic men, women and children into Theotonio's care. Nor was this the end of the saint's good deed, for his biographer scathingly recalled that the soft-skinned, city-dwelling Mozarabs proved incapable of working for their keep and ultimately became little more than burdens on the charity of the fledgling Augustinian monastery.

This dramatic vignette of daily life in frontier Portugal reflects a society that was in the midst of a profound transition. Afonso Henriques and his hard-bitten soldiers had not thought to distinguish among their captives on religious grounds. They were at war with the people of Seville and saw no need to draw finer distinctions among their enemies. In the complex, pluralistic culture of Iberia the simple fact that the Mozarabic prisoners shared their own faith was initially a matter of little or no concern to their Portuguese captors. Loyalties were constructed on such factors as geographical location and the bonds of kinship or common experience, rather than

on the basis of religious conviction. Theotonio's forceful intervention presented an alternative point of view and what was to become the foundation for a new self-identity; he spoke with the voice of Latin Christendom and echoed the more exclusive culture developing in the world beyond the Pyrenees. To the proponents of this culture, the essential characteristic of identity was spiritual belief and from this perspective the Portuguese soldiers bore a heavy responsibility for their co-religionists' wellbeing. At the same time, this faith-based association excluded all those who professed different beliefs and Theotonio, saintly or not, felt no obligation to plead on behalf of the Muslim prisoners. Similarly the anonymous author, apparently a canon in the European cultural bastion of Santa Cruz, made no effort whatsoever to conceal his own contempt for the Mozarabs and the culture of pluralism they personified.

But just as Theotonio reflected the social exclusivity of the Latin Christian cultural expansion into Iberia, Afonso Henriques represented the impact of what has been termed the 'aristocratic diaspora'.² The Burgundian dynasty came to Portugal on the first waves of European influence in the peninsula. Henry of Burgundy married into Spanish royalty and quickly integrated into local society; nevertheless, he continued to benefit from his exotic heritage by maintaining productive links with the great aristocratic houses of Latin Christendom, the reform papacy and the expansionist religious orders. His son Afonso Henriques, as heir to a two-fold cultural legacy, was uniquely placed to take advantage of the tides of change in the peninsula, first consolidating his position within Portugal sufficiently to declare himself king, then waging a long campaign to win international acknowledgement of this locally proclaimed royal status. Successful military leadership was essential to his struggle for political independence, but equally important was the careful cultivation of a reputation as a pious and effective defender of the frontier. The promulgation of the papal bull *Manifestis probatum* in 1179 was a remarkable triumph for Afonso's policies of international engagement, and yet it was a victory that also irrevocably bound the future of the Portuguese monarchy to the Latin Christian cultural expansion.

The thirteenth century brought complexities unknown to earlier generations and initially the monarchy was well placed to take advantage of the growing interconnectedness of the Latin Christian world. The focus of royal policy gradually shifted from conquest to consolidation. Urban growth and the profitability of international trade provided a strong foundation for the concentration of power into royal hands. The precocious Portuguese monarchy quickly established marriage links and close political alliances with other ruling families, first in Iberia and then in wider Latin Christendom. But in this new and vigorous climate old relationships came under greater strain; increasingly the thirteenth-century Portuguese kings chafed at the limits placed upon their authority by the power of the Church. Sancho *o Povoador*, Afonso *o Gordo* and Sancho *o Capelo* each adopted methods in keeping with

their individual personalities and with the nature of the resources available to them – but each in turn faltered before the entrenched influence of the Portuguese higher clergy, supported by an supranational papacy more than prepared to intervene in local affairs. Though the role of the Iberian kings as defenders of Christendom's southern frontier was acknowledged by the papacy, changing attitudes towards the struggle against Islam complicated the political value of the reconquest, and during the thirteenth century Portuguese monarchs were unable to draw lasting political advantage from military success. By 1248 the prestige of the Portuguese monarchy reached its nadir with the Church-sponsored deposition of the ill-starred King Sancho in favour of his younger brother, Afonso. The surrender of the last Muslim enclaves in Portugal the following year had by then lost all political significance and went virtually unnoticed outside the peninsula.

Yet the reconquest kings of Portugal achieved more than simply an anticlimax. If individual monarchs faltered, the institution itself continued to develop. In the period between 1140 and 1179 Afonso Henriques extended the scope of his locally proclaimed kingship by securing international recognition of his political independence and the hereditary nature of his rights. Yet at its core this status remained merely an acknowledgement of the king's existing secular authority. Royal status seemed to have been conceived of as a personal accoutrement held by the king himself, rather than any type of formalised obligation to the whole of society. This was made very evident by the final actions of King Sancho *o Povoador* who, despite his own policies of centralising authority into royal hands, alienated this authority on his deathbed without apparent qualm. However, his eldest son quickly demonstrated that the kingship was capable of further evolution. By appealing to Latin principles of primogeniture and the indivisibility of royal lands, Afonso *o Gordo* established the monarchy as a concept distinguishable from the person of the king. This was a subtle, but nonetheless crucial development, and one for which his own son would ultimately pay the price. For by setting the societal function of kingship above the will of an individual king, the possibility emerged of an 'unsuitable' monarch being denied this inherited responsibility. Hence, during the deposition crisis that ultimately brought down Sancho *o Capelo*, the fundamental choice faced – at least by his more politically astute subjects – was between fealty to an individual king and loyalty the evolving institution of the kingship itself.

For in fact the gradual re-conception of the monarchy as something more profound than the self-aggrandisement of an individual ruler reflected a more pervasive change within Portuguese society. In a time of widening horizons and a growing awareness of the threats and opportunities that lay beyond them, those groups most closely engaged with the outside world – the monarchy, the Church and the urban communities – found areas of common interests and means of cooperating in pursuit of mutual gain. Thus, during the campaign to secure political independence from Leonese

authority, Afonso Henriques had established a close association with the archbishops of Braga, most notably Archbishop João Peculiar, in order that they might both better defend their respective spheres of influence. His successor, King Sancho, was more often in contention with the local clergy and sought to bolster royal authority by creating stronger links of his own with the urban communities and their well-travelled merchants. This growing integration of different social spheres encouraged groups that had previously pursued narrow goals to identify their common interests, whether as clergymen seeking to defend secular political borders from ecclesiastical rivals, or urban militiamen from different towns mounting joint offensives. While on one level the expectations of this more integrated, more sophisticated society might impose constraints on the actions of an individual king, in the longer term this convergence of the disparate elements of society behind the institution of the monarchy formed a more enduring foundations for the kingdom as a whole.

Portugal was, even as Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão observed, a product of the *reconquista*. But the greatest achievements of the reconquest kings were not made on the battlefield; rather they were derived from their ability to use the unique characteristics of the frontier to mediate the influence of Latin Christendom to their own advantage. For in reality there was not one reconquest, but two. The first was a civil war between Christian and Muslim Iberians for political dominance of land; the second was a more subtle cultural struggle for the orientation of the resulting frontier society. In 1250 the territorial reconquest finally came to an end on the mainland; however, the cultural struggle for the orientation of Portuguese society continued to be waged, even indeed to the present day.

Appendix: Portuguese Voices

In recent years new editions of many of the most significant twelfth and thirteenth-century Spanish chronicles have been released to a wide and appreciative audience; many have also been translated for the English speaker and prefaced with comments detailing their authorship and provenance. Yet in the midst of this emerging chorus across the centuries medieval Portuguese voices have struggled to be heard. Even though the most important early documentary sources produced in Portugal were collated and published well over a century ago by Alexandre Herculano in the monumental collection *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica*, this material has (with the notable exception of the Anglo-Norman description of the siege of Lisbon) remained relatively unexplored.¹ A few short pages can scarcely do justice to the scope and complexity of this material; hopefully though, these very brief comments will provide at least a working context for some of the major sources referred to in the preceding footnotes.

Our knowledge of early events in the westernmost reaches of the Iberian Peninsula is largely reliant on the testimony of authors living and working elsewhere. Autochthonous historical writing begins with a series of interrelated documents, the earliest apparently dating from 1079, which have been published in several formats under different titles. Alexandre Herculano included portions of these fragmentary works in the first volume of his nineteenth-century compilation; a re-edited version was produced by Pierre David in 1947, using the title by which they are now customarily referred to: *Annales Portucalenses Veteres*. These annals consist of brief notices about major events structured into a strict chronology. David undertook a careful study of the relationship between the various extant documents and arranged the annals in broad chronological blocks, thus emphasising the links between manuscripts.² The earliest entries in the *Annales Portucalenses Veteres* are laconic references to the distant, semi-legendary past, but these brief and sporadic notes gradually become more detailed, with the final entry registering the attack by Gerald Sem Pavor on Badajoz in 1168.

A still more problematic source is the historical narrative traditionally referred to as the *Chronicon Gothorum*. The extant text of this chronicle is based on a copy made in the seventeenth century by the Cistercian scholar Antonio Brandão. Unfortunately the original document has not survived; nevertheless, there are strong grounds for relying on Brandão's efforts, and his rendering of the chronicle remains an important source for the reign of Afonso Henriques. The *Chronicon Gothorum* was included by Herculano in the *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica* and more recently has been re-edited by Maria Blöcker-Walter as *Annales D. Alfonsi Portugallensium Regis*. This

work describes in considerable detail the events of Afonso's career, beginning with his knighting ceremony in 1125 and continuing until 1184 – the king's penultimate year – at which point the account comes to a sudden end. Aware of the difficulties presented by the uncertain transmission of the document, Blöcker-Walter has subjected the text to an exacting comparison with other source material in a largely successful effort to establish its value for the historian.³

Another dimension to twelfth-century Portuguese society is provided by a series of hagiographies dedicated to local religious figures. The earliest of these was written between 1112 and 1128, in honour of the immigrant French clergyman Archbishop Gerald of Braga, by his admirer Archdeacon Bernard (later bishop of Coimbra). As the twelfth century progressed, the Augustinian monastery of Santa Cruz emerged as the cultural centre of the nascent kingdom. Two hagiographies were composed at Santa Cruz to celebrate the lives of Tello and St Theotonio, who had both played key roles in the foundation of the monastery. The first biography was written by Pedro Alvarde, probably before 1150 (since Tello breathed his last in 1136); the second composition, produced by an anonymous hand, appears to have been written soon after Theotonio's death in 1162. A third important hagiography produced in Santa Cruz at around the same time details the life and tragic death in captivity of the local religious luminary, St Martinho of Soure. These hagiographies contain a great deal of fascinating incidental information about daily life on the frontier and reveal quite starkly the tensions created by the political and cultural transformations occurring in Portugal at this time. All four of these narratives were included by Herculano in the *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica*, but a more recent edition of the lives of Tello, St Theotonio and St Martinho of Soure, along with exhaustive introduction and notes, has been produced by Aires A. Nascimento under the title *Hagiografia de Santa Cruz de Coimbra*.⁴

Adding to the information provided in these saintly biographies are a number of descriptions of specific military operations. One of these, the *De expugnatione Scalabis*, takes as its subject the Portuguese surprise attack on Santarém in 1147. Written at the royal monastery of Santa Cruz, *De expugnatione Scalabis* purports to be a first-hand account of the operation dictated by Afonso Henriques himself. Possibly this is too good to be true, and yet the text is internally consistent and seems to offer a detailed and very vivid picture of the events as they unfolded. Some seven months after the fall of Santarém the Portuguese and their crusader allies also captured Lisbon, and this victory was described by several eyewitnesses. The Anglo-Norman account known as *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* was first given prominence in the *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica* but has since become familiar to the Anglophone world due in large part to the admirable translation produced by Charles David in the 1930s. Several Portuguese editions were subsequently produced, updating David's invaluable footnotes and introduction,

most recently in the collection *Conquista do Lisboa aos Mouros* edited and translated (into Portuguese) by Nascimento, with an introduction by Maria João V. Branco.⁵ A Germanic perspective on the siege is presented in the several extant versions of the so-called 'Teutonic Letter'.⁶ For the next four decades military operations on the Portuguese frontier lacked a dedicated correspondent, until participants in the Third and the Fifth Crusades left eyewitness accounts of their contributions to the attacks on Silves in 1189 and Alcácer do Sal in 1217.⁷

Meanwhile, the changing cultural life in Portugal formed the background to a number of twelfth-century narratives charting the development of local religious institutions. The *Indiculum foundationis monasterii beati Sancti Vincentii* was produced in Lisbon towards the end of the twelfth century and, in addition to a description of the capture of the city, details the foundation and early expansion of the monastery of Sao Vicente de Fora. Editions of this important chronicle are to be found in the *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica* and, more recently, edited by Nascimento in *A Conquista do Lisboa aos Mouros*. The monastery's eponymous saint also became the subject of another composition, *Translatio et Miracula S. Vincentii*, which recounts the translation of the saint's relics to Lisbon in 1173. This celebratory work was written by Master Estêvão of the Lisbon cathedral, probably before 1180. Included by Herculano in his collection, it was also re-edited and published by Nascimento and Saul António Gomes.⁸ A final historical narrative of uncertain provenance is the *Crónicas breves e memórias avulsas de S. Cruz de Coimbra*, based on miscellaneous material collected in the monastery over several centuries, including references to Afonso Henriques and his son King Sancho – both of whom are buried in Santa Cruz. Herculano published a version of this chronicle in the *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica*; a more recent edition has been produced by Fernando V. Peixoto da Fonseca.⁹

In comparison to the twelfth century, the historiographical output in Portugal during the thirteenth century is quite disappointing. This relative hiatus is all the more noticeable because this same period saw the composition of a number of important histories in the other peninsular kingdoms. Authors such as Lucas of Túy and Rodrigo of Toledo produced extensive accounts of events in León and Castile; fortunately for the modern historian, these authors include a considerable amount of incidental information on Portugal. Similarly, the rapid expansion of links between western Iberia and the Latin Christian world led to an increasing number of references to events in Portugal being included in chronicles produced in distant regions of Europe. Nevertheless, the lack of a strong indigenous historiographical tradition is quite marked, and the only locally produced Portuguese chronicle to focus on events during this period in many ways simply emphasises the deadening general silence. The final Portuguese campaign on the southern frontier was described in the *Crónica da Conquista do Algarve*. This account was clearly written in an effort to support the territorial

claims of the Portuguese crown and military orders in the region. The text included by Herculano in the *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica* was based on a fifteenth-century manuscript discovered in Tavira and the reliability of the material has been called into question. There are indications, however, that the Tavira manuscript drew from still earlier accounts that have since been lost. Moreover, given the limited other source material available for the final phase of the reconquest, it is difficult to either confirm or discard such information as the chronicle provides.¹⁰

Tension between the monarchy and the Portuguese aristocracy threads accounts of battles and religious foundations; but this on-going friction is also the *raison d'être* behind the production of another series of important historical documents. The *Livros de Linhagens* are genealogical lists purporting to detail the descent of the leading noble houses and were assembled in response to royal efforts to appropriate aristocratic lands and limit ancestral privileges. While these folios rest heavily on aristocratic wishful thinking, they do include a good deal of supplementary information on the activities of various early notables. The *Livro Velho de Linhagens* appears to have been composed in the final decades of the thirteenth century; two subsequent compilations, the *Livro de Linhagens do Deão* and the *Livro de Linhagens do Conde D. Pedro* were brought together in the middle years of the fourteenth century. These genealogical lists have been edited under the guidance of José Mattoso in a new volume for the *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica* series.¹¹

The narrative record produced in Portugal provides a sometimes threadbare coverage of events; fortunately many additional details can be drawn from the relative wealth of official documents that have survived until modern times. In addition to a wide range of charters registering land ownership, donations and communications between secular and ecclesiastical magnates, Portugal can boast a rich collection of urban *forais*. Documents from the eleventh and twelfth century have been published in the several volumes of the *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica* series. Moreover, charters produced during the rule of Count Henry and Infanta Teresa, along with those issued by the royal courts of Afonso Henriques and Sancho o Povoador have been published in separate collections.¹² These documents can be corroborated by material found in the archives maintained by major religious institutions in the kingdom, which record in painstaking detail victories and defeats in the long ecclesiastical wrangles that convulsed the Iberian Church. The most significant of these collections were archived by church officials at Braga and Coimbra.¹³ From the end of the reign of King Sancho, however, the availability of royal documents diminishes. Extant records from the chanceries of Afonso II and Sancho II have not received the same scholarly attention as those of their immediate forebears. Some material, including the controversial census of ecclesiastical and aristocratic privilege undertaken by Afonso o Gordo, can be found in the later volumes of the

Portugaliae Monumenta Historica. Also useful are the documents included in the first volume of the *Monumenta Henricina*.¹⁴ By and large, however, the most accessible published versions of these documents outside Portugal are to be found in the registers of the thirteenth-century popes.

A century-long hiatus in Portuguese historical writing came to an end in spectacular fashion with the production of the first in what was to become a long tradition of Portuguese chronicles that harkened back to earlier eras. The authors of these works wrote under either royal or ecclesiastical patronage and were aware of the importance of their efforts in the political struggles of their time. In the desire to appeal to the tastes of demanding patrons these authors created an impressive national myth that was a bright tapestry interweaving imagination and historical fact. Nevertheless, these chroniclers had access to a wide range of material, much of which they copied into their own work, thus preserving the text of documents that might otherwise have been lost. This tradition reached a high point in the production during the seventeenth century of the multi-volume *Monarquia Lusitania*, covering the entire history of the kingdom. The reigns of the reconquest kings were researched by António Brandão, who fortunately was a prodigious transcriber of documents.¹⁵ Thanks to his efforts a number of important records have been preserved and indeed Brandão's volumes on the thirteenth-century kings often provide the most accessible published versions of documents, even though the originals have actually survived independently. Moreover, Brandão's work is in itself an engaging example of the fully developed traditionalist interpretation of Portuguese history. Thus, in addition to being a vehicle for the preservation of important source material, the *Monarquia Lusitania* has become in itself a source for a highly influential and indeed durable perception of the Portuguese past.

Figures




Figure 1 Portugal.



Figure 2 The Iberian Peninsula.




Figure 3 The Burgundian Dynasty in Portugal (to 1250).

Notes

Introduction

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53. C. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. M. W. Baldwin and W. Groffart (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 216–17.
54. Bishko, 'Fernando I and the origins', pp. 29–32, 41–42.
55. *Das Registers*, 1.6, 1.7, pp. 8–21; *The Register*, pp. 5–8. Given the earlier links between Rome and Aragon the singling out of Ebles is significant, since he was related by marriage to the Aragonese royal house. J. F. O'Callaghan, 'The integration of Christian Spain into Europe: the role of Alfonso VI of León-Castile', in Reilly (ed.), *Santiago, Saint Denis and Saint Peter*, p. 102. Certainly Abbot Suger of St Denis did not remember Count Ebles fondly, characterising him as a rapacious

- robber-noble with delusions of Spanish grandeur. *Vie de Louis VI le Gros*, ed. H. Waquet, 5 vols (Paris: Belle Lettres, 1964), p. 26.
56. Bishko, 'Fernando I and the origins', pp. 54–56.
 57. *Das Registers*, 4.28, p. 343; *The Register*, pp. 242–45.
 58. *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Cluny*, ed. A. Bruel, 6 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1876–1903), vol. 4, pp. 625–29.
 59. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 98–104; O'Callaghan, 'The integration of Christian Spain', pp. 103–104.
 60. *Das Registers*, 1.63–64, pp. 91–94; *The Register*, pp. 66–69.
 61. *Chronica Naierensis*, ed. J. A. Estévez Sola, in *Chronica Hispana Saeculi XII*, CCCM, 71A (Turnhout, 1995), 3. 18, p. 177; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 98–102; O'Callaghan, 'The integration of Christian Spain', pp. 107–108.
 62. Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon Regum Legionensium*, in S. Barton and R. Fletcher (trans.) *The World of El Cid. Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest*, p. 84, n. 67. For the dating of the council H. E. J. Cowdrey, *The Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 237–38.
 63. *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Cluny*, vol. 4, pp. 551–53.
 64. Gonzálves, 'The persistence of the Mozarabic liturgy', pp. 157–79.
 65. Costa, *O Bispo D. Pedro*, pp. 36–42. Ultimately Pope Paschal II (1100–1108) sanctioned Bishop Pedro's ordinations. PP, p. 161.
 66. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 199; PMH, *Diplomata et chartae*, pp. 340–41, 419–20.
 67. PMH, *Diplomata et chartae*, pp. 485–86; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 101–103, 237. For the depth of Mozarabic ill-feeling see also Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 218–20.
 68. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, p. 5.
 69. C. Erdmann, *Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten Jahrhundert der portugiesischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse Nr. 5, 1928); trans. by J. da Providência Costa as, *O Papado e Portugal no Primeiro Século da História Portuguesa* (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1935), p. 7, n. 1.
 70. P. Feige, 'La primacía de Toledo y la libertad de las demás metropolis de España. El ejemplo de Braga', *La introducción del Cister en España y Portugal* (Burgos: La Olmeda, 1991), p. 66; P. David, 'La crise de 1080', in David, *Études Historiques*, p. 423; but compare with Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 112–13.
 71. MGH, *Diplomatum regum et imperatorum Germaniae, Heinrich IV diplomata*, ed. D. v. Gladiss, 3 vols (Weimar, 1952–1978), vol. 2, no. 453, pp. 611–12; Hugh de Flavigny, MGH SS, vol. 8, p. 463; H. E. J. Cowdrey, *Pope Gregory VII, 1073–1085* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 228–32.
 72. PL 151: 288–290; Feige, 'La primacía de Toledo', pp. 66–72; Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, p. 47.
 73. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 12–13.
 74. *Vita Sancti Gerald archiepiscopi Bracarenensis*, in PMH, *Scriptores*, pp. 53–54.
 75. B. Sholod, *Charlemagne in Spain: The Cultural Legacy of Roncevalles* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1966); P. Boissonnade, *Du Nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland* (Paris: Édouard Champion, 1923), pp. 1–70; M. Defourneaux, *Les Français en Espagne aux XIe et XIIe siècles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949). See also M. Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 71–72.
 76. The 'proto-crusade' position is put forcefully by Boissonnade, *Du Nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland*, pp. 257–301; Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*,

- pp. 138–42; and J. F. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2003), pp. 24–25. A contrary position is taken by A. Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro 1064–1065: a reassessment', *Journal of Medieval History*, 9(1983), 129–44; Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 72–81. Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade in Spain', p. 42, adds: 'I regard [the Barbastro campaign] as a red herring in the history of crusading in Spain.'
77. The first of these references to papal involvement, the attribution of leadership to 'The commander of Rome', appears to be a translation error. Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro', p. 131. The second possible connection, the 'Spanish' privilege of Alexander II promising remission of penance, cannot be definitively linked to the Barbastro campaign. Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 72–76.
 78. Bishko, 'Fernando I and the origins', pp. 64–65.
 79. Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro', p. 141.
 80. Ferreiro, 'The siege of Barbastro', pp. 140–41; Lacarra, 'Dos tratados', pp. 125–26.
 81. PL 146: 1386–87.
 82. Suger of St Denis, *Vie de Louis VI*, p. 26.
 83. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 79–80.
 84. Boissonnade, *Du nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland*, pp. 30–31.
 85. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 106–16; Cowdrey, *Gregory VII*, p. 477.
 86. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 162.
 87. 'Abd Allāh, *The Tibyān*, pp. 116–17. See also A. Huici Miranda, *Las Grandes Batallas de la Reconquista durante las Invasiones Africanas (Almoravides, Almohades y Benimerines)* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1956), pp. 19–82.
 88. 'Historiae Francicae Fragmentum', in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. M. Bouquet and L. Delisle, 24 vols (Paris, 1738–1904), vol. 12, p. 2; and Hugh de Fleury, *Opera historica*, MGH SS, vol. 9, p. 390.
 89. A number of these knights left charters bearing witness to their motivations and their aims. Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 83–84.
 90. Boissonnade, *Du nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland*, pp. 33–35; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 210.
 91. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 194–98, 217. For the difficulty dating this agreement Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, pp. 58–60; and Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 26–29.
 92. Northrup, 'The imprisonment of King García', pp. 401–403; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 195–201.
 93. APV, pp. 300–01, 305; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 161–66; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 238–39.
 94. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 164; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 238–39, 242.
 95. APV, pp. 301–02; Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 104–06. Prior to marching south to defeat Raymond endorsed a charter in which Diego Gelmirez appears as notary.
 96. Raymond's last known document issued in Portugal was dated 9 September 1095, ES 40, p. 189.
 97. Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, pp. 61–70.
 98. For this dating see Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 240–41.
 99. Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon*, p. 88; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 234–35, 338–40.
 100. Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon*, p. 87, n. 85; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 247–49.
 101. 'Las crónicas anónimas de Sahagún', ed. J. Puyol y Alonso, *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, 76 (1920), 22, pp. 246–47.

2 Ambition in a World of Turmoil: Count Henry (1096–1112) and Infanta Teresa (1112–1128)

1. PMH, *Diplomata et chartae*, pp. 323–25; Merêa, 'De <<Portucale>> (civitas) ao Portugal', pp. 209–13.
2. CAI, 1. 73, p. 195. See also Barton and Fletcher, *The World of El Cid*, p. 195.
3. Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 36–38.
4. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.5, pp. 226–27.
5. P. Merêa, 'Sobre a concessão da terra Portuguesa a D. Henrique', in P. Merêa, *História e Direito (Escritos Dispersos)*, pp. 233–74.
6. One Frankish immigrant, Uzberto, and his son Pedro Uzbertz are mentioned in local documents. J. Mattoso, 'A região de Arganil: de fronteira a terra senhorial', in J. Mattoso, *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa. A Família e o Poder* (Lisbon: Editora Estampa, 1994), p. 322. In 1121 land was also granted to the Franks living in Guimarães, but nothing further is known of these people. DMP, vol. 1, p. 69.
7. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal no*, pp. 14–15.
8. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 290–314.
9. DMP, vol. 1, p. 4. Gontrond Moniz, Soeiro's wife, may have been the sister of Jimena, the mother of Infanta Teresa. A. Quintana Prieto, 'Jimena Muñiz, madre de Doña Teresa de Portugal', *Revista Portuguesa de História* 12(1969), 223–80.
10. Compostela laid claim to the churches of St Vitor and St Frutuoso; Astorga the parishes of Ledra, Alist and Bragança; and Mondoñedo claimed rights in Dume. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 15.
11. *Vita Sancti Geraldi*, p. 54; Costa, *O Bispo D. Pedro*, vol. 2, p. 422.
12. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 14.
13. *Vita Sancti Geraldi*, pp. 56–57; Feige, 'La primacia de Toledo', pp. 74–77.
14. The original bull has not survived, but was quoted in June 1121 in a missive from Calixtus II (1119–1124). Erdmann, PP, pp. 174–77; and by the same author, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 13; Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, p. 107.
15. Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, pp. 108–12.
16. B. F. Reilly, 'The "Historia Compostelana": the genesis and composition of a twelfth-century Spanish "Gesta"', *Speculum*, 44(1969), 78–85.
17. HC, I. 15, pp. 31–36; Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, pp. 114–15.
18. Thus da Costa, *O Bispo D. Pedro*, p. 19, acidly observes that generations of Muslims invaders refrained from damaging the tombs so readily plundered by the Galician clergymen.
19. PP, pp. 157–60. In March 1101 Bishop Maurice had secured papal endorsement of his authority over Viseu and Lamego. This action, almost certainly taken on his own initiative, was to be the source of a long series of ecclesiastical disputes. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 329.
20. HC, I. 17, pp. 36–42.
21. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 9–12, 17, 19, 21, 25. Henry and Teresa also confirmed a grant to the bishop of Coimbra in July 1109 in the company of Bernard of Toledo, in his capacity as papal legate. *Livro Preto. Cartulário da Sé de Coimbra*, dir. M. A. Rodrigues (Coimbra: Arquivo da Universidade, 1999), 59, pp. 99–101.
22. *Vita Sancti Geraldi*, pp. 53–55.
23. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 1–3; PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 350–60. Also J. F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 13–33 and 'The

- evolution of Portuguese municipal military policy during the High Middle Ages', *Mediterranean Studies*, 8 (1999), pp. 106–07.
24. APV, pp. 301–02. For the dating of this battle see H. B. Ruas, 'A data do desastre de Vatalandi', *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 4(1949), 361–73.
 25. R. Somerville, 'The council of Clermont (1095), and Latin Christian society,' *Archivum Historiae Pontificae*, 12 (1974), repr. in R. Somerville, *The Papacy, Councils and Canon Law in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990), pp. 71–73, 87.
 26. For Pedro Gutiérrez and Fernando Díaz, Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 305. Fortún Sanchez, Anzar Garcés, the brothers Iniguez, and Anzar Jiménez are identified by Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 97–98. The Burgundians are noted by J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095–1131* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), pp. 201, 212. Several additional possible Spanish crusaders are suggested by S. Barton, 'From tyrants to soldiers of Christ: the nobility of twelfth-century León-Castile and the struggle against Islam', *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 44(2002), pp. 35–36.
 27. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 6. 26, pp. 209–10; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 263.
 28. *Papsturkunden in Spanien*, 1. *Katalanien*, ed. P. Kehr. (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Kl., NS 18; Berlin, 1926), 23, p. 287. Translated in Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, p. 317. See also Barton, 'From tyrants to soldiers of Christ', pp. 35–38.
 29. PL 151: 504.
 30. Bull, *Knightly Piety*, p. 96.
 31. See below, p. 48.
 32. HC, I. 9, pp. 25–26; and I. 39, pp. 77–78; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 301.
 33. A. J. D. Dinis, 'Antecedentes da expansão ultramarina portuguesa', *Revista Portuguesa de História* 10(1962), pp. 108–09.
 34. PL 163: 508, 515; Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 108–09.
 35. J. M. Lacarra, 'La conquista de Zaragoza por Alfonso I (18 diciembre 1118)', *Al-Andalus*, 12(1947), pp. 65–69.
 36. For Calixtus' famous letter, JL 7116. The letter is translated and discussed by Jonathan and Louise Riley-Smith, *The Crusades. Idea and Reality, 1095–1274* (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), pp. 73–74. For the pronouncement of the Lateran Council see *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, ed. J. D. Mansi, 55 vols (Florence 1759–1962), vol. 21, p. 284.
 37. J. France, 'The First Crusade as a naval enterprise', *The Mariners' Mirror*, 83(1997), 389–97; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 12–26.
 38. L. Saavedra Machado, 'Os Ingleses em Portugal', *Biblos* 10(1933), p. 379; Snorri Sturluson, *Heimskringla: History of the Kings of Norway*, trans. L. M. Hollander (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), pp. 689–91.
 39. C. J. Bishko, 'Liturgical intercession at Cluny for the King-Emperors of León', in C. J. Bishko, *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History, 600–1300* (London: Variorum, 1984), VIII, pp. 79A–82A.
 40. DMP, vol. 1, p. 10. For the Cluniacs in Portugal see also J. Mattoso, *Le monachisme ibérique et Cluny. Les monastères du diocèse de Porto de l'an mille à 1200* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1968) and more recently the collection *Portugal Medieval. Novas interpretações*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1992); C. J. Bishko, 'Count Henry of Portugal, Cluny, and the antecedents of the Pacto Sucessório', in C. J. Bishko, *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History, 600–1300*, IX, pp. 180–81; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 296–97.

41. See below, n. 44.
42. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 3–4; PL 166: 944–66. For the dating and wider implications of this documents see C. J. Bishko 'Additional Note IX', in Bishko, *Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History*, p. 190A; and Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 26–29.
43. DMP, vol. 3, pp. 96–97. There were also (rather garbled) suspicions that the count sought to recruit soldiers to back his ambitions with force. 'Las crónicas anónimas de Sahagún', 76(1920), p. 247; T. de Sousa Soares, 'O governo de Portugal pelo Conde Henrique de Borgonha. Suas relações com as monarquias Leonesa-Castelhana e Argonesa', *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 14(1974), p. 376; C. Erdmann, 'Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 141(1929); trans. by A. Pinto de Carvalho as *A Ideia de Cruzada em Portugal* (Coimbra: Publicações do Instituto Alemão, 1940), pp. 6–7.
44. DMP, vol. 3, p. 109.
45. HC, I. 7, pp. 54–55. For the dating and circumstances of the count's death see J. E. Slaughter, 'Sobre la fecha de la muerte del Conde Raimundo de Galicia', *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 13(1983), 93–106.
46. Pelayo of Oviedo, *Chronicon regum Legionensium*, pp. 87–88. Although Pelayo is specific, later readers have frequently confused the renamed Zaida and Alfonso's previous wife, Elizabeth of Burgundy. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 339. See also Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', p. 47.
47. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 348–50; J. E. Slaughter, 'De nuevo sobre la batalla de Uclés', *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 9(1974–1979), 393–404.
48. Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, p. 352, n. 23.
49. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 6. 33, pp. 145–46.
50. 'Las crónicas anónimas de Sahagún', p. 247; Reilly, *Alfonso VI*, pp. 356–63; Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', p. 47.
51. Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, p. 623.
52. APV, p. 301; DMP, vol. 1, pp. 32–34.
53. B. F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Queen Urraca, 1109–1126* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 62–72.
54. 'Las crónicas anónimas de Sahagún', pp. 246–47. For a discussion of the dating of these events see Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 74, n. 100.
55. Uncertainty has long surrounded the date of Afonso's birth, although in recent years 1109 has come to be preferred. Long-held tradition named Afonso's birthplace as Guimarães, but growing agreement on the later birth date has led to a challenge in favour of the Viseu for this honour. J. Mattoso, *D. Afonso Henriques* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2006), pp. 16–17.
56. DMP, vol. 1, p. 43; 'Las crónicas anónimas de Sahagún', p. 247; L. G. Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, 6 vols (Lisbon: Edições Biblión, 1939–1944), vol. 3, pp. 103–04. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 74–86; Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 52–53.
57. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 33–34; AVP, pp. 305–07; Huici Miranda, *Las Grandes Batallas de la Reconquista*, pp. 103–34.
58. DMP, vol. 1, p. 42.
59. For the date of Henry's death see R. de Azevedo, DMP, vol. 1, pp. lv–lvi.
60. Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, p. 78.
61. DMP, vol. 1, p. 46.
62. L. L. Huneycutt, 'Female succession and the language of power in the writings of the twelfth-century Churchmen', in J. C. Parsons (ed.), *Medieval Queenship* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), p. 192.

63. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 37–44.
64. 'Las crónicas anónimas de Sahagún', pp. 346–47.
65. *Liber Fidei Sanctae Bracaraensis Ecclesiae*, ed. A. de Jesus da Costa, 3 vols (Braga: Junta Distrital de Braga, 1965–1990), vol. 3, 592, pp. 12–13; DMP, vol. 1, p. 42; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 83; Sousa Soares, 'O governo de Portugal pelo Conde Henrique', pp. 394–95; Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 141–42.
66. S. Barton, *The Aristocracy in Twelfth-Century León and Castile* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), pp. 278–79, 241–42; Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Alfonso VII, 1126–1157* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 8–9.
67. HC, I. 108–11, pp. 184–91; Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 140–43.
68. APV, p. 302; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 18–19.
69. HC, I. 76, pp. 118–19.
70. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 357.
71. *Vita S. Martini Sauriensis*, PMH, *Scriptores*, p. 60.
72. APV, pp. 302, 308; PP, pp. 171–72; Ibn Idhari, *Al-Bayān al-Mugrib. Nuevos fragmentos almorávid y almohades*, ed. A. Huici Miranda (Valencia: Textos Medievales, 1963), p. 151; T. de Sousa Soares, 'O governo de Portugal pela Infanta-Rainha D. Teresa (1112–1128)', in *Colectânea de Estudos em Honra do Prof. Doutor Damião Peres* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1974), pp. 101–03.
73. For example, APV, pp. 301–03; and *Vita Sancti Theotonii*, p. 81.
74. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 56–62, 104; PL 163: 408, 1255–56; Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 58–60, 63–68.
75. DMP, vol. 1, p. 40.
76. HC, I. 97–99, pp. 161–64; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 95–100.
77. PL 163: 361–62, 383, 385–87, 391; JL 6463–64; PP, pp. 167–68.
78. P. David, 'L'enigme de Maurice Bourdin', in P. David, *Études historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal*, pp. 441–501.
79. PP, pp. 173–74.
80. PL 163: 385; JL 6462. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 120–21.
81. PL 163: 491–92; JL 6637.
82. 3 November 1122. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 79–80; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 241.
83. PL 163: 1171.
84. HC, II. 16, pp. 254–58; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 242; Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, pp. 203–06.
85. HC, II. 89, pp. 410; *Queen Urraca*, pp. 117–18.
86. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 114–18.
87. At Burgos in 1117. The Huesca campaign in 1118 was promoted as a crusade by Pope Gelasius II and attracted considerable support from French noblemen. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 9–10.
88. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 144–46; possibly Afonso also acknowledged Queen Urraca's authority at this point. Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, vol. 3, pp. 123–25.
89. HC, II. 40, pp. 284–86.
90. PL 163: 1219–21; JL 6926–30; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 151.
91. PP, pp. 177–81.
92. PL 163: 1222–23; JL 6931–64.
93. PL 163: 1255–56.
94. HC, II. 63–64, pp. 347–56; JL 7160; Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, pp. 154, 211–12; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 185–88.
95. Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 212–16.
96. HC, II. 73, pp. 372–73; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, pp. 197, 228.
97. PP, pp. 183–85. The stinging judgement is Erdmann's, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 34.

98. 23 May 1127. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 96–98.
99. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 78–80; CAI, I, 5, pp. 151–52.
100. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 75–76, 87–89. Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 192, notes problems with one of the latter charters.
101. Sousa Soares, 'O governo de Portugal pela Infanta-Rainha D. Teresa', pp. 114–16; Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, pp. 116–18.
102. DMP, I, pp. 496–97.
103. *Vita Sancti Theotonii*, p. 81; see also P. Linehan, 'Santo Martino and the context of sanctity in 13th-century León', *Isidoriana*, 1(1987), 689–97; repr. in P. Linehan, *Past and Present in Medieval Spain*.
104. H. Dillard, *Daughters of the Reconquest. Women in Castilian Town Society, 1100–1300* (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), p. 109.
105. ADA, pp. 151; Reilly, *Queen Urraca*, p. 245.
106. CAI, I, 2–8, pp. 150–53.
107. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 18–19.
108. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 99–101.
109. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 351; Azevedo, *Historia de Portugal*, vol. 3, pp. 238–39.
110. Peres, *Como Nasceu Portugal*, pp. 122–23.
111. CMP-A, p. 10; DMP, vol. 1, p. 112; see also Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 100–04.
112. ADA, p. 152; B. F. Reilly, 'Alfonso VII of León-Castilla, the House of Trastámara, and the Emergence of the Kingdom of Portugal', *Mediaeval Studies*, 63(2001), pp. 196–98.

3 The Nascent Kingdom: Consolidation and Expansion under Afonso Henriques (1128–1148)

1. A. Herculano, *História de Portugal desde o começo da monarquia até o fim do reinado de Afonso III*, ed. J. Mattoso, 4 vols (Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 1989), vol. 1, p. 601.
2. CMP-A, p. 23; DMP, vol. 1, p. 121.
3. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 118–19; see also Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 109–14.
4. Mattoso, *Afonso Henriques*, pp. 36–38.
5. ADA, p. 152; A charter records the confiscated estates of the rebellious Aires Mendes and Pedro Pais being granted to João Viegas in return for his loyalty. DMP, vol. 1, p. 139.
6. M. J. V. Branco, 'The nobility of medieval Portugal (XIth–XIVth centuries)', in A. J. Duggan (ed.), *Nobles and Nobility in Medieval Europe. Concepts, Origins, Transformations* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000), pp. 232–38; J. Mattoso, *Ricos-Homens, Infanções e Cavaleiros. A nobreza medieval portuguesa nos séculos XI e XII* (Lisbon: Guimarães Editores, 1985), pp. 181–227.
7. Mattoso, *Ricos-Homens, Infanções e Cavaleiros*. pp. 159–60; Mattoso, *Afonso Henriques*, pp. 75–79.
8. For Martim Anaiia and Randulfo Soleimás see DMP, vol. 1, pp. 73–74, 147–48. Gonçalo Dias, appears as a signatory from 1126, DMP, vol. 1, p. 91. For Gonçalo's sons Fernando, Salvador and Gonçalo, who appear between 1154 and 1167. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 307–08, 379–80. His nephew Pedro Salvadores was seneschal in the court from 1179 until 1185, DMP, vol. 1, pp. cxxv–cxxvi. See also Mattoso, 'A região de Arganil', in Mattoso, *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa*, p. 322.

9. J. Mattoso, 'A nobreza de Entre Douro e Minho na história medieval de Portugal', in Mattoso, *A Nobreza Medieval Portuguesa*, pp. 301–06.
10. See above, n. 5.
11. *De expugnatione Scalabis*, PMH, *Scriptores*, p. 94.
12. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 108–09, 111–12.
13. *Vita Tellonis Archidiaconi*, p. 64. E. Austin O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio, the Twelfth-century Founders of the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra* (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1954), p. 46–49.
14. PP, p. 185; JL 7381. It was during this period that the mysterious 'Black Bishop' supposedly appeared in Portugal. Fifteenth-century legend holds that when churchmen remonstrated with Afonso Henriques over his treatment of Teresa, the Portuguese leader raised a Moor as bishop. When a papal legate was sent to Portugal Afonso threatened him physically and expelled him from the kingdom. The kingdom was placed under interdict as a result. *Crônicas breves e memorias avulsas de S. Cruz de Coimbra*, in PMH *Scriptores*, pp. 27–28. This tale may in fact be a fanciful allusion to Bishop Bernard, who was a former Benedictine monk. O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, p. 48, n. 55.
15. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 26.
16. *Vita Tellonis*, p. 65; M. J. V. Branco, 'The king's counsellors' two faces: a Portuguese perspective', in P. Linehan and J. L. Nelson (eds), *The Medieval World* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 520–23.
17. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 40–41; PP, pp. 188–89.
18. For the foundation of Santa Cruz see O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, pp. 36–86.
19. *Vita Tellonis*, pp. 64–65; CMP-A, pp. 42–44; DMP, vol. 1, pp. 138.
20. *Vita Tellonis*, p. 64. Domingo, a canon of Santa Cruz, was given the task of copying the customs of St Ruf. O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, p. 82.
21. *Vita Tellonis*, pp. 65–68; PP, pp. 190–92; O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, pp. 75–80.
22. ADA, p. 151.
23. *Vita Tellonis*, p. 65; Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.5–7, pp. 226–28; Lucas of Túy, *Chronicon Mundi*, ed. E. Falque Rey, CCCM 74 (Turnhout, 2003), 4.79, p. 317.
24. HC, III, 24, p. 458.
25. CAI, I, 74–7, pp. 185–86; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 42–43; Mattoso, *Afonso Henriques*, pp. 100–01.
26. CAI, I, 46, p. 183; DMP, vol. 1, pp. 166–85.
27. HC, III, 51, pp. 519–20; ADA, pp. 152–53; CAI, I, 77–78, pp. 186; DMP, vol. 1, pp. 194; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, p. 59.
28. A. Brasio, 'Ainda e sempre o problema de Ourique', in *Alexandre Herculano á Luz do Nosso Tempo* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1977), pp. 35–48; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, p. 64.
29. ADA, pp. 153–54; APV, p. 308. Only *Vita Sancti Theotonii*, p. 86 adds a religious dimension to the victory. 'King Esma' has been tentatively identified as Abū Muhammad Al-Zubayn b. 'Umar, the governor of Cordova and Granada. Mattoso, *Afonso Henriques*, p. 118.
30. Luis Vaz de Camões, *The Lusíades*, Canto III, 53. In an additional emotional twist the shields were also symbolically linked by royalist mythmakers with the five wounds of Christ.
31. See, for example, Fr. A. Brandão, *Crônica de D. Afonso Henriques*, ed. A de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, 1945), pp. 3–30, 57–65. The struggle to overturn these myths is described in L. R. Torgal, J. M. Amado Mendes and F. Catroga,

- História da História em Portugal, Sêcs. XIX–XX*, 2 vols (Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 82–87.
32. APV, p. 308; ADA, p. 152. The author does, however, make earlier mentions of the *regnum Portugallis* and numbers the years of Afonso's reign from 1128; CAI, I. 73, p. 184; *Vita Sancti Theotonii*, pp. 83, 85; HC, I. 51, p. 520. Mattoso, *Afonso Henriques*, pp. 56, 121–23.
 33. For example in the Capela de Sta Luzia de Campos can be found the inscription: 'ISTE FUNDATUS Fuit ERA M/ C (L)XX VI REG<NANTE> REX ALFOnS(us)'. M. J. Barroca, *Epigrafia Medieval Portuguesa (862–1422)*, 3 vols (Lisbon: Gulbenkian, 2000), vol. 2:1, pp. 188–93.
 34. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 212–13, 215–16. In general see J. Mattoso, 'A realeza de Afonso Henriques', in J. Mattoso, *Fragmentos de uma Composição Medieval* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1987), pp. 213–32; Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', pp. 171–73.
 35. ADA, pp. 154–55; CAI, I. 82–7, pp. 188–89; M. Blöcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal. Studien zu Geschichte und Sage des Begründers der portugiesischen Unabhängigkeit* (Zurich: Fretz und Wasmuth Verlag, 1966), pp. 37–39; A. Botelho da Costa Veiga, 'Ourique – Val de Vez', *Anais da Academia Portuguesa da História*, 1(1940), p. 99.
 36. *Collectio maxima Conciliorum omnium Hispaniae et Novi Orbis*, ed. J. Saenz de Aguirre and J. Catalanus, 6 vols (Rome, 1753–1755), vol. 5, pp. 54–55; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 80–81.
 37. P. S. Martínez, *História Diplomática de Portugal* (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1986), p. 23.
 38. W. Ullman, *Principles of Government in the Middle Ages*, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 121–22.
 39. HC, I. 66, p. 106; Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 235–36; Fletcher, *St James's Catapult*, pp. 133–34.
 40. CAI, I. 1, pp. 149–50; HC, II. 80, pp. 382–85. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 49–50.
 41. CAI, I. 69–70, pp. 181–83. Significantly, the *Historia Compostellana* makes no mention of Alfonso's imperial claims whatsoever.
 42. E. Lourie, 'The will of Alfonso I, "el Batallador", king of Aragon and Navarre: a reassessment', *Speculum*, 50(1975), 635–51.
 43. J. M. J. Zamora (ed.), *Historia de España*, 41 vols (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, S. A., 1998), vol. 9, pp. 664–78; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 44–45.
 44. CAI, I. 58–62, pp. 177–79; Zamora, *Historia de España*, vol. 9, pp. 608–12; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 45–47.
 45. ADA, pp. 151; For the problems in too early a dating of Portuguese coronation ceremonies see P. Linehan, 'Utrum reges Portugalie', pp. 389–407.
 46. Odo of Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, ed. and tr. V. Berry (New York: Columbia Records of Civilization 42, 1948), pp. 24, 66–68. Also C. W. Previté Orton, *The Early History of the House of Savoy* (Cambridge: CUP, 1912), p. 309–13.
 47. ADA, pp. 156–57 places the ceremony in 1145. The couple appear together as signatories possibly in June and certainly by July 1146, CMP-A, pp. 198–99. The emphasis in Portuguese chronicles on Mafalda's exotic origin also reflected their awareness of the growing problem of consanguinity in Iberian royal marriages. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 255, n. 35.
 48. Henry's birth in 1147 is recorded in *De expugnatione Scalabis*, PMH, *Scriptores*, p. 93.

49. L. J. Lekai, *The Cistercians. Ideals and Reality* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1989), pp. 1–52; Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, pp. 27–31.
50. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 251–52. See also M. A. Fernandes Marques, 'A introdução da Ordem de Cister em Portugal', in M. A. Fernandes Marques, *Estudos sobre a Ordem de Cister em Portugal* (Coimbra: Edições Colibri, 1998), pp. 33–34.
51. Fortunato de Almeida, *História da Igreja em Portugal*, 6 vols (Coimbra: Editor Fortunato de Almeida, 1922–1999), vol. 1, p. 631.
52. *Vita Sancti Theotonii*, p. 87. Also O'Malley, *Tello and Theotonio*, pp. 149–50. The headpiece of a staff widely believed to be that sent to Theotonio by Bernard survives in the Museu Machado de Castro, Coimbra.
53. For the strongest argument in favour of close communications, H. V. Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon" and its author', *Portuguese Studies*, 6(1990), 8–12; for a cogent assessment of the problems with this position see A. Forey, 'The siege of Lisbon and the Second Crusade', *Portuguese Studies*, 20:1(2004), 1–13.
54. DMP, vol. 1, p. 101; M. Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), pp. 32–33; Maur Cocheril, 'Les ordres militaires Cisterciens au Portugal', in *Bulletin des Etudes Portugaises* NS, 28:9(1967–1968), 24–25; and J. Valente, 'The new frontier: the role of the Knights Templar in the establishment of Portugal as an independent kingdom', *Mediterranean Studies*, 7(1998), 49–65.
55. DMP, vol. 1, p. 120.
56. *Vita S. Martini Sauriensis*, p. 62; and more generally, A. Forey, *The Templars in the Corona de Aragón* (Oxford: OUP, 1973), pp. 15–18.
57. *Vita S. Martini Sauriensis*, p. 62; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 472.
58. DMP, vol. 1, p. 272; CMP-A, pp. 209–10.
59. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 216–17; Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', p. 24.
60. DMP, vol. 1, p. 250.
61. JL 8590; PL 179: 860.
62. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 52–53; JL 8752; PL 180: 1036. For the suspension JL 9255, 9363; PL 180: 1345, 1405.
63. *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. J. Leclercq, 8 vols (Rome: Editiones Cisterciens, 1977), vol. 8, ep. 247, pp. 140–41.
64. G. Constable, 'The Second Crusade as seen by contemporaries', *Traditio*, 9(1953), 213–79; and more recently, J. G. Rowe 'The origins of the Second Crusade: Pope Eugenius III, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Louis VII of France', in M. Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 79–89; and G. Ferzoco, 'The origin of the Second Crusade', in M. Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, pp. 91–99.
65. For two views on the possibility of Bernard's involvement see Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', pp. 8–12; and Forey, 'The siege of Lisbon', pp. 1–13.
66. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 183–90; Picard, *Le Portugal musulman*, pp. 97–100.
67. Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, p. 139.
68. *Vita Sancti Theotonii*, p. 86.
69. The account which follows is drawn from *De expugnatione Scalabis*, pp. 94–95.
70. *De expugnatione Scalabis*, p. 94.
71. *De expugnatione Scalabis*, pp. 94–95.
72. *De expugnatione Scalabis*, p. 95.

73. Ibn al-Athir, *al Kitāb al-Kāmil*, in M. S. A. Conde, 'Para um corpus da documentação relative á paisagem de Shantarīn', *Media Aetas*, 2(1999), 107–08; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 115–25.
74. DMP, vol. 1, p. 272; CMP-A, pp. 209–10.
75. For example, Serrão, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 97.
76. The three main contingents of Anglo-Norman, Flemish and German are described at the outset. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 53–57. Also mentioned are groups from Scotland, Bretagne and Boulogne, p. 105. The Pisan engineer is mentioned in *Annales sancti Disibodi*, ed. G Waitz, MGH SS, vol. 17, p. 28.
77. The most authoritative account remains the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* supported by the comprehensive notes provided by Charles David. This information is reviewed by H. A. R. Gibb, 'English Crusaders in Portugal', in *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, ed. E. Prestage (Watford: Voss and Michael, 1935), pp. 7–17; C. Hillenbrand, 'A Neglected Episode of the Reconquista: A Christian success in the Second Crusade', *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 54 (1988), 163–70; and M. Bennet, 'Military aspects of the conquest of Lisbon, 1147', in J. Phillips and M. Hoch (eds), *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 71–90.
78. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 68.
79. An implication drawn by Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', pp. 12, 16. Other scholars have discerned Bernard's influence in the organisation of the crusader fleet and some of the themes developed in Bishop Pedro's sermon. Constable, 'The Second Crusade as seen by contemporaries', pp. 222, 247.
80. ADA, pp. 154–55. The earlier attack and the bad blood it caused was recalled in *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 96–97, 102–03.
81. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 99.
82. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 101–11. For this identification of authorship see Livermore, 'The "Conquest of Lisbon"', pp. 30–34. The case for assigning authorship to Raol is complicated by a number of unresolved questions, not the least of which is the possibility of alternative candidates. See M. J. V. Branco, 'Introdução', in A. A. Nascimento, *A Conquista de Lisboa aos Mouros. Relato de um Cruzado* (Lisbon: Vega, 2000), pp. 106–07. The attribution of authorship to Raol should most safely be considered a strong possibility.
83. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 73.
84. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 115–17.
85. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 123.
86. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 140–41.
87. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 164–65; *Annales Sancti Disibodi*, p. 28.
88. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 173–79.
89. S. Schwartz, 'Elegia de Rabi Abraham ibn Ezra (1092–1167), sobre a tomada de Lisboa', *Revista Municipal de Lisboa*, 55(1952), quoted in Mattoso, *Afonso Henriques*, p. 179.
90. S. Lay, 'Miracles, martyrs and the cult of Henry the crusader in Lisbon', *Portuguese Studies*, 24:1(2008), 7–31.
91. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 179–81; *Annales Sancti Disibodi*, p. 28. G. Constable, 'A note on the route of the Anglo-Flemish crusaders', pp. 525–26.
92. Lay, 'Miracles, martyrs and the cult of Henry', pp. 9–16.
93. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 115–17.
94. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 116–17. David notes that the date 789 actually marks the end of a period of consolidation under 'Abd al-Rahmān I (756–88).

This is not the only instance of Iberian confusion over the date of the Arab invasion. Aragonese authors displayed the same lack of precision. P. Linehan, 'At the Spanish frontier', in P. Linehan and J. L. Nelson (eds), *The Medieval World* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 41.

95. According to an early visitor to Lisbon, the Mozarabic community may have made up half the population of the city. Snorri Sturluson, *Heimskringla*, pp. 689–90. Raol confirms and strongly disapproves this pluralistic culture. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 94–95.
96. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 121–23.

4 Papal Recognition of Portuguese Royalty (1147–1179)

1. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 276, 490.
2. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 281–96, 307–08, 321–25.
3. CMP-A, pp. 224, 226–30, 237; PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 377–83.
4. DMP, vol. 1, p. 274; PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 447–51; CMP-A, pp. 274–75. See also Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 528, n. 162.
5. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 309–10.
6. *Vita Sancti Theotonii*, pp. 84–85, emphasizes these perils, recalling that a canon from Santa Cruz making a visit to Lisbon with funds to support building works at São Vicente de Fora was waylaid on the road by a raiding party from Évora. Ibn 'Idari, *Al-Bayan al-Mugrib: Nuevos fragmentos*, pp. 305–06 records a devastating Muslim attack on Trancoso in 1155.
7. Lekai, *The Cistercians. Ideals and Reality*, pp. 33–51; Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, pp. 157–58, 256–57.
8. CMP-A, pp. 230–31. A charter dated 29 September 1153 notes the desertion. See also M. Cocheril, 'L'Ordre de Cîteaux au Portugal. Le problème historique', *Studia Monastica*, reprinted with minor changes in M. Cocheril, *Études sur le Monachisme en Espagne et au Portugal* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1966), p. 205.
9. CMP-A, pp. 234–36.
10. The foundation of Alcobaça has been shrouded by the mythmaking propensities of early Portuguese writers, but the few reliable details are assessed by Marques, 'A introdução da ordem de Cister', pp. 29–33; and M. Cocheril, *Alcobaça: abadia cisterciense de Portugal* (Lisbon: Imp. Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 1989), pp. 25–29.
11. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 450.
12. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 290, 293, 309.
13. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 202–04; Picard, *Le Portugal musulman*, pp. 91–101; and Mattoso, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, pp. 66–68.
14. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 92–102; S. Barton, 'A forgotten crusade: Alfonso VII of León-Castile and the campaign for Jaén (1148)', *Historical Research*, 73: 182(2000), 312–20; O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade*, pp. 44–49.
15. DMP, vol. 1, p. 250.
16. Picard, *Le Portugal musulman*, pp. 194–96; M. T. L. Pereira, *Alcácer do Sal na Idade Média* (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2000), pp. 31–47.
17. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 531.
18. ADA, pp. 157–58.
19. For Bishop Gilbert's preaching tour *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 178, n. 4; and below, p. 194, n. 70. Alfonso's Sevillian charter is partially reproduced in Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, vol. 4, pp. 92–93, n. 2 and noted by Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, p. 115.

20. ADA, p. 158. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, p. 539; D. Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London: Longman, 1992), p. 165.
21. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 178–81; Feige, 'La primacía de Toledo', pp. 92–94. For the declaration of obedience to Braga see *Liber Fidei*, vol. 1, p. 249.
22. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 269; Serrão, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, pp. 85–86.
23. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 1–5; also E. Brásão, 'O papado e Portugal desde a conferência de Zamora (1143) até à bula de Alexandre III <Manifestis probatum> (1179)', in J. V. Serrão (ed.), *8.º Centenário do Reconhecimento de Portugal pela Santa Sé* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1979), pp. 83–114.
24. *Vita Tellonis*, pp. 64–65. The Spanish kings were generally spared the distractions of the investiture contest. They were sheltered, it would seem, by distance, local loyalty, and their consistent support for the reform papacy. See Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 149–52; and B. F. Reilly, 'On getting to be a bishop in León-Castile: the "emperor" Alfonso VII and the post-Gregorian Church', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, 1(1978), 35–78.
25. For an overview of João Peculiar's role as 'royal counsellor' see Branco, 'The king's counsellors' two faces', pp. 520–23.
26. In 1154 Bishop João Anaia of Coimbra accused his superior of a long list of misdeeds and abuses of power. Behind the undoubted exaggeration there was, perhaps, a kernel of truth. Erdmann, *Papado e Portugal*, pp. 82–83.
27. *Liber Fidei*, vol. 2, nos. 343, 370, 515, pp. 77–78, 104–05, 263; R. Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 1978), pp. 66–67; Reilly, 'Alfonso VII of León-Castilla', p. 216.
28. The gathering at Rheims in 1148 was one of the seven twelfth-century 'general councils' where decisions made were held to be binding on all regions of Latin Christendom. The others were Rheims (1119), First Lateran (1123), Rheims (1131), Pisa (1135), Second Lateran (1139) and Third Lateran (1179). See I. S. Robinson, *The Papacy, 1073–1198: Continuity and Innovation* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), p. 131.
29. Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, pp. 138–39.
30. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, p. 102.
31. G. Ferriera Borges, 'Saint Bernard et le Portugal: la legende et l'histoire', in *Mélanges Saint Bernard* (Dijon: Marilier, 1953), pp. 139–40.
32. JL 9255; PL 180: 1345.
33. PP, pp. 211–13.
34. JL 9362; PL 180: 1405; PP, p. 108; Feige, 'La primacía de Toledo', pp. 95–104.
35. The church of Braga secured a favourable decision in the Zamora dispute in 1153, but this was not the end of the imbroglio, which dragged on into the thirteenth century. Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, pp. 196–98.
36. F. Frita, 'Primera legación del Cardenal Jacinto en España: Bulas inéditas de Anastasio IV. Nuevas luces sobre el concilio nacional de Valladolid (1155) y otros datos inéditos', *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, 14 (1889), p. 544. Sections are also printed in Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, vol. 2, pp. 107–08.
37. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 110–11.
38. Feige, 'Die anfänge des portugiesischen', p. 207. Henry was born in 1147, even as his father concluded his plans for the attack on Santarém. He did not survive childhood and died in 1155. Blöcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal*, pp. 55–57.
39. *La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III, 965–1216*, ed. D. Mansilla (Rome, 1955), pp. 104–05.
40. Frita, 'Primera legación', pp. 538–42.

41. JL 9901.
42. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 83–94.
43. Following the death of Archbishop Diego in 1140 the see was vacant for three years as the royal candidate, Bishop Berengar of Salamanca, tried without success to secure papal endorsement. Not until 1143 was an alternative candidate, Pedro Helías, confirmed by the Holy See. Archbishop Pedro held office until his death in 1149, at which time Bishop Berengar of Salamanca was finally able to secure the see, albeit briefly, for he died in 1151. His successor, Archbishop Bernard, was archbishop for barely two years. On Bernard's death in 1152 Pelayo was elected. R. Fletcher, 'The archbishops of Santiago de Compostela between 1140 and 1173: a new chronology', *Compostellanum*, 17(1972), pp. 47–53.
44. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 83–88.
45. For this itinerary see PP, pp. 112, 219–22 and Frita, 'Primera legación', pp. 538–42.
46. *Documentación ... Inocencio III*, 483, pp. 114–15. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 88–94; JL 10125.
47. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 84; Feige, 'La primacía de Toledo', pp. 106–110.
48. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, pp. 124–35.
49. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 60–61; Feige, 'Die anfänge der portugiesischen', p. 217.
50. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.7, pp. 228–29; Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, p. 128. B. F. Reilly, *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 227–30.
51. The tension between the partible and the primogeniture models of inheritance are considered in greater detail below, pp. 218–19.
52. Reilly, *Alfonso VII*, 130–34; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 209.
53. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7. 9–13, pp. 232–34.
54. *Colección diplomática del monasterio de Sahagún (857–1300)*, ed. J. A. Fernandez Flórez, 5 vols (León: Fuentes y estudios de historia Leonesa, 1976), vol. 4, pp. 275–77.
55. Zamora, *Historia de España*, vol. 9, pp. 481–90.
56. ADA, p. 158; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, pp. 538–40.
57. Al-Makkari, *History of the Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain*, trans. P. de Gayangos, 2 vols (with new introduction by Michael Brett; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), vol. 2, p. 315; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 547.
58. Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 100–02.
59. Lomax, *The Spanish Reconquest*, pp. 113–15; D. Lopes, 'O Cid Português: Geraldo Sempavor', *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 1(1941), 93–111; A. Huici Miranda, 'Los Almohades en Portugal', *Anais Academia Portuguesa da História*, NS, 5(1954), 13.
60. Muslim descriptions of Gerald's depredations are collected by A. B. Coelho, *Portugal na Espanha Árabe*, 4 vols (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 277–90.
61. Walter Map, *De Nugis Curialium: Courtiers' Trifles*, ed. and trans. M. R. James, revised by C. N. L. Brooke and R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 30–35; D. Freitas do Amaral, *Afonso Henriques, Biografia*, 15th ed. (Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 2002) p. 157.
62. The proposed marriage of Infanta Mafalda and the count of Barcelona is noted by Blöcker-Walter, *Alfons I. von Portugal*, p. 56, who questions Mafalda's death. The meeting between Afonso and Fernando is equally controversial, and relies on two documents that have been called into question. DMP, vol. 2, pp. 616–18. See also Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, vol. 4, pp. 117–18; Martínez, *História Diplomática de Portugal*, p. 30.

63. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.19, pp. 241–42; Lucas of Tuy, *Chronicon mundi*, pp. 100–02; Freitas do Amaral, *Afonso Henriques*, pp. 159–62; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, pp. 556–61.
64. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7. 23, pp. 244–45.
65. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 317–18.
66. *Vita Tellonis*, p. 71; PP, pp. 379–80; JL 10412.
67. Much is known of the career of Gualdim Pais from a number of dedicatory inscriptions which testify, among other things, to his five year sojourn in the Holy Land. Barroca, *Epigrafia Medieval Portuguesa*, vol. 2:1, pp. 348–67; see also Mattoso, *Afonso Henriques*, pp. 222–24. For royal donations to the order during this period, DMP, vol. 1, pp. 318–44. The famous *Carta de Couta* (DMP, vol. 1, p. 342), purporting to list the holdings of the order during the time of Afonso Henriques, has been shown by Rui Pinto de Azevedo to be a thirteenth-century forgery. Cocheril, 'Les ordres militaires Cisterciens', p. 25, n. 26; also Valente, 'The new frontier', pp. 56–57.
68. The implications of the emergence of local military orders is considered below, pp. 182–86.
69. P. Linehan, 'The Synod of Segovia (1166)', *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law*, 10 (1980), 31–44. Repr. in *Spanish Church and Society*. See also, Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 279–87.
70. JL 10905, 11301, 11705; *Documentación...Inocencio III*, pp. 128–29, 130–32, 134–35. A. García y García, 'Alejandro III y los reinos ibéricos', in F. Liotta (ed.) *Miscellanea Rolando Bandinelli Papa Alessandro III* (Sienna: Accademia Senese degli Intronati, 1986), p. 250.
71. Robinson, *The Papacy*, p. 167; Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 66–67.
72. J. Gilchrist, 'The Gregorian reform tradition and Pope Alexander III', in Liotta (ed.), *Miscellanea Rolando Bandinelli*, 259–88.
73. *Vita Tellonis*, p. 73; CMP-A, p. 283, DMP, vol. 1, pp. 359–60.
74. PP, pp. 124, 244–45, 304.
75. PP, p. 252; García y García, 'Alejandro III y los reinos Ibéricos', pp. 246–47; Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, pp. 195–204.
76. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 178–81; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1868–1871), vol. 3, pp. 176–77.
77. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 269.
78. ADA, pp. 158; Ibn Sāhib al-Salā, *Al-Mann bi'l-Imāma*, trans. A. Huici Miranda (Valencia: Textos Medievales, 1969), pp. 139–40; Lucas of Túy, *Chronicon Mundi*, p. 114.
79. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, vol. 2, pp. 333–34. For Afonso's convalescence: DMP – *Regios*, pp. 383–95.
80. See below, p. 145.
81. DMP, vol. 1, p. 384; Valente, 'The new frontier', pp. 57–58. Afonso Henriques' generous grant was not without precedent. Ramon Berenguer IV promised the Templars a fifth of all captured territory in 1143. A. J. Forey, 'The military orders and the Spanish reconquest in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries', *Traditio*, 40(1984), p. 223. As Forey notes, these promises were never fulfilled.
82. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 221.
83. Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, vol. 5, p. 274.
84. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 223–31; *Livro Velho das Linhagens*, PMH *Scriptores*, p. 279; Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, vol. 5, p. 130.
85. *Councils and Synods with other Documents Relating to the English Church*, ed. D. Whitelock, M. Brett and C. N. L. Brooke (Oxford: OUP, 1981), vol. 1.2(871–1204), pp. 947–48, 953–55. Characteristically Henry II preferred a financial

- solution and pledged a fortune to the support of the Holy Land. C. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades, 1095–1588* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), pp. 43–44.
86. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, pp. 66–67; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 232. A confused memory of Afonso's tense relations with Cardinal Hyacinth may lie behind Roger of Hoveden's implausible story of high words leading to the legate's expulsion from Portugal. *Chronica*, vol. 2, p. 333.
 87. A. A. Nascimento and S. Gomes, 'S. Vicente de Lisboa e seus Milagres Medievais', *Didaskalia*, 15(1985), pp. 89, 109; P. J. Geary, *Furta Sacra: Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 154–56.
 88. *Translatio et Miracula S. Vicentii*, PMH *Scriptores*, p. 97.
 89. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 232–33.
 90. *Crônicas Breves e Memórias*, p. 25; Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, vol. 4, pp. 278–80.
 91. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 287–88. See also N. P. Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 2 vols (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 205–25.
 92. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 288. A translation of the Treaty of Cazola is included in Olivia R. Constable (ed.), *Medieval Iberia. Readings from Christian, Muslim and Jewish Sources* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), pp. 162–63.
 93. *Monumenta Henricina*, vol. 1, pp. 18–21.
 94. The tribute of four ounces (120 grams) was augmented to two marks (460 grams). The coins were *morabitinos*, Portuguese coins minted in imitation of Muslim dinars. For the wider significance of this tribute see Feige, 'Die anfänge der portugiesischen', pp. 216–28.
 95. Linehan, 'Utrum reges Portugalie coronabantur', pp. 389–47; Brasão, 'O papado e Portugal', p. 100.
 96. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 258.

5 Consolidation and Opportunity (1179–1211)

1. J. V. Serrão, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 107.
2. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, pp. 442, 575, 681–82.
3. ADA, p. 158.
4. M. J. V. Branco, *D. Sancho I* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2006), pp. 51–53.
5. Ibn Sāhib al Salā, *Al-Mann bi'il-Imāma*, pp. 233–34; Mattoso, *Afonso Henriques*, p. 244–47.
6. DMP, vol. 1, pp. cxvi–cxxiv.
7. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 398–89; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 682.
8. ADA, p. 159.
9. *Translatio et Miracula S. Vincentii*, p. 97.
10. *King Lear*, 1, p. iv.
11. ADA, p. 159; CMP-A, pp. 394–95, 398–99.
12. Mattoso, 'A realza de Afonso Henriques', p. 222, is convinced the ritual was in fact used. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 243–44, n. 137, argues against Sancho receiving coronation and further elaborates these points in 'Utrum reges

- Portugalie coronabantur', pp. 389–407, and 'Addenda', in Linehan, *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law*, pp. 1–4.
13. J. F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War. The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); and by the same author 'The creative interaction between Portuguese and Leonese municipal military law, 1055–1279', *Speculum*, 52(1977), 465–87; and 'The evolution of Portuguese municipal military policy during the high middle ages', *Mediterranean Studies*, 8(1999), 105–27.
 14. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 411–18. Discussion of these charters can be found in CMP-A, pp. 366–71 and Powers, *A Society Organized for War*, pp. 42–43.
 15. B. W. Diffie, *Prelude to Empire: Portugal Overseas before Henry the Navigator* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 18, 30–31.
 16. For example, Évora (1166), Lisbon (1179), Coimbra (1179), Santarém (1179) PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 392, 411–18. Such provisions appear in one form or another in most subsequent charters.
 17. See below, n. 20.
 18. Foral of the Moors (1170), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 396–97; Almada (1190), DDS, pp. 71–75.
 19. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, vol. 2, pp. 42–45.
 20. For example, Évora (1166), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 393 or Coruche (1182), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 427.
 21. Feixo (1155), DMP, vol. 1, pp. 309–10; Bragança (1187), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 463.
 22. Penacova (1192), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 483.
 23. Thus, the merchants Diego Pais and Fernando Menendes appear as signatories on the charter granted to Viseu (1187), DDS, p. 28.
 24. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 113.
 25. Almada (1190), DDS, pp. 71–75.
 26. V. M. Shillington and A. B. W. Chapman, *The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal* (London: Routledge, 1907), pp. 24–26.
 27. In the same document 'Lischebom' is also referred to as 'Lischebonim' or 'Leschebom'. A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Hansa e Portugal na Idade Média*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1993), p. 97.
 28. Diffie, *Prelude to Empire*, p. 30.
 29. Shillington and Chapman, *The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal*, pp. 26–27; P. Nightingale, *A Medieval Mercantile Community. The Grocers' Company & the Politics & Trade of London, 1000–1485* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 36–42.
 30. P. A. Odber de Baubeta, 'Some early English sources of Portuguese history', *Estudos Medievais*, 9(1988), 206–07.
 31. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 99.
 32. *Narratio de itinere navali peregrinorum Hierosolymam tendentium et Silviam capientium*, A.D. 1189, ed. C. W. David, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 81:5(1939), p. 628.
 33. DDS, pp. 47–51, 297–301.
 34. See below, pp. 208–09.
 35. The majority of Portuguese charters include details of *fossado* service. Early examples stipulating one-third commitment include Numão (1130), Mos (1162) and Linhares (1169), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 368, 390, 394.
 36. Évora (1166). The ratio of one-third of cavalry forces continues in charters following the Évora pattern, for example, Coruche (1182), pp. 392, 426. Other styles

- of charter soon also began to include this ratio, for example, Centocellas (1194), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 487. Santarém (1179) specified the obligation to provide 60 horsemen. This charter also grants cavalry status to archers. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 356–58.
37. ADA, p. 159.
 38. The destruction of the town was recorded sadly by Portuguese chroniclers ADA, p. 159. The extent of the tragedy was confirmed in a town charter granted to Coruche in 25 May 1182 specifically to encourage the re-population made necessary by the capture of earlier townsfolk by the enemy. DMP, vol. 1, p. 348.
 39. Powers, *A Society Organized for War*, pp. 43–44; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 234.
 40. Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum, Opera Historica*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1876) vol. 2, p. 30; Ibn 'Idhāri al-Marrakusi, *Al-Bayān al mugrib fi ijtisār ajbār muluk al-andalus wa al-magrib: los Almohades*, ed. A. Huici Miranda, 2 vols (Tetuan: Editoria Marroqui, 1954), vol. 1, pp. 70–75; Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.24, pp. 246–47.
 41. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 236; Branco, *Sancho I*, pp. 93–100.
 42. The fleet built by Bishop Diego of Compostela to protect the pilgrim trade provides an illuminating comparison. The bishop imported craftsmen from Italy to construct specialised warships and the *Historia Compostellana* emphasises the expense involved in equipping and maintaining the fleet. HC, I. 76, pp. 118–19; I. 103, pp. 174–76; II. 21, pp. 262–64; II. 24, pp. 266–68; II. 75, p. 375. The darker side of the Portuguese naval build-up is hinted at in the charter of Almada (1190), which stipulates that in this town at least the poor could not be pressed into service on royal ships. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 476.
 43. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 234–35; Huici Miranda, 'Los Almohades en Portugal', pp. 26–27; Picard, *Le Portugal musulman*, pp. 109–15. Colourful legend surrounds Roupinho, who reputedly built the Hermida da Memória at Nazaré in 1182 after a vision of the Virgin saved him from a fatal hunting accident. Brandão, *Crónica de D. Afonso Henriques*, pp. 298–306.
 44. *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 616–19.
 45. J. F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 242–43; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 242.
 46. PL 202: 1539; Riley-Smith and Riley-Smith, *Crusade: Idea and Reality*, pp. 64–67.
 47. For a general survey on the origin and progress of the Third Crusade see S. Painter, 'The Third Crusade', in K. M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, 6 vols (Madison-London: Wisconsin University Press, 1955–1984), vol. 2, pp. 45–86.
 48. This tradition seems to have been based on the misreading of a single letter from the king to Pope Gregory. Erdmann, *A Ideia de Cruzada em Portugal*, pp. 8–11, 19.
 49. David, *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 616–17, 663–66; *Annales Colonienses Maximi*, ed. K. Pertz, MGM SS, vol. 7, p. 796. See also C. J. Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095–1492', in *A History of the Crusade*, ed. K. M. Setton, 6 vols (Madison-London: Wisconsin University Press, 1955–1984), vol. 3, pp. 420–21; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, p. 241. The castle of Alvor was subsequently granted to the monastery of Santa Cruz. DDS, pp. 64–65.
 50. *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 626–27.
 51. *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 629–30.
 52. *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 631–32.
 53. *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 617–36.
 54. A. Forey, 'The emergence of the military order in the twelfth century', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 34(1985), p. 210.

55. The penance laid upon King Henry of England for his part in the murder of Thomas Becket in 1170 reflects this position. To expiate his sins Henry was expected to campaign in the Holy Land or, as an interim measure, in Spain. See above, p. 139.
56. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 237–43; A. Huici Miranda, 'Las campañas de Ya'qub al Mansur en 1190 y 1191', *Anais da Academia Portuguesa da História*, NS, 5(1954), 55–74.
57. Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (London: Rolls Series, 1867), vol. 2, pp. 116–17; and *Chronica*, vol. 3, pp. 42–43.
58. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, vol. 2, pp. 44.
59. Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, vol. 2, pp. 89–90, 117; Gibb, 'English Crusaders in Portugal', p. 21.
60. Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, vol. 2, pp. 116–18.
61. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 243; Ibn 'Idhāri, *Al-Bayān al mugrib: los Almohades*, vol. 1, pp. 169–70.
62. Valelhas (1188), PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, p. 471.
63. Defourneaux, *Les Français en Espagne*, pp. 57–73.
64. Almeida, *História de Igreja em Portugal*, vol. 1, pp. 606–08, 612–17; *Livro Preto. Cartulário da Sé de Coimbra*, pp. clxii–clxxxv.
65. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, p. 181.
66. *Indiculum foundationis monasterii S. Vincentii*, PMH *Scriptores*, p. 92.
67. CMP-A, pp. 209–10, 269–71.
68. A. J. Duggan, 'Aspects of Anglo-Portuguese relations in the twelfth century. Manuscripts, relics, decretals and the cult of St Thomas Becket at Lorvão, Alcobaça, and Tomar', *Portuguese Studies* 14(1998), p. 14, n.54; and *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 178–80; Almeida, *História da Igreja*, vol. 1, p. 148.
69. John of Hexham, *Historia*, in Simeon of Durham, *Opera omnia*, ed. T. Arnold, 2 vols (London: Lond & Co., 1882–1885), vol. 2, p. 324. For the possibility that these troops were diverted from Seville to Alcácer do Sal see above, p. 113. The grant of the indulgence to pilgrims is noted in *English Episcopal Acta 15 (London, 1076–1187)*, ed. F. Neiningen (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 139–40. For the mysterious letter of introduction, Azevedo, *História de Portugal*, vol. 4, pp. 98, 262–64.
70. Almeida, *História da Igreja*, vol. 1, pp. 627–28.
71. *Narratio de itinere navali*, p. 633, n. 27.
72. Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta*, vol. 2, pp. 89–90.
73. DDS, pp. 65–66, 92–93.
74. Diffie, *Prelude to Empire*, pp. 26–27.
75. *Indiculum foundationis*, pp. 91–93; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 134–35.
76. G. Constable, 'A further note on the conquest of Lisbon in 1147', in *The Experience of Crusading*, ed. M. Bull and N. Housley (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), p. 42, n. 10 observes that Winand may well have been the author of the eyewitness account of the siege sent to Archbishop Arnold of Cologne.
77. Cocheril, 'Les ordres militaires Cisterciens', p. 51.
78. C. G. da Silva, *O Mosteiro de S. Vicente de Fora. A comunidade regrente e o património rural (séculos XII–XIII)* (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2002), pp. 80–83.
79. *Indiculum foundationis*, p. 92. Although little else is known of the German canon Otho, Fernando Peres may have been Fernão Peres de Soverosa, *o Cativo*, an important court figure during the reign of Alfonso Henriques. J. Mattoso, *Identificação de um País. Ensaio sobre as origens de Portugal (1096–1325). I – Oposição*, 5th ed. (Lisbon: Estampa, 1995), pp. 173–75.

80. Lay, 'Miracles, martyrs and the cult of Henry the Crusader', 7–31.
81. *Indiculum foundationis*, p. 91.
82. *Annales Sancti Disibodi*, p. 28; *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 178–81; *Indiculum foundationis*, p. 91.
83. *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, pp. 133–35; *Indiculum foundationis*, p. 92.
84. *Indiculum foundationis*, pp. 92–93.
85. J. A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 124–25.
86. Lay, 'Miracles, martyrs and the cult of Henry', p. 20.
87. C. Duggan, 'English decretals in continental primitive collections, with special reference to the primitive collection of Alcobaça', *Studia Gratiana*, 64 (*Collectanea Stephan Kuttner*, IV) repr. in C. Duggan, *Canon Law in Medieval England: The Becket Dispute and Decretal Collections* (London: Variorum, 1982), IX, pp. 51–71; Duggan, 'Anglo-Portuguese relations in the twelfth century', pp. 9–10, 17–18.
88. Duggan, 'Anglo-Portuguese relations in the twelfth century', pp. 6–7.
89. ADA, pp. 156–57; Possibly too this emphasis of Mafalda's exotic origins was a reaction to the charges of consanguinity levelled against many Iberian royal marriages. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 252–59.
90. Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum*, p. 28.
91. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, p. 588. Although Herculano gives Philip a romantic gloss, in reality his reputation was not without blemish. Many harboured suspicions that Philip's 'crusade' in 1177 was actually an attempt to usurp the throne of the leprous King Baldwin IV (1174–1185) of Jerusalem. William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, CCCM 63/63A (Turnhout, 1986), 21.13–18, pp. 979–87.
92. Baubeta, 'Some early English sources', pp. 204–05.
93. Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum*, pp. 28–29. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, vol. 2, p. 622.
94. The safe-conducts granted to the Spanish diplomatic parties are among the earliest surviving in England. *Diplomatic Documents Preserved in the Public Record Office, I: 1101–1272*, ed. P. Chaplais (London: PRO, 1964), pp. 1–10.
95. Baubeta, 'Some early English sources', pp. 203–06.
96. D. Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London: Longman, 1992), p. 73.
97. Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum*, p. 701; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, vol. 2, p. 502.

6 Shifting Priorities: Portuguese Relations with the Latin Church in the Thirteenth Century

1. DDS, p. 35.
2. PP, pp. 342–43.
3. DDS, p. 48. See also Branco, *Sancho I*, pp. 163–68. For the failed attempt to buy off the crusaders see above, p. 156.
4. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 252–59.
5. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.24, pp. 246–47.
6. The severity of Celestine's measures are known only from papal bull issued by Innocent III in 1199, who took his predecessor's actions as a precedent. PL 214: 610–15; *Bulário*, pp. 60–61.
7. DDS, pp. 113–15.
8. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, vol. 2, p. 685.

9. Huici Miranda, *Las Grandes Batallas de la Reconquista*, pp. 138–216; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 244–47.
10. PP, p. 376. See also J. F. O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the kingdoms of Castile and León', in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent III and his World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 319.
11. The phrase is Roger of Hoveden's, *Chronica*, vol. 3, p. 90.
12. See above, pp. 137–38. See also Valente, 'The new frontier', pp. 49–60; Cocheril, 'Les ordres militaires Cisterciens', pp. 23–27; and S. A. Gomes 'A presença das ordens militares na região de Leiria (séculos XII–XV)', in I. C. Ferreira Fernandes and P. Pacheco (eds), *As Ordens Militares em Portugal e no Sul do Europa* (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1998), pp. 144–56. For the activities of the Hospitallers in Portugal see R. de Azevedo, 'Algumas achegas para o estudo das origens da Ordem de S. João em Portugal', *Revista Portuguesa de Historia*, 4(1949), 317–27.
13. PP, p. 118; DMP, vol. 1, p. 370; Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 166–70.
14. Erdmann, PP, p. 301; P. G. Barbosa, 'Cavaleiros do Templo e cavaleiros de Leiria', in L. A. Fonseca (ed.), *As Ordens Militares em Portugal* (Palmela: Estudos Locais, 1991), pp. 191–204.
15. Valente, 'The new frontier', p. 50.
16. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 370, 415; Forey, 'The military orders and the Spanish reconquest', p. 216; Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, p. 171.
17. DMP, vol. 1, pp. 384–85; CMP-A, pp. 319–20.
18. M. Cocheril, *Routier des Abbayes Cisterciennes du Portugal* (Paris: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1978); Serrão, *História de Portugal*, 1, pp. 175–76.
19. DDS, pp. 288–95.
20. M. D. Knowles, *Cistercians and Cluniacs. The Controversy between St Bernard and Peter the Venerable* (London: OUP, 1975).
21. PP, p. 373.
22. *Bulário português Inocência III (1198–1216)*, eds A. de Jesus da Costa and M. A. Fernandes Marques (Coimbra: Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica, 1989), pp. 359–62.
23. M. A. F. Marques, 'Inocência III e a passagem do mosteiro de Lorvão para a ordem de Cister', in M. A. F. Marques, *Estudos sobre a Ordem de Cister em Portugal* (Coimbra: Edições Colibri, 1998), pp. 75–125.
24. DDS, p. 161. See also M. de Oliveira, 'Origens da ordem de Cister em Portugal', *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 5 (1951), pp. 347–50.
25. Duggan, 'Aspects of Anglo-Portuguese Relations', 1–19.
26. Marques, 'Inocência III e a passagem do mosteiro de Lorvão', 75–125; Teresa developed a reputation for great piety and was beatified in 1750. B. Lackner, 'A Cistercian of the royal blood: D. Teresa of Portugal', *Vox Benedictina*, 6:2(1989), 106–19.
27. Similarities between the Iberian orders and the *ribat* bands are discussed by E. Lourie, 'The confraternity of Belchite, the Ribat, and the Temple', *Viator*, 13(1982), 159–76. The difficulties in establishing such links are examined by Forey, 'The emergence of the military order', 175–95.
28. D. W. Lomax, *La Orden de Santiago (1170–1275)* (Madrid: Escuela de Estudios Medievales, 1965); and 'The order of Santiago and the kings of Leon', *Hispania: Revista Española de Historia*, 18(1958), 3–32; and *The Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St James, 1170–1493*, ed. and trans. E. G. Blanco (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971).
29. *The Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St James*, pp. 3–12; Lomax, 'The order of Santiago and the kings of León', pp. 12–13; DMP, vol. 1, pp. 409–10 (Abrantes); DMP, vol. 1, p. 415 (Monsanto).

30. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.14, pp. 234–36; J. F. O’Callaghan, *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and its Affiliates* (London: Variorum, 1975); and more recently, T. M. Vann, ‘A new look at the foundation of the order of Calatrava’, in D. J. Kagay and T. M. Vann (eds), *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions. Essays in Honor of Joseph O’Callaghan* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 93–114.
31. C. Estow, ‘The economic development of the order of Calatrava, 1158–1366’, *Speculum*, 57:2(1982), p. 271.
32. J. F. O’Callaghan, ‘*Hernandades* between the military orders of Calatrava and Santiago during the Castilian reconquest, 1158–1252’, *Speculum*, 44:4(1969), pp. 609–10.
33. Cocheril, ‘Les ordres militaires Cisterciens’, pp. 41–42.
34. *Narratio de itinere navali*, pp. 630–31.
35. CMP-A, p. 356. Cocheril, ‘Les ordres militaires Cisterciens’, pp. 47–48; Oliveira, ‘Origens da ordem de Cister em Portugal’, *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 5 (1951), p. 34.
36. See above, n. 13; The same phrase was repeated virtually verbatim in Pope Innocent’s confirmation of the order’s status in 1199. *Bulário Português Inocência III (1198–1216)*, ed. A. de Jesus da Costa and A. M. Fernandes Marques (Coimbra: Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica, 1989), pp. 55–59; PL, 214: 590–93.
37. Cocheril, ‘Les ordres militaires Cisterciens’, pp. 46–47.
38. For general overview of the relations between Pope Innocent and the Iberian kingdoms see D. Mansilla, ‘Inocencio III y los reinos hispanos’, *Anthologica Annua*, 2 (1954), 9–43; and more recently, in addition to J. F. O’Callaghan’s previously cited ‘Innocent III and the kingdoms of Castile and Leon’, see A. García y García ‘Innocent III and the kingdom of Castile’, also in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent and His World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 337–52.
39. E. Peters, ‘Lotario dei Conti di Segni becomes Pope Innocent III: the man and the pope’, in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent and His World*, pp. 3–24; D. J. Smith, *Innocent III and the Crown of Aragon. The Limits of Papal Authority* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 18.
40. H.-J. Schmidt, ‘The papal and imperial concept of *plenitudo potestatis*: the influence of Pope Innocent on Emperor Frederick II’, in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent and his World*, pp. 305–09.
41. Robinson, *The Papacy, 1073–1198*, pp. 273–76.
42. At the exchange rate of 60 morabitanos to the mark. For Sancho’s payment, *Bulário*, pp. 5, 23, 42–44; PL 214: 87–88, 214, 419, 424–25. *Documentación... Inocencio III*, 170, p. 193.
43. *Die Register Innocenz III*, vol. 1, p. 550; vol. 2, p. 128; Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.24, p. 247. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, vol. 4, p. 79. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 258, n. 43, notes in support of Roger’s claim that in the bull *Etsi necesse sit* (May 1199), advising the Spanish clergy of the sentence of interdict, Innocent included a congratulatory note to his legate, Rainier, for refusing any ‘gifts’.
44. *Bulário*, p. 62; PL 214: 612–13.
45. P. D. Clark, ‘Innocent III, canon law, and the punishment of the guiltless’, in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent and His World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 281–83; and by the same author ‘Peter the Chanter, Innocent III and theological views on collective guilt and punishment’, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 52:1(2001), pp. 9–10.
46. C. T. Maier, ‘Mass, the Eucharist, and the cross: Innocent III and the relocation of the Crusade’, in J. C. Moore (ed.), *Pope Innocent III and His World* (Aldershot:

- Ashgate, 1999), p. 355. For the increasing use of liturgy and prayer in support of distant crusading operations see by the same author 'Crisis, liturgy, and the crusade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 48:4(1997), 628–58.
47. Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León*, pp. 195–203.
 48. *Bulário*, pp. 74–79; PL 214: 657–62.
 49. *Bulário*, p. 81. For Eugenius' letter concerning Zamora: PP, p. 218.
 50. *Bulário*, pp. 66–67.
 51. *Bulário*, pp. 69; PL 214: 653–56.
 52. *Bulário*, pp. 92–93; PL 214: 689. For the second letter to Braga: *Bulário*, pp. 82–83; PL 214: 680–88.
 53. *Bulário*, pp. 93–95; PL 214: 689–90.
 54. *Bulário*, pp. 150–51.
 55. Erdmann, *O Papado e Portugal*, p. 77.
 56. Significantly, Innocent's anonymous biographer emphasised the widespread acclaim this settlement attracted among the pope's clerical contemporaries. *Gesta Innocentii Papae*, PL 214: 42.
 57. This determination can be seen most clearly at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, where Innocent's second sermon dealt with the intended role of bishops. PL 217: 679–88; B. Bolton, 'A show with a meaning: Innocent III's approach to the Fourth Lateran council, 1215', in B. Bolton (ed.), *Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Care* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), XI, p. 62. Ironically the pope's sermon was disrupted by disputing bishops.
 58. *Bulário*, pp. 80, 245; PL 214: 663.
 59. *Bulário*, pp. 294, 305; PL 216: 380–81, 423; Feige, 'La primacía de Toledo', pp. 129–32.
 60. See above, p. 191, n. 54.
 61. *Bulário*, p. 230.
 62. *Bulário*, p. 293; PL 216: 379.
 63. DDS, p. 35.
 64. *Bulario*, p. 168. After a failed attempt to reach agreement in the royal court in 1201, Innocent charged the bishop of Zamora with the task of adjudication, who found in favour of the canons. *Bulário*, pp. 163–83.
 65. See below, pp. 180–81.
 66. *Bulário*, p. 229.
 67. J. Antunes, J. G. Monteiro and A. R. de Oliveira, 'Conflitos políticos no reino de Portugal entre a Reconquista e a Expansão: estado do questão', *Revista de História das Ideias*, 6(1984), pp. 29–35.
 68. *Bulário*, pp. 280–81; DDS, pp. 290–92; PL 216: 272–73.
 69. Queen Urraca first appears in Portuguese charters in February 1209. DDS, pp. 272–73.
 70. They were João Alvo, Pedro Fedum and Martinho Peres Tirou. *Bulário*, pp. 284, 320–21; PL 216: 276.
 71. Delicate and high-profile papal business undertaken by Bishop Pedro included the negotiations in 1204 surrounding the fate of castles disputed after the annulled wedding of Berenguela of Castile and Alfonso of León, *Bulário*, pp. 213–15; PL 215: 373–76, and the imposition of peace upon all the kings on pain of excommunication in 1211, *Bulário*, p. 293.
 72. *Bulário*, pp. 295–97, 299–301; PL 216: 383–86; Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 29–41.

73. *Bulário*, pp. 296–97; PL 216: 384.
74. *Bulário*, p. 298; PL 216: 386–87. Innocent raised similar concerns about Latin literacy in the French court in response to the angry resistance he faced from King Philip Augustus. PL 215: 1135–36; and 216: 36–37. See also B. Bolton, 'Philip Augustus and John: two sons in Innocent III's vineyard?', in B. Bolton, *Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Authority* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), V, p. 129.
75. C. Morris, *The Papal Monarchy. The Western Church from 1050–1250* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 424–25; Bolton, 'Philip Augustus and John', pp. 123–29.
76. *Bulário*, p. 296; PL 216: 383–85.
77. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7. 6, p. 228; *Bulário*, pp. 237; PL 215: 1008.
78. DDS, pp. 47–51 (first version), and 297–301 (second version); *Bulário*, p. 303; PL 216: 423. See also *Bulário*, pp. 301–02; PL 216: 424.
79. DDS, pp. 308–24. The exemption from military service was granted on 28 December 1210. DDS, p. 309.
80. DDS, pp. 313–19. Despite being abandoned by their royal ally the burghers maintained their resistance to the bishop for several months before they too capitulated. *Bulário*, pp. 320–21, 329.
81. *Bulário*, pp. 301–02; PL 216: 424. In a second bull Innocent sought to extract further concessions on behalf of the local church. *Bulário*, p. 303; PL 216: 423.
82. *Documentación...Inocencio III*, no. 442, pp. 472–73; PL, 216: 353.
83. A forged letter attributed to al-Nāsir and dated 8 December 1211 gave form to these fears. In this widely circulated letter the caliph reacted angrily to papal interference in his affairs and threatened to wage war against Christians to the very gates of Rome. O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the kingdoms of Castile and Leon', p. 330, n. 63. For the letter itself: *Continuatio Lambacensis*, MGH SS, vol. 9, pp. 557–58.
84. *Chronica Latina Regum Castellae*, ed. L. C. Brea, CCCM, 63 (Turnhout, 1996); trans by J. F. O'Callaghan as *The Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile* (Tempe: Arizona University Press, 2002), 20, p. 40; Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 7.38, p. 258.
85. O'Callaghan, 'Innocent III and the kingdoms of Castile and Leon', p. 331; Smith, *Innocent and the Crown of Aragon*, pp. 89–92, 103–13.
86. B. Bolton, 'Fulk of Toulouse: the escape that failed', in B. Bolton, *Innocent III: Studies on Papal Authority and Pastoral Care* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), III, p. 85; Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, vol. 2, pp. 12–13.
87. *Documentación...Inocencio III*, nos 468, 470–71, pp. 468, 500–02; PL 216: 154, 513–22, 553. In these communications Innocent reveals a very human fear about the outcome and encourages the Castilian king and prelates to seek a truce with the Almohads if possible, rather than risk disaster in a direct confrontation.
88. Maier, 'Mass, the Eucharist and the cross', pp. 352–56; Smith, *Innocent and the Crown of Aragon*, pp. 105–06.
89. 'Alfonso's letter', *Documentación...Inocencio III*, no. 483, pp. 511; Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, vol. 2, p. 17; Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', pp. 422–23.
90. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8.2, p. 260.
91. A more official Portuguese presence is suggested by Alberic of Trois Fontaines, *Chronica*, MGH SS, vol. 23, p. 894.

92. This was true even when opportunities fell into his lap. In 1197 a passing flotilla of crusaders attacked and captured Silves. Doubting that King Sancho was either willing or able to defend the city crusaders burned Silves themselves before continuing their journey. *Narratio de itinere navali*, p. 660, n.101.
93. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 5, p. 264.
94. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 6, pp. 265–66; ‘Alfonso’s letter,’ p. 511.
95. ‘Alfonso’s letter,’ pp. 511–12.
96. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 9–11, pp. 270–75; ‘Alfonso’s letter,’ p. 511; ‘Arnaud’s letter,’ *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. M. Bouquet, 24 vols (Paris, 1840–1904), vol. 19, pp. 250–54; European accounts of the battle include: Alberic of Trois Fontaines, *Cronica*, pp. 894–95; *Continuatio Claustroneoburgensis*, MGH SS, vol. 23, p. 622; and Ricardo of San Germano, *Chronica*, ed. C. A. Galufi, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 32 vols (Bologna, 1937–1938), vol. 7/2, pp. 35–46. See also Huici Miranda, *Las Grandes Batallas de la Reconquista*, pp. 231–37; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal*, pp. 255–56.
97. *Documentación...Inocencio III*, no. 488, pp. 520–21; PL 216: 703–04; and translated in Riley-Smith, *Crusade: Idea and Reality*, p. 61.
98. Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, vol. 2, p. 20.
99. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 10, p. 273.
100. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 12, p. 276.
101. Smith, *Pope Innocent and the Kingdom of Aragon*, p. 112.
102. Rodrigo of Toledo, *Historia de rebus Hispanie*, 8. 10, p. 275.
103. Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 295–97.
104. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality*, p. 122.

7 The Science of Kingship: Institutional Innovation during the Reign of Afonso II (1211–1223)

1. H. V. Vilar, *D. Afonso II* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2005), p. 10.
2. DDS, pp. 12, 35.
3. DDS, pp. 47–48.
4. Queen Urraca first appears as a signatory to a Portuguese document on 25 February 1209. DDS, pp. 272–73.
5. DDS, pp. 297–301.
6. M. J. V. Branco, ‘The general laws of Afonso II and his policy of “Centralisation”: a reassessment’, in M. Gosman, A. Vanderjagt and J. Veenstra (eds), *The Propagation of Power in the Medieval West* (Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1997), pp. 79–95; also P. Linehan, ‘The church and feudalism in the Spanish kingdoms in the eleventh and twelfth centuries’, in P. Linehan, *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of the Law. Studies on the Iberian Kingdoms and Papal Rome in Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 327–29. The laws themselves are to be found in PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 168–73.
7. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 163–64, 173; Diffie, *Prelude to Empire*, p. 31.
8. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 168–73; H. V. Livermore, *A History of Portugal* (Cambridge: CUP, 1974), p. 72.
9. PMH, *Leges et consuetudines*, pp. 178–79.
10. Shillington and Wallis Chapman, *The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal*, pp. 20–27; Y. Renouard, ‘Les Relations du Portugal avec Bordeaux et La Rochelle au Moyen-Age’, *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 6(1955), pp. 244–48;

- Marques, *Hansa e Portugal na Idade Média*, pp. 97–98, 130–31; and Odber de Baubeta, ‘Some early English sources’, pp. 205–07.
11. R. L. Wolff, ‘Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault, first Latin emperor of Constantinople: his life, death, and resurrection, 1172–1225’, *Speculum*, 27(1952), 281–322. For the marriage and subsequent events see Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, pp. 152–53 and Marques, *Hansa e Portugal na Idade Média*, pp. 97–98.
 12. *Genealogiae comitum Flandriae*, ed. D. L. C. Bethmann, MGH SS, vol. 9, p. 330; *Layettes du Trésor des Chartes*, eds A. Teulet, H.-F. Delaborde, and E. Berger, 5 vols (Paris, 1863–1909), vol. 1, 978–81, pp. 373–75; J. W. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus. Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 203–04.
 13. *Layettes du Trésor des Chartes*, vol. 5, 189, p. 66; Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, p. 152; see also J. Bradbury, *Philip Augustus. King of France 1180–1223* (London: Longman, 1998), pp. 285–86.
 14. Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, pp. 152–53; Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, pp. 211–13.
 15. Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, pp. 290–92.
 16. N. Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, in S. D. Church (ed.), *King John. New Interpretations* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), pp. 335–46; Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, pp. 292–93.
 17. Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, pp. 279–311.
 18. William the Breton, ‘Gesta Philippi Augusti’, *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton: historiens de Philippe-Auguste*, ed. H.-F. Delaborde, 2 vols (Paris: Societe de l’histoire de France, 1883–1885), vol. 1, 203, pp. 296–97.
 19. William the Breton, ‘Gesta’, vol. 1, 202, pp. 295–96; G. Duby, *The Legend of Bouvines: War, Religion and Culture in the Middle Ages*, trans. C. Tihanyi (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 31–32.
 20. Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, pp. 177–84.
 21. Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, p. 342.
 22. L. Cordeiro, *Berengela e Leonor, Rainhas da Dinamarca* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1984).
 23. S. Barton, ‘Traitors to the faith? Christian mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100–1300’, in R. Collins and A. Goodman (eds), *Medieval Spain, Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), p. 29; Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain*, vol. 2, pp. 26–31; M. T. N. Veloso, *D. Afonso II. Relações de Portugal com a Santa Sé durante o seu reinado* (Coimbra: Arquivo da Universidade, 2000), pp. 65–70.
 24. *Bulário*, pp. 315–17, 318–20; PL 216: 473–75.
 25. *Bulário*, pp. 330–31.
 26. *Bulário*, p. 332.
 27. P. Moraw, ‘Careers of graduates’, in W. Rüegg (ed.), *A History of the University in Europe*, 3 vols (Cambridge: CUP, 1992–2004), vol. 1, pp. 244–64; J. W. Baldwin, ‘*Studium et regnum*: the penetration of university personnel into French and English administration at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’, *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 44(1976), 199–215.
 28. Veloso, *Afonso II*, pp. 179–89.
 29. Barroca, *Epigrafia medieval portuguesa*, vol. 2:1, pp. 682–86; Veloso, *Afonso II*, pp. 187–95; Vilar, *Afonso II*, pp. 158–59.
 30. Antunes, ‘Conflitos políticos’, p. 48, n. 55, and p. 66, n. 120; Branco, ‘The king’s counsellors’ two faces’, pp. 524–28.

31. A. D. de Sousa Costa, *Mestre Silvestre e Mestre Vicente, juristas da contenda entre D. Afonso II e suas irmãs* (Braga: Franciscana, 1963), pp. 26–33.
32. Branco, 'The nobility of medieval Portugal', p. 235.
33. Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 52; Branco, 'The king's counsellors' two faces', pp. 526–27.
34. *Bulário*, pp. 331–42, 348–49, 376–78; PL 216: 855–56.
35. J. M. Powell, 'Innocent III and the crusade', in J. M. Powell (ed.), *Innocent III. Vicar of Christ or Lord of the World*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1994), pp. 121–34.
36. Eyewitness accounts include *Gosuini de expugnatione Salaciae carmen*, PMH, *Scriptores*, pp. 101–04; *Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum*, in *Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores*, ed. R. Röchricht (Geneva: Soc de l'Or. Lat., 1879), pp. 29–59; and *De itinere Frisonum*, in *Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores*, 59–71, also in 'Emonis et Menkonis Werumensis Chronica', ed. L. Weiland, MGH SS, vol. 23, pp. 478–83. For a brief overview of the operation see J. M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1986), pp. 124–27.
37. *Gosuini*, pp. 101–02a; *Gesta*, pp. 29–30; *De itinere*, pp. 59–62.
38. *Gosuini*, p. 202a; *Gesta*, pp. 30–31.
39. *De itinere*, p. 62.
40. *De itinere*, p. 63; Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, p. 125.
41. *Gosuini*, p. 103a–b; *Gesta*, p. 31; *De itinere*, pp. 62–63. The Rhinelanders noted with sullen satisfaction that several of the Frisian ships encountered the predicted adverse weather conditions and were forced to rejoin them at Alcácer anyway. *Gesta*, p. 31.
42. *De itinere*, p. 62; see also *Gesta*, p. 30. Also Lay, 'Miracles, martyrs and the cult of Henry', pp. 19–23.
43. *Gesta*, pp. 31–32 claims 4 kings and 100,000 soldiers; *Gosuini*, pp. 103 included only three kings and less than half as many troops.
44. *Gesta*, pp. 32–33; *Gosuini*, pp. 103–04.
45. *Gesta*, p. 33.
46. MGH, *Epistolae saeculi XIII*, eds G. Pertz and C. Rodenburg, 3 vols (Berlin, 1883–1894), no. 35, 36; *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, ed. P. Pressutti, 2 vols (Rome: Typographia Vaticana, 1888), vol. 1, 997, p. 170; vol. 1, 1027, p. 174; *Monumenta Henricina*, vol. 1, pp. 45–47.
47. Velar, *Afonso II*, pp. 131–13; R. P. de Azevedo, 'Primórdios da ordem militar de Évora', *Boletim da Junta Distrital de Évora*, 8(1967), 45–62. Afonso's initial grant to the order was to prove a significant one. The knights of Évora established Avis as their primary base of operations and eventually renamed the order to reflect this relocation.
48. *Bulário*, p. 332.
49. *Regesta Honorii*, 1, 990, p. 169; *Monumenta Henricina*, pp. 50–51.
50. Significantly, the inscription over Bishop Soeiro's tomb, preserved in a sixteenth-century transcript, highlighted his role in the conquest of Alcácer above all his other achievements. Barroca, *Epigrafia medieval portuguesa*, 2:1, pp. 745–49.
51. Vilar, *Afonso II*, pp. 165–66; R. P. de Azevedo, 'O livro da chancelaria de D. Afonso II de Portugal', *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 8(1967), 35–62.
52. PMH, *Inquisitiones*, pp. 1–287; Branco, 'The general laws of Afonso II', pp. 79–85.
53. Costa, *Mestre Silvestre e Mestre Vicente*, pp. 91–104; Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 62–73; Veloso, *Afonso II*, pp. 125–53.

54. *Regesta Honorii*, vol. 1, 1652, p. 275; *La Documentación pontificia de Honorio III (1216–1222)*, ed. D. Mansilla (Rome: Monumenta Hispaniae Vaticana, Sección Registros, 1965), 192, pp. 152–53.
55. *Regesta Honorii*, vol. 1, 2910, p. 480; *Documentación... Honorio III*, 343, pp. 253–56; Veloso, *Afonso II*, pp. 143–45.
56. Ironically, the identity of these loyal followers was recorded for posterity by the royal officials undertaking the very *Inquisitiones* in the Braga region that had provoked the confrontation. Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 2, pp. 294–95.
57. *Regesta Honorii*, vol. 1, 2905–06, 2919–22, pp. 479–80, 82; *Documentación... Honorio III*, 342, 346–49, 357, pp. 253, 257–60, 263–64. Also Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 68–69, n. 125.
58. *Documentación... Honorio III*, 343, pp. 253–56.
59. *Regesta Honorii*, vol. 1, 2911, pp. 480–81.
60. *Regesta Honorii*, vol. 1, 2917, p. 481.
61. Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', p. 169, n. 126.
62. *Regesta Honorii*, vol. 2, 4045–46, p. 81; *Documentación... Honorio III*, 407, p. 301.
63. *The Livro de Linhagens do Conde D. Pedro, Portugaliae Monumenta Historica, Nova Series*, ed. J. Mattoso and J. Piehl, 2 vols (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1980). 25G3; Herculano, *História de Portugal*, vol. 2, pp. 297–301; see also Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 71–73.
64. *Regesta Honorii*, vol. 2, 5135–57, p. 275; Veloso, *Afonso II*, pp. 143–50.

8 The Final Campaign: Sancho II, Afonso III and the Completion of the Reconquest in Portugal (1223–1250)

1. The exact date of Sancho's birth is unknown, but a comment in the agreement reached with the infantas in 1223 (see below, n. 3) records that the king was approaching his majority at that time. Afonso's will made careful provision for the succession should Sancho die without heirs. Veloso, *Afonso II*, pp. 282–84.
2. H. Fernandes, *D. Sancho II* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2006), pp. 125–27.
3. A. Costa, *Mestre Silvestre e Mestre Vicente*, pp. 130–32; Antunes, 'Conflitos políticos', pp. 25–160; Fr. A. Brandão, *Crônicas de D. Sancho II e D. Afonso III*, ed. A. de Magalhães Basto (Lisbon: Biblioteca Histórica, n.d.) pp. 345–51.
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57. Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', pp. 430–31.
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60. Serrão, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1, pp. 37–39. In fact, the status of the Algarve remained a point of friction between the kings of Portugal and León-Castile for much of Alfonso's reign, with violence flaring on the disputed border on several occasions. Ventura, *Afonso III*, pp. 138–48.
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Conclusion: The Reconquest Kings of Portugal

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Appendix: Portuguese Voices

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